Nature, Spirit, and Revolution: Situating Hegel's Philosophy of Nature
This paper ties together several anthropological and naturphilosophische themes in Hegel in order to re-examine the place of the philosophy of nature in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. By taking Hegel’s anthropology, and the apparent “transition” from Natur to Geist, as a starting point, I argue that Hegel’s philosophy of nature has for its subject not nature “as such,” or nature as the real, but rather a “spiritual” nature, nature as cognized by Geist, so that the identity of these two natures is not something given, but rather, is constructed by spirit itself retroactively. I trace the origin of this difference to the revolutionary event that institutes Hegel’s anthropology – an event which is, I contend, not a transition from nature to spirit, but a pure break or new beginning; this break and the logic of “idealization” that builds upon it, culminating for Hegel in the creation of the conceptual world of nature as “we” (that is, philosophers of nature) know it. As a result, the philosophy of nature does not precede, but rather follows from, the anthropology and the philosophy of spirit; the natural foundation is retroactively replaced by the philosopher with the anthropological one. The human is revolutionary for Hegel, and not nature as such – the human revolutionizes, among other things, the natural status quo itself. The philosophy of nature is also a product of this revolution.
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason aims to determine boundaries of reason. Reason is a
faculty of the soul. But Kant does not deal explicitly with the question what a faculty of the soul itself may be. The dissertation construes Kant’s implicit notion of a mental faculty in relation to psychological debates in 17th and 18th century Germany. It can be shown that Kant agreed with Christian August Crusius in that faculties are real properties, an assumption that was denied by Christian Wolff. This poses a problem which is fundamental for understanding Kant’s project: How can we have knowledge of mental faculties at all? If knowledge of faculties was empirical for Kant, it would belong to psychology rather than to epistemology which, according to Kant, must not rely on empirical facts. In order to find out whether there can be knowledge a priori about mental faculties, the book provides a close reading of relevant passages from published texts and other sources (lecture transcripts, Reflexionen). The final result is negative: Kant has no conclusive argument for the real existence of mental faculties. Nevertheless, an awareness of Kant’s unwritten “metaphysics of the mental” is essential for understanding implicit premisses of Kant’s thought.
Such crucial aspects of philosophical and psychological conception of scientific work of prominent domestic philosopher and psychologist Sergey Leonidovich Rubinstein as problems of Man and Personality, ontological basis of their essence and means of existence and self-realization are analyzed. Created by the scientists school consecutively developed his sophisticated and profound ideas, integrating separately elaborated aspects (abilities, needs, motivation, consciousness, self-consciousness, thinking as personality problems), widening the context of their researches. Rubinstein's approach due to his disciples and followers, due to the constructivism of his ideas itself holds a leading position in Russian psychology.
This article deals with reconstruction of representations of V. Frankl about the Person as a basis of an individualization and self$formation. Methodological bases of V. Frankl-understanding of the Person in philosophical anthropology of M. Sheler and psychological categories by means of which the process of actualization of humans personal origin is described are considered, and also is given the estimation of sights of V. Frankl from a point of view of a range of the problems solved by psychology of the personality.
личность, свобода, ценности, Совесть, смысл, person, freedom, Values, conscience, meaning
This paper provides some comparison of Herzen’s and Hegel’s notions on philosophy of history and claims to represent Herzen, anatomizing the situation of European riots of the mid. 19th century, as а thinker of current interest. While Herzen asserts that history is a development process with no predetermined goal, Hegel (whose works were very important for Russian intellectuals of Herzen’s generation) proclaims that history has already ended with the Napoleon’s Empire and his own — Hegel’s — philosophy.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.