Since the end of the XX century projects "Creation of the Future" came into fashion in the West,its main purpose is radical transformation of human "nature" with the mix of high technology. This problem as been discussed in the conference in Belgorod, a review of which is presented in this article.
Hannah Arendt refers to the notions of ancient Greek philosophy for the clarification her own concepts of action and thinking. Some of them are the terms "daimon", "daimonion" associated with thought and personality of Socrates. This article considers the role of metaphorical using of these categories in such Arendt’s texts as «Vita activa, or about the activities of life," "Life of the Mind", "Thinking and moral considerations ". How does the socratic daimon (daymonion) become a metaphor in Arendt’s philosophy? What functions does his image play in Arendt's concepts of action and thinking? What things do separate and unite the context of the metaphorical application of these terms in her different texts? The answers on these questions form the content of the article.
The so called “Gift of the Gods” in Plato’s “Philebus” [15a-19a] remains to be one of the most enigmatic, perplexing and interesting texts in the ‘later’ dialogues. It was often considered as being largely influenced by Pythagoreans or even as a direct adoption of some Pythagorean way of inquiry. However, what might seem to be a good explanation of its origin and style, would not always work as a good way of interpretation. In this paper an attempt is made to interpret the “God’s Gift” as a part of Plato’s discussion of the dialectical method in the ‘later’ period. The problem of the nature of ‘henads’ is the focal point of the analysis, since these become the main subject of the ‘godly’ method. Also presented here are some thoughts concerning the role of the two oppositions which has traditionally been viewed as ‘pythagorean’, namely one & many and limit & unlimited.
Review of book by Deborah Martinsen "Surprised by Shame"
In his article the author considers Russias problems in the context of Dresden. Three fi gures of Russian culture which have infl uenced European spirituality - Bakunin, Dostoevsky, Stepun - as fate would have formulated the most important postulates of their concepts was in Dresden. Near to them the author raises the congenial fi gure of Hoffmann, Wagner and Tillich. During the Dresden uprising in May 1849 Bakunin proposed to cover the barricade Madonna by Raphael. In Dresden Dostoevsky wrote a great novel The Possessed, which depicted the dire consequences for European culture Bakunin ideas that paved the way for Bolshevism and Nazism. In Dresden at 30 years of the last century in the texts Stepun and Paul Tillich arose again the theme of demonic.
David Humes heritage is considered as philosophy of culture, corresponding to the time of its writing, which marked the beginning of a turn from classical model of culture to nonclassical one. Todays nonclassical philosophy of culture addresses itself to Humes ideas of illusiveness of a Self, to his moral philosophy, philosophy of religion, and to his critic of methodological use of a concept of causality, viewing them as its background.
In the O. A. Zhukova’s article Evgeny Trubetskoy as a Philosopher of History: on the Meaning of Russian Revolution is shown that Evgeny Trubetskoy raised the question about the meaning of war and the causes of the Russian revolution, continuing the line of reasoning about the specifics of the national history and the spiritual crisis of the Christian civilization, which was developed by European and Russian thinkers in the last third of the XIX century.-
This paper examines ontological strategies of Western existential philosophy (its "atheistic" current) and the Buddhist philosophical school (darsana) of madhyamaka. We can discover similar phenomenological strategies together with extreme differences in anthropology and the value purposes (personalism and deconstruction of classical European subject in the existential philosophy and radical impersonalism of Buddhism). We suppose that Heidegger, Sartre and Buddhism have comparable theories of consciousness. The madhyamaka's "sunyata" (emptiness) is comparable with Heidegger's and Sartre's "Nothingness" (though they are not absolutely similar) and we can discover primacy of negativity in both cases. We also try to substantiate that the position of madhyamaka (that created a fundamental ontology) was a radical nihilism and not scepticism contrary to the position of a number of modern buddologists. And what is also important for us is the problem of the "unhappy consciousness" (be it Buddhist "duhkha" or "Sorge" of Heidegger, or Sartre's "Nausea") and different attitudes of thinkers towards it.