

Perspectives on Development in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) Region

Leonid Grinin
Andrey Korotayev
Arno Tausch

Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy

World System and World Values
Perspectives

 Springer

Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

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Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy

World System and World Values Perspectives

With a Foreword by Dilshod Achilov

 Springer

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Foreword

Islamic and Islamist resurgence, along with the evolving dynamics thereof, continues to shape the increasingly complex political landscape of Muslim societies worldwide. While a lot has been written about why and how Islam has been (and is being) instrumentalized in politics—often coined as a phenomenon of “Islamism” or “Political Islam,” much confusion still remains in both public and academic circles. We still lack a thorough understanding of Islamism’s intricate nuances and diverse manifestations in a rapidly changing and an ever-connected, techno-driven global village. Perhaps it is not surprising given the Islamism’s multilevel, multi-dimensional character. However, to date, little has been done to systematically unpack the complex dimensions of modern Islamism, particularly from its genesis to its becoming a dominant political force in the Muslim world. Furthermore, we still know little about (both current and prospective) dynamic challenges/opportunities that diverse Islamist political actors (old and new) present both in domestic as well as in cross-national context.

By directly addressing this lacuna, this monograph—by Profs. Grinin, Korotayev, and Tausch—enables the reader to better understand and contextualize what modern Islamism entails and the ways in which it grapples with sociopolitical challenges and opportunities in contemporary Muslim politics. Furthermore, the authors effectively probe the extent to which ordinary Muslims negotiate support for politically moderate and politically radical Islamism and how these attitudes have changed over time. In doing so, this volume accomplishes three critical tasks: (a) *diagnosing* the enduring and outstanding sociopolitical issues pertaining democratization, (b) *explaining* the genesis and contingencies of Islamist political ideology, and (c) *forecasting* the trajectory for potential triumphs and pitfalls of modern Islamist movements, particularly in the MENA region.

Virtually all existing studies on modern Islamism acknowledge its complexity and multifaceted nature. Conceptual overgeneralizations as well as simplistic reductionism major pitfalls that hamper our understanding of a complex concept such as Islamism. To avoid these pitfalls, engaging in a painstaking dialogue between theory and empirical data is instrumental (Achilov 2016). Yet very few studies have attempted to unpack the intricate nuances of Political Islam by

engaging in rich qualitative-comparative as well as quantitative analyses in a diverse cross-national context (Achilov 2015). To this end, this book makes a timely contribution that advances the research frontier on the evolving dynamics of Islamism from a comparative and cross-national perspective.

In conceptualizing Islamism, the authors acknowledge that:

Islamism is an ideology and movement associated with the politicization of Islam and the transformation of the ideas and values of Islam (often into political slogans but sometimes even into political programs). Yet, the ideological range of political Islamists is broad and diverse.

While the overarching puzzle of the book is to unpack the nexus among Islamism, Arab Spring, and evolving democratization patterns, the authors remarkably accomplish this goal by providing nuanced and contextualized narratives to the following, though not limited to, exhaustive questions:

- *What is modern Islamism and in what ways it continues to evolve?*
- *How can we deconstruct and analyze the different dimensions of modern Islamist ideologies?*
- *What explains the divergence between moderate and radical forms of Islamist ideology in the Muslim world? How do modernization effects and gender parity fit into this equation?*
- *To what extent has the recent wave of revolutions shaped the societal values in the Middle East? What did the Arab Spring deliver and in what ways did it fail? Who participated in the Arab Spring uprising? Short and long-term Implications?*
- *How, if any, will moderate political Islamism influence the democratization trajectory in the post-Arab spring space? Under what conditions will it succeed and in what ways may it fail?*
- *How do ordinary Muslims negotiate the tensions between supporting moderate versus radical Islamism?*
- *How do the emerging patterns and findings (from the analyses) help construct tangible paths forward toward promoting civil liberties and robust political rights in the Muslims world (particularly in the Middle East and North Africa [MENA])?*

This body of work presented by leading scholars who have written extensively on the subject sheds *timely light* to these pressing questions that help advance knowledge on deciphering the prospects of democratization in the Muslim world. Perhaps the most distinguishing aspect of this scholarship is that the authors invite readers to view the familiar questions (that scholars have long grappled with) in a completely new and fresh light. The breadth of historical accounts as well as the scope of the contemporary issues are remarkably comprehensive. Said otherwise, the explanatory conditions involve all major domains of life including civil society, political economy, human developmental metrics, critical historical junctures, international relations (including the exogenous interventionist policies from), and,

of course, domestic politics. In short, the readers will find robust explanations for each of the abovementioned questions.

As it becomes clear as you read on, the authors construct complex arguments that go beyond simplistic reductionism. Theoretically, the explanations are grounded on the World Systems theoretical framework. This framework helps draw a *big picture* of the World politics in terms of shifting paradigms of the past decade. This is significant given that the social science literature has been largely silent on this matter. Particularly, the book makes a cohesive inquiry into the macrolevel, world order systemic analysis in terms of how Muslim states position themselves given the complex web of “clashing” international conflicts and competing strategic interests. Empirically, extensive individual-level survey data (also nested at the state-level aggregation) inform the findings. Finally, the emerging nexus between theory and empirical analyses serve as a foundation for the policy formulation in regard to the pressing questions listed above.

The book is organized into two broad parts. The first half examines both diverging and converging patterns of genesis, diffusion, and evolution of modern Islamism: in this process, the complexities and Islamism is unpacked in greater detail. Uniquely, the book engages in a civilizational comparative analysis of India, China, and MENA through the World Systems theoretical lens. This novel theoretical and methodological approach is both fresh and innovative which takes the reader through a previously uncharted territory of Muslim politics.

By rightly highlighting that “Islamism not only spiritually but also functionally permeates the social fabric of society,” the volume explores this venue further and thereby addresses an uneasy task head-on: providing a context-rich elucidation of the *characteristics, intelligibility, and practical sociopolitical functionalities* of Islamism. The book successfully documents how *diverse* the Islamist actors are (and have been) who are not merely bounded in political affairs; rather, previously less known aspects of Islamist diversity is expressively discussed.

In so doing, both social bases, along with humanistic value systems, are accounted while the prevailing (and often simplistic) assumptions regarding Islamism are debunked. At the same time, the authors do not shy away from raising hard questions about shifting popular sentiments toward “moderate versus radical” Islamism. What makes this volume distinct from other studies on the field is that the proposed function-characteristic typology (e.g., functionalities) is highly innovative (i.e., novel) in terms of how diverse manifestation of Islamism is embodied in society at large.

Furthermore, conducting a careful and nuanced analysis of the Arab Spring mass mobilizations, the authors also present an elaborate sketch of post-revolutionary and post-voluntary events that unfolded in Egypt as well as in Yemen, Libya, and Syria. The book also provides the primary source accounts in the post-revolution Egypt following Chap. 5 (“*Letters from Tahrir*”). These raw accounts (letters) of the events provide insightful, yet diverse context to the ongoing uneasy Egyptian struggle for democracy.

The second part of the book presents rich empirical account of how Muslims negotiate the attitudinal sentiments toward radicalism, terrorism, relations with the West, Islamophobia, Anti-Semitism, and collective political mobilization (e.g., mass protest engagement). Impressively, the account of who actually participated in the Arab Spring demonstrations, along with the individual demographic and political-ideological indicators, is well documented. The analyses and findings are grounded on empirical (e.g., factor analytical) examination of individual-level quantitative survey data (nested at country-levels) primarily sourced from the *Arab Barometer*, *Pew Research Center*, *World Values Survey*, and other reputable databases.

Central to the authors' findings is the emphasis that "it will take much time and hard work" to promote liberal values in the MENA region: "not instead of the Islamist ones but in combination with them." In other words, the authors posit that:

...only through moderate Islamism interacting with secular political forces will the Islamic world be able to undergo a considerable transformation of its society. This is complex and contradictory, but perhaps the only real path to social development for many Islamic countries.

Relatedly, the volume effectively illustrates *why* the use of force is insufficient to combat radical and militarist Islamism and, in this regard, explicate *how* the politically moderate Islamist voices may triumph over radicalism *organically*. In doing so, the intervening exogenous factors (i.e., international variables, particularly stemming from the West) are not discounted. In my humble view, the book makes a precise diagnosis that the future of Muslim democratization (in which both secular and Islamist forces may coexist and compete electorally) rests on preventing misguided and ill-informed foreign interventions (particularly in the MENA region).

Indeed, one of the most distinctive accomplishments is the effective assemblage of large volume of comparative-qualitative and path-breaking quantitative data. In addition to providing rich-contextualized explanations, the volume provides insightful *forecasts* based on the current sociopolitical trajectories (particularly in the MENA region). From this vantage, what makes this contributing particularly unique is that the monograph offers *tangible*, *realistic*, and *innovative policy* venues that can help foster conditions conducive to building pluralist society with moderate Islamism playing an instrumental role.

This book is a product of scholarly collaboration (among three authors) reflecting years in the making. Each author brings a unique perspective in addressing the questions at hand. I applaud the authors for accomplishing such a timely project which will help advance the debate on evolving dynamics of democratization in the Muslim world.

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Chapter 1

Introduction. Why Arab Spring Became Arab Winter



1.1 Islamism, Its Currents, and Terrorism

If we open a newspaper, turn on an international news channel, or search for international news via platforms such as “*Google News*,”¹ we will quickly be confronted with the often value-laden and bitter debate which goes on today about “*Islamism*,” the “*Arab Spring*” and also the *future of democracy* under the threat of global terrorism. Almost all politicians turn out, in one way or another, to be connected with these topics. For example on May 10, 2017, “*Google News*” displayed as hit number 1 in the list of articles dealing with the subject of “*Islamism*” an analysis or polemic, depending on your point of view, by the Gatestone Institute (a US think tank), attempting to convince us that France’s newly elected, Emmanuel Macron, is a “*Useful Infidel*.” They argue that he is even worse than a supporter of terrorism or Islamism because he does not even realize the existence of such a threat at all.²

Further down the news result list, we find a completely different item that deals with the encounter between the German Chancellor Ms. Angela Merkel and the Turkish President Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on February 1, 2017, in Ankara:

The term ‘Islamist terrorism’ should not be used in any context, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Thursday. Speaking at a joint press conference in Ankara, Erdoğan expressed concern over the use of term ‘Islamist terrorism,’ saying that it is not ethical to mention the two terms side by side, as Islam is a religion that promotes peace. ‘The literal meaning of the word Islam is peace’ Erdoğan said, and added

¹ <https://news.google.com/>.

² <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/10310/emmanuel-macron-islamism>.

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that the interchangeable use of terrorism with Islam, as a result of Daesh terrorists worries billions of Muslims worldwide.³

According to President Erdogan, there is no “*Islamism*” at all and consequently, we should change the title of this book? Or, did he mean that one should not confuse terrorism and radical groups using Islam as their banner with those respectable and moderate Islamists who despise terrorism no less than do Westerners? We would think the latter is more likely than the former. Yet, it turns out that it is difficult to define Islamism and decide whether or not terrorism is associated with it. The analysis of Islamism will be a major subject of our book (see Chaps. 2, 3, 8, and 11). It is important to realize that Islamism is far from being homogenous; it is multidimensional and undergoes considerable transformations in the course of time. Islamism is no less diverse than Socialism. You will remember that both the followers of oppressive totalitarianism (down to the cannibalistic Khmer Rouge) and quite respectable social democrats (who play important roles in the maintenance and improvement of the democratic mechanisms of Western countries) would call themselves “socialists.”

Islamism is an ideology and movement associated with the politicization of Islam and the transformation of the ideas and values of Islam (often into political slogans but sometimes even into political programs). Yet, the ideological range of political Islamists is broad and diverse. At the same time, Islamism relies on shaping or directing the powerful domestic mood of lay Muslims and on constructing themselves as a kind of grass roots (i.e., what Americans would call a “populist”) archetype. That is why it can hardly be eliminated and one can only direct it toward becoming moderate, civilized, open, and cultural. Our position is based on the idea that only through moderate Islamism interacting with secular political forces will the Islamic world be able to undergo a considerable transformation of its society. This is complex and contradictory, but perhaps the only real path to social development for many Islamic countries (this aspect is discussed in detail in Chap. 3). Then, perhaps, moderate Islamism will serve as a springboard to transition Islamic societies into accepting or accommodating global values.

Radical Islamism, terrorist Islamism, especially the recent excesses of the terrorist Islamic State/Daesh and its supporters in different countries, have made this direction a scarecrow for the whole world. It is, therefore, not surprising that President Erdogan would like to disown this term as it applies to his fellow citizens. It is also not surprising that quite a few politicians and researchers suggest abandoning the term “Islamism” in relation to moderate Islamism, retaining it only to refer to radicals. However, this would be neither right nor wise.

Islamism has many faces, and the views of its supporters vary. There is nothing strange in the fact that the positions of researchers who write about Islamism differ. There is no complete unity among the authors of this book. But maybe it is good. Perhaps this is the case when the truth is born in a dispute. Be that as it may, our position, which we propose and develop in this book (especially in its Part I), is based on the fact that it is through moderate Islamism, in its interaction with secular

³<https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/02/02/islamist-terrorism-shouldnt-be-used-in-any-context-erdogan-says>.

political forces, that the Arab World will be able to move toward a significant positive change in Islamic society.

Talking about the differences in approaches to the definition of Islamism and its danger, it is impossible not to mention that important sections of the leading and, therefore most influential scholars who have a global platform have attempted to counterbalance this rising global concern about Islamist terrorism by maintaining that not Islamist terrorism, but “*Islamophobia*” is the real problem we are facing.

In the prestigious “*Columbia Law Review*,” published at New York’s Columbia University, Beydoun (2016) writes:

Islamophobia as the presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and inassimilable. Combined with this is the belief that expressions of Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism. It argues that Islamophobia is rooted in understandings of Islam as civilization’s antithesis and perpetuated by government structures and private citizens. Finally, this Piece asserts that Islamophobia is also a process—namely, the dialectic by which state policies targeting Muslims endorse prevailing stereotypes and, in turn, embolden private animus toward Muslim subjects. Islamophobia therefore has three dimensions: structural policy, private animus, and the dialectical process by which the former legitimizes and mobilizes the latent and patent bigotry of individuals and private actors. The result is far more expansive and complex than mere “fear and dislike” of Islam and Muslims. (Beydoun 2016: 2)

Indeed, Islamophobia can be transferred into a trope from which to Muslim’s anger at the West may transform from an ember into a forest fire. Yet it cannot be said to cause Islamism or to be a central feature of it. Those who claim this are also implicitly suggesting that Islamism is no more than a reaction to Western Islamophobia and thus Muslims are incapable of creating their own independent ideology.

However, of course, the matter is far from being only Islamophobia. Danger, although sometimes pre-enlarged, is quite real. Not everything goes smoothly. The radical Islamism has also a large number of adherents in the Muslim and Arab World as well as in Muslim communities in Europe and other parts of world. And actually, this Islamism is accompanied with mass character terrorism, that is the terrorist movement involves a large number of people. More often terrorist organizations are not mass-based organizations. They are small and secretive (Gause III 2005: 68). However in the last two decades, we could observe the emergence and growth of international terrorist organizations (as al-Qaeda and ISIS) that are rather numerous. In our book, we will examine the social roots of terrorism and its connection with Islamism, and the very real threat of Global Terrorism (we discuss this problem in Chaps. 3, 8, and 9). Nevertheless, we believe that although radicalism is an integral part of the broad current, unpleasant and dangerous, it is, but a natural offshoot in the development of Islamism. Islamism is not identical with terrorism. Any teaching, belief system or ideology, always has a radical wing, if it has enough followers. Therefore, the task is, not to exterminate extremists, but to create as few conditions as possible for the growth of radicalism.

Given the sheer magnitude and the never-ending character of the global Islamist terrorist challenge the world is now facing, we share with the Israeli analyst Heller (2015) the idea that it is time to seriously analyze what those sectors of Muslim society that support extremism, think and do, and why they think in such a way—while, at

the same time, other important segments of Muslim society oppose radicalism and terrorism and even combat it. It is possible to achieve this by the multivariate analysis of global representative opinion surveys (see Chaps. 8–11).

