The paper focuses on the paradox embedded in conceptual logics of the Left and Right thought, that is the semantic amalgam of the concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy. Through the conceptual deconstruction of Carl Schmitt and Michelle Foucault theories we demonstrate the actual identification of sovereignty and legitimacy in political discourse. Since this identification forms the international legal framework, we perceive the power as legitimate one by recognizing the sovereignty. We reveal the similarities in power’s perception and conceptualization of the most radical representatives of the Right and Left political thought and explain it through the merge of legal and sacral in concept of sovereignty and perception of the power’s technic as independent political value.
The heterogeneity of the cybernetics movement, its blurred boundaries, its deep penetration into the scientific, cultural, political and religious institutions of different national communities — all these provide an opening for broadly different approaches to describing the cybernetics movement. Cybernetics was equally attractive to irreconcilable opponents — atheists and clerics, scientists and mystics, Communists and Liberals, cultural figures and counterculture activists. Any study, social or intellectual, of such heterogeneous movements requires simplification of that complexity. e main goal of the article is to find a basic unity that runs through the cultural, social, doctrinal, and institutional diversity of the cybernetics movement. e unifying feature had to meet three requirements: first, the starting point of the analysis should be the original problem that cybernetics addresses throughout its history to date; second, this problem must have a certain degree of universality, that is, its significance must be more than theoretical or applied so that it somehow resonates with philosophy, psychology, and with cultural, political or ideological forms of thought; third, the problem must be relevant in the context of current polemics.
The distinction between analog and digital proved to be a convenient conceptual tool for drawing a sharp outline around cybernetics. e article does not attempt to provide a coherent treatment of its history but instead consists of several fragmentary ideas that are relevant to the history of cybernetics. It is also an experiment to show the potential of that approach. e main thesis presented is that an under- standing of the history of the cybernetics movement can be systematic and productive when based on the analysis of the key cybernetic distinction between analog and digital. This approach reveals important shared problematics and genetic kinship in seemingly incompatible doctrines that make use of cybernetics (Wiener, Shannon) and post-structuralism (Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze).
The main thesis of the article is that revolution and corruption are structurally and genetically related to the process of state building (étatisation). Basing itself on Michael Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas on the state, the article demonstrates that revolution and anti-corruption agitation are derived from a “normative pressure”, resulting from the generalization of the fiction of raison d’Etat. In the conclusion of the article this thesis is considered in the context of recent protest movements in the US and Russia which impose a demand on the “new norm”. The fact that the normative initiative walked away from the governments to protest movements suggests that current models of political representation are undergoing a deep crisis.
The article analyses the term “meme”, its history, ideological and theoretical background. The article aims at revealing the meaning of the term in different scientific and philosophical interpretations.
Meme was introduced by Richard Dawkins who tried to embed culture into his theory of gene evolution. Hence its meaning was similar to “gene” in Dawkins interpretation. The term became popular in research culture, popular science, and common sense. It is often used to describe the online phenomena of quickly spread funny pictures and phrases.
The scientific use of the term supposes a specific ideological background. It is atheistic, technocratic, media-oriented and sets human being as a prosumer. This approach did not develop richly in scientific fields of anthropology or sociology. However it became widely used in research related to contagious news or messages diffusion.
The article claims that meme popularity is an attempt to conceptualize text and context in a new way stressing pragmatic aspects of messages exchange. The process inherits McLuhan and other media theorists idea of communication leading role. The content of memes is similar to what Claude Levi-Strauss named “bricolage” and the social situation refers to Benjamin mechanical reproduction.
Finally the meme is compared to theories of popularity and celebrity and recognized as a conceptual language to describe the practice of consumption that is close to production. The key feature of meme in this context is that it does not produce new meanings and only reproduces the old ones.
The purpose of this essay is to explore the prospects for the use and development of Thompson Clarke’s ideas from his well-known paper, “The Legacy of Skepticism.” The paper is particularly concerned with Clarke’s criticism of the so-called “standard human-conceptual constitution,” which provides a ground for the distinction between plain questions of ordinary life and a philosophical intellectual quest. In support of Clarke’s criticism, it is compared to Donald Davidson’s criticism of scheme-content dualism. Moreover, the paper provides an assessment of G. E. Moore’s arguments against philosophical skepticism, which can be applied to a critical study of metaphysical preconditions in contemporary epistemology and for elaborating on the extended conception of “ordinary.” The main conclusion of the paper is that skepticism, being the logical result of these preconditions, mostly depends on the distinction between pure logical and epistemological possibilities, which is presupposed by the very idea of a conceptual scheme. This distinction is the basis for drawing radical and intuitive skeptical conclusions.