Порошин В., Авраамов Ю., Шляпин А. и др. Вып. 5. М.: Международный институт «ИНФО-Рутения» (АНО МИИР), 2012.
Added: Nov 10, 2012
Воронин Г. Л., Дорофеева З. Е., Киселева И. П. и др. В кн.: Вестник Российского мониторинга экономического положения и здоровья населения НИУ ВШЭ (RLMS-HSE). Вып. 2. М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2012. С. 6-65.
Added: Jan 29, 2013
The Economic Returns to Higher Education in the BRIC Countries and their Implications for Higher Education Expansion
This paper focuses on the changing economic value of secondary and higher education in four potential world economic powerhouses—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—known as the BRIC countries. We show that in the past twenty-five years in the BRIC countries, changes in rates of return to higher education have not conformed to the diminishing returns to capital theory, which says that rates decline with level of education and that this pattern holds as countries develop economically and educationally. The rates to university completion have generally risen relative to the rates to investment in lower levels of education, and in all but India are now higher than the payoff to secondary schooling. We argue that this reflects the rapid economic change in all four countries, including their incorporation into the global economy, and, in Russia and China, the transformation from command to increasingly market economies.
Added: Aug 28, 2012
Куранов Г. О., Владимиров А. Б. В кн.: X Международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества: В 3 кн.. Кн. 1. М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2010.
Added: Sep 27, 2013
Edited by: В. Порошин, Ю. Авраамов, А. Шляпин и др. Вып. 4. М.: Международный институт «ИНФО-Рутения» (АНО МИИР), 2012.
Added: Nov 10, 2012
Островская Е. П. Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2010. № 4. С. 52-63.
Added: Oct 2, 2012
Shmatko N. A. Science, Technology and Innovation. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. WP BRP 32/STI/2014 .
Adopting a Bourdieusian perspective, human capital of research team in the paper is understood as the configuration of the active properties of individual team’s members and the distribution of differences of their active properties. The paper describes a research team as an ensemble of social distinctions determined by a distribution of “active properties” of the team members (educational, research, administrative and media characteristics) and analyses their empirical distribution. The study is based on the consideration of sociological factors of research teams’ performance. The paper discusses in depth the performance of research team (from a sociological point of view) and the relationship between the performance and the social management efficiency. It is prouved that the performance depends on the efficiency of human capital management research team. These distributions show how holistic properties of the field develop, how they relate to individual agents’ properties and how individual researchers “fit” into science.
Added: Dec 3, 2014
Мозиас П. М. Вопросы экономики. 2010. № 9. С. 93-114.
Added: Sep 30, 2012
Формирование и развитие инновационной экономики: Материалы международной научно-практической конференции
Н. Новгород: Нижегородская государственная сельскохозяйственная академия, 2010.
Added: Nov 22, 2012
Exploring innovation modes of Russian companies: what does the diversity of actors mean for policymaking?
Gokhberg L., Kuznetsova T., Roud V. Science, Technology and Innovation. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 01.
Recent studies of innovation behavior characteristics focus on analysis of microdata (enterprise level) as the key instrument to reveal facts and hypotheses describing the innovation activities under diverse economic, political and infrastructural conditions. This paper applies the state-of-the-art innovation modes approach [OECD, 2008] to provide insights on the Russian innovation environment, highlighting the variation of innovation strategies across sectors of Russian industry. Cross-country comparison based on the OECD data and Russian firm-level findings is presented along with the discussion of possible development of systemic instruments and evidence-based methods for policymaking.
Added: Oct 13, 2012
Прантл Й., Ближковский П. В кн.: Куда движется век глобализации?. Волгоград: Учитель, 2014. С. 327-331.
Added: Oct 8, 2014
Экономика и управление: проблемы и перспективы развития. Сборник научных статей по итогам международной научно-практической конференции г.Волгоград 15-16 ноября 2010 г.
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Added: Feb 22, 2013
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Яковлев А. А. Общественные науки и современность. 2008. № 4. С. 21-37.
Added: Sep 22, 2012
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Уринсон Я. М. Вестник Европы. 2014. № 38-39.
Added: Feb 5, 2018
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Карпов А. В., Вольский В. И. Полития: Анализ. Хроника. Прогноз. 2011. № 2. С. 162-174.
Added: Jun 24, 2011