The present paper is a reply to Borisov’s recent criticism of my interpretation of Russell’s joke about yachts. I partially agree with him in the issue of semantic content / truth conditions differentiation. Nevertheless, I deem it necessary to clarify the basic idea of my approach and to to draw attention the main drawback of the Borisov’s ‘objectual analysis III’ – namely, his interpretation ignores the “reflexive” content of the analyzed sentence.
P. Bourdieu borrows a number of ideas and conceptions of G.-V. Leibniz and uses them in his theory of the social space in systematic fashion. The Leibnizean theories of the relation physical space, of the real definition, of the pre-established harmony become the interrelated reflective means of empirical sociology. This article attempts to interpret epistemic significance of the fact that the conceptions of Leibniz have appeared to be fruitful in sociology of Bourdieu. The real definition of the social space is neither direct reflection of social structures nor such purely formal operations of indirect mathematic construction of the social space which could be jettisoned after achievement of the result. The construction of the real definition is included in its result. The objectivity of this definition consists not in achieving the reality of “the things themselves” but in expressing genesis of purely transcendent, not accessible to simple reflection social relations in gradual construction of a system of purely immanent, sensual signs, in numeric dependencies and terms.
“Lectures on Justification” were read by John Henry Newman, one of the leaders of the Tractarian movement, in 1837 in Oxford, and then published in 1838. This series of lectures exemplifies Newman’s doctrine of the “via media” of the Anglican Church. According to this doctrine, Anglican Church is supposed to pass between the extremes of papism and popular Protestantism. The tenth lecture examines the relationship between faith and justification. The author criticizes the popular Protestant doctrine of justification by faith only that neglects the office of sacraments in salvation. He suggests the interpretation of faith as one of the instruments of justification, which justifies only after and not before the baptism.
Many contemporary scholars converge the main issues of the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” of L. Wittgenstein with B. Russell’s agenda aimed at eliminating language confusion that causes “fundamental philosophical problems”. Although this may be correct to a certain degree, the main idea of the “Tractatus” often remains overlooked: according to Wittgenstein, establishing the language boundaries must lead us to the inexpressible meanings and values of life, and somehow demonstrate them. It was done by Wittgenstein in "Tractatus", however results of his activity still remain in some way confidential, leaving a scope to various versions in this respect. The offered work represents one of possible versions too, and we hope that it will be useful. 2 Our approach consists in the ultimate radicalization of characteristics of the logical structure showing that the facts within only the logical structure cannot be understood and described in comprehensible propositions. Thereby it is possible to outline actually the logical level of language, and on this background to show the contents of the non-logical meanings and values providing understanding of the world. Such approach allows to master the performative measurement of "Tractatus" and to return values and meanings on their lawful place, to verbal expressions. Wittgenstein's thesis about their inexpressibleness in language is interpreted, respectively, as impossibility to express them in special philosophical propositions, separately from real functioning of the natural language.
This article considers the problem of defining the concept of "Austrian philosophy" in the context of the possible influence of Austrian philosophy of the XIX century on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. From Haller&Neurath’s point of view the Austrian philosophical tradition can be represented as a single chain of mutual influences. In particular, we can trace continuity, find common features in the philosophy of the Brentano school and philosophy of the Vienna Circle. But here is the question. Should Ludwig Wittgenstein also be included in this tradition? By responding to this question, we can better understand the boundaries of this tradition. But in case we include Wittgenstein in this tradition, then he will be in one tradition with Alexius Meinong, who is often called Wittgenstein's opponent in logic, semantics and philosophical psychology. Therefore, our task is to find out whether these theories are really so different. May be we can find common features or signs of the influence of one theory on another. The main clue in this case is the concept of "Sachverhalt" or "state of affairs", which Wittgenstein used in "Tractatus" and which is quite comparable in meaning with the Meinong’s concept of "objektiv".
Article is dedicated to the description and analysis of metaphilosophical and scientific contexts of the McTaggart paper ‘The Unreality of Time’ (1908) and drawing connections to the ‘analytical’ style of his pupils – B. Russell and G.E. Moore. Main line of argu- ment against the reality of time is presented and analyzed. By the positive relation of McTaggart to the work on ethics by G.E. Moore and negative – to philosophical implications of the spe- cial theory of relativity author shows the movement for the autonomy of philosophy or ‘antipsychologism’. Question of a different understanding of the term ‘reality’ in Moore and McTaggart is posed and resolved.
Due to some recent researches the problem of the reciprocity of logic and psychology got back into the philosophy of logic. Logicians and psychologists reconsider the relations between the logical laws and the human reasoning and deny the idea expressed by antipsychologists that exploration of the human reasoning is non-informative for logical theory. In the course of the controversy over psychologism at the turn of the XXth century some thinkers claimed that these disciplines were strongly connected. Some current researchers united under the name “Neopsychologism”. The article covers the problem of the reciprocity between logic and psychology in terms of Wilhelm Wundt’s theory and the Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen’s case research of reasoning peculiar to children with autism.
Wundt was not a typical psychologist. He argued that the laws of logic and the laws of thought should be strongly separated. His idea of the correlation between the thought process and the other cognitive functions is “heuretic” as well. Despite that – or thanks to that - his theory is prolific. Its analysis and comparison with the recent logical researches show the difference between the classical psychologism and the neopsychologism. The article also reveals which of Wundt’s ideas are still important for philosophy of logic and psychology today.
Thought experiments can be used in various ways. A part of them seems to have a special epistemic value: they can give us a new, unknown information about reality. One of the most famous thought experiments of that kind is the thought experiment of Galileo which demonstrates that two bodies of the same kind should fall with the same speed. However, an analysis of this argument shows that it is based on several ontological presuppositions. Therefore it's not the thought experiment itself that has a significance, but its correspondence to real experience.
This reply to Oleg Domanov’s target paper is not concerned with the technicalities of the proposed approach. Rather, I discuss the fruitfulness of the underlying ideas in dealing with Quine’s famous “double vision” scenario, for which the approach is designed. I point out some key ingredients of Domanov’s proposal: (a) context dependence of propositional attitude ascription (and ascribability); (b) replacement of individuals with finer-grained entities for reference and quantification, such as Kaplan’s “vivid names”, Frege and Yalcin’s senses or Percus and Sauerland’s concept generators; and (c) using the apparatus of cross-identification functions. I show that those ingredients were already present in a body of work preceding the target paper. On the other hand, there are known problems related to the fact that sometimes the choice of the pertinent mode of presentation depends on the choices associated with quantifiers higher in the syntactic tree. No account based on manipulations with the global context, such as Domanov’s in its current form, can handle them.