The Handbook of Business and Corruption provides an overview of corrupt business practices in general and, more particularly, in different industry sectors, considering such practices from an ethical perspective.
Usually in service systems with bids for proceeding in the queue interactions between players are ignored, and symmetric information is assumed. The aim of this paper is to explore the influence of communication between players on the total amount of bribes. Preliminary results show that under imperfect information interactions in groups and the properties of the utility function and key parameters are relevant for the equilibrium level of corruption in the system.
This article presents a model of business organization in highly corrupted economy. In real life we always meet “big” firms who win the tender, and hire “little specialized firm” to realize the contract. Our model provides an explanation for puzzling fact why firms which win the government contract in auctions, need to hire someone else to realize the project. In our article Iwill try to show that a firm can use mixed strategy and the amount of bribe will decrease.
We provide a survey of the research devoted to microeconomic models of combating corruption. We focus on four aspects: interconnection between corruption and competition on markets for goods and services, structure of public bureaucracy and incentives for public officials: efficiency wages and penalties for corruption. We cite the most important theoretical and some empirical papers on these issues, provide detailed disussion of key arguments and illustrate them with basic models.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.