Through a study of agricultural service cooperatives in Russia’s Belgorod region, this article addresses two gaps in the literature: first, the dearth of empirical studies on cooperatives in post-socialist Russia; second, the lack of attention to top-down cooperatives in the global literature, and the overly negative approach to the topic in the few extant studies. Whereas state attempts to establish agricultural cooperatives in Russia in a top-down fashion have largely failed, such cooperatives have sprung up widely in Belgorod. The article investigates: (1) what influence the (regional) state exerts on the cooperatives, and how that affects their daily functioning and viability; and (2) to what extent such top-down cooperatives might evolve into less state-led forms, such as classic member-driven or business-like cooperatives.
In recent years the role of anti-monopoly policy in Russia has grown significantly. The enforcement power of the anti-trust agency has increased dramatically. At the same time adverse trends in competition policy have emerged and strengthened. The main reason was, paradoxically, a growing role of anti-trust policy in the Russian government. The enforcement of anti-trust rules is expected to result immediately in control of the price level and/or support of a defined group of market participants (e.g. suppliers of food products). In this context legal rules are changing in a way that leads to an increase in the number of false positives (type I errors) in anti-trust cases. False positives not only impose a burden on the accused but also distort the incentives of market participants, restrain potentially efficient business practices and also paradoxically can prevent competition. This article considers three examples of adverse development of anti-trust rules in Russia: regulation of trading activity, rules on collusion and excessive prices of collectively dominant market participants, and rules on discrimination as an abuse of a dominant position.
This article provides an examination of the role of experts in the Russian budget process. Experts are those whose role is based on specialised knowledge and technical skills, rather than affiliation to an agency, association or political party. Ideally their contributions are impartial. In the first part of the article the channels of expert influence are described, primarily within the executive branch. Features are found in these channels that mean that impartial advice is not always guaranteed. In the second part, on the basis of a survey of experts, the answers to two questions are sought: whether they feel that impartial advice is expected of them and whether they provide it. There are negative elements in the responses on both counts, suggesting that despite some evidence of demand for such advice on the part of policy-makers, expert advice is often not impartial.
This article investigates spatial determinants of FDI location. In particular, it focuses on FDI in neighbouring countries and foreign market potential for a panel of 25 transition countries in 1993–2010. The spatial FDI spillovers are found to be positive and economically large. Moreover, omitting spatial FDI leads to a serious misspecification of the model explaining FDI location and biases estimation of the coefficient of the foreign market potential variable, which is found to be a non-robust determinant of FDI location.
The spatial complementarity is stronger for disaggregated data such as bilateral FDI and sector level FDI. There is substantial heterogeneity of spatial FDI spillovers across sectors. Spillovers are large and positive for services sectors and non-significant or even negative for manufacturing sectors.
The aim of this article is to determine the rationale for the ‘irrational’ investment behaviour of multinational corporations (MNCs) in Russia. During the on-going recession in a number of major sectors, MNCs have undertaken only a very limited number of divestments and, instead, have commissioned a record number of new manufacturing facilities (by opening new plants and expanding the capacities of existing plants). To explain this phenomenon, we first provide an overview of existing theoretical and empirical studies on investments in difficult locations and divestments of foreign subsidiaries, and indicate the major weaknesses of the prevailing approaches and underlying assumptions of such studies. Next, we present a detailed picture of both industrial investments and divestments in Russia from January 2015 to March 2017. Finally, we indicate how a combination of systemic and contingent factors (pressure from the host country’s government, subsidiaries’ orientation towards the host country’s markets, and the absence of potential local and international acquirers for existing Russian manufacturing facilities of Western MNCs) has created ‘cul-de-sac’ conditions for foreign-owned industrial assets in Russia.
This article considers the behaviour patterns of Russian “rms before and during the “nancial crisis of 2008…09. To facilitate comparison, we de“ne three main groups of actors at the “rm level in the Russian economy … large, politically connected companies; medium-size “rms that expanded in the 2000s with the help of administrative support, and successful medium-size “rms driven by market factors. Many of the large companies practised highly risky “nancial policies and experienced a decrease in ef“ciency before the crisis, and the managers and owners of some Russian “rms have been engaging in opportunistic behaviour during the crisis; the forms and causes of this behaviour are analysed here. We conclude by proposing some policy implications with emphasis on supporting successful medium-size “rms driven by market factors.
The evolution and outcomes of conflicts in Europe, including the current one in Ukraine, have been influenced by the dynamics of economic, technological and military balances, which in turn are affected by the economic warfare and sanctions that have been used to alter them. This article reviews defence economic concepts of relevance to the Ukraine conflict and then draws out lessons for the present concerning power balances, military capabilities, conventional deterrence, economic warfare and counter-measures against sanctions from experiences in Europe in the twentieth century. An evaluation is made of the impacts of economic sanctions on Russia and Ukraine in 2014–2016.
The aim of this article is to conduct an empirical investigation and reveal which types of modernisation strategies and characteristics of regional institutional environment are likely to be associated with patterns of the performance of Russian manufacturing firms in 2007–2012. In addition to estimating the impact of ex-ante behaviour on the rate of sales growth, we use hierarchical cluster analysis to reveal the typical trajectories of firms’ sales growth. We find that the dynamic of sales for more than 90% of firms can be described by just two types of performance curve: (a) crisis decline with recovery and growth; and (b) crisis decline with weak recovery and stagnation. Firms that invested more prior to the crisis and implemented active restructuring were more likely to have positive post-crisis dynamics of sales. We find evidence that firms in the regions with lower levels of corruption (both administrative and everyday) were more likely to recover successfully after the crisis.