Terrorism and radical Islamism are particularly fueled when two factors coincide: the low level of a population's general culture platform (e.g., low literacy levels) and the low level of political culture in the societies with weak statehood traditions [not by chance terrorists are especially active among the Palestinians who have never had a state, in Afghanistan where the tribalistic ideas still predominate, in some territories of Iraq and Syria where states were never established (see Chap. 2 for more detail)]. So when the state power weakens, terrorism is strengthened in polities constituted of a conglomerate of various ethnic groups and cultures.

That is why the destruction of strong (albeit authoritarian) regimes under the flag of establishing democracy is one of the most important conditions for the growth of radicalism and terrorism. We will take a closer look at this in Chaps. 4 and 5. Thus, it is necessary to select allies in the fight against radicalism. Such allies, albeit temporary, can include socially just authoritarian regimes. Attempts to establish democracy in countries with fragile statehood (for example in Libya) through armed revolution, intervention, and the overthrow of the government will unequivocally lead to rampant terrorism. Attempts to establish socialist republics in countries such as Afghanistan (what the Soviet Union was trying to do) will lead to the same outcomes—a rise in individuals motivated to join terrorist groups. The invasion of Iraq gave birth to Daesh. Another factor contributing to the growth of terrorism is the attempt to use such organizations for geopolitical purposes. We note that al-Qaeda became a product of reliance on terrorist groups in the fight against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan (see, e.g., Kepel 2002).

Osman (2016) considers the secularist-Islamist conflict to be the main issue to be resolved at the center of Islamic societies. In general, this is true. However, in our view, the transition to secularism and its victory is much more likely through moderate Islamism, that is, through cooperation with it. And if we consider that radical Islamism is the result of the violation of social order, then this order should be kept at any cost. To this, the problem is not a choice between authoritarianism and democracy, but between a secular authoritarian regime and radical Islamism. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand that radical Islamism can be weakened if not effectively defeated under current conditions only on the field of Islam proper, supporting moderate and law-abiding Islamism and cooperating with it where possible.

For how long will the Islamic terrorism remain a political label for the Muslim world? This is a difficult question. Huntington (1996) suggested that by the third decade of the twenty-first century the ageing of population and the economic development of the Muslim countries would probably lead to a considerable weakening of the Muslims' propensity to violence. However, the 2020s are close, but Islamist terrorism is still very strong. Yet, we suppose that sooner or later it will decline since the cultural level increases (the process of ageing will influence this too). Moreover, moderate Islam could play a critical role for this weakening of terrorism. Moderate Islam is a legitimate movement, which under certain conditions moves toward order and respectability. That is why it fears radical terrorist Islamism and sometimes even fights it.

Meanwhile, one should keep in mind that wars, interventions, and especially the overthrows of strong political secular regimes contribute to the growth of terrorism. That was the case in Iraq in 2003 after the actual US departure from this country which created a power vacuum which coincided with the start of the civil war in Syria in 2012–2013.

In any case, at present, there is every indication of a global threat of radical terroristic Islamism: the seemingly endless sequence of Islamist terrorist attacks in Manhattan, London, Madrid, Boston, Paris, and Berlin et cetera. In confronting the Islamist terrorist threat, it is wrong to define radical Islamism only in terms of the identification with the outright support for the immediate “*bomb-throwing terror*,” while neglecting the underlying ideological radicalism and also the ongoing radicalization of such organizations as the *Muslim Brotherhood* (Lebl 2014a, b) or the Turkish *Milli Görüş* (Vielhaber 2012), which both start from the intense hatred of Western civilization as such (Lebl 2013; Tibi 2013a, b). It is also worthwhile to emphasize that Islamist movements, both radical and moderate, are internally heterogeneous. Under certain conditions (in particular a strong political order and participation of Islamists in elections), moderate groups begin to prevail, whereas with the banning of Islamist organizations and the pursuit of them radical ones do. Such ambivalence of Islamism is not always taken into account, which sometimes leads to serious political consequences.

1.2 The Arab Spring and Opportunities for Democracy in Muslim Countries

The issue of correlation between Islam and democracy is one of the most complicated and disputed areas of concern with respect to mutual understanding between the West and the Arab World. In Chaps. 3–5, and 8–9, we discuss different aspects of this problem in detail. Is Islam compatible with democracy? Probably, to a certain extent, it is. At least the last decade demonstrates that some Islamic movements are capable of integrating into democratic processes. But one can hardly ignore the fact that this democracy has certain distinctions from the Western standards of democracy. In particular, since the Islamists enjoy broad popularity among the Muslim populations, the democratic procedures are generally profitable for them. That is why it is impossible and dangerous to try to completely separate democratic and Muslim values, but it is necessary to search for a certain balance between them.

The causes and results of the Arab Spring as well as the factors affecting those disappointing outcomes are the major subjects of our investigation (Chaps. 4 and 5 and also many chapters of Part II are devoted to a multiaspect analysis of this event). The Arab Spring revealed the forces and problems which turned the renovation expectations of the spring into the gloomy reality of winter. This phenomenon has showed up in other Islamic states, but in a different way. The price of these revolutionary experiments turned out to be very high everywhere. In this respect, Nikolai Berdyaev

was right when he wrote that “neither revolutionaries nor counter-revolutionaries can make out what a revolution is” (Berdyayev 1990: 41). No doubt, the revolutions in the Arab countries had certain triggers. The analysis of social, economic, and demographic processes and transformations in the Arab World during the last fifty years can convincingly explain the causes of the Arab revolutions and counterrevolutions (the analysis of this phenomenon is presented in Chap. 4, also some aspects are covered in Chap. 2). A rapid population growth, the increasing share of youth cohorts (the so-called youth bulge), as well as fast transformations in education system, living standards, and living habits are combined here with relatively high illiteracy rates, the high influence of religious fundamentalists, unemployment, etc. All these fueled the dissatisfaction with the level of justice, system of distribution of benefits, nepotism, corruption, lack of democracy, with Arab states’ social and political regimes in general, as well as with the autocrats who cling to power for decades. However, all these could transform into revolutions under certain circumstances (including the explosive increase in food prices in 2010–2011) and with active outside interference these have led to revolutionary outbursts. At the same time, most Arab countries (with all the above-described problems) developed quite vigorously and had good chances to overcome some of the problems had that development continued. Yet, in the countries unprepared for democracy where the Western values would be adopted by a smaller part of population and in a quite superficial manner the expectations that revolutions would bring democracy and progress contributed to the fact that the revolutions unleashed powerful destabilization forces but failed to bring any positive effects.

On the other hand, as we said earlier some Islamist movements are capable of integrating into democratic processes. And since the Islamists enjoy broad popularity among the Muslim populations, democratic procedures are generally profitable for them. But this is a path not to liberal but to Muslim democracy, the latter being considerably narrower than the liberal one but still much better than dictatorship. There are many supporters of Muslim democracy. For example, Hoffman and Jamal (2014) concluded that in Tunisia and Egypt the reading of the Quran, not mosque attendance, is robustly associated with a considerable increase in the likelihood of participating in protest. Furthermore, this relationship is not simply a function of support for political Islam. Evidence suggests that personal motivation mechanisms rather than political resources are the reason behind this result. Qur’an readers, the study attempts to show, are more sensitive to inequities and more supportive of democracy than are nonreaders. These findings suggest, the authors maintain, a powerful new set of mechanisms by which religion may, in fact, help to structure political protest more generally.

Why have revolutions in the Arab countries failed to establish a stable democracy? The matter is that revolutions frequently lead to dictatorships even more cruel than the pre-revolutionary one, and moreover, to the societies’ degradation (see, e.g., Huntington 1968, 1993; Gurr 1988; Grinin 2012a, 2013a, b, 2014, 2016, 2017a, b; Grinin and Korotayev 2016b; Grinin et al. 2016b). One can often speak about the so-called Thermidor Law when a revolutionary wave is followed by a reactionary wave which can take the form of dictatorship.

Certainly, revolutions can stir societies, mobilize new forces, raise urgent issues, and give considerable political experience. They can lead to positive developments. But one can hardly expect that revolutions can solve the most important problems. Unfortunately, at present the developmental model follows not the desirable scheme from revolution to democracy but the one from revolution either to counterrevolutions (as in Egypt) which seems more preferable, or to new revolutions or just chaos and civil wars what we observe today in Libya, Yemen, and Syria (see Chap. 5). Moreover, sometimes they lead to the creation of terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS/Daesh). In any case the euphoria of revolution and its initial slogans gave way to deep splits in Arab society, drop in living standards, transformation of peaceful protests into protracted conflicts, civil wars, and military interventions.

It shows that revolution does not necessarily lead to democracy and the transition to democracy requires a certain level of development, mentality, and readiness of a significant part of population. Otherwise, revolutions can even delay the transition to democracy as we see in the case of many Arab countries.

1.3 Islamism and Values

Revolutions also raise the questions of societies' values. The issue of values in the Arab and Muslim countries is covered systematically in the first part of the present book, while the second part uses statistics and formal methods to analyze these same values via their indicators. The analysis of values shows that many Muslim societies demonstrate a large variance in value perceptions as they are modernizing; as a consequence of considerable differences in education level, culture, and income of different population layers (not to speak about the differences caused by confessional heterogeneity of population); they are, to a certain extent, split societies. At the same time, the analysis shows that Islamist values predominate (even in the most advanced societies like Tunisian they remain very popular). To ignore this fact is silly and even dangerous. At the same time, we show that Islamist values are far from inherently contradicting Western liberal values. The matter is related to the emphasis and priorities of this array of values. That is why, in our opinion it will take much time and hard work to promote liberal values, not to replace but to combine with Islamist ones.

Unfortunately, revolutions far from always strengthening democratic, let alone liberal values in a society, the situation can lead to the opposite in this respect. Robbins and Tessler (2012) claimed to have found strong support for the thesis that the impact of the Arab Spring on public opinion includes a decrease in support for democracy but an increase in commitment to democracy, at least in two very dissimilar Arab countries. Democracy is no longer the unambiguous solution to social, economic, and political problems.

It is rather the hoped-for end point of a regime transition that, at least in its early stages, appears to bring political chaos, economic downturn, and [a] rise in crime and violence in [the] transitioning countries. Confronted with these realities, some citizens are apparently less inclined to believe that democracy is the best political system. (Robbins and Tessler 2012).

Although the political transition may be tumultuous, many citizens appear, the authors argue, to blame incumbent regimes for this outcome rather than democracy-seekers or other protestors. The uprisings appear, Robbins and Tessler (2012) argue, to have demonstrated that although regimes made many claims about the disadvantages of democracy, they failed to fulfill their part of the authoritarian bargain by showing decisiveness and providing security and economic well-being in exchange for restricting political rights. This claim, however, appears to be grossly exaggerated (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011b).

Islamism may seem something terrible and unbearable to a Western individual (and there is some truth here). At the same time, moderate Islamism undoubtedly has its positive sides, including the moral aspect (in particular, it encourages the priority of the spiritual over the material and restricts the itch for gain; it requires helping the poor and mutual help as well as preserves family values and justice as well as forbids immorality and drinking, etc.). Islam makes all Muslims generally equal before Allah and, respectively, his law. In this context, Islam and Islamism are especially democratic. Thus, Islamism represents a whole system of moral and spiritual values, rather up-to-date in certain respects which can appear frequently enough to provide a normal life for a huge number of people and entire societies.

What is the problem then with Islamism in terms of modern values? In our opinion, it may be presented in terms of two distinct concerns. First, the Islamists, especially the radical ones, figuratively speaking look not toward the future but to the past, and second, they are not ready to admit a number of modern values especially Western ones. These values are often rejected not because they are bad by themselves but because they do not fit the Islamist dogmas (i.e., they are bad because they contradict Qur'an or Shari'ah law). Also the Islamists try to impose their views on other members of society justifying this with the belief (or espoused claim) that they have the supreme power sanctioned from above.

The status of females in Muslim society is one of the major problems in the relations between Islam and the West, as well as one of the main values heatedly debated. Indeed, numerous real problems are abundant here. Nevertheless, if one sets aside the external attributes (hijab, dresses, etc.), female rights are generally recognized including the right to vote, education, jobs, and many other things [yet, there are many problems here, but that the movement in the right direction is still obvious (see Chaps. 3 and 11 for detail)].

Here one should bear in mind that when brought to their own (extreme) maximum, the rights of individuals are also likely to conflict with social values and other people's rights (as is apparent today in the right to bear arms in the USA). Thus, a gradual expansion of the scope of individual's rights is more socially adaptive because societies would be able to integrate these rights into their national social compact.

There is another painful issue of the balance between Islamism and democracy already described above which also produces non-uniformity among the Islamists. In general, moderate Islamism does not contradict democracy and respect for certain human rights but of course, within the Islamic conception. In the course of the Islamists' integration into the political landscape, they come to perceive democracy more as a value. But certainly, much depends on the political moment. Thus, a spokesman for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement said in July, 2013: "We have our own belief in the democratic system and we are ready to die for it" (Chumley 2013). But today, Muslim brothers are driven underground and that is why many would obviously change their attitude to democracy. This shows the ambivalent attitude of Islamism toward democracy which was discussed above. Besides, this also suggests that the coalition with moderate Islamism against the radicals may strengthen the trust to democracy and improve its perception as a value. In a number of Muslim countries (as will be also shown in Sect. 3.5 of Chap. 3) democracy is considered to be a great value even in the eyes of Islamist parties who see it as a means to achieve success.

We find it extremely difficult to demand pure democracy according to every western criterion. One should point out that an explosive growth in the popularity of democratic ideas among many Islamists is associated with the fact that Islamist conceptions are very popular among people in many Muslim countries and thus they have real chances to take power by democratic means. In fact, free elections in Muslim-majority countries naturally could end with the Islamists' victory (e.g., Gause III 2005) which cannot but provoke the Islamists' appeal to this form of political organization of a state.

One comes to another important point: under democracy power belongs to those supported by the majority, but they frequently use power in unreasonable ways and this is a problem. It should be clear that if a society is not completely ready for democracy, then one should not be in a hurry with its implementation. However, with development of certain institutions, society can begin to approach the implementation of democratic policies and rights. So in general, the Islamic world, though slowly and with difficulties, moves in the right direction. With the development of the world, technologies, etc., a certain convergence occurs in the perception of values. In particular, the development of information technologies allowS for the distribution and reception of the same information, and values both in the West and in the East. Nevertheless, the differences in the perception of values are still rather considerable (for details, see Part II of the present monograph) and they will hardly be smoothed in the near future (if ever).

1.4 The Middle East, Revolutions, World System, and Geopolitics

The analysis of the situation and trends in the Middle East in the context of the World System's development and in World System terms is one of the main tasks of the present monograph. So almost in every its chapter we try to analyze processes and events that are interrelated with global trends. In the Conclusion to this monograph (Chap. 11), we interpret the events in the Middle East as the start of a reconfiguration process of the World System.

The issues of revolution and the relationship between democracy and revolutions with respect to the Arab Spring will be the main topic of Chap. 4 (“Perturbations in the Arab World during Arab Spring: General Analysis”) and Chap. 5 (“Arab Spring, Revolutions, and the Democratic Values”). One of the major and typical problems leading to revolutions (which will be described in Chaps. 4 and 5 but is worth covering in this Introduction as well) is the correlation between a society's rather successful development and increasing discontent within it. Our study of a number of developmental models of different countries in different epochs showed that regardless of consumption level and population growth rate the processes of modernization are quite tightly and intrinsically related to the perils of social and political cataclysms which can rather easily transform into revolutions and violent disorders. That is why one should consider the cases of crisis-free development in the course of modernization and escape from the Malthusian trap rather as an exception in comparison with cases of revolutions and political upheavals.

As a result, revolutions frequently occur in economically successful or even very successful societies. However, that very success leads to unrealistic expectations which become the ideological basis for social upheavals. By the 2010s, the situation in such countries as Egypt and Tunisia developed following this very model.

