• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site

Article

Incentives for Repeated Contracts in Public Sector: Empirical Study of Gasoline Procurement in Russia

International Journal of Procurement Management. 2016. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 272-289.
Yakovlev A. A., Oleg Vyglovsky, Demidova O., Alexander Bashlyk.

Contrary to previous studies of relational contracting this paper analyzes the impact of repeated procurements on the price of a simple homogeneous product. Using a large dataset on procurements of AI-92 gasoline in Russia in 2011, we show that price difference between repeated and one-time contracts can be explained by the type of procurement procedures. Less transparent procedures (single-sourcing and requests for quotations) are more suitable for corrupt collusion. This might explain relative price increase in this case. On the contrary, the prices of repeated contracts were lower compared to one-time procurement in the case of more transparent e-auctions.