Proceeding from a fragment of Vasily Rozanov about astronomy, Auguste Comte and horoscopes, our study clarifies the complex ideological relationship between astronomy and astrology in intellectual culture of the turn of the XIX – XX centuries. Both these disciplines were closely related with positivism: the main goal of science— the search for scientific laws — was identified as a key element of positive philosophy. For Auguste Comte and his followers, astronomy became a model of the most advanced positive science. On the one hand, the concept of immutable laws of nature was developed in astronomy. On the other hand, the success of astronomy predetermined the positivists’ interest in astrology, and not only from a critical point of view. Astrology was considered, first of all, as human knowledge stage of development, closely related to the gradual progress in understanding the laws of history, which was reflected in the growth of interest in the history of astrology in the late XIX – early XX centuries. In this article, we will try to determine the historical logic that connects positivism, astronomy, and astrology (which prima facie may not be completely obvious for the modern reader) at the turn of the XX century. We reconstruct the growing historical interest in astrology by analyzing positivist sources, which are the key to the interpretation of astrological texts through intellectual language at the turn of the XX century, which allows us to discover one of the problem fields in which astrology was involved. The starting point of our research will be Vasily Rozanov’s book “The Apocalypse of Our Time”, which is a synthesis of positivist moods and interest in astrology, the explanatory potential of which is combined with the apocalyptic expectations of the beginning of the last century.
This paper examines the conceptual transformations of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of death in Vladimir Bibikhin’s philosophy. For this purpose, the author analyzes Bibikhin’s phenomenology of death in the context of the ontology of time worked out in Bibikhin’s lectures “(It’s) Time.” The key difference between Bibikhin’s ontology and the one from “Being and Time” is the approximation of the past and the future in “(It’s) Time” based on Bibikhin’s interpretation of these tenses as the restrictions of human activity. The limit of this activity is death, in which, according to Bibikhin, “I will not be able to do anything.” Moreover, Bibikhin pulls together death and childhood memories as well as Heideggerian concepts of understanding and mood. This trends are most noticeable in the “Early Heidegger” workshop, in which Bibikhin uses certain excerpts from Heidegger’s works to ground the concept of death as impossibility of action. The comparison of Bibikhin and Kojève’s phenomenology of death shows that Bibikhin eliminates the reference to non-being from the concept of death. Nevertheless, Bibikhin’s thought continues some patterns of Heidegger and Kojève’s atheistic phenomenology. For instance, Bibikhin reduces the transcendence to the existential modes, in which it can be given. Therefore, Bibikhin in several cases describes the death not in philosophical, but in religious terms.
Abstract: This paper examines one attribute of the active intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός) — ἕξις (disposition, quality). In “De Anima” (III.) Aristotle characterizes νοῦς ποιητικός “as a kind of disposition (ὡς ἕξις τις), like light.” Why does Aristotle call the active intellect ἕξις? There are two difficulties here. () If ἕξις is some sort of quality or property (as it is sometimes taken to be), how can it be “unmixed, separated, eternal and immortal”, as Aristotle further characterizes it? () The second difficulty concerns the Aristotelian comparison of the active intellect with the light. Though it is often considered to be a simple figure of speech, I contend that Aristotle’s comparison between the active intellect and the light is not a mere metaphor. Since the light and the active intellect are “some ἕξις”, the clarification of the phenomenon of light may help to clarify what active intellect is.
In my little reflection on the explanation of the article by Julia Gorbatova, I share some thoughts about the nature of unspeakable as the main property of what could be called the main interest of philosophy. I try to show that philosophy is the type of thinking that is always directed at unspeakable. The text shows that philosophical ineffability, which philosophers often refer to as the special term "transcendental" resists mystical, "transcendent" ineffability. If the second is hidden "outside of us", the first one is hidden "inside of us". Philosophy is interested in something that is not represented in the world such as objects and phenomena. It is directed to non-existent (non – objective), which is before any existence. It makes something as an existent, though never meets in it, due to it is not an entity, essence or the object.
The seventh lecture of Juan Donoso Cortes from the series "Lectures on Political Law" delivered at the Madrid Ateneo on January 24, 1837.
REVIEW OF A BOOK: CHURCH, D. 2021. POST-HORROR: ART, GENRE, AND CULTURAL ELEVATION. EDINBURGH: EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS
The article is devoted to the role and place of neuroethics in national and international projects for the study of the human brain. The work deals exclusively with those projects that have chosen the using of complex systemic multifactor models of the brain and nervous system as the main method of research, the coordinated work of which is provided by the large computing resources of hardware and software systems and is implemented in a series of computer simulations of the neurophysiological, neurobiological and neuropsychological processes of a living organism, including human. Such projects declare the widest range of solutions to the problems associated with the study of the brain: from studies the characteristics of the transmission of electrical signals between the synapses of neurons to research in the field of the emergence, functioning and development of such higher functions of the brain as intelligence and consciousness.
The final part of the article is devoted to the correctness of the neurophilosophical concept of the origin and functioning of consciousness and intelligence on the principles of a neuromorphic nature, namely, the possibility of interpreting the phenomenon of the emergence of consciousness as the highest form of nervous activity and its further development, based on natural science laws embedded in the biological structure of the brain and nervous system. Which means, in the case of understanding and further creation of technologies for reproducing such laws, the real possibility of obtaining artificial intelligence and consciousness without reference to living organisms, in particular to humans. The author questions this view of the nature of consciousness in the course of a thought experiment, which is based on arguments from the subject area of computer simulations, and also assumes the brain as a complex computer system, similar to existing supercomputers, but from the point of view of architecture and software arranged and functioning according to more complex algorithms.
