Стимулы к процессным инновациям в дискретных структурных альтернативах конкурентной политики
This study analyzes the incentives for process innovations under different conditions determined by the competition policy for intellectual property rights (IPR) and particular features of markets and technologies. Competition policy is defined by the presence or absence of compulsory licensing, markets are characterized by technological leadership or technological competition. The results of modelling show that the uncertainty engendered by technological competition may lower the intensity of innovative activities, if there are no mechanisms of coordination between participants. Voluntary licensing generally improves social welfare but does not guarantee an increase in innovative efforts. Compulsory licensing can impede innovations due to the opportunistic behaviour of market participants but certain measures of state policy can prevent this negative effect.
The paper describes the institutional organization of the resource type regions. The advantages of the political and economic approach based on structural alternatives of development identification are justified. The choice between those alternatives is decided by dominant political and economic actors’ interactions, motivations and limitations of the actors are regarded in the context of path dependence and lock-in effects. Different configurations of those actors’ interactions can both strengthen and weaken resource dependence. The results of the resource type regions development in 2005-2015 are regarded bearing in mind the structural shift effects. The authors show that emerging due to structural shift effects cannot be explained without involving institutional factors that determine the degree to which the regional economy operated as an integral unit or as a set of enclaves in its social and economic development.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.