The events in a more economically backward country of the region—Yemen—developed in a different and dramatic way. Having not yet recovered from a long civil war, Yemen lagged behind its neighbors. The attempts to establish a liberal democracy via revolutions revived old conflicts and triggered new ones. As a result, at present Yemen has been split and gripped with a new civil war, which has been sharply exacerbated by the Gulf States' intervention. All this supports the idea that the attempts to instantly impose liberal democracy on the unformed states, especially on the ones that lack ethnic and confessional unity (e.g., Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, etc.) lead to destabilization of the situation, increasing number of conflicts, and humanitarian crises. This may also result in the collapse of previously stable states which consequently contributes to a rapid spread of the radical Islamist and terrorist ideology.

In case of Syria, we still must deal with “the Syrian Dead-End” because the Syrian conflict has become the center of global geopolitical tensions involving many countries including Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the USA, European countries, Russia, etc. As a result, the Islamic State stepped forward, which was one of the most unpleasant “surprises” of the Middle East.

In our analysis of the events, we actively employ Berdyaev's law which states that "all revolutions end with reactions" (1990: 29) and the events in the Middle East support that law rather well. We also extend the law to note that any interference also ends with reactions. That is the reason why one can state that ISIS is the response to Western (and, especially, American) interference.

Undoubtedly, the current uninviting prospects are the results of the American and Western foreign policy aimed at the elimination of strong regimes in the Middle East, including support of Islamists.⁴

As a result, today destabilization is observed throughout the region. The most dangerous situation was created in Libya where there is no hope on reunification the country. There are still two main sharply competing governments with different level of the international recognition—more Islamist in Tripoli, and more secularist in Tobruq as well as some other independent groups. In such a situation the Islamist radicals from all countries flow here. There is an increasing threat that the radical Islamists' sphere of influence will spread to the sub-Saharan regions involving Mali, Chad, and Nigeria where radicals from Boko Haram, Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Shari'ah, and others already operate. The West risks creating a permanent source of terrorism and radicalism in Africa which will poison the world atmosphere for many decades. This will pose a definite threat operating in the background of a powerful demographic pressure in this region (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2014a, 2015; Zinkina and Korotayev 2014a, b). And this will affect all parts of the world, including the Western countries. The measures to control migration may fail and actually already do not work since the EU authorities seriously discuss the necessity to bomb the illegal migrants' worthless fleet. If one employs Toynbee's term (1974: 153), the external proletariat from Asia and Africa infiltrates into Europe and America and forms the internal proletariat here which is able to undermine stability (see also Emre 2015; Roubini 2015). The USA and the West should abandon the policy of seeking to eliminate statehood in the countries of the Greater Middle East and Africa by means of so-called revolutions and start to think about reinforcing statehood there. Indeed, the globalization processes obviously unites the destinies of many people from different cultural, social, historical, and religious backgrounds.

The USA and Europe often act violently and aggressively against the developing countries because they are sure that none of these affairs concern them. However,

⁴"For the past decade, two successive US administrations have maintained close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya, to name just the most prominent cases. The Obama administration conducted an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2010 and 2011, beginning even before the events known as the "Arab Spring" erupted in Tunisia and in Egypt. The President personally issued Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) in 2010, ordering an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood and other "political Islamist" movements, including the ruling AKP in Turkey, ultimately concluding that the United States should shift from its longstanding policy of supporting "stability" in the Middle East and North Africa (that is, support for "stable regimes" even if they were authoritarian), to a policy of backing "moderate" Islamic political movements. To this day, PSD-11 remains classified, in part because it reveals an embarrassingly naïve and uninformed view of trends in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region" (<http://gulfnnews.com/news/mena/libya/us-document-reveals-cooperation-between-washington-and-brotherhood-1.1349207>).

the nature of globalization brings the situation to their door if not inside their house when events in one part of the world rapidly affect the landscape in other places.

We make a conclusion that current situation objectively forces actors to take responsibility for the results of their foreign policy and geopolitical actions while the Western countries still act as though they live not in the twenty-first but in the nineteenth century. However, in the epoch of globalization the response to such actions will be quite rapid and can be unexpected as we see by the example of the EU's migrant and refugee crisis.

The subject of the Arab revolutions by all means requires considerable attention and further study. But we hope that the present monograph will also contribute to the understanding of this phenomenon.

Answering the question in the headline of the present chapter, we can say: revolutions have only exacerbated the Arab countries' problems. Unfortunately, over the seven years none of the Arab revolutions has solved any serious problem (and probably, will ever be able to). To be sure, what can be done in terms of modernization either has already been done or could be conducted under authoritarian regimes.

The events of the Arab Spring have in a violent manner proved once again that a democratic constitution and endeavors of some part of revolutionaries are not enough to strengthen democracy. There must be a number of conditions including historical and economic prerequisites, an existing civil society, and relatively high living standards, etc. This poses a question of whether the democratic principles of government can be considered universal.

Despite the mainstream assumption in the West (and especially among Western academics) that democracy is the best pattern for all societies at any stage of their development and cultural level, as well as with any archetypes, in the Western sociology there are serious studies that disprove this statement and show that democracy requires the presence of a number of complex conditions (see, e.g., Aron 1970; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Huntington 1968, 1993). Revolutions for the sake of the establishment of democracy in societies unprepared for it, quite frequently delay its introduction (e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2014c, 2016b). All this, unfortunately, is proved by the events of the Arab Spring. At present, it is important that the region should calm down and pass to economic and cultural growth which will promote the progress of these societies, and their possible but not inevitable transition to more democratic systems than their current ones.

In the present book, we have elaborated on ideas that we have presented elsewhere.⁵ On the basis of the current literature, we have come to the conclusion that a thorough and more comparative-empirical approach, based on the systematic use of opinion survey data would be necessary on the subject (Abdel-Samad 2014; Acevedo and Chaudhary 2015; Achilov 2013; Al Ganideh and Yaseen 2016; Alianak 2014; Amin 2016; Bakker and Rotondi 2016; Brownlee et al. 2015; Brynen 2012;

⁵Tausch and Moaddel (2009), Tausch (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a, b, c, 2017), Tausch et al. (2014), Grinin (2012a, b, 2013a), Grinin and Korotayev (2012, 2014a, b, c, 2015a, b, 2016a, b), Grinin et al. 2016a, b, Korotayev et al. 2013, 2014a, b, 2016a, b, Korotayev et al. 2015a, b, Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, Korotayev and Zinkina 2014a, b etc.

Dabashi 2012; Davis 2013; Esposito et al. 2016; Falco and Rotondi 2016; Farha 2016; Fox et al. 2016; Ghanem 2016; Govrin 2014; Guzansky and Berti 2013; Haas and Lesch 2013; Hassan 2011; Hoffman and Jamal 2014; Javorssek and Schwitz 2014; McCauley and Scheckter 2008; Mohamad and Ishac 2016; Noueihed and Warren 2012; Pottenger 2004; Rynhold 2015; Sadiki 2015; Sidamor et al. 2016; Underwood 2013; Yavuz 2011; Zartman 2015 and many others).

1.5 The Structure of This Monograph

Now let us briefly describe the structure of the book. It is organized in two parts. One of the reasons for such an organization of the book is the complexity of its subject. As we have already mentioned and as we will see below (e.g., in Chap. 3), the Islamism is an immensely complex phenomenon, and there is no unanimity among the scholars with respect to the evaluation of it. Hence, there is no surprise that the treatment of Islamism in Part I differs substantially from its treatment in Part II. As it sometimes happens in research, not all of the three authors agree with the political conclusions of this book here in the introduction but also in the overall conclusions. Arno Tausch agrees with the analysis of the genesis of Islamism, and the World System analysis of Islamism by Grinin and Korotayev. But Arno Tausch, following the arguments of Bassam Tibi, does not think that there is any moderate Islamism, and thus, he is absolutely opposed to an “inclusive strategy” vis-a-vis the Islamists, started by former US President Obama (see Part II of the book). Rather than concealing this important difference, all the authors agreed that they can live with it, for the sake of jointly presenting a World System and world values perspective of Islamism, its genesis and trajectory. Thus, the monograph considers the Islamism in different perspectives, which, we hope could allow achieving a truly stereoscopic vision of this important phenomenon. This also allows a more profound analysis of the Islamism.

Part I (by Leonid Grinin and Andrey Korotayev) is titled “Islamism and the Arab Spring: A World System Perspective”.

Chapter 2 is devoted to a systemic consideration of the requisites for establishing modern Islamism in the Middle East through a comparative analysis of some developmental trends in this macroregion and in China and India. Such analysis seems of vital importance since radical Islamism appears a powerful destabilizing force at the global and regional levels. We attend to the need to delineate between radical and moderate Islamisms, since in many Muslim societies the latter appears to be more a stabilizing force and not a destabilizing one.

A multifaceted, multidimensional, changing and inconsistent Islamism is a subject under study in Chap. 3. Islamism possesses many levels and manifestations: from rather respectable political parties and academic disputes to stream of consciousness of individual poor educated or illiterate Muslims, from the state level to the level of fanatic terrorists, from moderate political movements to extremist storm troopers (see Kurzman 1998; Denoeux 2002; Ayoob 2009; Schwedler 2011; March 2015; Volpi and Stein 2015; Achilov 2015, 2016; Achilov and Sen 2017). It is impossible

to comprehend modern Muslim (and all the more Arab) societies without an account of the impact of Islam as simultaneously an ideology, cultural environment, modus agenda, and mode of life.

One of the main conclusions made in this chapter is that actually most parts of Islamism are not radical (yet, even within this non-radical part there exists a kind of swamp disposed to radicalism at certain periods). It would be a mistake to present Islamism as a node on the body of Muslim societies. In fact, Islamism in many respects reflects the essence of modern Muslim societies, of their mode of thought and life. And still most of the population are not the proponents of radical Islamists, otherwise the entire Middle East would have already turned into an analogue of the notorious Islamic State/Daesh. On the contrary, Islamism in many ways helps to maintain social, economic, political and various other arenas of life at different societal levels as well as create a peculiar Islamic pattern of modernization.

That is why Islamism cannot be eliminated at the present stage, it can be only overgrown. And this will take a long time. One should understand clearly that it is impossible to reduce the dangers of radical and terrorist Islamism only by force. It will decrease only after it is separated from moderate Islamism having made the latter a more respectable, open, and involved in normal political life movement.

Chapter 4 (“Perturbations in the Arab World during the Arab Spring: General Analysis”) offers an analysis of the conditions in the MENA countries on the eve of the Arab Spring in the World System perspective, as well as causes (internal and external, general and specific) and certain consequences of the Arab revolutions in certain countries, the MENA region and in the World System. We will discuss Arab revolutions in a wide historical and theoretical context.

In Chapter 5, we will continue to discuss Arab revolutions in a wide historical and theoretical context. However this chapter discusses the Arab revolutions in some other aspects as the previous one, especially as regards issues of democratic transitions and value orientations. Yet, in this chapter we do not preserve a chronological sequence and focus on some other aspects. In particular, we define common and distinctive features in the course of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and pay considerable attention to the turning points of the Arab revolutions, especially the July 2013 coup in Egypt. This chapter attempts to analyze different versions of the transition to democracy, to show the costs and political, economic, and social perils of the striving to establish democracy quickly and by radical means (from time to time using the example of the recent events in Egypt). Our goal in this chapter is to analyze the issue of democratization of Egypt and some MENA countries within the contexts of globalization and regional history. In the final part of the chapter, we present a sketch of revolutionary and postrevolutionary events in Yemen, Libya, and Syria. We have added to this chapter an appendix titled “Letters from Tahrir. From Revolutionary Euphoria to Disappointment and Frustration.” These letters demonstrate the evolution from the euphoria connected with the overthrow of the Muslim Brothers to a deep disappointment with the situation in the country and the fate of the revolution that developed as a result of the military coup.

Part II (by Arno Tausch) is entitled “Islamism and Its Dimensions in the World Values Perspective” and consists of six chapters (Chaps. 6–11) and there is also an online Statistical Appendix: The Factor Analytical Results.⁶

The second part of the book covers the issues connected with Muslim ideology and its role, much attention is paid to the issues of Islamic radicalism and terrorism, the extent and reasons for the support of terrorism among the Muslims as well as the relations with the West, Islamophobia, and the correlation between Islamism and Anti-Semitism.

The key issues are the analysis of values in the Arab World especially of the democratic ones, including the problems of future democracy in the Arab World.

In this part, we will evaluate already published major empirical studies on Islamism and the “Arab Spring.” Our readers then have a right to know how good and reliable our social scientific GPRS, which we are using on this journey, really is (methodology section). We then go on to present, step by step, our multivariate empirical results on Islamism, the Arab Spring and what we call the solitude of the West in the fight against terror, based on analytical international opinion surveys in the results section.

In the following, we will present the results of a few path-breaking studies which focused on the real issues as we perceive them here and which are an important guiding post in our own empirical attempt to approach Islamism, the Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy. Such recent literature making use of the statistical data, which underlie our analysis provides important insights for our research project, and the available, often contradictory results make further research very urgent. The studies under scrutiny here help us to provide some maps on the scholarly knowledge about Islamism, the “*Arab Spring*,” and the future of democracy. Not only the multivariate analysis about our theme enters almost completely new space, but also the country values of the important indicators used in the multivariate analysis, such as the support rates for the terrorists of the “Islamic State” (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) or the international rates of people rejecting the fight against them are not known.

In one of the leading studies on the subject nowadays, Brownlee et al. (2015) maintain that democracy remains elusive in the Middle East. Tunisia, the study argues, made progress toward some type of constitutionally entrenched participatory rule, while the other countries that overthrew their rulers Egypt, Yemen, and Libya remain unstable. Elsewhere in the Arab World, the uprisings were suppressed, subsided or

⁶https://www.academia.edu/36302399/Online_Statistical_Appendix_to_ISLAMISM_ARAB_SPRING_AND_DEMOCRACY_Springer_2018_. It also appears appropriate at this point to mention the inputs received by Arno Tausch from the debates about his contributions in the journal “Telos” and in the Blog “Teloscope” in New York (<http://www.telospress.com/author/atausch/>). Note also that Table 8.1, Table 9.3, Table 9.4, Table 9.5, and Table 11.2 are courtesy of Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published those tables in Middle East Review of International Affairs. Table 8.4 is courtesy of Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Strategic Assessment. Finally, last but not least, we mention the advice and active help received from Mr. Robert Mundigl, a computer expert, who developed an easy to handle and freely available program to use Microsoft EXCEL data for world choropleth maps. His programs are a vital tool for international political economy and global value research, and are freely available at <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>.

never materialized. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds find that the success of domestic uprisings depended on the absence of a hereditary executive and a dearth of oil rents. Prior levels of socioeconomic development and state strength shaped whether nascent democracy, resurgent authoritarianism, or unbridled civil war followed.

This part as it is now spreading to the social sciences: starting from background (often also called objectives)—moving on to methods—the results—and then to the conclusion remarks. Part II firmly shares the established methodology of global values and comparative opinion research (Davidov et al. 2008; Inglehart 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2015; Tausch et al. 2014), augmented at the end of this part by the analysis of economic cycles, fully presented in the recent study Grinin et al. (2016). Illuminating earlier opinion studies on the Arab countries, making good use of the systematic study of comparative opinion surveys, were published, among others, in Achilov (2013), Al-Ississ and Diwan (2016), Ciftci and Bernick (2015), Fox et al. (2016), Gorman (2015), Grim (2014), Hoffman and Jamal (2012), Nisbet et al. (2004), Ogan and Varol (2016); Pahwa and Winegar (2012), Paragi (2015), Sjoberg and Whooley (2015), Tessler (2004) and Weber et al. (2013); and consequently, these articles serve as a methodological guiding post for Part II.

Chapter 6 (“Background”) introduces the contents of Part II of the present monograph. It also introduces the concept of *Din wa-dawla* (unity of state and religion) and Anti-Semitism, and analyses important earlier empirical studies on the subject. We highlight the erroneous judgements of past US administrations about ties to the Muslim Brotherhood highlighted in President Obama’s Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) in 2010. Earlier empirical studies, reviewed in this chapter, inter alia come to the conclusion that 75% of religious Muslims appear to support politically moderate Islam, while 25% show support for politically radical Islam, and that there is no Anti-Zionism without Anti-Semitism. In the present background chapter, we also debate changes in the global economy, and indicators of global terrorism.

