The article analyzes the relationship between temporality and causality as connections that form the structure of conscious experience. It is traditional for phenomenology and transcendental philosophy to posit temporality as a fundamental characteristic that determines the existence of consciousness. According to D. Hume, perceptions succeed each other and nothing persists through change. For I. Kant, every synthesis is built as a necessary condition of time-consciousness. In E. Husserl’s theory of constitution the content of my current experience is shaped on the basis of the quasi-temporal flow. For M. Heidegger, ‘original temporality’ determines the horizon of Being. According to J. P. Sartre, time is a condition of possibility of consciousness as existing at a distance from itself.
However, the attribution of fundamentality to the temporal flow leads to a simplified understanding of causality. Suppose that the temporal flow of consciousness is an immediately given basis of conscious experience; then there is no need to consider a causal relationship as a connection that explains emerging of new contents of consciousness and their order. Since new contents are delivered and ordered by the temporary flow, the question of the conditions of newness is not posed. According to Hume, causality arises from a habit of the mind to a repeated sequence of experiences. In Kant’s view, causality is a rule that gives the sequence an objective character. Husserl referring to non-obviousness of causal laws diminishes the role of causation in consciousness. The assumption about the priority of temporality in comparison with causality directs poststructuralist thought (the most typical example is the concept of J. Derrida).
As the author shows, the abyss between the idea and its embodiment, between the mental and the physical world, and also the impossibility to find a place for freedom in the phenomenal world are results of primacy of temporality over causality.
The article analyzes classical typologies of Carlism in the genetic stage of its development (1833-1876) as a special case of the Spanish conservatism as well as related conceptual and methodological problems. Based on the Russian classical typology of conservatism, which was proposed by A.A. Galkin and P.Yu. Rakhshmir, the author compares the typology of «political tendencies» of F. Suarez Verdeguer, the fractional classification of Carlism of C. Seco Serrano, and «three trends of Carlism» of J.C. Clemente Muñoz. For detailed conceptual and methodological draw, all analyzed typologies are tabulated in the summary with political-ideological and political-party spectrum of the emerging Spanish conservatism. Finally, the author concludes that the political-ideological «mainstream» of the emerging Carlism belonged to its right «fraction», namely, potentially right-wing conservatives, who had defined the essence of the whole Carlism for the next half-century. On this basis, the author argues that the genesis of Carlism in Spain could be presented as an ideal type for the study of the right-radical conservatism genesis within such «peripheral conservatisms» as German, Italian, Eastern European, and Russian ones.
The article explores the ways of developing the Hyperborean problem, which was brought up anew after one-hundred-year break by the thinkers of the late XIX-XX century in connection with the appearance of so-called Arctic hypothesis of the origins of civilization. The Hyperborean problem is examined in a broad historical and political context in connection with the most diverse trends of humanitarian thought, which are new for the Russian science. A connection is shown between the mass surge of interest in the Hyperborean problematics and the state of public consciousness in the epoch in question.Critical analysis of the concepts of J. Bailly, W. Warren, B.G. Tilak, E.P. Blavatsky, G. von List, J. Liebenfels, R. von Sebottendorf, G. Wirth, O. Rahn, R. Guénon, M. Serrano is given. Not only the postulating of the existence in the antiquity of the northern paleo-continent, where the “original Eden” of mankind was located is common to them, but also the selective use of scientic data, the use of intuitive analysis instead of scientic methodology, ignoring the lack of connection of the “hyperborean civilization” with any known archaeological culture. Despite the signicant results achieved by the authors in the eld of the history of culture, linguistics, and ethnography, the widespread usage of their works to solve the practical and political problems has led to the marginalization of the Hyperborean theme in the scientic world.Meanwhile, the academic science of the XIX-XX centuries thoroughly studied a number of individual issues related to the Hyperborean problem. Among them was the question of the geographic belonging of the northern peoples in the Arimaspea and the ways of the Hyperborean gift-givers, the origin of the cult of Apollo associated with the North of the Oecumene. A number of Herodotus's reports concerning Hyperborea was conrmed by new data of archeology. Signicant results were obtained by classical philologists and historians of philosophy in the study of ancient evidence of Hyperborea, as well as the legacy of Aristeus and Abaris, thinkers who linked the Greek tradition to the distant North. Discoveries in the eld of anthropology and ethnography allowed expanding the context of the interpretation of their teachings.
The author analyzes three interpretations on G.M. de Jovellanos' political-ideological heritage – liberal, traditionalist and liberal-conservative ones, – which reflected the complicated and contradictory character of the genesis of Spanish liberal conservatism in the end of XVIII – the beginning of XIX centuries.
