We use so-called “Imputation Distribution Procedure” approach to sustain long-term cooperation in n-person multicriteria game in extensive form.
Using some specific approach to the coalition-consistency analysis in n-person multicriteria games we introduce two re¯nements of (weak Pareto) equilibria: the strong and strictly strong (n-1)-equilibriums. Axiomatization of the strictly strong (n-1)-equilibria (on closed families of multicriteria games) is provided in terms of consistency, strong one-person rationality, suitable variants of Pareto optimality and converse consistency axiom and others
Using A-optimality concept for vector-valued maximization, we propose a refinement of Pareto equilibria in n-person multicriteria games. The theorems on existence of A-equilibria and subgame perfect Aequilibria are derived. Time consistency of A-equilibria in extensive multicriteria games with perfect and incomplete information is proved.