Performance Incentives under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia’s Regions
Available evidence indicates that there is considerable variation among autocracies in the extent to which subnational officials are rewarded for economic growth. Why is economic performance used as a criterion for appointment in some autocracies but not in others? We argue that in more competitive—though still autocratic—regimes, the political imperatives of maintaining an electoral machine that can win semi-competitive elections leads regime leaders to abandon cadre policies that promote economic development. Using data on turnover among high-level economic bureaucrats in Russia’s 89 regions between 2001 and 2012, we find that performance-based appointments are more frequent in less competitive regions. These findings demonstrate one way that semi-competitive elections can actually undermine economic development under autocracy
State Capitalism could be characterized by a triple role of the state: the state performs as a “programmer” to guide economic activity; it acts as a “protector” to safeguard national economic interests; and it also plays the role as a “producer” to create national wealth through its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, the influences of State Capitalism in a country are not only limited to the domestic sphere. They often extend internationally, either through the globalization of SOEs, or through Sovereign Fund investments, or by means of other influences. Many recent acquisition projects by SOEs, often in strategic sectors, highlight the importance of understanding this new geopolitical investment which has created special relations between State Capitalism and the free market. They also raise the question of the need for updating national economic security concerns in the context of globalization. As the value of Sovereign Funds reaches several trillion dollars, the controversy surrounding these Funds is evolving. For many, these Funds do not necessarily always look for maximizing business performance, but are sometimes also accompanied by political and strategic ambitions of the respective states from where they originate. The phenomenon of State Capitalism has gained prominence in recent years especially in several emerging markets. It appeared, firstly, because of multiple government interventions in the economy,and secondly, emphasis given to the globalization of their SOEs / economic organizations in international markets (China, Russia, Brazil, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India, Korea, etc.). In January 2012, The Economist published another special article on State Capitalism and wondered if the new balance of power that is being built-up with the emergence of market oriented SOEs will pose a challenge to the liberal capitalist model. The objectives of this conference are manifold: to examine the characteristics of State Capitalism in the world economy, especially in emerging countries, to assess its real impact on economic development, to identify its scope to other developing countries, and also to explore the major challenges that it poses to the liberal capitalist model in the world of free-markets.
В статье дан анализ ситуации, которая сложилась в России в начале ХХ века, и попыток царской власти по предотвращению надвигающейся катастрофы, которые были связанны с реализацией идеи о народном представительстве. Также показано отношение последнего российского императора к идее формирования народного представительства.
The paper contextualises the philosophy of Adam Smith and analyses the pre-history of political economy as being in large parts determined by notions of patriarchalism, i. e. the notion that the role of a head of state is analogous to the head of a private household. It is shown how this notion migrates from political philosophy proper (Bodin, Hobbes) into mercantilist discourses and that it is a fundamental part of Locke's economic theory. Adam Smith denies the validity of this analogy: his cosmopolitanism, his views on the divison of labour, and his arguments against interventionism are all directed against patriarchalist misunderstandings of the relationship between the economy and the state.
Energy security has become a central concern for all the countries in the Asian region and the search for sufficient sources of energy to fuel economic growth has drastically influenced relations among the South Asian countries as well as their respective relations with their neighbours China, Myanmar, Iran, and Afghanistan. The recent nuclear deal between India and the US is also indicative of how energy and power politics are linked and how these new inter-linkages underlie relations between states. This book aims to give a South Asian perspective on the geopolitics of energy, with a central focus on India. The chapters address show India's global and regional foreign policy making has changed in light of India's search for energy and how this is affecting the relationship on a global level between India and the US, as well as on a regional level between India and the other Asian countries. The book also offers views from Pakistan and Bangladesh, as well as how this shifting reality is affecting relations between India and Southeast Asia. © 2009 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. All rights reserved.
The paper consists of three main sections. The first is devoted to a discussion of the "state capitalism" concept and the reasons for the growing interest to this phenomenon. It is proposed here to consider the state capitalism not only in terms of the state ownership in major national industrial enterprises and banks, but also taking into account the efficiency of SOEs. In the second section, the new data on the state involvement in the Russian economy are represented, including the shares of the state in the authorized capital of the largest industrial enterprises and banks. Their economic indicators are compared. Contrary to some assumptions P / E values for national champions are lagging behind the average for emerging markets. The third section examines the hypothesis that one of the major challenges faced by the state capitalism is the development of investment incentives for SOEs and their performance. It is shown that the interests of the state as an owner of business enterprises are often in conflict with the interests of the state as a social institution. A number of examples are demonstrated. In order to solve this problem the state should reduce its stakes in SOEs except for those that are of strategic importance. The output of the analysis is that the state capitalism as a social phenomenon has no a long-term perspective. Most of so called “state capitalist” countries will take in future the path of traditional mixed market economy.
В статье опровергаются идеи о деспотическом характере и неизменности российского самодержавия. Автор показывает, что в истории основания легитимности власти менялись, что обычай, культурная традиция, закон, а также высшие сословия, прежде всего дворянство, а затем, во все возрастающей мере – общественные организации – оказывали влияние на государственное управление. Исторически прослеживаются такие формы монархии как народная монархия XVII в., дворянская патерналистская монархия XVIII в., правомерная монархия первой половины XIX в., всесословная правомерная монархия второй половины XIX в., дуалистическая правовая монархия 1906-1917 гг., которые обозначают общий вектор развития страны – от народной монархии к правовому государству.
В обсуждении того, как следует определять частную собственность автор выделяет два подхода: субъективный (отожествляющий частную собственность с индивидуальной) и функциональный (связывающий ее с капиталистическим типом использования).