In Chap. 7 (“Methods and Data for the Analysis”), we debate the sources of our analysis and the statistical methods used. We also amply discuss the methodological literature on these subjects. Our data sources are the Arab Opinion Index of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar; the Arab Barometer, Wave III; the Pew Spring 2015 Survey; the BBC Global Scann; and the World Values Survey. We debate error margins and other statistical concepts and highlight such methods as factor analysis and econometric time series analysis, available via our used Statistical Program, the SPSS.

In Chap. 8 (“Radical Islamism and Islamist Terrorism”), we present in a compact and summarizing form some of our most recent research results on the strength or weakness of global Muslim rejection or support for Islamism and terror in the region, presented in scholarly journals. We ask ourselves the question: how broad is the spectrum of Arab and also global Muslim society, which could be potentially affected by the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh ideology? While the results presented here clearly reject the hypothesis, popular among populist political currents in the West that Islamism and Islam cannot be separated from each other, we reach the conclusion that support for terrorist organizations competing with ISIS/ISIL/Daesh is considerable and that also acts of terrorism receive a sympathy too big for comfort—both for the political forces in the Muslim world, allied with the West or at least with the idea of

democracy and a market economy, and for the political decision makers and political publics in the West.

In Chap. 9 (“Between the Arab Spring and the Support for Terrorism”), we first attempt to answer with the help of our data the question which political and social segments of the Arab population were especially active in the Arab Spring demonstrations. Only 17% of those who participated in the Arab Spring demonstrations were supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, while 49% of those who participated in the Arab Spring demonstrations had no confidence at all in the Muslim Brotherhood. In the following, we underline the still existing weakness of Arab Civil Society (overwhelming support for democracy but weak support for the structures of democracy). Variables of trust, nonviolence, some indicators of gender justice (especially equal access to political office) and tolerance toward homosexuals indicate some of the existing deficits in the development of civil societies in the region. One major other result of this chapter is that armed terrorist operations against the USA are clearly supported respondents oriented toward Iran and Turkey, by the upper strata, by respondents distant from the Arab Spring, and by people supporting the Shari’ah state. The propensity to endorse terrorism against the United States of America is an outflow of an Islamist ideological conviction. Our terror factor has a positive loading with trust the Muslim Brotherhood, and other indicators of common Islamism and sexism. Our results also show the alarming trend of terror support among the manifest electorates of political parties in Turkey.

In Chap. 10 (“The Solitude of the West in the Fight against Terror”) we discuss the following questions: Do global populations and the populations of Western countries in particular stand behind the international consensus to fight Islamist terrorism? As it is generally known, 70 countries of the world are now members of the “Global Coalition against Daesh” (theglobalcoalition.org); but how many global citizens really are behind it? And do they hold the opinion that Islamist terrorism is a real security challenge? Or is the French writer Houellebecq (2015) nearer the truth, when he predicts in his ironic novel the West’s submission to the forces of Islamism? In the present chapter, we would like to enrich international literature on the subject of the future of democracy by providing results from multivariate analysis based on the available evidence from global opinion surveys.

Chapter 11 (“Islamism, Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy”) highlights the strategic conclusions to be drawn from our analysis. We debate the urgent needs of Arab societies for reform: the system of education, and the system of higher education in particular. In compliance with latest results of economic cycle—oriented research on the Arab Spring (see Part I of the present book, above) we analyze some long-term cyclical trends, using spectral analysis. Egypt, the only Arab country with long-term data in our data base, clearly shows only shorter Kuznets cyclical upward and downward movements, while we cannot discern any Kondratieff waves for the Egyptian economy. We also analyze the real convergence of living conditions of the Arab World with the rest of the world, based on life expectancy data from the World Bank. While average living conditions, measured by average life expectancies, improved, there is a considerable slowing down in the velocity of convergence as compared to the European Union since the late 1980s. Not rising poverty or misery,

but a failed relative convergence process seems to create so many frustrations on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. This failure in the process of relative convergence is further compounded by the zig-zag economic convergence process measured by Gross National Income per capita in comparison to the EU, and the rate of unemployment. Finally, we wind up our debates about Islamism, Islamicity, the Open Society and the Future of Democracy in the Arab World. To this end, we present international value comparisons, combined with macro-quantitative reflections which will allow us to make cautious predictions about the future trajectories of democracy in the region, based on the relationships between development levels and value developments. Our Open Society Index combines data for the mass support for tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and nonviolence. All Muslim countries in our 77 countries and territories with full data which were under investigation here are below the global average; and the best placed Muslim country is post-Soviet Kazakhstan; and the best placed Arab country is Qatar. While some Arab countries might perform, here and there, in a rather surprising and positive fashion, it is especially the combination of the dimensions, where the Arab World really fails. We debate the possible reconciliation of Popper's Open Society and the theology of Islam, namely the writings of the US scholar Hossein Askari. His Index of Islamicity is the instrument how a society fulfills what Askari calls Islam as a rules-based religion. We find that his Indicator is a valid instrument to measure socioeconomic progress. Following Askari's argument, the real precondition to develop a truly Islamic society, guided by truly Quranic principles and directed toward an Open Society, would be to develop precisely the patterns of societal tolerance, captured by our democratic civil society index. The development of tolerance, measured by our democratic civil society index, explains almost 69% of the variance of Askari's Islamicity Index. We also amply debate the famous Hoffman and Jamal (2014) study about Quran reading and the Arab Spring. According to our multivariate results from surveys, individual piety did not play a significant role in influencing Arab Spring protest behavior. In the following, we also used World Values Survey data first to classify the identification of global publics with pivotal aspects of democracy and the market economy, and we then analyzed how the country values for the general publics, the practicing Roman Catholics attending Church services every week, and the Muslims in these countries depend on per capita incomes. Our research gives evidence to the fact that not only macroeconomic phenomena, but also value developments and even patterns of prejudice are U-shaped or inverted U-shaped functions of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. We call this process the Kuznets trap: rising crises phenomena in the transition phase from the rural to the urban lifestyle, accompanied by an implosion of basic values, necessary for the functioning of a democratic society and a market economy.

Statistical online appendix to Part II gives a complete account of the results achieved. Our specialist readership will find a large amount of information in that appendix

As we will see below, the Islamism is an immensely complex phenomenon, and there is no unanimity among the scholars with respect to the evaluation of it. Hence, there is no surprise that the treatment of Islamism in Part I differs substantially from

its treatment in Part II. Thus, the monograph considers the Islamism in different perspectives, which, we hope could allow achieving a truly stereoscopic vision of this important phenomenon. This also allows a wider analysis of the Islamism.

Chapter 12 (“General Conclusion to the Monograph. Mena Region and Global Transformations. Arab Spring and the Beginning of the World System Reconfiguration”) offers a conclusion to the present book. The matter is that the events of the Arab Spring and subsequent events can be analyzed in two dimensions: first, with respect to internal and global causes [in particular, global crisis and agflation (as we did in Chap. 4)], and second, in terms of their influence on the future scenarios of the World System development. Such a view we use in the conclusion. The authors explain the amazing synchronization of social upheavals in a dozen of Arab countries. The analysis is based on the theory (developed by the authors) of the periodical catch-ups experienced by the political component of the World System that tends to lag behind the World System economic component. Thus, we show that the asynchrony of development of various functional subsystems of the World System is a cause of the synchrony of major political changes. In other words, within the globalization process, political transformations tend to lag far behind economic transformations. And such lags cannot constantly increase, the gaps are eventually bridged, but in not quite a smooth way. That is why the international system is starting to transform more rapidly and more substantially. Thus, we enter a new period of search for solutions within the World System, which implies that this period will be rather complex and turbulent. The formation and consolidation of a new model of political order could be a rather arduous, prolonged, and relatively conflict process. Thus, it eventually becomes evident that the turbulent events in the Arab countries are also a precursor of the forthcoming structural transformations of the world. We called this process the reconfiguration of the World System. This conclusion offers results of our analysis of such reconfiguration of the World System together with a few forecasts that stem from it. We also suggest an explanation why the new catch-up of the World System political component started in the Arab countries.

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Part I
Islamism and the Arab Spring:
A World System Perspective

Chapter 2

The Middle East in the World System Context in Comparison with India and China: Some Backgrounds of Islamism in the MENA Region



Introductory Note As we will show in what follows, Islamism is a phenomenon with multifaceted dimensions covering many spheres of life. Since Islamism is spread almost in every country of the Middle East, it seems reasonable to formulate some ideas explaining its widespread influence in this part of the world. In order to mark out the peculiarities of the Middle East, we compare it with India and China (for a detailed comparison, see Grinin and Korotayev 2016). In Chap. 3, we discuss the different reasons that have caused the strengthening of Islamism, but in the present chapter, we will focus on the historical, regional, and the World System aspects. You can also find multifaceted dimensions of Islamism in Chap. 11.

2.1 Statehood, Civilization, and Historical Traditions in the Middle East, China, and India

The Middle East (similarly to China and India) is in many aspects a complicated and heterogeneous system and an autonomous world [in terms of Braudel (1981–1984)] which is evidenced in the complicated range of interactions between its subjects and entities. At first glance, this seems to refer just to the Middle East where many states and societies with different cultures and religions coexist and are often in extremely tense and openly hostile relations.¹ Yet, in certain respects, for example, in terms of language, ethnicity, and religion, the Middle East seems to be much

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¹For details about different countries and regions of the Middle East, see Grinin et al. (2016b).

more homogenous than, say, India which is one of the most multilingual states of the world (Dasgupta 1970).² This homogeneity became the most important basis for internationalization of Islamism which could then easily cross the state boundaries making them transparent (see, e.g., Mitchell 1993; Woltering 2002; Yapp 2004; Ayoob 2009; Strindberg and Warn 2011).

The success of Islamism is also determined by the traditionally fragile statehood in the Middle East. The weak traditions of statehood in the Middle East (except for Egypt, Turkey, and to a certain extent Iran³) explain the instability of many regimes as well as the insufficient modernization level.⁴ Meanwhile, India proceeded to solve many of the problems related to successful state-building at a lesser expense due, in part, to the long-lasting internal peace under the colonial administration which also established the fundamentals of administrative traditions (Keay 2011; see also Dirks 2006; Stein 2007). Thus, at present, the level of development of statehood in China and even India is generally higher than that in most Middle Eastern countries. Thus, the differing level of statehood development, in many respects, determines both the path to globalization and the general success of the Middle East and countries of other regions as well as explains their domestic and external problems (on the peculiarities of political systems and culture of the Asian countries, see Voskresensky 2007; see also Grinin and Korotayev 2006; Grinin 2010).

One of the Islamist fundamental ideas consists in the opposition between the proper, highly spiritual, and moral Islam society and the money-focused, materialistic, and immoral Western world (for details see Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2.2). One must admit that the Middle Eastern people have historically justified reasons to dislike the West.

Nevertheless, despite the proceeding modernization (and in some aspects just due to it), the cultural and religious (ideological) legacy and traditions cannot but produce a huge impact on all the ongoing processes and phenomena, especially in the countries where most part of the population is still poorly educated and religion appears the most powerful tie forming a nation (as it is in Saudi Arabia, the countries of the Gulf and Maghreb regions and India). In this respect, it seems reasonable that the Asian and North African societies' fidelity to their traditions unites them again in the endeavor to preserve independence in the globalization environment (Yakovlev 2015: 6). After all, every society searches for its own way to globalization and develops a certain attitude toward it (see, e.g., Berger and Huntington 2002; Srinivas 2002; Grinin 2008b, 2009, 2012a, b, g).

²There live several hundred ethnic groups of different racial origin speaking languages belonging to several linguistic families (contemporary Indian statistics distinguish 1562 languages). Besides, the population numbering more than 1200 million people of different religions and divided into dozens thousand castes and sub-castes (Gorokhov 2011).

³About the development of statehood in Egypt, see Korotayev and Khaltourina (2006); Grinin (2006, 2007, 2011c); Grinin and Korotayev (2009a, b).

⁴There is not enough research yet on the relationship between the age of statehood and the state stability; however, a number of authors note the connection between the presence of deep traditions of statehood and the stability of the state order (Huntington 1968; Smith 1986; Tilly 1992; Fukuyama 2006; Ikenberry 2006a, b; Collier 2009; see also Gellner 1983; Dobbins et al. 2007; Fritz and Menocal 2007 in connection with the problem of nationalism and nation-building).

If one compares China, India, and the Middle East in civilizational terms, then the Middle Eastern one preserves its civilization features to the largest degree (yet, this may also show the cultural and modernization lag).

Due to an early formation of civilization, urbanization and bureaucracy along with relatively weak sense of ethnic identity, large corporativity of priests, impact of nomads, and a number of other historical factors, the Middle East generated in antiquity and the early Middle Ages many large state entities but it did not develop strong ethno-state formations that only managed to emerge in Persia and Egypt (and to a certain extent in the Jewish states). Neither would there emerge strong developed states which even temporally decentralized would strive for reunification as was observed in China (for details, see Korotayev and Komarova 2004; Korotayev et al. 2006b; Grinin 2008a, 2010, 2011a, 2012d). On the contrary, after the collapse of the Middle Eastern empires, they would never be restored so that other empires with different ethnic and cultural elites would emerge; otherwise, these territories were incorporated into alien empires.

Such a fragile inner unity of territories incorporated into state formations was also characteristic after the formation of Muslim caliphates and emirates that constantly shifted their boundaries. The situation remained the same after Turkish rule as well as after the colonial and quasi-colonial rule of France and Great Britain, and actually has survived until the present in many regions of the Middle East. Today, one can speak about three genuine states along with Israel whose boundaries are supported by national self-identity and population unity: Turkey, Iran, and Egypt.⁵ As to the rest, in some countries, the process of internal consolidation proceeds rather successfully, while the border integrity of the others is mostly supported by the world community which is unwilling to change them; yet, there are some factors that can change the situation which today is rather fragile in Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other states.

Thus, some historical traditions continue to affect the worldview and authority of the regions under study. To summarize, one can conventionally say that *the Middle East involves the world into its own problems and at the same time generates intolerance to a different lifestyle and continues to struggle for the preservation of Islam and its triumph. Meanwhile, India coexists with the world and adapts its current impacts transforming them within its own World System. China strives to create its own Sinocentric World System, at present only in economic terms, though implementing state policy aimed at concentration of economic power and a state expansion to other regions* (about modern China and India, see Candland 2007; Bramall 2008; Holslag 2010; Breslin 2011; Grinin 2011b, d, e, 2012c, h, 2013a, 2014a; Ahluwalia and Little 2012; Tyner 2012; Callahan 2013; Beeson 2013, 2014; Stephen 2014; Kumar 2014; Malesky and London 2014; Mulvad 2015; Schottli and Thapa 2015; Beeson and Li 2016; Kang 2016; Nordin 2016; Lal 2017; Horesh and Lim 2017; Zhao 2017; Grinin et al. 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2016).

Unlike India and China, the Middle East and the North Africa have always been tightly connected with Europe (the West). The relations were mostly of a

⁵Still Turkey has problems with the Kurdish periphery striving for independence.




Fig. 2.1 Literacy dynamics, % of adult population (World Bank 2017)

complex character with the contacts contributing to mutual technological and cultural enrichment. Meanwhile, the balance of power would shift. The closeness to Europe launched modernization in the MENA region (primarily in Turkey and Egypt), especially in military sphere earlier than in other Asian societies not to mention about most African ones. However, at present, the Middle East has mostly lost this advantage in comparison with India and China; yet, India still lags behind it in some spheres (e.g., in the literacy level, see Fig. 2.1).

Nevertheless, we should point that the Middle East is still the leader in such an important aspect as urbanization (Fig. 2.2).

Meanwhile, it is often reasonably pointed that Islamism is an ideology of an urbanizing society (see, e.g., Kepel 2000).

We should also point that already in the Middle Ages, the Middle East demonstrated a high level of urbanization and in this aspect was almost leading the World System in degree of urbanization (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2009a, c, 2015)

If one compares the Middle East with India and China in terms of peculiarities of their political regimes, one will note that a relatively stable democracy distinguishes India from the Middle Eastern societies (for the analysis of the peculiarities of the Indian democracy, see Alaev 2007; Grinin and Korotayev 2016; Chandra 2016; Kohli 2016; Roy 2016; Guha 2017; Pelinka 2017). As to Chinese authoritarian regime, its strength distinguishes it from a number of the Middle Eastern non-consolidated democracies. This is one of the problems and even traps of the Middle Eastern societies in which a substantial part of the population seems to be ready for democracy, while the society on the whole is not (see, e.g., Grinin et al. 2016b). Let us point that the society is not quite ready for liberal democracy, while a number of Middle Eastern societies are quite ready for Islamic democracy (see also Gause III 2005).




