The objective of this study is to develop a system of leading indicators of the business cycle turning points on a wide range of countries, including Russia, over a more than thirty years period. We use a binary choice model with the dependent variable of the state of economy: the recession, there is no recession. These models allow us to assess how likely is the change of macroeconomic dynamics from positive to negative and vice versa. Empirical analysis suggests that the inclusion of financial sector variables into equation can significantly improve the predictive power of the models of the turning points of business cycles. At the same time, models with financial and real sector variables obtained in the paper outperform the “naïve” models based only on the leading indicator of GDP in the OECD methodology due to either a lower level of noise (recession model) or a higher predictive power (model of the recovery from recession).
In 1981 in Chile the Pinochet regime reformed the state-led PAYG pension system into the private pension system. Chilean experiment attracted the attention of both politicians and experts around the world and laid the foundations for the new pension orthodoxy. As a result, more than 30 countries (mostly in Latin America and in the former Soviet bloc) followed the Chilean model and privatized pension systems. The paper considers the design and results of the Chilean pension reform. The aim of the paper is to show the specific path of transformation of theoretical concepts into actual economic policy. The research provides two key results. The first is that although pension reforms of recent decades were influenced by the ideas of liberalism, their design and implementation in fact suited the pattern of the new paternalism characteristic of “neoliberalism”. The second is that implementation of the Chilean model in other countries was due to the persuasiveness of the discourse of the new pension orthodoxy rather than to actual performance of the Chilean pension system.
The experience of the last decade has demonstrated that the state policy on the extension of competitive procedures in public procurement has been challenged by the attempts of customers and suppliers to restrict competition. The mass survey of customers and suppliers carried out by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies in 2017 showed that about a half of the customersfollowed a strategy of contracting predetermined suppliers in 2014—2016. Moreover, different explanations of this practice (justification, accusation or a combination of both reasons) allowed us to identify groups of suppliers that differ significantly in their models of behavior in the public procurement market.
China’s initiative about “One Belt, One Road” could be treated ambiguously. On the one hand, it is intended to transform the newly acquired economic potential of that country into her higher status in the world. China invites a lot of nations to build up gigantic transit corridors by joint efforts, and doing so she applies productively her capital and technologies. International transactions in RMB are also being expanded. But, on the other hand, “One Belt, One Road” is also a necessity for China to cope with some evident problems of her current stage of development, such as industrial overcapacity, overdependence on imports of raw materials from a narrow circle of countries, and a subordinate status in global value chains. For Russia a participation in “One Belt, One Road” may be fruitful, since the very character of that project provides us with a space to manoeuvre. By now, Russian exports to China consist primarily of fuels and other commodities. More active industrial policy is needed to correct this situation. A flexible framework of “One Belt, One Road” is more suitable for this objective to be achieved, rather than traditional forms of regional integration, such as a free trade area.
The paper analyses the concepts of transparency and accountability, their correlation with other key concepts used in Russian social and economic discourses, and also the critique of the transparency and accountability practices. It is shown that the main effect of development of these technologies is the substitution of reality by the “picture” formed for external users, transformation of this “picture” into the self-purpose. The reason of this is the change of paradigms of trust. Society has passed from trust in authorities with their right to make decisions on the basis of professional judgment to trust in procedures and standards, trust in “picture”. We have changed trust in result to trust in processes of its receiving.