Revisiting the democracy-private investment nexus: Does inequality matter?
Contrary to the predictions of a large theoretical literature, recent cross-country evidence suggests autocracies can generate statistically indistinguishable levels of private investment compared to democracies. We argue that the previous exclusion of inequality explains part of this puzzle. We model current investment as a function of investors’ beliefs about future tax rates, which are conditioned by the constraints on the Executive in setting tax rates and expropriating tax revenues. In democracies, where tax rates reflect the preferences of the median voter, investment declines with rising inequality. In autocracies, investor beliefs about future tax rates reflect the relative power of Elites compared to the Executive. As inequality rises, the increased resources available to Elites constrains the Executive’s ability to expropriate more tax revenues. The heterogeneous determinants of investor beliefs can explain the observed pattern of investment across regime types. We first test our predictions at the macro-level with cross-country data. We then test the behavioral underpinnings of our model with a novel laboratory experiment showing how inequality affects individual-level investment behavior dependent upon regime type. Results from both types of analyses show that when inequality is taken into account autocracies can generate similar levels of investment to democracies.
Following a normative approach that suggests international norms and standards for elections apply universally, regardless of regime type or cultural context, this book examines the challenges to electoral integrity, the actors involved, and the consequences of electoral malpractice and poor electoral integrity that vary by regime type. It bridges the literature on electoral integrity with that of political regime types.
Looking specifically at questions of innovation and learning, corruption and organized crime, political efficacy and turnout, the threat of electoral violence and protest, and finally, the possibility of regime change, it seeks to expand the scholarly understanding of electoral integrity and diverse regimes by exploring the diversity of challenges to electoral integrity, the diversity of actors that are involved and the diversity of consequences that can result.
This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of electoral studies, and more broadly of relevance to comparative politics, international development, political behaviour and democracy, democratization, and autocracy.
An assessment of current state and forecast of social instability in the Arab world in the context of the Arab Spring processes is a very important and relevant task, but it is also very challenging. Respective difficulties are related to the variety of factors affecting social instability, to individual peculiarities of historical, cultural, socioeconomic and political processes in the region. The complexity is also associated with the fact that different experts who make predictions of possible dynamics of instability often evaluate the significance of various factors very differently. In this article we have identified a set of factors that allow evaluating the current state of social and political destabili-zation in the countries of the Arab Spring. These factors of instability act in long and medium term creating grounds for discontent with the existing situation among the population and elites. With respect to the Arab Spring the most significant factors have turned out to be the following: the ability/inability of the government to reduce social ten-sions, the presence/absence of ‘immunity’ to internal conflicts as well as the internal contradictions level (especially the intra-elite conflict). Such indicators as structural and demographical characteristics and the external influences appear to be less significant as predictors of the actual level of the sociopolitical destabilization within particular Arab Spring countries in 2011. However, the demographic structural factors turn out to be very important if we consider fundamental factors of the Arab Spring in general. It should be also mentioned that the significance of the external influences indicator notably increases while accounting for the death toll that resulted from the destabiliza-tion in respective countries
Arisingmodulations of surface gravitywaves in a shallow-water resonator under harmonic forcing is discovered in laboratory experiments. Different types of modulations are found. When certain conditions are satisfied (appropriate frequency and sufficient force of excitation), the standing waves become modulated, and the envelopes of standing waves propagate in the channel. Strongly nonlinear numerical simulations of the Euler equations are performed reproducing the modulational regimes observed in the laboratory experiments. The physical mechanism responsible for the occurrence of modulated waves is determined on the basis of the simulations; quantitative estimates aremade with the help of a simplified weakly nonlinear theory. This work was initiated by and performed under the guidance of Prof. A. Ezersky. We dedicate this text to the memory of him.
Authoritarian regimes differ by the degree to which the leader is constrained in his ability to influence the decision-making process. It has been argued that unlimited executive can either lead to adverse economic policy outcomes or improve economic performance. In this work, I reassess the effect of executive constraints on economic performance. While most of the previous research in this area focuses on regime typologies, I use observable indicators of power personalisation in 90 autocratic countries from 1960-2010 and estimate their effect on economic performance. I focus on power concentration, the extent of the decision-making power of chief executives and leaders’ ability to dismiss the elites form political institutions as the indicators for measuring leaders’ ability to influence the decision-making process. I discover that countries, where leaders are able to stay in office longer and are able to change the cabinet, concentrate more power in their hands and tend to be more opportunistic. The results imply that strong leaders establish such power-sharing mode that allows them to act in a self-interest way.
We model the evolution of a trans-boundary marine fishery, which is based on the harvesting of a single “highly-migratory” stock and is beginning to be impacted by regional oceanic-climate changes. The fish-stock’s range will be composed of a number of jurisdictional zones: namely, its intersection with the EEZ of each coastal country for which that intersection is non-trivial. There may also be a zone within international waters of the high seas. We also assume that management of the fishery is vested in a Regional Fishery Management Organization, whose members are countries that are “direct stakeholders” in the fishery—being either one of the above countries with jurisdictional authority in a zone or a country that has registered fishing vessels that are licensed to harvest in the fishery, or both.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.