Health is an indispensable public good. At the national level it has been manifested in the BRICS governments’ commitment to scale up health financing, though to a different degree. At the global level it is evidenced by the international community progress on the three health-related Millennium Development Goals. However despite successes in fighting infectious diseases, child and maternal mortality, old risks persist and new challenges emerge, resulting from the 2008 financial crisis, current slack economic growth and growing economic inequality.
The BRICS face these challenges and have begun cooperation on health issues. It is important that they build their emerging health agenda recognizing these challenges, committing to develop sustainable policy solutions, and cooperating with other actors to promote effective health governance for change.
To explore how the BRICS contribute towards global health governance the article first considers the BRICS cooperation (its institutionalization, discourse, and engagement with other international institutions) with a focus on health issues. The authors then look into the BRICS members’ national health systems, challenges and goals. The article concludes with expectations of the BRICS future health agenda and its implications for global governance.
This article analyzes global financial market regulators, with a brief look at institutional reforms within the global financial system. Its purpose is to detect and outline major shifts in the interaction of the global financial regulators within the last decade. A structural analysis of the vast empirical data on the activities of the global regulators led to a selection of the most important institutions and to a description of the major measures. The authors studied the documents issued by these institutions, assessed their relevance and the intensity of their cooperation as well as the logic of interactions among them, outlined the priorities in their goals, and established a pattern in the functioning of the institutions as an integrated system. They concluded that a consolidated system of institutions of global financial governance exists. This system has grown in size, but remains viable. It comprises both long-time established and newly legitimized formal and informal global institutions. The role of informal institutions is growing. They provide a necessary flexibility in operations and a high level of compliance at the same time. This study focused on the activities of specialized international institutions, whose importance is constantly increasing although their influence has not yet been fully revealed. The article considers many aspects of global banking governance among the top governance priorities of the emerging system. In their conclusions, the authors justify the point that the system of global financial governance has the potential to continue developing and become more efficient.
China took over the G20 2016 presidency from Turkey at a period of subdued economic activity and diminished global growth. Growth in China was expected to slow to 6.3 percent in 2016 and 6.0 percent in 2017, primarily reflecting weaker investment growth as the economy continued to rebalance. Acknowledging that lower growth rates became the “new normal” Chinese leadership set the annual target growth rate for China to be no less than 6.5 percent in its 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The Plan redefined China’s development paradigm from speed to quality based on innovation, coordination, green development, opening up and sharing. This vision constituted the foundation of China’s concept and priorities for the G20 presidency. The article reviews main outcomes of the Chinese G20 presidency focusing on major results which reflect China’s priorities for domestic development and international cooperation. Using qualitative and quantitative analysis of the G20 2016 documents and the documents of international organizations the author highlights the key decisions made at the Hangzhou summit and trends in G20 engagement with international institutions. The findings indicate that the Chinese Presidency priorities of development, innovation and trade received unprecedented attentions with development reaching almost 43% share in the discourse (compared to the average of 15% for the eleven summits), innovation rising tenfold to about 7% (compared to 0.75% for the eleven summits) and trade peaking to 7.3 (compared to the 2.8 average). At 2.2% the share of G20 discourse on environment was higher than the overall average (1.42%) and any other summit except Cannes and Los Cabos. While lower than for Brisbane and Antalya energy issues (about 4%) are comparable to the average for the period (3.4%). Economic issues share (at 25%) was close to the average for the period (27%). In line with the historical trend the share of finance issues in the G20 discourse continued to decline, reflecting the G20 role in the division of labor with regard to financial markets regulation. Intensity of G20 engagement with international organizations was higher than the average since the Washington summit. The choice of organizations was defined by the presidency priorities and established trends. Given the UN role in the Sustainable Development Goals, and China’s commitment to the UN as the central element of a fair and peaceful multilateral system, it came as no surprise that the intensity of references to the UN was twice as high as the average for G20 and significantly higher than in any other summit. A similar trend is observed for the WTO and UNCTAD. G20 reliance on the OECD expertise continued to rise. Intensity of G20 engagement with the IMF and the WB was slightly lower than in the previous presidencies. Last but not least, China consolidated G20 dialogue with engagement groups, most notably with B20 and L20.