Fig. 2.2 Dynamics of the urban population in China, India, and Middle East, in terms of percent, from 1960 to 2016 (World Bank 2017)

The regions under study have different regimes, and they have much in common with respect to their so-called political culture (see Voskresensky 2007; Melvil 2002; about political culture, see also: Aron 1970; Eisenstadt 1978a, 1978b; Diamond 1993; Huntington 1968, 1993, 1996; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Alesina and Giuliano 2015). The characteristic features include a crucial role for bureaucracy in society which actually implies its unlimited power and respectively, corruption; a considerable intervention of the bureaucratic upper circles in business, in particular, attempts to acquire personal control (via members of the family, clan or people under control) over the most important and profitable business spheres; nepotism, the strife to become above the law and so on [see, e.g., Alaev 2007: 499 and other chapters in the collective monographs edited by Voskresensky (2007, 2011); see also: Jong-Sung and Khagram 2005; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Goldstone 2011; Gatti et al. 2003; Brownlee et al. 2015; Brynen 2012; Tyler and Darley 1999]. Of course, with Arab monarchies, the situation is different since the members of the royal families and clans have legitimate rights to control business and society. In fact, the monarchic clans form the upper stratum in societies and hold top positions⁶ (Dontsov and Churilina 2007).

So there are many reasons for popular discontent with government and political clans in the Middle East which also enhances the positions of those Islamists who stay in opposition and adds to the attractiveness of their clear and persuasive appeal

⁶For example, in Qatar the ruling family Al Thani together with affined and allied tribes accounts for about 20,000 people, which make about 10% of the country's indigenous citizens (Sapronova 2007: 152).

that the main cause is the oblivion of the Islam principles by the presumptuous upper class.

At the same time, the Islamist positions are also reinforced by the increasing role of the state in the regulation of economic and social spheres. While being too weak to oppose nationalist ideas against Islam, many Middle Eastern states are still strong enough to take the responsibilities to support living standards of the population. Hence, the political authorities become an easy target for Islamists. Islamism gains particular strength and relevance just while staying in opposition. Meanwhile, when it comes to power, its authority is rather quickly undermined (e.g., as it happened after 2011 in Egypt; see Chap. 5 below).

It is notable that one can trace some features of a welfare state in almost every Middle Eastern country, although the foundations of social policy are quite different. The Middle Eastern oil countries use petrodollars to support population in different ways including various benefits which would seem exotic but still create high rates of indigenous citizens' consumption and dependence, while millions of migrants from poorer countries would work for them. Egypt also widely implements social welfare policy in several ways; in particular, there exist subsidies on bread, rice, sugar, vegetable oil (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, d). Hence, the fluctuations in crude oil and food prices may cause serious crises and social unrest (see Akaev et al. 2012; Grinin 2012f; Grinin et al. 2016b) along with attempts of domestic reforms which one observes, for example, in Saudi Arabia.

2.2 The Place of India, China, and the Middle East in the World System and in the Currently Forming World Order

In our opinion, the Middle East was the initial leading center in the formation of the World System. The emergence of the Chinese and Indian centers of the World System and their further merger with the Middle Eastern core transformed the World System into the Afroeurasian one, but for a long time, the Middle East remained its main center (Korotayev et al. 2006a; Grinin and Korotayev 2012b, 2013a, b, 2018; Korotayev and Zinkina 2017; Zinkina et al. 2017). It was not until the first millennium B.C. that the center started shifting toward Europe, on the one hand, and toward China, on the other. With the Age of Discovery, the core of the World System (which had already become the global one) shifted to Europe. While the Middle East continued to play an important role in the World System, India and China remained remote periphery territories in the Eurocentric World System. Further, they were hardly interested in developing connections with Europe (this especially refers to China) (Goldstone 2009; Alaev et al. 2010; Keay 2011; Grinin and Korotayev 2015). Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all three societies remained on the periphery of the World System (probably, except for Turkey); moreover, China and some Middle Eastern regions experienced a profound crisis [yet, the Ottoman Empire of that period was generally on the rise except for

the decade connected with the First World War and defeat (see, e.g., Gelvin 2008; Maddison 2010)]. However, just this period witnessed the rise of Islamic thought and later of organized movements in India, Egypt, and former Ottoman provinces which was supported by the latter's defeat (for details, see Chap. 3 below).

The Middle East, India, and China joined the global processes as a result of the colonial empires' fall and of the developing countries' growing significance. Unfortunately, this involvement was accompanied with military conflicts which seem inevitable in certain respects because the formation of any new state always causes complications while separating peoples and settling the borders (see in particular, Grinin 2012e, 2013b, c; Grinin et al. 2017), especially since such separations were complicated by the colonial legacy, Second World War, and the postwar confrontation between socialism and capitalism.

The formation of the Indian state after Second World War, as well as the restoration of the Chinese state marked significant changes within the World System whose impact has continually increased and will probably grow in the coming decades. These changes were accompanied by the emergence of a number of new states in the Middle East. Their emergence weakened the World System core considerably, especially its former leaders (Great Britain, France, and defeated Germany together with Japan). The world order became bipolar having been formed along the axis between socialism and capitalism. The emergent Third World, although remaining a periphery, at the same time became a battlefield between two blocks (Grinin et al. 2016a). As a result, India, China, and the Middle Eastern countries started to actively play the card of the opposition between the USA and USSR trying to benefit from this division and to gain opportunities for geopolitical maneuvers (Lunev 2010). Since the 1960s, China started to approach the USA in order to oppose the USSR (Kissinger 2001, 2014). India during Jawaharlal Nehru term as the Prime Minister (and after it) played an important role in the Non-Aligned Movement and even was its formal leader between 1983 and 1986 (Lunev 2010). At the same time, India sought to find a balance between the USA and USSR. Such an active balancing behavior between two blocs was also observed in the Middle East, especially in Egypt. In connection with the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Middle East started emerging from periphery into semi-periphery, which was definitely promoted by a sharp leap in oil prices. This also increased the role of Islamism. As to India and China, one can also point that their role in the world order has increased. Moreover, due to vigorous economic development (especially of China), this trend has intensified and contributed to the emergence of the theory about the return (or shift) to the East as the center of and for development (see, e.g., Frank 1997, 1998; Arrighi 2007).

While for India, China, as well as some other countries, the World System transformations resulted in nationalism, and other national, tradition-based, ideologies gaining power, in the Middle East (due to the opposition with Israel and a number of other factors which we are going to describe below) Islamism started to claim the leading positions in ideology regarding Arab nationalism. At first, it was overshadowed by the ideology of Arab nationalism (Khalidi 1991; Tibi 1997; Goldschmidt 2004: 116; Dawisha 2016), but later Islamism passed ahead. And by the end of the twentieth century, Islamism finally pushed into the background the ideas of Arab

nationalism (see for details Chap. 3: see also Khayrullin and Korotayev 2017b: 36). Let us note that all three regions or societies (i.e., India, China, and the Middle East) from the very beginning of their post–World War II activity appeared involved in serious conflicts. Meanwhile, despite their different causes, these conflicts still remain acute and urgent. The origin of India and Pakistan was immediately marked by war which appeared to be a continuation of two decades of clashes between Muslims and Hindus. Yet, this was caused not only by political and religious rivalries but also by a considerable difference in the political culture of the two parts of the formerly united society. “The story of India’s further development with firm traditions of parliamentarism and of Pakistan with its regular changes of power and frequent military-dictatorship regimes allows distinguishing two different political cultures: that of primarily secular in India and Islamized Pakistan” (Alaev et al. 2010: 422; see also Stein 2007: 368–377).⁷ The strained relations with Pakistan (despite a certain relaxation) still remain the major characteristic of the Indian foreign policy with the account that India is one of the world’s largest arms importers (which, nevertheless, strives to become an exporter; see, e.g., Armanyan 2015). China also opened a new page of its history with conflicts (the most severe was the Korean War) among which the unsettled relations with Taiwan remain a train wreck waiting to happen (Kastner 2016). As to the Middle East, starting from the formation of the State of Israel, it remains one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world. Moreover, this is the region which spreads terrorism throughout the world. On the whole, it is not surprising that almost all states of the MENA region pay great attention to the development of army, weapons, and military strategies, though every state does it in its own way. In the period between the 1970s and the 1990s, the societies under study started to gain more benefits from globalization (see Grinin and Korotayev 2015, 2016: Chap. 5; Grinin et al. 2016c: Chaps. 3 and 6). The first to benefit were the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, which were completely transformed due to the shower of wealth from petrodollars. Their authority in the world has also dramatically increased. Previously, foreign trade used to be of little importance and would hardly influence the life of most of the population.⁸ At present, the Middle Eastern countries are far ahead of the export-oriented Chinese economy and India as regards share of foreign trade in their GDP (see Fig. 2.3).

However, in general, the rapidly growing volumes of export and import in the countries under study vividly demonstrate to what extent they are actively integrated into globalization (by the way, all the three regions actively develop tourism).

⁷The given citation proves the above stated idea that the difficulties experienced by the Middle Eastern countries result from their weak statehood which is in many respects connected with peculiarities of Islam (see, e.g., Korotayev 1996, 2000, 2003a, b, 2004, 2005, 2006; Korotayev et al. 1999, 2003, 2007, 2013, 2014b, 2015b, c, 2016a); Grinin and Korotayev (2009b); Korotayev and Issaev (2014).

⁸Thus, the transaction volume of the first oil concession in Saudi Arabia (1933) between the Falcon company and the Saudi king with the term of 60 years and covering the territory of 360 square miles amounted \$625 thousand (55 thousand pounds), that is, about 25–30 million in current dollars. And that was a huge amount of money for the Saudi dynasty at that time (Yergin 1999: 227), not to speak for the Bedouin population.




Fig. 2.3 Foreign trade, % of GDP (World Bank 2017)




Fig. 2.4 Share of investments in the GDP, % (World Bank 2017)

Another important indicator of development and integration is the growth of foreign investments whose volume, as well as the volume of total investments, in China and India is far ahead of the Middle East (Fig. 2.4).

No doubt, the shower of petrodollars fertilized the soil for Islamism. Having official and non-official powerful financial sources, this movement succeeded in

becoming more powerful and widespread while using Western money against the West as well as against their own governments (as radically inclined movements often do). The flows of petrodollars in particular have supported the reinforcement of official conservative Islamism by the Middle Eastern oil monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia.

The World Systemic role of China, India, and the Middle East has considerably increased in recent decades. Yet, while the Middle East can claim a semi-periphery role at best, China and India can claim alternative central roles (or even counter-centers) in the World System, in the long run (see, e.g., Zeng 2006; Winters and Yusuf 2007; Ozawa 2009; Zakaria 2009; Bardhan 2010; Berthelsen 2011; Dahlman and Utz 2005; Friedman 2007, 2009, 2011).

Still this role of the World System's periphery or semi-periphery appears an important source of power for Islamism. On the one hand, they are unable to counterpose the Western economic power with the economy of any individual Middle Eastern country, nor with the economy of the whole region. On the other hand, historically, the Muslims are unprepared to admit Western superiority (and of Christianity as its religion since many still identify the West with Christianity). That is why the only thing they can challenge the West with is the fidelity, verity, and faith in the final victory of Islam as the leading religion of the world. And Islamism becomes a natural basis for this opposition. On the one hand, many Muslims envy Western wealth and success, while on the other hand, having oil, they do not feel themselves poor (not to speak about the Gulf citizens' world perception) and aggrieved. It is just oil (and energy commodities in general) that supports many Middle Eastern trends including Islamism. The oil production has attached a great significance to the Middle East by increasing its self-esteem and thus allowing it to obtain a peculiar position in the world as well as in the relations with the West.

2.3 On the Role of Oil Production

In the nineteenth century, cotton used to be the most important raw stuff for the European industry and later it was rubber; finally, oil had become the number one product. The European countries were rich in coal, while the oil reserves were limited. So the dependence on oil supplies would only increase. The struggle for oil during the rise of national economies started already in the 1920s and 1930s with Mexico being its most famous episode since it had nationalized oil companies. After Second World War, nationalization became an important event that alternated with overthrows of the governments to initiate nationalization (the most vivid example here is Iran in the 1950s). Meanwhile, the weight and self-identity of the oil- or other strategic raw material-producing countries would increase. The Second World War revealed the importance of possession of oil resources; that is why soon after it, the Middle East became a strategically important region. Saudi Arabia became the key focus for the USA and was considered to be the most valuable foreign investment. It is no wonder that already in 1950, President Harry Truman wrote a letter to the Saudi Arabian

king assuring that any threat to the kingdom would demand American attention and concern (Yergin 1999: 329). Thus, the strategic partnership between Saudi Arabia (and later the other Gulf countries) and the USA originated some time long ago.

The year 1960 turned out to be an important landmark in the development of the oil-producing countries since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in Baghdad with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela being its founders. OPEC became the most influential supranational organization of the developing countries after the drastic price increase in the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., Griffin and Teece 1982; MacAvoy 1982; Gately 1984) which marked the start of new relations between the developed and developing states. Finally, it was just in the sphere of oil supply that the developing countries had overwhelmingly defeated the West for the first time in history because for the first time ever the economic activities of the Third World countries would launch a rather long and intensive global economic crisis.

For a number of countries, the subsequent increase in oil production laid a path to welfare, capital import, and even convergence with the Western countries. On the whole, in the 1970s, oil became a symbol of growing opportunities of the Third World countries with respect to the West. Of course, the oil revenues were for a long time spent far from efficiently (and in many respect this situation endures even now), but on the whole, they became a significant resource for the developing countries' accumulation and provided opportunities to realize important reforms in some countries involving the rise of agricultural sector, improving of education, health care, etc.

For a long time, India and China played only a minor role in the global economy, while the Middle East started to play a significant role. Since the 1950s, Western countries intervened in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries and were instrumental in causing several military regime changes (as in Iraq in 1953). Moreover, as we already said, the significance of the Middle East increased dramatically in the early 1970s due to oil prices' rise.

The end of the era of cheap oil also put an end to the so-called German and Japanese "economic miracles" that is to their high rates of economic growth as well as brought serious and diverse consequences for the economies of different countries. Thus, it brought a severe crisis in the Western world as well as forced the Western economies to search for technological means of saving energy, thus generating many important innovations and development of oil production in new areas.

Let us also recall that the oil price growth seriously affected the Soviet economy and its dependence on import, and the price decrease in the second half of the 1980s increased the number of economic problems and contributed to the collapse of the USSR.

Meanwhile, the flow of petrodollars changed the lifestyle in the oil-producing countries; some of them even hardly knew how to spend such an amount of currency. This resulted in the further integration of the Middle Eastern economy with the global one. First, the petrodollars started to be invested in the Western (especially, American) financial system, which, by the way, allowed the USA to freeze the accounts of undesirable countries or persons. Second, the development of infrastructure and other

projects in these countries would invigorate investments and brought large orders to the Western companies. Third, the role of state and state corporations increased in the oil-producing countries (which was sometimes accompanied with nationalizing Western companies' property as happened in Iraq in 1972). Fourth, a path was opened to the rise of new developing states in South America, Africa, and Asia where oil was found (simultaneously, the search for oil deposits was activated in different regions).⁹ There is no doubt that the growing energy commodities prices made a significant contribution to the start of the Great Convergence (Korotayev 2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, 2016; Korotayev and Grinin 2016, 2017; Korotayev et al. 2011a, b, 2012a, c, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a; Korotayev and Zinkina 2014; Grinin and Korotayev 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016: Chap. 5). Fifth, one should also mention the sharply increasing imports of weapons to the Middle Eastern countries which intensified after the 1991 Gulf War.

