This article seeks to reveal the role of compliance in the functioning of the European Union as a system of multi-level governance and to observe the factors determining the differentiation of EU member states by the level of compliance with the European Union law. In order to determine the degree of compliance of a state with the EU law, it is necessary to concentrate on three main stages of compliance: (1) transposition of the norm, (2) implementation of the norm and (3) application of the norm. We conclude that, within the framework of the compliance process, member states and institutions of the European Union, primarily the European Commission, participate in a “two-level game”, in which they evaluate the gains and costs of choosing one or another strategy associated with three stages of compliance. EU countries choose between three compliance strategies: (1) unconditional compliance, (2) negotiation of better compliance conditions, and (3) ignoring the normative requirements for the longest possible period of time. In turn, supranational regulators, in their attempts to combat violations of the EU law, choose between the “soft” instruments of enforcement to compliance and the “hard” instrument of infringement. The choice of compliance strategies at the lower (national) level of power is determined by the following factors: (1) the level of economic development of the state, (2) the influence and role of the state within the framework of EU institutions, (3) the strength of the administrative apparatus of the state, (4) the coalition potential of the state and (5) legal fit. Thus, some states violate the EU law intentionally (voluntary non-compliance), while the difficulties of the compliance process for other countries are determined by objective reasons of a socio-economic nature (involuntary non-compliance). In turn, the supranational level of the “two-level game” when choosing a compliance strategy is guided by both administrative and reputational motives.
The article analyzes China’s attempts to confront the EU’s normative power by the example of Italy joining the “Belt and Road Initiative” on March 23, 2019. The author claims that the signing of a memorandum of cooperation between Italy and China was not so much economic as political for both countries and for the European Union as a whole, which was the reason for the public criticism from Brussels of the actions of the Italian leadership. The author concludes that the political significance of the event for China lies in an attempt to publicly “overcome” the EU normative power, and for Italy, in an effort to uphold the principle of national sovereignty and position itself as an actor within the European Union, capable of influencing the process of formation of the EU normative power in interaction with third countries. At the same time, the case of Italy demonstrates that in opposing the EU normative power, the PRC uses a certain discursive strategy, which is to form a social network of trust within the country and increase the amount of social capital to a level that can influence the political decision-making process. The Italian “government of change” in this case turned out to be the most “convenient” partner, since from the very beginning it has built conflict discourse with Brussels, upholding the principle of national sovereignty in foreign and domestic policy, and thereby undermining the effectiveness of the EU normative power. Thus, the signing of the memorandum reveals the weakening of the normative force of the European Union, the effectiveness of which is being questioned not only by the “new” EU members, but also by the political leadership of one of the founding states of the Union. This reflects a very real risk that the development of the ideas of “sovereignty” can harm the EU’s international activity
This article is dedicated to three interconnected concepts – “collective goods”, “free rider” and “hegemony” in the context of modern politics. We analyze three theoretical approaches to the problem of provision of collective goods by hegemonic states. These approaches are: neoliberal, (neo) realist and World-System Theory. Basing on these theoretical premises, we analyze the debate about free-ridng in the Western political discourse (especially among US allies) and we point out that particular interests of US can be disguised as “collective goods”. Basing on this, we analyze discussions about free-riding both in the Western world (among NATO and EU members) and among US allies in the Pacific region (Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand). We point out that in fact US can use the concept of collective goods to push their own agenda. Than we move to popular in western political science idea that China is a global free rider – for instance in the sphere of sea lane security and global energy security. Basing on A. Kennedy works, we demonstrate that China in fact does not wish to make western powers pay the costs of collective goods. China is rather afraid that western powers will exploit his resources. This idea is supported with the evidence, gathered during in-depth interview with Chinese diplomats and foreign policy experts. Having said that, paper points out that mentioned cases mark the importance of the concept of trust. Trust is well-studied in the field of behavioral economics, but IR theory doesn`t usually takes the concept of trust into account. Also this paper raises a question about including historical and cultural topics in the theory of international relations. Basing on analysis of different ways to incorporate economic arguments in IR theory, authors point out that modern IR theory lacks economic argumentation. Paper concludes with the idea that IR theory should capitalize on behavioral economics
The role and importance of the complementary currencies circulating in different countries over the world are under consideration.
