Critical notes concerning debatable or unfounded claims casting doubt on facts and formulas discovered by the author in a number of the demographic works of A.V. Korotaev and his coauthors devoted to demographic problems of modern Russia and published during the last 10 years.
Direct and indirect losses resulting from major conflicts significantly upset the natural reproduction of a given population and give rise to large - scale waves of migration. Estimating these losses remains a persistent task for demographers . An important source of information regarding the number of casualties of combat and one - sided violence is annually updated databases on armed conflicts. The article discusses data sources and evaluations of mortality due to organized collective violence. The trends in the number of armed conflicts of various types and of the death toll resulting from them for the period 1946-2015 are analyzed for the whole world and for the major regions, as well as the impact of losses in armed conflict on the population and its age and sex composition. From 1946 to 2015, the severity and bloodiness of armed conflicts declined, but since 2011 there has been a tendency towards an increase in the number of conflicts, as well as in the number of people killed in them. The number of internal armed conflicts, which then often develop into international ones with the participation of many countries, is increasing. So far, however, a comparison of the last quarter -century (the era after the Cold War), and the previous quarter -century indicates a reduction in the number of major armed conflicts involving the state and one -sided violence in the form of mass murder on ethnic and political grounds.
The first objective of this study was to provide an overview that briefly describes how modern research explains changes in matrimonial behavior in time and space (heterogeneity between European countries and within Russia). The second objective was to identify the main determinants of the choice of the first matrimonial union that function at macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. The third and main objective was to find an answer to the question of how changes in the matrimonial behavior of Russians are correlated with trends observed in other European countries. For this purpose, the second wave data of the international survey "Generation and Gender" and panel data of the Russian part of the same survey were employed. The analysis demonstrated that in Russia, changes typical for the unified social spaces of industrial and post-industrial societies are taking place: an increase in the number of partners over a lifetime, a gradual decrease in the proportion of people getting married, an increase in the share of single people, and a decrease in the number of second marriages. Intercountry differences in matrimonial behavior are explained by a country's historically formed type of marriage, the values profile of the population, and the family policy regime (macro-level). In Russia, as well as in other countries, the choice of first matrimonial event type is determined by the type of settlement (meso-level), age at the first union, conception preceding the union, the matrimonial experience of parents, the circumstances of leaving the parental home and entering the job market, and the level of education (micro-level).
The paper presents a modern methodology for estimating the impact of different age groups on the production and distribution of national income, called national transfer (generational) accounts. The human economic lifecycle is divided into stages defined by the ratio of labour income to consumption. In middle ages the gained income is higher than current consumption. The resulting surplus of resources is supposed to cover the income deficit in older and younger age groups. Estimates of the deficit or surplus at different ages are made for the Russian population for 2013 based on the results of age profiles taken from administrative sources and surveys. In the paper we also estimate the projected changes in the lifecycle deficit under different demographic development scenarios. Age profiles of labour income and consumption are used to calculate the effective economic support and the influence of demographic changes in Russia on economic growth rates in the near future.
The paper analyses the age structure of internal migration across Russian regions. We use data on the age of interregional migrants in the regions of Russia in 2011-2015 given for one-year age groups and data on the population size of the Russian regions by one-year age groups. The regions were grouped into clusters (by the ratio of arrivals/departures per age group to the total number of migrants) using the method of k-means clustering with SPSS. The results of the analysis indicate that, as in other countries, the peak of migration is observed at young ages, which is explained by mass enrollment of school graduates in institutions of higher education. As people become older, their migration activity declines. In some cases, regions experience another migration peak in young old age groups: after retirement, people may move to a place more appropriate for 50-60-year-olds or return to their previous place of residence. The analysis also revealed significant variations in age patterns of interregional migration, both for inflows (arrivals) and outflows (departures). These differences mainly concern the level of the migration peak at young ages and the presence of additional migration peaks at other ages.
