We prove that a generic complex deformation of a generalized Kummer variety contains no complex analytic tori.
In this paper, we investigate differences in and determinants of technical efficiency across three groups of OECD, Asian and Latin American countries. As technical efficiency determines the capacity with which countries absorb technology produced abroad, these differences are important to understand differences in growth and productivity across countries, especially for developing countries which depend to a large extend on foreign technology. Using a stochastic frontier framework and data for 22 manufacturing sectors for 1996-2005, we find notable differences in technical efficiency between the three country groups we examine. We then investigate the effect of human capital and domestic R&D, proxied by the stock of patents, on technical efficiency. We find that while human capital has always a strongly positive effect on efficiency, an increase in the stock of patents has positive effects on efficiency in high-tech sectors, but negative effects in low-tech sectors.
Superior bargaining power arises when one trading partner becomes dependent on the other. It can be abused to exploit the counterparty or to grab profi ts within a product value chain. It is necessary to apply anti-monopoly law to superior bargaining power because, firstly, abuse of a superior bargaining power distorts the product value chain and, finally, leads to higher prices or a decline in product quality. When superior bargaining power originates from an intellectual property right, its abuse will hinder both the application of the subject technology and competition in adjacent or downstream markets. Secondly, the economic relationships that abuse of superior bargaining power covers are often macroscopical. Compared to other laws and legislative proposals, anti-monopoly law is the most appropriate way to regulate superior bargaining power.