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Article

Арабская весна и реформа Шенгена

Международные процессы. 2016. Т. 14. № 4. С. 80-98.

By studying the process of reform of the Schengen acquis in 2011-2013 inspired by the Arab Spring andthe inflow of migrants to the Mediterranean shores of the European Union, this paper seeks todemonstrate how policy entrepreneurs exploit windows of opportunity that open following an externalshock (a notion is used to conceptualize the events of the Arab Spring) in order to fulfill their ownpreferences, regardless of the substance of the external shock in question. How could it happen that thereform initiated by Italy and France in 2011 to “re-nationalise the Schengen” would in the end turn outto be just the opposite of what they sought to achieve? The article suggests that the major factor whichhelps explain this is the institutional position of the European Commission which holds exclusive rightof legislative initiative, and the fact that by using its position, the Commission was able to win over theEuropean Parliament to its side by effectively making it a veto-player in negotiations with the EUCouncil, thus trapping the Member States into the “joint decision trap”. The research traces the reformprocess through all of its stages: starting with the agenda-setting by the Italian authorities who appliedalarmist rhetoric trying to securitize the migrants arriving to the Italian shores, proceeding with thechoice between alternative solutions proposed by different actors and policy reform initiation,multilateral negotiations between the EU Member States and the European Parliament and, concludingwith the adoption of the two legislative acts. The concluding remarks put the case into the broader

theoretical perspective of comparative politics.