The authors consider more promising areas of the EAEU member states’ supranational competencies, where application of the OECD standards could create the highest “added value” for the Eurasian economic integration. Based on an analysis of Russian and the EAEU strategic planning documents, and the OECD best practices and experience of cooperating with integration associations, the paper presents a number of pilot projects in the scope of which the above standards were applied in the most important areas of the Eurasian economic integration. However, the list of pilot projects (in areas such as tax policy, antimonopoly regulation, supporting SMEs, trade policy, and digital agenda) is not exhaustive, while the proposals for applying the OECD standards and best practices in the EAEU need to be further discussed with the Union member states, and require adequate political approval. The supranational consultation mechanism for these topics should be supported by a comprehensive assessment of the socio-economic benefits of applying the OECD standards in the EAEU member states, and of the integration effects for the Union as a whole.
The BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which was hosted by Russia for its first meeting of BRIC members at Yekaterinburg on 16 June 2009, has evolved into a plurilateral summit institution recognized both by former sceptics and proponents as a major participant in the international system. Ever since, the BRIC has grown institutionally, developed into the BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa, expanded its agenda and the intensity of interaction among its members, and demonstrated its capacity to deliver on a wide range of decisions, the latest examples being the New Development Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the Cooperation Agreement on Innovation and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation among BRICS Export Credit Insurance Agencies.
The regional situation in Eastern Europe changed significantly by the end of the first decade of the 21st century. Competition between Russia and the European Union increased during the 2000s, while at the same time both actors were changing their approach to the six states of the former USSR that lie between Russia and the EU — Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In order to widen and deepen their influence on those territories and to reduce uncertainty about their regional politics, Moscow and Brussels developed their own integration projects and demanded those post-Soviet states define their position in the EU-Russia competition. Russian and European scholars, when trying to analyze the future of the Post-Soviet Six, mostly examine the attractiveness of the two integration projects. While important, such an approach is insufficient, as it ignores the individual internal environments. To assess the prospects for Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and the EU’s Eastern Partnership, however, one must look inside the six states, which are so important for both Moscow and Brussels. This article explores the aspects of the European and Eurasian integration projects that may be attractive to the six states. Within this framework, it considers what and how elements of those states’ internal environment might influence their choice by examining and comparing both integration projects. It proposes focusing directly on the countries that are currently facing the dilemma of integration and are expected to choose. Despite a number of internal factors influencing the states’ integration behaviour, research has shown that in such circumstances, a choice (whether it is made) cannot be considered final, given the individual internal environments of the Six. Their further integration will require additional mechanisms of stimulation, which will need to be developed by the centres of integration — namely, Moscow and Brussels.
The cumulative effects of a significantly changing climate are projected to have disastrous implications on the world’s natural habitats, and along with that, are projected to drastically increase the rate and likelihood of violent conflict globally, particularly in high-density, urban, poverty hotspots. Limiting the effects of a changing climate is thus critical in influencing multiple societal goals including equitable sustainable development, human health, biodiversity, food security and access to reliable energy sources.
This paper argues that the G7/8 has led global climate governance in ways other international environmental institutions have largely failed to do. It has done so largely by placing climate protection at the forefront of its policy objectives, alongside economic, health, energy and security goals, and reaching consensus repeatedly amongst its leaders on the importance of stabilizing emissions through energy efficiency, conservation, investment and technological innovation. Moreover, this chapter argues that the summit’s predominant capability, its constricted participation, democratic convergence and political cohesion – as well as the combined effects of global shocks – have all had positive impacts on the G7/8’s success in mitigating climate change.
Following a detailed process-tracing exercise over the summit’s 40-year history in which clear surges and retreats on global climate governance are outlined, this paper concludes by assessing the G7/8’s accountability record on climate mitigation and outlines a set of prescriptive recommendations, allowing for the delivery of a more tangible, coherent, results-driven accountability process for global climate governance.
The article presents analysis of the G8 and G20 activities in the spheres of energy and climate change for the period of 2008-2010. The establishment of an effective post-Kyoto climate regime and the global energy security (in a broad sense), in the eyes of the author, were the key problems that defined the range of issues within energy and climate change areas at the G8 and G20 summits during the period of analysis. The author shows the evolution of the issues within each institution and observes the division of labour between the G8 and G20. The conclusion is made that the division of labour between two institutions should be based on the principle of comparative advantage - the issue should be included in the agenda of the institution, which can effectively solve the problem with a higher probability. In that case, the G8 and G20 will reinforce each other's realization of global governance functions.