There are long-standing concerns over low fertility levels in Europe and an increasingly important debate on the extent to which migration can compensate for below-replacement fertility. To inform this debate, a wide array of indicators have been developed to assess the joint influence of fertility, mortality, and migration on birth replacement and intergenerational replacement. These indicators are based on various models and assumptions and some are particularly data demanding. In this article we propose a simple method to assess how far migration alters the extent of replacement for a birth cohort as it ages. We term the measure the overall replacement ratio (ORR). It is calculated by taking the size of a female birth cohort at selected ages divided by the average size of the cohorts of mothers in the year of birth. We present estimates of the ORR for a range of European countries representing different replacement regimes. We demonstrate that for many countries net migration has become a key factor in their population trends during the last few decades.
The paper traces the history of the three population microcensuses held in Russia in 1985, 1994 and 2015, highlighting their methodological, technological and perational aspects, as well the questionnaire’s design. Given that the microcensuses provide more data in terms of new topics than conventional decennial population and housing censuses, this article focuses on the main research findings based on microcensus data. A closer look is taken at the 2015 population microcensus, as it has peculiarities in terms of sample size and design, as well as at the content of the census questionnaires. Deviations of the regional-territorial structure of the sample from the permanent population of Russia are revealed.It is shown that the representativeness of the data for the whole country is distorted, and the socio-demographic and geographical characteristics of the population are also biased due to the considerable variability of the sample size by regions of Russia. A comparison of the size and structure of the population according to the 2015 microcensus with data from vital statistics and population censuses, together with an estimate of age heaping, indicates serious problems with the data quality of the microcensus and the presence of typical errors common to conventional population censuses. Attention is focused on a shifting of the age structure of the population to older ages according to the 2015 microcensus, which could affect figures on education, economic activity, morbidity, disability, the demographic composition of households and other variables closely related with age.
The Institute of Demography of The Higher School of Economics annually prepares a detailed scientific report on the demographic changes in Russia in the previous year. However, due to the fact that the work on the full report, including its publication, takes a long time, we are publishing in this issue a short express version of the report that gives an overview of the main results of Russian demographic development in 2013.
Alexander Kulischer [Alexandre Koulicher] (1890-1942), a former professor at Petrograd University (St. Petersburg, Russia), who emigrated to France after the Russian Revolution of October 1917, may be considered one of the pioneers of the theory of demographic transition. However, his contribution to the development of this theory has gone almost unnoticed and underrated. This article presents the intellectual biography of Alexander Kulischer, and it analyzes his views on the demographic transition (demographic revolution), as he expressed them in his publications in German and in French in the early 1930s. Two of these forgotten publications written in French are republished (in the language of the original and in Russian translation) in the appendix to the article.
This article is devoted to the dynamics of the mean age of child-bearing in Dagestan, an indicator which has differed significantly from the overall Russian trend within the last decade. The paper is based both on data from official sources and preliminary results from field research conducted by the authors in the rural areas of Dagestan. The data from both sources strongly supports the idea of a decrease in the childbearing age in the republic both for the mean age of childbearing (MAB) without parities and for the mean age of childbearing at first and second births.
The existing literature highlights, among others, two main factors inhibiting the increase of the MAB usually expected with a decrease of the total fertility rate. These are, first of all, the important role of religion (mainly Islam) in the society, and secondly, the “patriarchal” structure of the family. Our preliminary results lead us to the conclusion that the first factor is more important.
The last few years have seen a significant growth of interest in UN population projections. The latest such projection made by the UN Population Division was published in 2017, and is, on the whole, in agreement both with previous UN projections and projections conducted by other institutions. According to the 2017 Revision, world population size will reach 9.772 billion persons in 2050 and 11.184 billion in 2100. However, these dry figures themselves cannot explain the appearance of harsh criticism of these projections. This paper aims to get a better grip on the real reason for this criticism – the new methods used in these projections and their significant reworking, or the results themselves. For this purpose, an analysis is made of the recent UN projections, their methods, the data used, and the results of projections made in the last 15 years. Shortcomings of the UN projections are discussed, as well as the limitations and conditionality of their possible use. It is shown that among the possible reasons for an increase in projected world population, the most significant ones include: 1) the overestimate of projected infant and child mortality in previous projections, and 2) the underestimate of the rate of fertility decline in several African countries. It is argued that short-term population projections should be trusted and may be used for practical purposes, while the conditionality of applying long-term projections, for which there are multiple possible unpredictable factors of future demographic development, significantly reduces their precision. For particular countries, a great uncertainty of long-term projection may be caused by a sharp change in population policy or sociopolitical organization. This is illustrated by examples for several countries.