The Persian Gulf countries as well as some other oil-producing countries in this and other regions (such as Libya or Brunei) became wealthy states that, in addition, served as beneficiary states to poorer Islamic countries and people since Islamic ideology requires sharing with the poor and does not allow the wealthy to ignore indigent people. Thus, the population of the former Bedouin countries started to live on rentier income. This is one of the few examples in Modern history when formerly poor developing countries started to have GDPs comparable with that of the developed countries. In particular, today five of the six countries of the Persian Gulf are included in the list of 30 countries of the world with the highest GDP per capita (Vishnevsky and Denisenko 2016). This has surely reinforced the positions of monarchic regimes and dictators.¹⁰ OPEC became one of the most important economic organizations in the world.

The improvements in life standards in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East have significantly changed its demographic sphere as well as created (probably, for the first time with respect to the developing countries) a considerably large flow of migrants from the neighboring poor Muslim countries to the Gulf countries and some other oil-producing countries.

Although Islamist fundamentalism and terrorism existed already before the rise in oil prices, one can hardly doubt that the surplus of petrodollars created a fertile soil for it. At first, terrorism had an anti-Israeli bias (yet, here we should also bear in mind the assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954 and assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt in 1981 as well as the Kurdish terrorists); later, its scale has increased and involved Russia, the USA, then the Middle Eastern countries, and today even Europe. The secular governors have failed to take control over terrorism, yet secretly or openly support related organizations.

Aggressive Islamism and terrorism will undoubtedly hamper the development of the Middle Eastern countries in the long run, all the more so as the birth rates in some

⁹About the shifts that have taken place with the expansion of non-OPEC oil production, see Grubb et al. (1996).

¹⁰One should note that the events of the Arab Spring demonstrated that monarchic regimes seem to be more legitimated and hence stable than the quasi-democratic regimes with inconsistent authoritarian capacities; yet, the situation with oil prices can influence the stability of monarchies (Grinin and Korotayev 2011, 2012a; Grinin 2012f; Korotayev et al. 2012d).

countries are still high and the youth share (“the youth bulge”) in population structure is considerable [yet, tending to decrease (e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2012)]. One may hope that a gradual decrease in birth rates along with the growth of literacy and cultural and humanitarian development will reduce aggression in these societies.

2.4 Modernization and Religion in the Middle East in Comparison with China and India

Undoubtedly, due to weak nationalism in the Middle East [especially after the reduced influence of an Arab nationalist ideology (see, e.g., Khayrullin and Korotayev 2016, 2017a, b, c)], the majority of the population adheres to traditional ideological patterns suggested by religion or politicized religious ideology—Islamism. One should note that even in the Middle East, the role of a non-religious ideology, on occasions, can be prominent (see Chap. 3, and Sect. 3.4.1). For instance, this was the case at the beginning of the Arab Spring when the ideology of the secular minority was in the vanguard (see Chap. 4). There is also observed a certain dualism in the Asian and African societies associated with modernization, since within them one can trace two tendencies: the contemporary modernized society which involves Westernized intelligence as it is expressed by an urban middle-class and a modernized society rooted still in traditions that is socially supported by the same strata of educated people as well as by semi-educated people (see Grinin 2012e, 2013b, c, 2014b, 2017c, d). The latter form of modernization is characterized by adherence to communal consciousness that directs political behavior and people’s attitude toward the state and which is determined by traditional identity (national, religious), as well as the pursuit of a peaceful life (Yakovlev 2015: 326–327; see Chap. 3). In fact, this explains the dualism (appropriate for modernized societies and which was revealed in the elections held during the Arab Spring)¹¹ of many Middle Eastern countries. It largely applies to India where due to long-standing traditions of elections and democracy the participation in elections makes people follow certain parties and their leaders and not just to identify them (more precisely, the identification merges with party affiliation). To a lesser extent, this refers to China where people are more united and the role of the state is traditionally very significant.

Let us formulate an idea about the role of religion and ideology in these societies and then give some examples.

The role of religion in the Middle East is huge since it is the leading paradigm in all spheres of life. That is why the rise of Islamism and the Islamic Resurgence

¹¹Samuel Huntington analyzes quite well this complex relationship between urban middle-class and rural people in modernizing societies at different stages of modernization (Huntington 1968; Grinin 2017a, b).

are hardly surprising. In India, the role of religion is smaller than in the Middle East but it is very important both in private life and in policy, as well as in the formation of nationalist ideology. The role of ideology in China is significant yet it is a changing ideology which transforms drastically as a result of state changes—yet, there is a stable, consistent yet still changing archetype: an ideology of empire and emperor, omnipotence and righteousness of the state, Confucian principles with respect to elders, authorities, orders, and labor ethics.

Igor M. Dyakonov noted that in ancient societies, the ideology was of a ritual-magic type which did not require dogmatic exceptionalism, while the medieval societies had the religious ideology of a ritual-ethical type that rejected any deviations from dogma (Diakonov 1971: 144). However, the Reformation changed the situation in Europe. As Thomas Hobbes unambiguously noted, “none but the sovereign in a Christian Commonwealth, can take notice what is or what is not the word of God” (Hobbes 2010 [1651]: Chap. XL). Not without reason during the sixteenth-century Reformation in Germany, there appeared a principle (according to Peace of Augsburg 1655) “*cuius regio, eius religio* (‘Whose realm, his religion’),” i.e., the religion of the prince became the religion of the state and all its inhabitants, put up with discrimination.

However, in the Arab World, for the most part of the medieval period, the Caliphs had limited political power, as they did not have the deciding vote in religious matters. In fact, religion as well as the society received autonomy from the political power which usually could not interfere with a number of spheres of life including many branches of law (see, e.g., Bolshakov 1984; Hodgson 2009). Only in some cases, the supreme power claimed real primacy over religion.¹² But even then the sultan infrequently interfered with religious matters and still such interference sometimes could be repulsed on the part of the clergy (in Iran, the Shiite clergy sometimes would oppose the Shah, see Chap. 3). In fact, at present, such religious and civic autonomy persists in many Arab countries, especially in the Gulf States (and some other Islamic countries) which makes it difficult to implement long overdue reforms in the legal sphere, in the field of female rights, etc., and also contributes to internationalization of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. At the same time, fundamentalism and terrorism are one of the most noticeable global impacts of the Middle East on the rest of the world.

Thus, as regards the Middle East, the functions of religion are extremely significant and diverse there; perhaps, nowhere else they have been as broad as in Islam. Religion

¹²This was particularly the case with the Ottoman Empire (but not always). The Ottoman Empire was the first state in the history where the Muslim “clergy” gained official status and created a hierarchical organization of professional “church” officials with a clear indication of functions and positions (e.g., Ivanov and Oreshkova 2000: 77). Unlike in the Arab Caliphate in Turkey (and in some provinces of this Empire, e.g., in Egypt), there also develops the “clergy” of the *ulama* whose most part is included in the state apparatus by some means (officially or de facto). This situation contributed to the implementation of secular reforms in Turkey in the twentieth century, although the influence of Islamic religion remains considerable in this country.

has substituted for political ties and law, and in some respects still continues to do it (especially this concerns some areas of law in many Middle Eastern countries). As Primakov (2006: 16) rightly put it, no Arab leader could ignore the traditional deep religiosity of the population, and even the Arab Spring is another confirmation of this fact (Grinin et al. 2016b). This explains to some extent why the significance of politicized Islam (Islamism) has greatly increased, while Islam has always been politicized. But at present, the Islamist politicians are to a lesser extent connected with the body of clergy and rely on the grass roots (also see Chap. 3).

In this respect, Islam, on the one hand, unites the Middle East, but on the other hand, it separates it from external influence. Unlike Hinduism, Islam adapts external influences with much more difficulties.¹³

The role of religion in India is traditionally significant, and manifestations of religious fanaticism are quite frequent there (yet, one should point to some changes in this respect).¹⁴ Hinduism has become one of the most important bases of the national liberation movement (see, e.g., Yurlov and Yurlova 2010; Gorokhov 2011; Stankevich 2011; Wilkins 2006; see also Fox 1977; Bhat 2001; Dyson et al. 2004), and its ideologist, Mahatma Gandhi, created an ethical and political philosophy on the basis of Hinduism. Gandhi used to be considered as a saint. However, for a long time, the aspiration to make a saint or a deity from the ruler was preserved among a substantial part of the Indian commoners. The social power of religion in this country is also great since it consecrates the social division into castes and so-called Communalism (Klyuev 2002; Bayly 1975; Chandra 1984; Nandy 2004).

China has always evolved with a strong state ideology (due to its subordinate role, the religion was underdeveloped). At the same time, there were signs of periodic changes in the attitude toward different religions and ideologies especially when dynasties and regimes would change. Nevertheless, Confucianism was closely associated with the political structure of the Chinese Empire. Consequently, it had the greatest influence on traditions, mentality, and political ideology (Eisenstadt 1978b; Yum 1988; Bell 2010a, b; Fan 2011).

Thus, the peculiar and persistent role of religion in the Middle East is the most important prerequisite for the growth of Islamism which may be considered not only as politicized Islam but also as an ideology of reformed (in a specific manner) Islam.

¹³The striving to stand alongside with the West and at the same time to fight with it is perceived in Islamism as in no other ideology. But this duality became noticeable long ago. The French historians wrote about it 90 years ago, "...with every intellectual movement in the Muslim world one cannot ignore two factors leading to the same result: with unconscious imitation of Europe, on the one hand, and wishing to fight against Europe, on the other hand, they want to supply Islamism with arms and to provide with opportunity to fight on equal terms. Finally, Islamism strives to become liberal in order to protect itself from liberalism and transforms basing on the instinct of self-preservation. This explains why in this transformation of Muslim doctrines the main figures are the scholars of Muslim church who devote themselves to religion and have a great inclination to identify their nationality with it" (Cahen and Metin 1939: 12–13). This duality was especially evident in Iran.

¹⁴According to investigations conducted by World Values Survey in 2005–2008, 44% of the Indians attend worship at least once a week. India's religiosity level is significantly higher than in China, Europe, and even the USA, but it is lower than in Muslim countries of the Middle East (Korotayev and Khaltourina 2009; Korotayev et al. 2012b).

2.5 Migrations

Migrations as a social source of radical Islamist ideology play an important role in the Middle East. Thus, nearly 40% of the population of all six countries of the Gulf consists of migrant laborers (about 23 million). The vast majority of migrants, especially from the East Asian countries, perform hard, low-paid, and low-skilled jobs in building, industry and as household servants of native inhabitants. Their labor is not adequately protected; accidents and deaths are relatively common. Migrants represent the lower layers in social stratification and are subjects of indigenous population. They are not included into the social security system and depend on their employers who as a rule confiscate their passports (see, e.g., Vishnevsky and Denisenko 2016).

Other migration flows are directed to the USA and Europe. In 2015, emigration became an all-European and even worldwide problem after the illegal migrants from the Middle East (mainly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan) had flooded Europe. But, on the whole, the Arab diaspora in European countries (especially in France, Spain and Belgium) has a great influence on social and economic life in these countries (all the more so since it combines with migrants from other southern countries). It increases the threat of terrorism and strife in the society; yet, many migrants try to fit into their new homes in Western society.

On the whole, at present, the Muslim migrants make up 27% of all international migrants which means that about 60 million Muslims (4% of global Muslim population) live outside the country of their origin [by comparison, the indicators of migration activity of the Christian population make up 49% and 106 million, respectively (Gorokhov 2015: 21)]. Thus, the share of Muslim migrants is approximately the same as the share of Muslims in the total population of the world. About 11 million Muslims born outside the region live in Arab oil-producing countries of the Gulf. So, at present, most Muslims born outside live in Europe and the Middle East (Pew Research Center 2012).

2.6 Geopolitics

Starting from the postwar period, the Middle East, China, and India came to play a significant role in global geopolitics. The main events took place in the framework of competition between the superpowers—the USA and USSR, capitalism and socialism—which occurred in the context of intraregional struggle (about intraregional struggle in the Middle East, see, e.g., Salloukh 2013; Phillips 2016, 2017; Grinin et al. 2016b).¹⁵ Of course, oil production also played a significant role as evidenced by a number of coups in Iran, Iraq, and other countries of the Middle East. The USA

¹⁵Let us remind that for the Middle East, the Arab–Israeli conflict remained the main problem which also used to be a part of the global clash between socialism and capitalism for a long time. But later (after the collapse of the USSR and the start of support of the Palestinians from the West), this aspect disappeared. Nevertheless, the Arab–Israeli conflict remained of great importance in the

within its overall strategy actively turned the countries of this region into the staging ground for encircling the USSR with military bases and military blocks. The USA, as was mentioned, established strong partnership with Saudi Arabia during Second World War (Yergin 1999), and it only strengthened after the war. However, after the Egyptian revolution of 1952, due to the Arab–Israeli confrontation (with the USA and the West supporting Israel), the countries of the Middle East started maneuvering between the USA and USSR, first supporting one and then the other [a vivid example is Egypt (see, e.g., Flower 1972; Vatikiotis 1992; Daly 1998; Marsot 2004)]. This was largely due to the oil shocks of the 1970s which were arranged by the OPEC countries.

In the period between the 1950s and 1970s, the ideology of pan-Arabism, a peculiar form of Arab nationalism (uniting the most part of Arab countries), played a great role in the life of Arab countries. It was especially promoted by the conflict between the Arab states and Israel (see, e.g., Khalidi 1991; Tibi 1997; Dawisha 2016). The President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, played a crucial role in the development and popularization of this ideology. Later, this ideology weakened due to the defeat of the Arab nationalists during the war with Israel in 1967, the reorientation of Egypt toward the USA under Sadat, and a number of other factors (see Khayrullin and Korotayev 2016, 2017a, b, c).

Just after the oil crisis, the USA started to intensify cooperation with the Arab countries, though it had initially rejected the idea of forceful intervention into the policy of oil-producing countries. As a result, a strategic partnership between the USA and the Gulf countries was formed which was strengthened after the war of 1991. The agreements about widespread oil trading only in dollars were adopted, which strengthened the dollar after its positions were lost as a result of devaluation at the early 1970s and the rejection of the gold standard. In general, the USA began to strengthen its positions in the Middle East; in particular, it arranged the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1979. The positions of the USA strengthened further as a result of USSR's departure from the Middle East.

In the 1980s, the positions of the USSR in the Middle East were staggered, and with the disintegration of the USSR, they became weak (Vasiliev 2018). This resulted in a dramatic increase in the US presence in the region (especially after the first Gulf War in 1990–1991); yet, the countries in the Middle East did not benefit much from this situation (with the exception of Arab Palestine for some time). At the same time, US intervention led to many crises. For instance, we refer to the US invasion into Afghanistan and Iraq, the rising tensions between the USA and Pakistan, and the expansion of al-Qaeda.

Starting from 2009, the USA, following Obama's doctrine of military withdrawal from Iraq and the Middle East (along with raising US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region), tried to reduce its activity (and consequently expenditures) in the region (see Phillips 2016). The idea appeared inopportune and counterproductive due to the start of the Arab Spring, in the course of which the USA, being obsessed

Middle East region till the Arab Spring which decreased its importance (see Grinin et al. 2016b: Conclusion).

with spreading democracy by all means, refused to help their allies (regimes in Egypt and Tunis) and actually betrayed them. Besides, they supported the idea of the overthrow of strong and stable regimes in such countries as Libya and Syria. This idea came from Saudi Arabia that considered (not without reason) that the fewer stable regimes will remain in the region, the stronger will be its own geopolitical positions (Ibid.). As a result, the USA failed to cope with their tasks in the region and turned it into a zone with much more conflict than it was prior to the Arab Spring (Grinin et al. 2016b).

Besides, under Obama the United States behaved inappropriately toward its oldest and most strategic allies—Israel and Saudi Arabia—by starting (and successfully concluding) negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program (however, as is well known, the new US president Trump withdrew from this agreement). The decreasing American presence allowed Russia to return to the Middle East as the most influential power (e.g., Vasiliev 2018).

Nowadays, the Middle East has become the scene of rivalry, including a military one, which involves both world forces (e.g., Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the European Council, the USA, China, Qatar) and local forces (such as the Kurds or the Houthis in Yemen). As a matter of fact, this region is a tight knot of world contradictions that is fertile ground for recruiting new generations to fuel world terrorism. It has become an area where everyone acts in their own interest (often disregarding the interests of the countries of the Middle East), and there are no suitable ways to overcome this quandary (see Grinin et al. 2016b).