Drawing on the qualitative and quantitative analysis results the author concludes that China’s G20 presidency contributed to the country’s development priorities, reflected China’s role in the evolving world order, and consolidated G20 status as the premier forum for economic cooperation and capability to make globalization work for all. The author asserts that China managed to ensure its imprint on G20 future cooperation, first, by integrating innovation, new industrial revolution and digital economy into its core agenda, generating 137 commitments on innovative growth and setting up relevant international mechanisms. Second, on trade and investment it facilitated development and adoption of two documents defining guiding principles for global investment policymaking, and promoting inclusive trade and global value chains. Third, under China’s stewardship G20 agreed three action plans on energy cooperation, including Enhancing Energy Access in Asia and the Pacific: Key Challenges and G20 Voluntary Collaboration Action Plan, G20 Voluntary Action Plan on Renewable Energy, and G20 Energy Efficiency Leading Programme (EELP) making further progress to address energy access, cleaner energy future, energy efficiency, global energy architecture, energy security, as well as market transparency. Fourth, China advanced further G20 cooperation on development based on the Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Fifth, the Presidency committed to establish three China based G20 centers, thus creating opportunities to enhance its influence on the G20 process through evidence base, research and knowledge exchange on key policy areas. China struck a good balance in continuity and innovation of the G20 agenda, contributed to its legitimacy and effectiveness through productive engagement with key international organizations and dialogue with the engagement groups, and consolidated G20 capacity for direction setting, decision making and delivery.
The institutions features take place in many papers focused on the euroregions issue. There are three groups of borders with strong differences in the institutional conditions: the European Union internal state borders; the CIS internal state borders; and the borders between the EU and CIS members. This research is a comparative case study of those three types euroregions.
This article explores the internal and external factors influencing the compliance performance of the Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS. The authors start with an overview of the G20 and BRICS compliance patterns using comparative data onthe number of commitments made by the two institutions, the level of institutional compliance, and distribution of commitments and compliance across issue areas. G20 compliance is traced since the leaders’ first 2008 summit in Washington. The BRICS compliance performance record includes data since the third stand alone summit in Sanya in 2011.The study then takes stock of compliance catalysts embedded in the summits’ discourse: priority placements, numerical targets, timelines, self-accountability pledges and mandates to implement and/or monitor implementation. The authors review trends in the use of catalysts in different years and issue areas and identify commonalities and differences.The analysis then turns to external causes of compliance and focuses on demand for collective actions and members’ collective power to respond and deliver on their pledges. Here the study explores whether the self-accountability mechanisms created by the institutions in response to the demand for effectiveness and legitimacy facilitate compliance.The article concludes by highlighting catalysts, causes of compliance and their combinations with the greatest power to encourage implementation, explaining trends in G20 and BRICS compliance performance. The data sets on G20 and BRICS differ in terms of scale. The G20 data set contains 1,511 commitments of which 114 have been monitored, and the BRICS data set contains 231 commitments of which 23 have been monitored.
Russia’s system of international development assistance (IDA) is still in the making. Among other things there is a need to establish a system to evaluate its effectiveness. Donors usually focus such evaluations on the results of individual projects and programs. Today, the field of IDA as a whole or its specific policies are increasingly the object of evaluation, which raises the question of articulating the expected effect or a goal of IDA from the donor’s point of view. This article considers the relationship between the underlying purpose of IDA and its evaluation criteria based on a review of the goals of main donors as stated in their policies and criteria outlined in evaluation manuals. It compares those findings with related research results. Most donors use evaluation criteria related to the positive impact of IDA on the socioeconomic development of recipient countries. The declared goals of IDA include fighting poverty, supporting sustainable development, promoting respect for human rights, and ensuring peace and security. At the same time, the donors’ political and economic interests never cease to play an important role. The global financial crisis has narrowed the gap between words and actions as many donor countries must justify their IDA budgets to their taxpayers. Not only have the declared goals of IDA changed, but the criteria for evaluation its effectiveness are also being reconsidered. Donors are now trying to assess the political and economic effectiveness of IDA for themselves. However, only a few countries manifest these changes and so it is still early to speak of a common trend.