This article examines and defends the principle of distrust to thoughts (pomysly).According to this principle, it is morally justifable for the agent to ignore any evidence forsome belief if he has sufcient evidence that this belief will cause him to act in a morallywrong way. To justify this principle I employ a number of ideas developed in Wittgenstein’s“On certainty”. In the frst section, I sketch the account of knowledge and belief from “OnCertainty” and narrow the scope of my defense of the principle of distrust to the particularsystem of beliefs, namely the beliefs of Orthodox Christianity. In the second section, I showa variety of senses of the word “pomysel” in Synodal Bible Translation and explain the relevantsense of “pomysel” using the vocabulary of analytic philosophy. In the third section, I discussa number of basic beliefs of Orthodox Christianity that substantiate the principle of distrust:the belief in God and his angels, the belief in original sin, the belief in the existence of passionsin the human soul, the belief on the existence of evil demons that try to manipulate the agentby generating thoughts in his consciousness. These beliefs are discussed and explained in thecontext of the principle of distrust. In the fourth section, I defend the principle of distrust andshow its superiority to the other Cliﬀord’s principle formulated by P. van Inwagen. Finally, inthe ffth section, I provide a reader with a brief thought experiment involving good and evilneuroscientists in order to illustrate the meaning of the principle of distrust in naturalisticsystem of beliefs.
Two main discourses of participation used by Origenes— natural participation (N) and individual participation (I) — are identified in this article. N refers to participation of the beings of the created world in the divinity according to their natural capacities, or to participation of the beings of the material world in the principles and logoi of the intellectual world according to the natural qualities of the beings. This type of participation is employed when Origenes addresses the relationship between the Persons of the Holy Trinity, or the connection of the humans with God. Having analyzed these discourses in Origenes, the author identifies four subtypes in N and two subtypes in I. First subtype of N indicates the order in the participation of species of the created beings in the Persons of the Holy Trinity. According to the second subtype of N, all created beings naturally participate in the logoi contained in the Logos-Wisdom. The third subtype is associated with the natural capacity of all intellectual beings to participate in the divine substance (the union with God). According to the fourth subtype, all humans naturally participate in the capacity of reasoning which constitutes the human nature.
Author's response to the reviewers of the book "Political form and political evil"
The article examines the place of the concepts revolution and reform in the political discourse in the first years of the Great reforms in Russia. Revolution was considered as a worst case scenario, so the menace of it was an effective argument against one or another decision or policy from the moment the concept had appeared in s. The paper shows that the situation changed to some extent at the beginning of Alexander II’s reign. Menace [ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ] АНДРЕЙ ИЛЬИН [ of revolution was used at that time in order to justify reforms. Those who spoke on behalf of the government referred to the possible revolutions; their opponents spoke about revolutions, intending to exert pressure on the statesmen and to promote their own ideas and plans. It was acknowledged that revolution and reform had common goals. Although the concepts were opposites in many ways, revolution and reform, they were starting to drift together. Conception of revolution from above developed by the leftist journalists such as A. I. Herzen or N. P. Ogarev was a vivid manifestation of this trend. It meant that transformations carried out by authorities had to be fundamental, meet the people’s interests and require its participation. Yet, these tendencies were not sustainable. The article concludes that semantic experiments and convergence at the beginning of the Great Reforms were connected with the ambiguity of the government’s status in emerging circumstances and also with the unsettled character of the public sphere. An opposition between revolution and reform became more and more apparent during the 1860s. Conception of revolution from above was abandoned by the leftist authors. Revolution and reform became tools for political demarcation between the revolutionary movement and liberal supporters of the government. Revolution lost its previous role, but found a new legitimate place in public discussion, although usually as only a negative and threating scenario.
Pavel Florensky have been influenced by Cantor’s ideas and wrote a paper “On the symbols of infinity”. In this paper he says that transfinite mathematics of Georg Cantor is an example of symbolic vision of God, but not direct. He restates Cantor’s idea from the Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre: “The absolute can only be acknowledged but never known. The absolutely infinite sequence of numbers thus seems to me to be an appopriate symbol of the absolute”. In my presentation I will analyze the meaning of symbol in Georg Cantor and Pavel Florensky and juxtapose them with the understanding of the symbol by later Florensky.
During the lecture, Donoso analyses the political philosophy of Plato and L. G. A. de Bonald, proving that both philosophers, with all their differences, created in general the similar “theory of despotism”. Criticising Plato and Bonald from a liberal position, Donoso opposes Enlightenment concept of freedom to their understanding of power as being despotic, and the liberal-bourgeois notion of the individual as reasonable man — to their knowledge of the state as the absolute one. The lecture is analysed in the broad context of the political struggle between the liberal-conservative wing of the moderados party and its opponents on the left (progressists) and on the right (the Carlists). The author proves that some of the opinions expressed by Donoso, who in the second half of the 1830s was at the liberal-conservative stage of his ideological evolution, later will change. In particular, his attitude towards Plato and L. G. A de Bonald will become positive, and a shift in emphasis will be made in the interpretation of G. Vico’s works. Meanwhile, the others (his driven by geopolitical reasons hostility to Russia, his desire to put up the “Anglo-Saxon race” against it, etc.), on the contrary, will only get further development. As a result, the Donoso’s lecture acquires the unique conceptual and theoretical sounding, thereby demonstrating that the political philosophy of Spanish liberal conservatism is an integral part of the all-European one.