Recently Chinese IR scholars have been debating the need to create their own original theory of international
relations, which is traditionally dominated by Western scholars. One of the key contributors to the ongoing debate
is Yan Xuetong, the professor of Tsinghua University. In 2005 he started a research project, which aim was to
enrich international relations with non-Western thought and historical experience. He analyzed Chinese classical
texts from the Pre-Qin era and evaluated their applicability to the analysis of modern international relations. In
2014 he formulated the theory of moral realism, which combined main assumptions of realism with new concepts
derived from the ancient Chinese thought. The main goal of the theory and related research questions is to provide
an alternative explanation of China’s rise and the future of the world order. In this article, the authors analyse
the key concepts of the theory presented in different publications of Yan Xuetong: morality, political strength,
power, types of leadership and types of major power. The key concept of the theory is morality, which is borrowed
from the ancient Chinese philosophy. Moral behaviour in domestic and international politics increases strength
and comprehensive power of a state on the international arena, while moral qualities of the major power shape the
world order and determine international stability. The authors examine practical recommendations built upon the
moral realism theory that Yan Xuetong gives to the Chinese leadership. From a scientific point of view, the theory
is criticized for the lack of clear definitions, for contradictions and biases, but it is valuable because it reflects the
The article aims to conceptualize the economic model of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), to fi nd similarities with the European Union single market model, to identify critical remarks on the part of the EU, to estimate the perspectives of integration in a wide space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, Astana and Bishkek. The author comes to the following conclusions. 1) The EAEU complies with canons formed by the EU and is being built with due regard to the European integration experience. The common external tariff, the “four freedoms” of the internal market and principles of its organization – the prohibition of discrimination, harmonization, mutual recognition of standards, conformity mark, common sectoral policies, logic of neofunctionalism – all these regulation elements are present in both models. 2) Russia considers cooperation with the EU as positive, because it has gained regulation methods for the traditionally controlled market and strengthened its global position due to this cooperation. 3) The EU makes a signifi cant indirect impact on the Eurasian integration through criticism and expansion of peculiar approaches. Part of the criticism is of temporary or politicized character. 4) The EAEU has a strong starting idea – common history, common genetics and the need to preserve achievements in exploration and development of the vast Eurasian space. 5) An opportunity for interaction between the EU and the EAEU derives from the convergence of regulatory systems. However, high degree of state participation in economies of the EAEU countries, which distinguishes the Eurasian model from the European one and has become an irritant in the EU–EAEU relations, will continue to hinder “the integration of integrations”.
Review of the book: Optimization of Investment Ties of Modern Russia / A.V. Kuznetsov, ed. Moscow, IMEMO, 2016. 120 p.
The article is a pilot holistic study in Russian academia of foreign-funded banks operating or targeting Central Asian region and looks into the effect of exogenous and endogenous risks on banking performance and on regional banking sector at large. It is found that internationalization of banking regulation and supervision positively affects foreign-funded banks regardless of their size, country of origin, and local market experience. Identified risks further systematized through economic and legal domains that allowed understand the key characteristics of alien banks’ effective performance in Central Asia.
The article analyzes the role of the institution of elections in the legitimation of public authority, depending on the type of the ruling political regime. The distribution of government forms in modern states allows us to conclude that in the overwhelming majority of states, the institution of elections is called upon to play the determining role in the typology of public power legitimation. In each specific state, the real typology of public power legitimation is dictated by the way this institution is implemented in the political practice of the given state. In states with ruling regimes of minimal electoral and more developed forms of democracy, honest, free and competitive elections serve as a key mechanism for ensuring the democratic rational and legal legitimacy of public authority. In constitutional monarchies belonging to this cluster of states, along with democratic rational legal legitimacy, traditional legiti- macy takes place, the mechanism of which is a constitutionally established order of succession to the throne. This legitimization does not correlate with that of the imperiously-compulsory powers of public authority, but has the character of their moral and ethical legitimation in the context of historical traditions and experience of this state. In non-democratic states with authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes of dictatorial type, the institution of elections is deliberately deformed by distorting the legal basis of electoral legislation and using electoral corrup- tion in the process of election campaigns. In such states, elections are transformed into measures of plebiscitary legitimization with a simulation of competitiveness that imitate the rational and legal public authority legitimation. There are also such types of legitimization as charismatic, created with the use of technologies of mass consciou- sness manipulation and propaganda, and ideological, constructed on the basis of this or that ideology of etatism with nationalistic coloring, which play an important role in achieving the results of measures for their plebiscitary legitimization that simulate competitive elections.