Various commentators often contrapose emerging development donors to the traditional ones on a number of factors including aid effectiveness. While such distinction can be productive for analyzing development assistance at a global level, it might bring less value when considering development aid milieu at a local level. In this article the author considers the case of Kyrgyzstan and its main aid donors based on select criteria set out by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. It draws on an analysis of databases, official documents, open sources including media and the country’s National Sustainable Development Strategy for 2013–2017. It concludes that traditional and emerging donors do not represent homogeneous groups; for Kyrgyzstan, differences within the group can be as significant as differences among the groups. Moreover, the analysis does not support the notion that assistance from traditional donors has greater effectiveness. On some parameters including alignment emerging donors’ assistance can be more effective. Nonetheless, serious gaps between the two groups remain in terms of transparency, mutual accountability and harmonization. The author also explores the stronger bargaining positions of aid recipient in their interactions with donors due to the increased diversity of sources of assistance, focusing on this trend in Kyrgyzstan. Given Kyrgyzstan’s position as a priority for Russia’s assistance and Russia’s rapidly increasing levels of support, the author also addresses the case of Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund in detail.
The article presents the outcomes of the qualitative research conducted within the framework of the project “Analysis of the NEFU’s role in the development of the territory on the basis of the OECD methodology adapted for Russian universities to develop recommendations for enhancement of the university’s influence on innovative, technological, educational and socio-cultural development of the region”, implemented within the contract № 1537-09/12, 24.09.2012 by the Institute of International Organisations of the National Research University “Higher School of Economics” and Department for Strategic Development of North Eastern Federal University in 2012. The research aimed to evaluate NEFU’s impact on facilitating development of the Sakha Republic and Far Eastern Federal District through: 1) human resources education and training; 2) research; 3) knowledge transfer to stimulate region’s socio-economic development; 4) strengthening innovative potential consolidating capabilities of research and education institutions, business, local government and NGOs; 5) attracting advanced international technologies and knowledge and their adaptation to regional conditions. The author concludes that the university fosters regional development through improving quality of secondary education, improving access to education, particularly in remote areas, extending research activities, enhancing health services for indigenous population and stimulating local labour market development by training specialists required by the region.
The article reviews the progress of G20-B20 engagement since Toronto to St. Petersburg with the objective to identify which mechanisms and areas of cooperation are most effective to ensure continuity of the B20 efforts on the key priorities, the B20 influence on the G20 decision-making and the G20 compliance with commitments related to the B20 priorities. With this objective in mind the study is focused on two dimensions. The first dimension is B20 recommendations influence on G20 deliberation, direction setting and decision making on the basis of analysis of how the B20 specific recommendations are reflected in the G20 documents. The second dimension is B20 influence on G20 delivery on the pledges made, which is assessed by monitoring the G20 compliance with the B20 related commitments.
The authors assess the average level of the B20 recommendations reflection in the G20 documents as considerable, however its dynamics across presidencies is mixed. The average level of G20 members’ compliance on the B20 related commitments is lower than the G20 average score for compliance with general non B20 focused commitments. It can be explained by a shorter monitoring period and by the fact that the B20 related commitments are more specific. Key areas where cooperation can be most effective (financial regulation, employment, investments, trade) have been identified. Key factors of success have been revealed. The analysis shows that a high level of B20 recommendations’ inclusion into the G20 documents and actions does not guarantee subsequent implementation of the commitments made. The B20 should ensure continuity on their priority recommendations in the dialogue with the G20 and engage in the follow up process by more actively participating in the G20 agreed initiatives and projects at the national and global levels.
Progress on the B20 related commitment should be reviewed and made public for each summit. It can help to increase the level of effectiveness of B20 and G20 engagement.
Full report "From Toronto to Saint Petersburg: Assessing G20-B20 Engagement Effectiveness" is available at http://www.hse.ru/en/org/hse/iori/news/86843927.html