The Middle East has completely turned into the most conflict-ridden region of the world (Grinin et al. 2016b; Korotayev et al. 2016b). Apparently, it will remain that way for a long time. But perhaps later this will trigger changes and there will take place a subsequent gradual separation between policy and religion as well as a transformation of the Islamic religion toward a direction more conducive to effective modernization.

Endless changes in the American foreign policy considerably increase instability in the Middle East and can bring even more intense chaos. By the end of 2015, the agreements on Iran's nuclear program were signed somehow. Iran agreed to restrictions, and they started to gradually lift the sanctions. But in 2017 under Trump, there was a sharp reversal in the US foreign policy which at present disavows the nuclear deal. All these facts reveal serious problems in the American political machine which may be considered as a reaction to the general weakening of their position in the World System (see Grinin 2015, 2016; Grinin et al. 2016b).

Thus, the whole geopolitical history of the Middle East in the post–World War II period contributed to the Islamic Resurgence, the rise of Islamism which won the victory on the ideological front. The ever-growing interest of the USA to entertain a confrontation with Iran, the support of terrorist and Mujahideen groups, interference by the USA and other foreign powers in the domestic affairs of many Middle Eastern

countries, support for both Israel and the regimes of the Gulf, and all the American political fluctuations in the Middle East made this country a target for constant criticism, a kind of ideological bane for the faithful, thereby increasing anti-Westernism which is a cornerstone of radical Islamism (Grinin et al. 2016b; see Chap. 3).

Concerning China there are different views about the growing global role of this country. Some people admire Chinese progress (see, e.g., Lau et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003), others are frightened of it (e.g., Bernstein and Munro 1998); the Chinese phenomenon is used to corroborate various ideas, conceptions and forecasts—ranging from the forthcoming Chinese global hegemony (e.g., Campbell 2008; Hutchinson 2013; Mugomba and Bekker 2013; Kelly 2014) to the collapse/disintegration of China (e.g., Chang 2001; Javers 2009; STRATFOR 2010: 6). But nobody can ignore that the growing economic power of China is transforming in its geopolitical power. Not to mention its growing military power.

2.7 Islamism

2.7.1 *Moderate and Radical Islamism*

There are many definitions of Islamism, part of them we cite in the next chapter. In this chapter, we cite only one. “Political movement that favors reordering government and society in accordance with laws prescribed by Islam” (Hooper 2015).

Moderate Islamism (see Chap. 3) is a political movement which promotes Islamic values in Muslim societies, but which is also ready to maintain constitutional norms and struggle for their ideals peacefully and within the framework of national law via participation in political processes, elections, coalitions, etc. (see, e.g., Kurzman 1998; Denoex 2002; Schwedler 2011; March 2015; Volpi and Stein 2015; Achilov 2015, 2016; Achilov and Sen 2017). Radical Islamism aspires to a forcible transformation of society on the basis of Islamism. The characteristics of moderate and radical Islamism will be described in Chap. 3. Moderate Islamism is a social phenomenon that implies a relatively ordered internal life. Radical Islamism, on the other hand, is more a phenomenon signifying the disorder in a society. It is a result of interventions (by foreign powers), struggle with intervenors, etc. The largest number of terrorist attacks took place in countries which suffered from wars and deprivation, whose territories were occupied (e.g., Palestine), and where the people resisted the occupants. Occupation of territories by foreign or hostile powers provided an impetus for terrorism—cf. Taliban, al-Qaeda, Daesh.

As we will say in the next chapter, there are many cases of transition of moderate Islamists to radical Islamism (see, e.g., Ketchley 2017; Abboud 2016), and vice versa (Rajae 2007; Schwedler 2011; Bayat 2013; March 2015; Hossain 2016; Amin 2017); in many cases, there is an antagonism between radical and moderate Islamists (Osman 2016: 260).

2.7.2 *International Influence and Islamism*

Until the last decades of the twentieth century, apart from conflicts with neighbors, the influence of India was associated with its role in Non-Aligned Movement and efforts to maneuver between the USA and the USSR (in a certain sense, one can trace here the traditional characteristic for India that the external influences should be adapted and synthesized within the framework of its own Indian mentality). The role of China was determined by its reluctance to be a player on the world stage, and it was uncertain with whom to align its influence while it remained closed for the world [one can see here the consequences of the traditional Sinocentric perspective of the external world (about Chinese perspectives, see Grinin et al. 2015)]. The Middle East appeared to be connected to oil and gas, Anti-Zionism, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism. The attempts of flirting with socialism were rejected. Despite the US active impact and cooperation with many Middle East regimes, the ideology of struggle with the West and anti-Americanism generally persists and has intensified since it is a breeding ground for fundamentalism and terrorism (especially after the dissolution of the USSR). By the way, the USA largely nourished the terrorism themselves (see Chap. 3 below).

Thus, the rapid growth of oil production in the Middle East and rising oil prices had a considerable impact on many countries of the world, their economy and policy. But despite the ongoing modernization in the Middle Eastern countries, they could not outstrip the level of periphery countries while continuing to affect (and shake) the world through spikes in oil prices, conflicts, and terrorism based on Islamist radicalism. Due to the Arab Spring, levels of conflict as well as instability have reached an unprecedented scale (see Grinin et al. 2016b; Korotayev et al. 2016a).

Among the real changes, one should distinguish the rapid growth of business travel which has become very important for Turkey, Egypt, and Tunis, Saudi Arabia, and in part for Israel and Morocco, but not for all countries of the region. Yet, in part due to the Arab Spring, in recent years, there has been a rise in terrorism and other significant problems. In the Middle East, there exists a certain division of labor [e.g., Egypt used to be the center of education and tourism for the Gulf countries (Korotayev and Yur'iev 2018)]. The Gulf countries try to diversify their economies but have a long way to go. Israel has the most developed economy, followed by Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Many countries of the region achieved significant results in agriculture (due to irrigation and use of better yielding varieties of plants). Agriculture, to a significant extent, meets the needs of the growing population, but, as regards grain and a number of other products, these countries are for the most part import dependent. In 2010–2011, this dependence caused the spreading of social protests since there occurred an increase in food prices (the so-called second wave of agflation) contributing to social discontent (see Chaps. 4 and 5 below as well as

Grinin 2012f; Korotayev et al. 2012d; Korotayev and Khodunov 2012; Khodunov and Korotayev 2012; Akaev et al. 2012).

On the whole, despite modernization, the Middle East has failed to considerably improve its position in the global economy (in contrast to India and China). Oil production has increased in these countries; moreover, gas production also increases. One can also observe the construction of oil refineries and the development of a large gas liquefaction sector. As a result, the *Middle East has been and continues to be primarily the region of production and an exporter of energy*. And undoubtedly, this nourishes Islamism and its radical wing, while a closer and more well-balanced integration into the global division of labor would contribute to the growth of other ideologies and mitigation of radicalism.

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Chapter 3

Islamism and Its Role in Modern Islamic Societies



Introduction. What Is This Chapter About? The subject of this chapter is how Islamism is not a monolith but rather, multifaceted, multileveled, continually changing, and often self-contradictory. It is simply impossible to understand contemporary Islamic (and, especially, Arab) societies without considering the influence of Islamism as a pastiche of ideology, cultural environment, modes of action, and ways of life. Without acknowledging this, the mass of relevant phenomena will look unexplained and not integrated into the general course of life. To understand Islamism is not easy, because it is one of the most complex social phenomena of the present time (Kepel 2000: 25; Levin 2014: 4). In addition, for a number of reasons, which we will discuss below, for many observers of the Middle East in the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, Islamism remains “a phenomenon lurking beneath the surface” (Osman 2016: xiii). For that reason, it remains insufficiently understood. Meanwhile, it can swing wildly in its manifestations from quite respectable political parties and debates of scientists to a vocal stream of consciousness rant by an illiterate Muslim or violent actions of radical Islamist groups. Thus, “political Islam is not a monolithic phenomenon, but rather a complex concept with multifaceted dimensions, comprising Muslim political attitudes that vary vastly cross-nationally” (see, e.g., Achilov and Sen 2017: 609; see also Ayoob 2009; Denooux 2002; Schwedler 2011). In addition, “the very concept of Islamism is sensitive to volatile social and political shifts” (Achilov and Sen 2017: 621), and, as a result, the concept of Islamism changes with certain major events.

As experts note, even radical Islam is extremely diverse. There is still no established terminology for its designation: Experts speak of Islamism, political Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic terrorism, jihadism, Wahhabism, Salafism,

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etc. (e.g., Kisriev and Savateev 2015). Meanwhile, Islamism could be also moderate, democratic, but it may be perfectly undemocratic, as diverse and contradictory, not frozen, but alive as a life, reacting to various changes, ranging from extreme radicalism to quite liberal statements and political actions (Kurzman 1998; Denoex 2002; Ayoob 2009; Schwedler 2011; March 2015; Volpi and Stein 2015; Achilov 2015, 2016; Achilov and Sen 2017).

This chapter does not pretend to perform a comprehensive study of Islamism. This is simply impossible in any study (some of the questions were raised in Chap. 2). The main thing that we would like to convey to the reader is this: Radical and terrorist Islamism is a sad and cruel reality. As we all know, the media, and even the researchers, give it the lion's share of their attention—of course, not without some reason. This reason is that the radical Islamism represents a formidable and often invisible danger, as its possible victims can be anyone anywhere (including moderate Islamists). However, behind this threat, which also has a tendency to be exaggerated, the most important facts fall out of our scope of attention: and that is that, in fact, radical Islamists make up a very small part of Islamists. Most Islamists are not radicals, though in this mass there is also a certain “swamp,” which has the potential to lean toward radicalism under certain conditions. In general, Islamism largely reflects the essence of modern Islamic societies, their way of thinking and living. Yet, the majority of the population of modern Islamic countries are not supporters of radical Islamists, otherwise the entire Middle East would long ago become an analogue of the infamous Islamic State. On the contrary, Islamism in many ways helps to establish social life at different levels of society, creating a special Islamic path to modernization.

For many citizens of Islamic countries, and even for most of them, Islam is an important part of their worldview and everyday life. That is why Islamists often win elections. There is no wonder that in the Muslim world, one can hardly find a single country left where Islamism has not become an influential and stable factor of domestic and foreign policy. What appeared at the end of the last century as particular episodes turned out to be one of the main trends in the world politics (see, e.g., Malashenko 2015).

That is why Islamism cannot be eradicated at the present stage; but Muslim societies can well grow beyond it (Bayat 2007, 2013; Hossain 2016; Amin 2017; Holdoa 2017),¹ and this will take a long time. One can agree that Islamism—regardless of how it is defined and which movements, parties and groups are affiliated with it—will remain a political actor on the national, regional, and global stages for more than one generation (Malashenko 2015: 122).

Further, we must clearly understand that it will be impossible to reduce the danger of radical, terrorist Islamism by force alone. It is likely to fade away only if it is possible to do this in alliance with moderate Islamism, if it is possible to make moderate Islamists more respectable, open, and engaged in normal political life. We will consider these aspects in this chapter. Additional analysis of radical Islamism is presented in the second part of the book.

¹Similarly, it was impossible to abolish the influence of Protestant doctrines in most communities of colonists in North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which lived according to the norms of Christian fundamentalism. And then the process of reducing the influence of these norms went quite spontaneously.

3.1 Definitions of Islamism, Some Views on This Phenomenon. Emergence of Ideas and Organizations

3.1.1 *The Notion of Islamism*

Definition Researchers are unanimous in stating that it is impossible to put an equal sign between Islam and Islamism; that is, between religious faith and the political ideology created on this basis. Modern Islamism is a derivative of Islam, a relatively young political ideology, connected initially with an awareness of the Western domination and the challenge it poses to Muslim societies. In recent decades, the development of Islamism is closely linked to the Islamic Resurgence—a special kind of Islamic modernization. In short, Islamism is often defined as “politicized Islam” or “political Islam” (see, e.g., Levin 2014: 4; Ignatenko 2004: 40; Achilov 2016: 252; Achilov and Sen 2017: 608), which is convenient, but because of the brevity of the label, it is not entirely true. Islamism is not only a political, but also a social ideology, a way of life and action. But in any case, of course, it is true that Islamism makes Islam not only religious, but also a political ideology.

Consider some definitions of Islamism, starting with Mirsky’s definition: “Islamism is a political movement based on a radical ideology, the essence of which is fundamentalism, the conviction that all the troubles of the Muslim world come from forgetting the foundations of ‘pure, righteous, true Islam of the ancestors,’ from attempts to borrow alien values and the secular organization of society” (Mirsky 2016: 13). Let us pay attention to the fact that here emphasis is placed on the point that Islamism is a radical ideology. In many respects this is true, but only with reference to radical Islamism; indeed, the most extreme currents of Islamism are aimed at transforming the life of the whole world into the harmony of true Islam (although the understanding of true Islam varies very much among a multitude of Islamist trends). That is why, to some extent, the following definition of Islamism is also legitimate (but—again—only as a definition of radical Islamism):

Islamism is a global project for the reconstruction of the world based on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, a plan for realizing the idea of Muslims as providential saviors of mankind, saving us from the destructive consequences of secularism, nationalism, globalization. (Levin 2014)

Radical Islamism relies heavily on the ideological trend in Islam, called Salafism/*salafiyah*² [though, of course, a very large proportion of Salafis are not radicals (see, e.g., Schwedler 2011; March 2015)]. Most adherents of this trend recognize the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet as the only basis of faith and advocate a return to pure Islam, which was in the early Islamic communities in the first centuries of its existence. That is, they claim that they stand for a return to the fundamentals, which is why this current is considered fundamentalist and the very word *salafiyah* is sometimes translated as “fundamentalism.” According

²The word comes from the expression *as-salaf as-salihun* (righteous ancestors).

to some researchers, Islamism is nothing else but the current version of *salafiyyah* (Malashenko 2006: 14), which, however, ignores the presence of non-Salafi Islamists.

Nevertheless, let us reiterate that we must not lose sight of the fact that Islamism is heterogeneous, torn by contradictions, that almost the main enemies of radical Islamists are not secularists, but moderate Islamists (Osman 2016: 260). Therefore, it does not always make sense to focus specifically on the fundamentalist character of Islamism, since in the case when moderate Islamism seeks to fit into a society where many institutions are secular, fundamentalism recedes into the background. And it is impossible not to agree with Huntington (1996: 110) when he notes that “Islamic ‘fundamentalism,’ commonly conceived as political Islam, is only one component in the much more extensive revival of Islamic ideas, practices, and rhetoric and the rededication to Islam by Muslim populations. The Resurgence is mainstream not extremist, pervasive not isolated.”

It is important to point out that the above definitions are rather definitions of radical Islamism, and not of Islamism in general, as they do not take into account the existence of such an exceptionally important phenomenon as moderate Islamism (strictly speaking, to give such definitions is basically the same as, say, to substitute the definition of Marxism with the definition of Leninism or Stalinism).

In this respect, the following definitions appear to be much more adequate:

Political movement that favors reordering government and society in accordance with laws prescribed by Islam. (Hooper 2015), or:

The term “Islamism”... represents a form of social and political activism, grounded in an idea that public and political life should be guided by a set of Islamic principles. In other words, Islamists are those who believe that Islam has an important role to play in organizing a Muslim-majority society and who seek to implement this belief. (Poljarevic 2015)

With regard to the above definitions, it is very important to bear in mind that by Muslims themselves, such things as “laws prescribed by Islam” or “Islamic principles” can be understood very differently—and here one can find not only radical but also rather moderate interpretations. In addition, real Islamists very seldom in fact seek to reorganize the whole world in accordance with certain Islamic principles. Much more often, it is a matter of restructuring in accordance with these principles of a particular Muslim-majority country. In addition, the construction of an Islamic state (if this is the case at all) is often seen only in an indefinitely distant future.