The author defines three conceptual and-valuative levels of Spanish conservatism, their relationship and basic intentions; he discovers the basic antinomies of Spanish conservatism which determine its historical dynamics in 1808–2008.The discursive features of Spanish reformism and anti-reformism are analyzed.
The claim that human understanding is grounded in receptivity of mind-independent reality, despite its historical anteriority and accordance with intuition of ordinary consciousness, becomes invalid in the process of development of phenomenological thought. The reason for denial of receptivity is a lack of conformity between separate sense data and concepts as involving unifying functions. An assumption that the results of the receptivity initially have connections also does not solve the problem of knowledge of “the things themselves”, because, generally speaking, these connections are different from connections of the things.
Denying receptivity to otherness phenomenology explains the manifold and originality of contents of consciousness in two alternative ways. The first way is that the things of the world with their horizons are formed as a result of passive synthesis (E. Husserl), and the second way is the assertion that the condition of knowledge is original openness of being (M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, M. Merleau-Ponty). Husserl denies the receptivity, because for him phenomenology is egology, and subjectivity is the ultimate basis of explanation of the world. According to Husserl, the results of passive synthesis are the products of subjectivity, on the one hand, and the objects that are pregiven to egoic synthetic activity and make it possible, on the other hand.
The author shows that Husserl’s presentation of the problem is true: it is in subjectivity that the basis of our consciousness of the world is to be found. The concepts claiming the original openness of consciousness to alterity overlook this important issue and consequently face fundamental difficulties. As concerns Husserl's solution to the problem, it is also not acceptable. The given study proved the need for a new consideration and further rethinking of the concept of receptivity so that it could become a working concept of a transcendental-phenomenological theory of knowledge.
The article deals with the question about the possibility of realization of phenomenological project which aim is to understand the whole content of experience as constituting by consciousness. To achieve the goal of transcendental philosophy – a clear understanding of himself as the subjectivity functioning as primal source – E. Husserl moves from description of things of the intuited surrounding world (life-world) to analysis of successively lower layers of sense accomplishments. In doing so, he faced the impossibility to describe how the primal hyletic configurations that determine the unity of the absolute flow of consciousness are forming in the process of passive genesis. Husserl’s analyses of passive synthesis point to openness of consciousness to alterity. The “alterity” of original unities means that they not only do not require the ego’s activity and therefore seem to be alien to consciousness, but are really alien to it. Paradoxically, while being other to consciousness, primordial unities play a key role in its organization, making possible the structure of the “living present”.
Husserl’s account of consciousness as receptive to what is alien to consciousness creates a basis for comparison of his ideas with the ideas of S.L. Frank. The Russian philosopher argues that a foundation of “transcendental objects” is a “concrete supertemporal all-unity” as absolute being, outside of the relation to which consciousness would be impossible.
As the study shows, the recognition of dependence of consciousness on the pre-conscious layer of subjectivity opens the way of solving the problem of the structure-forming grounds of conscious.
The idea of pre-reflective consciousness arises in response to difficulties that occur in the process of searching for the foundation of the unity of our conscious experience. The basis of the experience can not be found in the experience and lies beyond the world of objects. Can we distinguish a single classical way of transcendence? If so, what is the way and what are its fundamental difficulties? Can the idea of pre-reflective consciousness be considered as the basis of another method of transcendence?
The author argues that the classical method of transcendence of the experience bases on temporality and substantiality – the structures that are found by the way of reflection. As necessary for any experience, these characteristics are projected to a source of experience and understood as characteristics of subjectivity.
Sartre indicates that self-consciousness is enclosed in the awareness of transcendent object. It is so-called pre-reflective self-consciousness. However, Sartre’s ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness is reflective self-consciousness. Indeed the conscious as such is neither any object nor a collection of objects. The consciousness itself is Nothing – that is Sartre’s modification of substance. Time is the condition of possibility of the consciousness.
Reflexive transcendence always turns out to be unjustified, since it is based only on positing of the immediate characteristics of subjectivity.
What is another way of transcendence? The consciousness should be presented not as a kind of an immediate givenness, but rather as the result of self-knowledge. A certain ‘givenness’ of subjectivity is the condition of possibility of the consciousness, however, this ‘givenness’ cannot be conscious, i.e. available for reflection. We can only talk about the pre-reflective pre-conscious ‘givenness’ of self, but this ‘givenness’ is not something initially and directly accessible, but a result of pre-conscious cognition. Therefore the object of self-knowledge can not be initially identical to the subject of self-knowledge.
