В статье рассматривается, каким образом региональные элиты влияют на электоральные результаты доминирующей партии - "Единой России" (ЕР). На основе оригинальной базы данных, включающей сведения о выборах в региональные законодательные собрания в 2003-2011 годах, мы показываем, что ЕР демонстрирует лучшие результаты в регионах, где губернаторы выстроили собственные сильные "политические машины". Таким образом, заменяя всенародно избранных губернаторов невыразительными бюрократами, с трудом мобилизующими избирателей, федеральный центр подрывает собственную электоральную поддержку. Это одна из причин относительно низких показателей ЕР на недавних выборах.
Most studies of intergovernmental financial flows in the Russian Federation focus on the federal center’s decision-making in determining the direction of these flows. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that regional governments employ a variety of tools and strategies to compete over federal transfers. This study uses data on federal transfers during 2002–2012 to examine the factors associated with the politically sensitive share of such transfers occurring in this period. The key findings highlight the importance of administrative capacity and the value of attracting attention from, as well as cultivating relations with, federal officials for shaping decision-making on the distribution of federal transfers. We discuss some specific strategies used by more successful regional governments in attracting additional federal funds.
Corruption is widespread throughout the former Communist states, and it is particularly severe and entrenched in Russia. Despite the fact that Russia's contemporary corruption has recently become a subject of analysis, there is, however, no study that has addressed the role of the Communist legacy in the development of various aspects of corruption. This paper contributes to the debates through, first, disentangling the complex phenomenon that is corruption, and focusing on its three aspects: supply, demand, and the attitude of the population. Second, the paper also contributes to the literature on modern corruption by explicitly focusing on the role of the historical legacy in these different aspects of corruption. The study is based on several rich data-sets on corruption and on an original data-set compiled to measure the percentage share of Communists in various regions of Russia in the last decades of the USSR (1970s-1980s). The analysis presented in the paper uncovers different roles of the Communist legacies across the development of various aspects of corruption. By doing so, the paper contributes to the literature on historical legacies in general, on Communist legacies in particular, as well as to the broader literature on the causes of corruption in transitional societies. © 2014 Taylor & Francis.
In this paper, we build a theory that presents the process of succession at the subnational level as bargaining between the region and the center. The region should first be able to produce qualifying candidates for successor status, which requires incumbent control. If potential successors emerge and one is designated as such by the incumbent, the central authorities still need to accept such a candidate as the new leader. The center’s strength (depending on the level of centralization) and the region’s strength (depending on regional elite cohesion) shape this negotiation. Using biographical data on subnational political elites in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the 1990s and 2000s, we construct elite social networks and demonstrate how and why we observe leader succession in Tatarstan in 2010, but not in Bashkortostan.