Preserving and strengthening the health of population is designated by the development priorities in the State program "Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020". The article attempts to assess trends in life expectancy, mortality from the main causes of death and infant mortality in one of the largest regions of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation - the Arkhangelsk region. It also presents the differentiation of mortality from the main groups of causes of death, including cardiovascular diseases (CVD), neoplasms, external causes, diseases of the respiratory and digestive systems, infectious diseases and some other causes in Arkhangelsk, Severodvinsk and other cities and rural areas. The analysis is based on the standardized death rate (SDR) by causes of death.
The mortality rate in the Arkhangelsk region is higher than the average Russian indicators, especially for men. The lowest mortality is observed in Arkhangelsk and Severodvinsk, slightly higher in medium and small cities and significantly higher in rural areas.
The structure of causes of death in all groups of settlements is more than 80% determined by CVD, neoplasms and external causes, but there is a small decrease in the proportion of CVD and external causes and a more significant increase in neoplasms. Arkhangelsk is characterized by a higher level of SDR from malignant tumors. Mortality from external causes is characterized by significant differentiation by groups of settlements. However, SDR from accidental alcohol poisoning in all groups is on the same level
Moscow is the region with the highest life expectancy in Russia. The country’s largest city, it has high incomes, a special population structure and a high concentration of all resources, including in the healthcare sector, which is given special attention by the city authorities. In some periods, the changes in life expectancy in Moscow have been unique compared to most other regions of Russia. The difference in life expectancy between Moscow and Russia in the period from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was mainly due to lower mortality in middle age. Since the mid-2000s, the main contribution to the difference in life expectancy has been shifting to old age mortality. Given the overall rapid decline of mortality in Moscow since then, changes in the mortality rates and life expectancy of certain age groups seem implausible. The quality of population and mortality data has a significant impact on the accuracy of estimates of mortality indicators and requires special attention in the case of Moscow. In particular, the number of people at advanced ages in Moscow is likely to be overestimated, which affects mortality rates in this age group. Peculiarities of mortality by causes of death in Moscow generally correspond to the average Russian trends; however, in Moscow a more rapid decrease in mortality from neoplasms is observed, as well as more realistic age-specific death rates in older age groups.
The article aims to evaluate the possible motivational potential (in terms of having more children than planned) of various measures of family policy listed in the questionnaire of the Russian Microcensus-2015. During the last several decades, fertility in Russia has been below the level of simple reproduction. The state, starting in 2005, has expressed an interest in finding effective measures to raise fertility in the country. The latest Microcensus had, among other objectives, the goal of “testing” the attractiveness of different policy measures for the general population. These included both already existing policies (federal and regional “maternity capitals”, land grants) and those which were hypothetical at the moment (prolongation of paid childcare leave until the child reaches the age of three, a guaranteed place in kindergarten, benefits equal to the cost of living for every child starting from the third, tax benefits, flexible working hours/work from home, and interest-free loans for the purchase of housing).
This paper aims to estimate the cancer mortality and morbidity derivatives for the Russian population given the limited access to medical and demographic data. The multiple decrement life table method also known as the population model of cancer was originally proposed by J. Duchêne and makes it possible to assess otherwise inaccessible indicators, such as the prevalence of cancer in the Russian population. Applying this model to the publicly available data on cancer mortality and morbidity, we were able to estimate the following indicators for the Russian population: average age at malignant neoplasms (MN) diagnosis, the average duration of disease, the prevalence of MN, and an average age at death from MN. We aimed to determine whether the prevalence of MN is increasing in the Russian Federation and whether this growth is occurring due to the expansion of morbidity.
It was found that the average age at cancer diagnosis, along with the average age at death from cancer, is increasing in the Russian population, with the primacy of the latter. These processes are in turn resulting in an increase of the average number of years lived with cancer, hence justifying the claim for an expansion of morbidity. This phenomenon, along with the increase in the incidence of MN, is the cause of the increase in MN prevalence in Russia.
