The article is devoted to the presentation of the methodological foundations of the theory of multilevel competition and the justification of a set of new methods and coefficients for analyzing the level of competition in individual markets and in the market of multilevel competition as a whole (by the example of a two-level market). The necessity of forming such methodological foundations of the theory of multilevel competition is justified by an analysis of the axiomatic kernel of modern theory. This analysis showed that the axiomatics of the theory is outdated, requires careful adjustment, and the theory itself — its reorientation, taking into account the new achievements of economic science. The proposed approach is based on the consideration of a two-level market using the balance method. This method is generally a two-dimensional table for the production of goods and their distribution among intermediaries who act as buyers of goods in the B2B wholesale market and a two-dimensional table for the sale of goods by intermediaries in the B2C market to end-segmented consumers. Here the author provides a general conceptual approach to the analysis of multilevel competition, on the basis of which the structure of the market of each level is presented in a structured tabular form. On this basis, modernized and adapted concentration indices, used in competition theory to measure the level of competition, are proposed — three- and four-point concentration indices and the Herfindahl- Hirschman index. The directions of the further development of the tool base for analyzing the state of competition at each level of the multilevel market and in the multilevel market as a whole are shown. A general analytical economic and mathematical model of multilevel competition is proposed, on the basis of which the researcher can conclude that competition is in the multilevel market as a whole
M&A decisions are vital for long-term development of emerging market companies. Existing research pays little attention to studying structure of synergy and valuation of synergy in M&A deals, initiated by private companies.
Therefore, there are no inclusive methods exist to analyze different components of financial and operating synergy. This article aims to systematize existing literature about synergy and validate theoretical model suitable for synergy valuation in M&A deals in Russia. We also test several empirical hypotheses about synergy structure during growth and crisis periods on Russian M&A market.
In the introductory part of the article we discuss concept of synergy in M&A deals and types of synergy. In the second part we review academic literature related to valuation of different components of operating and financial synergy. In the third part we develop inclusive valuation method for five components of synergy. We formulate hypotheses and discuss data sample in part four. In part five we test hypotheses on empirical data using our model and discuss significant results.
This article may be useful for company management and investment analysis to estimate value of prospective M&A deals.
The paper studies the specific features of trade-off between type I and type II errors in vertical restraints regulation. It pays attention to possible deviations from trade-off logic due to separate consideration of enforcement errors and some imperfections of Russian legal rules. The game theoretic model which is discussed in the second part of the article can be useful for formal analysis of externalities created by the enforcement errors.
We consider the socio-economic phenomenon - patrimonial business networks that are prevalent in the domestic economy. It is shown that these networks are formed by entrepreneurs as protection from the external environment, primarily - from misconduct government representatives.
Rapid development of markets for experience and credence goods in XXI century has not yet been analyzed in Russian academical literature. Meanwhile these markets has institutionalized and changed organizational structure and rules of some markets, for instance, private tutors market (internet site www.repetitors.info) and home-rent market (internet site www.airbnb.com). In this article I analyze internet markets in context of assymetric information and adverse selection, comparing them to offline markets. Key thesis is that online markets without reputational mechanisms are less efficient compare to offline markets. I consider list of recent research of reputation on online markets which offer different mechanisms to avoid adverse selection on internet. I compare social interactions of consumers and web 2.0 (user-generated content) instruments. I conclude that online markets should help seller of experience good (or service) to build his reputation through stimulating his consumers to share information in their social accounts. In conclusion I suggest more directions for deeper analysis of these phenomena.
The urgent need to prepare the Russian version of Guidelines on vertical restraints (the analog of very detailed EU Guidelines) requires intense efforts. In particular, it is necessary to define and to describe many types of vertical restraints that are not mentioned in Russian antitrust law now (the list contains only the maximum/minimum resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, fixed payments for access to the distribution network). The first part of the article discusses the basic types of vertical restraints and their classification criteria used in theoretical literature. The second part of the article is dedicated to the description of vertical restraints mentioned in EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. This document pays attention not only to basic types of vertical restraints, but also to much more complicated distribution systems. In the third part of the article the possible classifications of these types of vertical restraints are considered. .
The urgent need to prepare the Russian version of Guidelines on vertical restraints (the analog of very detailed EU Guidelines) requires intense efforts. In particular, it is necessary to define and to describe many types of vertical restraints that are not mentioned in Russian antitrust law now (the list contains only the maximum/minimum resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, fixed payments for access to the distribution network). The first part of the article discusses the basic types of vertical restraints and their classification criteria used in theoretical literature. The second part of the article is dedicated to the description of vertical restraints mentioned in EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. This document pays attention not only to basic types of vertical restraints, but also to much more complicated distribution systems. In the third part of the article the possible classifications of these types of vertical restraints are considered.
This article analyzes the major trends in the consideration of the concept of specific investments, as a party receives the partner positive effects of their implementation have a significant impact on the possibility of further interaction. In modern literature, there is no single definition is not specific investments, in some works the notion of selfish-specific investments in other cooperative specific investments. It is therefore relevant to assess their effect on the behavior of the parties and the conclusions of the authors of contemporary works.
Please find below a short comment from me that I send to the readers. It all began when some people at an economic theory conference asked me to tell them about the status quo in the modern competition in politics. The question is nothing new and the reasons why it is asked are understandable enough. But given the venue where it was asked, it was naturally extended and finally looked like: If we take the concepts of healthy business competition and healthy competition in politics, can we establish a link between the two-' Frankly, I never thought about that. The reason for that is the fact that the legal regulation of the antimonopoly measures and the political pluralism policies regulation are the subject matters of two quite different specializations in the legal profession. Nevertheless, I made a mental note about the problem identified to me, and I started making real notes on paper on matters related to the theme. Then it suddenly turned out the idea to discuss the problem was in the air and the modern economic conditions really produced the question. Can we put an equality mark between the competition in politics and business competition- Is it true that political monopolies inevitably bring about more unhealthy competitive business practicesThe questions seem to be as pressing as the usual Russian questions Who is to blame- and What should be done- and the question of who would rule the country in the future. I understand that the problem cannot be examined from the point of view of a legal professional only as the problem is only partially legal. That is why I suggest a multidisciplinary discussion should be opened. As a specialist in the constitutional law that examines the legal regulation of the state power, I shall try and examine the problem from a legal specialist's point of view.
Abstract. Law «On protection of competition» adopted in 2006, changed the procedure of ex ante merger control in Russia substantially. Positive impact of the changes in law on economic efficiency seems to be at least twice as annual budget of Federal Antitrust Service. The treatment of group of economic entities as economic firm was apprehended by Russian business. At the same time ex ante merger control still suffer from path-dependency: the most striking is the system of behavioral remedies containing the elements of price regulation.