Liberalism appears in Spain at the beginning of the XIX century as a spontaneous popular movement against Napoleonic absolutism. The nation becomes self-conscious; as a result, political modernity comes to Spain. Peculiarity of Spanish political reality is that unlike other countries liberals fight for the establishment of the monarchy of Fernando VII but not against it, how it been, for example, in France. The relations of liberalism with the monarchy give it a very specific character. Ideologically, this is original liberalism because it results from the typically Spanish political reality – “medieval Spanish monarchy” founded by “Catholic kings”, and both moderate liberals and right-wing radicals value it. This political form is a fundamental myth of Spanish liberalism, and is the forerunner of the modern constitutional monarchy. Spanish liberalism is an unrealized attempt; it never obtained its own political body and proved to be incompatible with the masses, which led to the civil war of 1936–1939s.
The article is devoted to the explosion of the myth of spontaneous origination of early Greek science and philosophy on the territory of Ancient Greece. The article traces the origins of the common misconceptions, and criticizes the tendency of studying philosophy of Ancient Greek as an isolated phenomenon. The author refers to a long tradition and extensive study of cultural relations between the Front East and Ancient Greece, and offers easy and clear methodology for determining the level of Oriental influence over Greek philosophical thought; the methodology is expressed in viewing the teachings of Ancient philosophers in chrono-topic interconnection. According to the author, chronological-geographical principle of studying Ancient philosophy has heuristic value concerning the content of philosophical doctrines, as well as the reconstruction of reception of Eastern knowledge by Ancient Greeks; in addition, it allows including into research the number of thinkers, which do not fit into any school. Based on statistical data, the article concludes about quantitative predominance of thinkers of Asia Minor's origins on the list of philosophers of the archaic and pre-classic age.
The formation of the New – liberal-bourgeois – order in Spain lasted for almost one and a half century and experienced many «ups and downs». A milestone in this process is the Royal Statute written by an outstanding liberal conservative on the first half of the 19th century F. Martinez de la Rosa. In an effort to harmonize liberal Liberty and traditionalist Order, Martinez takes a position between left-wing liberals (progressists) and traditionalists. However, under the conditions of the liberal-bourgeois revolution and the first Carlist war, a stable political-ideological consensus between revolutionaries and conservative reactionaries was impossible. Trying to ensure the survival of the declared constitutional monarchy, Martinez was forced to make a tactical alliance with moderate traditionalists, which caused a flurry of criticism from the left. The imbalance of the political system led to the abolition of the Royal Statute and a new revolutionary cycle, in which Martinez occupies a definitely conservative position.
The subject of this article is Heidegger's existentially-ontological consideration of human being (Dasein) as the transcending structure. This article proves the conclusion that the interpretation of Heidegger's intentional consciousness as "transcendence"
means going beyond Husserl's phenomenology. Consequently, raising an issue of intentionality as a specific kind of Being (rather than cognition) Heidegger in contrast with Husserl considers the latter not as the consciousness immanent act, but as the act of transcending, or ecstasis, which being "isomorphic to Husserl's structure of intention" is regarded as ontological (rather than epistemological or academic) phenomenon. Specifically, Heidegger regards the act of transcending as the ecstatic temporality, and, therefore, as the fundamental aprioristic structure of the human Being. Significantly, this ecstatic temporality corresponds to "«the horizon of understanding, which ontologically belongs to Dasein".
Furthermore, Heidegger characterizes the above-described structure as the "openness" (openness of things existent to Dasein and vice versa) and interprets it as the basic phenomenon, and as the initial research subject in his phenomenological ontology. Moreover, this structure of the human being has a twofold interpretation: as the Being of things existent (Dasein), or as the aprioristic condition of this Being, hence it "internally" grounds "the possibility of ontology" in principle.
The research deals with transformation of the subject matter of Husserl's phenomenology in Martin Heidegger's philosophy. The research explores why even with remarkably similar philosophic opinions shared by Husserl and Heidegger the latter had to give up his position of a teacher and to express differently the subject matter of the phenomenology. While answering this question, two approaches are undertaken. The first one deals with the phenomenology as transcendent philosophy: the research underlines that transcendental ego is a complicated matter, which eventually revealed itself as ultimate. The second approach calls for an entire change of the phenomenology. This approach embodies the fact that a taking-out-of-the-context method cannot be applicable for all areas of reality. Thus, the dimensions of reality that practical aspects deal with, including taking out of the context, are basically inaccessible for being taken out of the context. This is why the demand for Being comes to be essential. As a result of this demand, Husserl's phenomenology loses its position for, from now on, first, Being itself takes the place of transcendental I; second, intentionality appears to be an existential attitude; third, phenomenology as well as the truth gets a new meaning; forth, a concept of transcendental philosophy modifies substantially. Thus, the research explains the point that in passing over the basic settings of Husserl's philosophy it was crucial that Heidegger realized a priority role Being itself plays as regards to any means of Being, including pure consciousness.