Localizations with the highest and lowest MN prevalence were identified, as well as localizations for which the expansion of morbidity phenomenon does not occur. It was found that in Russia the general trend is for the expansion of morbidity, expressed in an increase in the number of years lived in an imperfect health condition. MN of the lip, oral cavity and oesophagus (C00 - C15) in women is the only localization for which this phenomenon is not observed. This localization is the only exception to the otherwise observed expansion of morbidity. The main limitations and drawbacks of the study are discussed in a separate section.
Population ageing is forcing researchers throughout the world to study more closely the economic activity of pensioners. In Russia in the last few years pensioner employment has demonstrated significant growth, while economic activity of the working age population has remained stable. This fact requires further investigation. One of the sources that can shed light on the trends in pensioners’ employment activity is data from The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE). In this paper we use data from the Russian Statistical Office (Rosstat) and RLMS-HSE to analyze the trends of older people’s employment activity from the statutory age of retirement (55 for women and 60 for men) until age 70. We show that the recent increase in economic activity was typical for Russian pensioners of all age groups, but the highest growth was recorded for females 60-64 years old. The paper also reveals that among all working pensioners the share of those employed in education, healthcare, science, housing services, The ministry of internal affairs and the military-industrial sector – economic sectors where the role of the state is predominant – has increased for the period under review. Hence the most popular career options for those working at pension age are either to keep their previous job in the above-mentioned industries, or to change jobs, often for a less demanding position and/or informal employment. Unlike developed countries, the increase of economic activity of Russian pensioners has not been driven by increased flexibility of the labor market. Neither the share of self-employed nor the share of part-time employed pensioners increased in the period under study.
More than half of all deaths in Russia in 2011-2014 were subjected to pathologic or forensic autopsy, as a result of which the cause of death was not identified for 3.8 percent of the cases. More than 147,000 unproductive autopsies which left the cause of death unknown were carried out. Such a large number of cases cannot be explained by the state of the cadavers at the moment of the autopsy. Another 161,000 deaths (4.1% of autopsies) were classified as events of undetermined intent. This paper attempts to find a rational explanation for such a high proportion of uncertain autopsy conclusions concerning the cause of death. The methods applied include an analysis at the macro-level (regions), with the help of factor analysis and clustering techniques, and multinomial logistic regression at the micro-level, using anonymous individual records. The study is based entirely on Russian state statistics data. There are large interregional differences in the practices of determining the cause of death based on autopsy. Practices of diagnosing external causes also vary greatly by region. In regions where the proportion of unspecified causes is higher, the share of events of undetermined intent is also higher. These differences are not connected with the peculiarities of mortality in each region. The analysis suggests that the large number of cases in which the cause of death remains unknown after an autopsy is due to the lack of incentives to clarify the cause of death after the issuance of the preliminary medical death certificate. Moreover, the existing system of relations between forensic bureaus and law-enforcement agencies makes no provision for apprising forensics experts of the final conclusions concerning the external causes of death. From 2011 to 2014 the number of forensic autopsies of persons who had died from disease increased by 20 percent, but there are doubts that the information obtained as a result of the autopsies is effectively used by the health care system.
Using two representative for Russia surveys (“Person, Family, Society” for research models building and “RLMS-HSE” for auxiliary, descriptive analysis), we analyzed the differences in the life courses of Russian men who served and did not serve in the army. For these two groups of men, we compared the ages and sequences of the most important starting events (separation from parental home, first job, obtaining an education of highest level, first cohabitation, first marriage, and first child). We constructed socio-demographic events for these men at the age of 15 and at the moment of the survey “Person, Family, Society).
Our results revealed that the ones who served in the military have more socio-economic and demographic events than those who avoided military service: men with military experience start adult life earlier and more intensively. The mechanism of the selection to the military services changed: since the 1990s, served men are mainly children of parents who did not get higher education and did not occupy senior positions in the period of their children socialization. After dismissal from military service, men often work and live separately, while avoided the army study and live with parents.