This article aims at investigating the conceptual course of sign-significance-representation throughout different philosophical moments, because it becomes fundamental for the understanding of the scientific development of the processes of signification.
The title of this article unites two rather important notions – “macroevolution” and “the World System”. Those notions are used by different theories but they are intrinsically connected. We understand social macroevolution as a term denoting an important dimension of social evolution that includes a series of the most significant evolutionary transformations. It appears important to emphasize that the World System genesis and a series of its subsequent transformations can be regarded as nodal elements of the social macroevolutionary process. What is more, the World System formation was not only the most important result of all the preceding socioevolutionary macroprocesses, it was also a sort of borderline, beyond which it is totally necessary to distinguish the social macroevolution as a special suprasocietal component of social evolution (that is the one that does not pertain exclusively to any particular society). The main characteristics of macroevolution, such as irreversibility and directionality are manifested in the World System transformations.
Already within the framework of the principle of phenomenological intentionality, one is dealing with the existence of a certain inevitable intertwining of the perspective and the object upon which this perspective is directed, or, in other words, the intertwining of the object of consciousness and that of which one is conscious is guaranteed, as is their initial unity. If we try to apply to consciousness any ‘type’ of relationship or subject–object schemes, then we immediately come up against paradoxes. It is impossible to determine consciousness by means of subject–object, not only because it is not an object, nor a subject, but also because consciousness inevitably turns out to be “prior” to all other similar distinctions. Therefore consciousness is not an object that can be enumerated or related to some other object. It cannot be separated from us; we cannot step aside from it or distance ourselves from it, for consciousness is non-spatial.
This article aims to establish a connection between Kant's Lectures on Anthropology and his political writings.
Рецензия на книгу: Sophie Van der Meeren. Exhortation à la philosophie : le dossier grec, Aristote (Collection Fragments, 11). Paris : Les Belles Lettres, 2011. xxxii, 279 p.
Рассматриваемая статья С.Дж. Гулда и Р.Ч. Левонтина является одной из ключевых как для споров об эволюционной теории, так и для критики социобиологии. Рефлексия философии биологии, спровоцированная Гулдом и Левонтином, позволяет прояснить связь адаптационистской программы с биологическим редукционизмом.
How can we understand (German) idealism as emancipatory today, after the new realist critique? In this paper, I argue that we can do so by identifying a political theology of revolution and utopia at the theoretical heart of German Idealism. First, idealism implies a certain revolutionary event at its foundation. Kant’s Copernicanism is ingrained, methodologically and ontologically, into the idealist system itself. Secondly, this revolutionary origin remains a "non-place" for the idealist system, which thereby receives a utopian character. I define the utopian as the ideal gap, produced by and from within the real, between the non-place of the real as origin and its reduplication as the non-place of knowledge’s closure, as well as the impulse, inherent in idealism, to attempt to close that gap and fully replace the old with the new. Based on this definition, I outline how the utopian functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Furthermore, I suggest that (German) idealism may be seen as a political-theological offshoot of realism, via the objective creation of a revolutionary condition. The origin of the ideal remains in the real, maintaining the utopian gap and the essentially critical character of idealism, both at the level of theory and as social critique.