The volume contains the articles intitially held as talk at the conference "Is this real? Phenomenologies of the imaginary" at the Central-European Institute of Philosophy" (19-22.11.2013) as result of the research projects “Philosophical Investigations of the Body Experiences: Transdisciplinary Perspectives” (GAP 401/0/1164) and “Relevance of Subjectivity” (M300091201) in the Department of the Contemporary Continental Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, Prague.
The paper claims all metaphysical views could be divided in two classes: metaphysical moral exclusivism that is the idea of the otherworldly nature of morality, and metaphysical moral inclusivism that is the idea that morality is an intrinsic component of the reality. The originality of the proposed separation is justiﬁ ed by historical review and the comparison with known ethical concepts. We also consider how the metaphysical notions of morality should correlate with the methodology of the empirical study of moral consciousness. We show that asking the question about the place of morality in the structure of reality imposes some theoretical constraints upon the Is-Ought Problem.
Author raises the question of the principles of studying of western esotericism by researchers inside the church. He suggest to divide all the works of confessional scholars on two approaches: "approach of the tree" and "modernist approach". "Approach of the tree" is based on the idea of unity of the esoteric tradition, it opposes the traditions of the Church to the esoteric tradition, "modernist approach" sees in the esoteric different forms of deception. Confessional approach in the article relates to different areas of modern scientific studies of esotericism – European and American schools
The paper describes the necessary metaphysical grounds and central points of J. Searle’s general theory of social reality. It shows how in a world of physical particles and fields of force, the diversity of social life is constructed with the help of one kind of logical and linguistic operations, i.e. declarations of status functions.
We have to elaborate an ontology of possible worlds only if the possible-worlds semantics, which is an indispensable tool for the formal calculus of the logicians of modalities, is apt to express the truth conditions of natural modal thoughts. We show that because a vast range of natural modal thoughts are sensible to the passage of time, i.e. because they make an essential use of tenses, their truth conditions cannot be reflected in a framework that includes a plurality of worlds. For nothing cannot be a world that is in the time of another.