Here are some other definitions of Islamism/political Islam:

A form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives...., a form that “provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic traditions.” (Denoeux 2002: 61; see also Achilov 2016: 253; Achilov and Sen 2017: 608–609)

“A body of faith” that “has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion”. (Fuller 2004: xi)

It should be noted that some experts tend to restrict the “Islamists” labels to radicals, whereas they prefer to designate moderate Islamism with some other terms (say, “Islamic activism”—see, e.g., Tsaregorodtseva 2017). What is more, there is a tendency to doubt the existence of moderate Islamists, or to just reject their very existence:

The discussion about whether there are ‘moderate Islamists’ is difficult because, in order to find the answer, one would have to look inside the head of the supposed ‘moderate’. If he (or she) engages in parliamentary elections, can he be termed a ‘moderate Islamist’, and has he thus been ‘tamed’? My contention is that those ‘Islamists’ who have genuinely accepted the rules of the system they participate in should not be called Islamists, because they no longer have the desire to overthrow this system. (Woltering 2002: 1134)³

Below one can find an even stronger formulation:

Moderate Islamism is an oxymoron. There may be moderate Muslims but definitely no moderate Islamists. There is not a hair of ideological difference between the various Islamist groups. There are theological differences, policy distinctions, and diverse strategies and tactics (some, indeed, more moderate than others) but ideologically, all aim to subjugate other religions and worldviews and create an Islamist Caliphate. (Bisk 2015: 132–133)

Of course, there may be different opinions, but according to our reasoning, such an approach is unproductive on two planes: the scientific and the practical. First, Islamism, in the very meaning of the word, is linked to the prominence of Islam and the dissemination of its principles to different spheres of life, but it should not necessarily require the violent overthrow of the ruling regime. Secondly, there are many cases of transition of moderate Islamists to radical Islamism [say, part of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after July 2013 (see, e.g., Ketchley 2017), or some Syrian moderate Islamists who radicalized after 2011 (see, e.g., Abboud 2016)], and vice versa, for example, radical Islamists in Iran have now become moderate enough to, say, observe the rules of democratic elections (Rajaei 2007). And such a seemingly unquestionably radical Islamist organization as Hezbollah in Lebanon participates in elections, has its representation in parliament, and, moreover, enters the government bloc with Christian and secular parties (for other examples of the transformation of radical Islamists into moderate Islamists see, e.g., Schwedler 2011; Bayat 2013; March 2015; Hossain 2016; Amin 2017). In our opinion, it is better to have a general term for Islamists; but a better term than “Islamists” seems difficult to offer.

In addition, despite the enormous differences in attitude toward terror, participation in political life, etc., Islamists are united by certain common ideological approaches. Yet, as must be obvious by now, these approaches are not only blurred, but Islamists vary greatly with regards as to what degree to implement its manifestations (Kelsay 2007: 166).

That is why it appears equally wrong to try to consider moderate Islamists as non-Islamists, and to fail to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. It

³Interestingly, not only some Islamologists, but also some liberal Muslims (see, e.g., Tibi 2012, 2013) adhere to this approach, as well as some politicians (see the Introduction).

is more productive to recognize the presence of both radical Islamism and moderate Islamism⁴ (for a detailed explanation of this approach, see the following papers: Kurzman 1998; Denoëux 2002; Ayoob 2009; Schwedler 2011; March 2015; Volpi and Stein 2015; Achilov 2015, 2016; Achilov and Sen 2017).

We conclude this discussion of the various approaches to the definition of Islamism, by citing the following words of Achilov and Sen: “[empirical data]... challenge the notion that Muslim attitudes toward political Islam are uniform. Substantively, moderate views of Islam’s role in politics are nested within support for political pluralism, a belief in individual civil liberties and accommodation for both Shari’ah and secular laws. By contrast, politically radical views are shaped by support for the exclusive rule of Shari’ah, intolerance for democratic pluralism and a belief in the superiority of clerics in governance decisions. We also find that support for politically moderate Islam, compared with radical views, is associated with higher levels of education, social class, associational social capital, and engagement in political activism. At the same time, we suggest the need for further future empirical scrutiny for a possible lurking variant that may lie between politically radical and politically moderate Islamism”. (Achilov and Sen 2017: 621).

So, if we summarize different approaches to the definition of Islam, trying to take into account different trends in Islamism, then we could say that *Islamism is a political trend and ideology, widespread in Muslim, especially Arab countries. Islamism is based on the idea of placing a high value (or even superiority) on the rules and traditions of Islam, on the need to build life (in varying degrees) in accordance with variously understood principles of Islam; it is oriented at the organizing politically around people who put some Islamic (or interpreted as Islamic) ideas and principles at the center of political life.*

Heterogeneity of Islamism as Ideology and Political Movement Some authors have come to the conclusion that so-called Islamic fundamentalism is “more than just a religion”; rather it is a revolutionary movement at a global scale in which a combination of social, religious and political goals is revealed. Consequently, it must be viewed and analyzed not only and not so much in the religious aspect as through a secular prism, as a “revolutionary ideology” (Dennis 1996: (i). Some political analysts seek to generalize and even simplify the notion of “Islamism,” and view it through the prism of the foreign policy problems of Western countries. For example, Swedish researchers Anders Strinberg and Mats Warn believe that Western Islamic studies are fused with foreign policy concerns, with the interests of security and politics, and, as a result, create a permanent political and academic dead loop... As a result, the study of Islamism was immediately limited to the study of it as a dangerous

⁴However, many of the moderate Islamists themselves prefer to call their version of Islamism not “moderate Islamism” but “post-Islamism” (see, for example: Bayat 2007, 2013; Hossain 2016; Amin 2017). Note that we are still inclined to regard post-Islamism as the most advanced version of moderate Islamism, that is, if different from moderate Islamism, then only towards even more moderation and adaptation to modern sociopolitical systems (see para 3.6.3). It is noteworthy that such a prominent representative of post-Islamism as Bangladeshi Ahand Akhtar Hossain is inclined to view post-Islamism as a concept that is homonymous to the notion of “a softer version of Islamism” (Hossain 2016: 214).

enemy (Strindberg and Warn 2011: 4). In short, the study of Islamism was limited to study of radical Islamism.

Consideration of Islamism as a constant enemy in many respects stems both from the position of the radical Islamists themselves, who view the West precisely in this Manichaean perspective, and from the historical tradition of confrontation between Christianity and Islam. As a confirmation of their views, let us cite the position of the famous American Islamicist Bernard Lewis, who considers Islamism a modern extrapolation of the fourteen centuries of struggle between the two rival civilizational systems—Christianity and Islam. According to him, in Islam, the struggle between good and evil very quickly acquired political and even military character (Lewis 1990).

Such a prominent liberal Muslim as Bassam Tibi believes that all versions of modern Islam can only be understood in the context of a clash with Western culture; and this confrontation contains both political–economic and cultural–civilizational aspects (Tibi 1988: 6).

In the twenty-first century, the dichotomy of views on Islam and Islamism persists. According to the first point of view, politics is part of the norm of the Islamic tradition. Consequently, Islamism is a phenomenon immanently inherent in the Muslim world, hence, one can never “defeat” it, and one cannot expect it to disappear. According to the second point of view, Islamism, “political Islam” is a historical “scum,” which sooner or later evaporates, and Muslim civilization, in the final analysis, will not fundamentally differ from the secularized Christian-Western civilization.

Both approaches have their own system of reasoning. The main things when analyzing the situation in the Muslim world are as follows: (a) the factor of historical time; and (b) the balance of forces between the Muslim world and its neighbors. As long as the Muslim community retains core features of its traditional sociopolitical heritage, Islam will be preserved as the main regulator of relations between people, and between the state and society. Therefore, in countries with a Muslim majority, almost all parties and movements, including those who are fighting for democracy, will be interested in Islam as an instrument of political mobilization. And, of course, nobody would predict how long the Muslim community will remain in transit, especially after the Arab Spring (Malashenko 2015: 120–121).

Islamism unites its supporters, serving as the basis of their attitude toward Islam and to its principles. Since Islam is multifaceted and heterogeneous, there is no collectively shared interpretation of sacred texts but rather contradictory interpretations abound because of differences among Muslims. Islamism is not and, by definition, cannot be a monolithic construct. Islamism also has a wide range of political opinions from very moderate and willing to cooperate with the West and other non-Islamic civilizations to the most radical (see, e.g., Ayoob 2009; Denoëux 2002; Schwedler 2011; see also Sects. 3.2 and 3.6 of the present chapter).

Back in the late 1960s, Clifford Geertz in his monograph *Islam Observed. Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (1971) very clearly demonstrated the great differences in these two Muslim countries located in different parts of the Islamic world. And Yapp notes in this connection that “there were such profound ideological differences as to make one ask the question whether this was one religion

with different aspects or two religions sharing some common features” (Yapp 2004: 162). Great differences in Islamism in different places and periods are connected with the fact that Islamism is a living current that changes with realities, even if from the outside it is not always noticeable. As M. al-Janabi points out,

the diversity of approaches to the problems of the contemporary Islamic phenomenon, relating both to terminology and its essence, roots and premises, is primarily a reflection of the dynamics of this phenomenon. With each “sudden” change in its forms and characteristics, common terms also change, and new interpretations are invented. This shows either that the internal signs of this phenomenon have not yet been formed, or that such differences and discrepancies are a consequence of the old approach to new political realities or the combination of partial methodologies. (Janabi 2015: 55)

Among Salafi Islamists in particular, the following currents can be mentioned (but these are by no means all trends). On the one hand, it is, above all, the ideology of Sunni adherents of strict orthodoxy, for example the Afghan Taliban, who are fighting for the Shari’ah state in Afghanistan; they demand from Muslims’ strict observance of the Shari’ah regulations in the interpretation of medieval religious and legal schools. It is also worth mentioning here Salafis from other countries advocates of the idea of returning to the sources of faith. In general, the Salafis are represented by Islamists of two categories. First of all, there are guardians of the purity of the Word of God, insisting on the purification of Islam from late medieval perversions without reconsideration of sacred texts in the modern spirit (Muslim Wahhabi Puritans and their adherents), who advocate the revival of the Islamic community solely on the basis of the Quran and the Sunnah; on the other hand, there are keepers of the spirit of Revelation, the followers of the Muslim reformers Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdo, both modernizing and conservative, both moderate (like the Muslim Brothers) and radical (Levin 2014: 77; Savateev et al. 2015; 2017; Osman 2016). Let us note that modernizing Salafism, which goes back to the ideas of these thinkers, has emerged as one of the important sources of moderate Islamism (see Sect. 3.1.2 of this chapter). It appears important to stress again that a very large proportion of Salafis are not radicals (see, e.g., Schwedler 2011; March 2015).

Islamism: Historical Parallels If we consider Salafi Islamism, given the limitations mentioned above, as a modern version of Muslim fundamentalism, then we can say that Islamic societies (in a very peculiar form, of course) experience something similar to the period of the Reformation (see, e.g., Huntington 1996: 111). On the other hand, global trends are also affecting the evolution of the Islamic World.

To a certain extent, parallels with Islamism can be found in the politicization of Christianity and its branches in certain periods and in certain contexts. So the contradictions between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland led to the politicization of these religions there, which caused the radicalization of a fairly mature society in Northern Ireland. This radical stage with full-scale terror lasted for more than 40 years (from the 1950s to the 1990s, though, in fact, it began much earlier). In West Germany after the war, when other ideologies were discredited, the politicization of Christianity was a natural direction, resulting in the birth of Christian Democratic parties (CDP and CDU). One can agree with Osman (Osman 2016: xvii)

that it is wrong to get too involved with such analogies, since Islamism has grown on a much different ground than political trends based on religious ideas in Europe. A greater similarity (in terms of worldview) can be found with the politicization of Hinduism, which processes are taking place in India, etc. (see Grinin and Korotayev 2016). But in India, Hinduism is simultaneously synonymous with the identification of Hindu nationalism, and the situation with nationalism in the Middle East is completely different from that in India.

Therefore, the most productive historical analogy will still be with the Reformation in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when religion was perceived not just formally, but faith was the most important thing in whose defense people fought, gave lives, dealt with dissenters, introduced censorship and self-censorship in societies. It appears appropriate to recollect at this point that the second half of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries in Western Europe was quite a “freethinking” epoch; a whole series of writers criticized the church, power, and general order. But with the spread of Lutheranism and especially Calvinism, freedom of speech was significantly reduced. Similarly (though, of course, with significant qualifications), we can say that the period until the end of the 1970s, in a number of Islamic societies, was a sort of more “liberal” in terms of clothing, gender relations, and certain secularizing trends than the 2000s⁵ (about the influence of the Reformation in Europe on the formation modern type of statehood see Grinin 2009; 2010; 2011b; 2012).

As for the similarities between the Reformation and the rise of Islamism (the Islamic Resurgence), Huntington (1996: 111) correctly noted that both of these processes are, in part, a reaction to the stagnation and corruption of existing institutions; they call for a return to the purer and more demanding form of their religions as they preach work, order, and discipline. By these means they also attract modern and dynamic representatives of the middle class to their side. The central spirit of both the Reformation and the Islamic Renaissance is a fundamental reform. He also says that there are even parallels between Jean Calvin and Ayatollah Khomeini and “the monastic discipline they tried to impose on their societies” (Huntington 1996: 111). Huntington concludes that ignoring the influence of the Islamic revival on the Eastern Hemisphere at the end of the twentieth century is like ignoring the influence of the Protestant Reformation on European politics at the end of the sixteenth century.

Concluding this comparative excursion, let us say that the Islamic Resurgence looks (on occasions) like the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Catholic Europe in the seventeenth century. The Counter-Reformation included among other things the lift of bans on reading and interpreting the Bible by the Catholic Church; it further intensified the development of education and science (some monasteries became centers of scientific research), whereas the Catholic Church had to adapt to a number of changes. Islamism, in the end, also contributes significantly (of course,

⁵Since the 1970s, Islamic symbols, beliefs, traditions, institutions, policies, and organizations have been gaining more and more loyalty and support in the Muslim world. Islamization, as a rule, occurs first in the cultural plan, then goes on to the social and political spheres. Leaders from the intelligentsia and politics, whether they like it or not, can neither ignore nor avoid adopting it in one form or another (Huntington 1996).

in its own rather special way) to the development of education and culture in the Muslim-majority countries.

3.1.2 Emergence of Modern Islamist Ideas and Organization

Modern Islamism is a comparatively young political current, somewhere around 100 years old, but it has become especially active in the last 40 years, since the 1970s. Below we describe, in more detail, which events had a particularly serious impact on this.

Modern Islamism was born as an ideological and political response to the advancement of Europeans to the Middle East. It grew more as a result of Western imperialism in the territory of Muslim countries, and, consequently, became anti-colonial and anti-imperialist. They were motivated to mobilize society against the dangers presented by Western imperialism and all its sociocultural entailments. In fact, the geopolitical impetus was the defeat of Turkey in the First World War, as well as the fall and division of its Islamic, but non-Turkish territories (i.e., Transjordan, Syria, etc.). Particularly significant for the emergence of the course of modern Islamism was the moment when Kemal Atatürk abolished the caliphate in 1924 (e.g., Sayyid 1997: 57). The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the breakdown of the trade, economic, and social structure and the emergence of new nations also caused a rather lengthy economic stagnation. Before that, the Middle East had a developing economy and in general this region flourished with the onset of Tanzimat reforms (Fromkin 1989).⁶

The worst defeat of the Middle Eastern Islamic empire occurred with the history of the penetration of the West into the Middle East. At the same time, the connection between secular power and its sacred source, which was the position of the Caliph earlier, was lost. This connection was restored in Arabia. In Turkey and other territories, the secular system became the source of power (which began to deny the rights of the “*ulema*”). All this made a great impression on Islamic thinkers. The intensity of the debate [concerning the political aspect of Islam] gained ground (Quamar 2017: 259).

Given that the struggle with Europeans on ideological grounds took place for many centuries, the arguments were not difficult to find. The ideas of the Islamic revival came from below (Osman 2016: 2). The main concepts of Islamism as an ideology were laid down in the writings of Islamic thinkers-reformers as early as the nineteenth century, such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–1897), Muhammad Abdo, and others. A special role was played here by the Muslim University Al-Azhar in Cairo that became the leader of education and the Islamic religious ideology for

⁶This view can be considered sufficiently substantiated with regard to a positive assessment of the successes achieved by the Ottoman Empire in economic development in the decades preceding the First World War, but it ignores the fact that after this war, the economic development of the countries to which the Ottoman Empire disintegrated experienced considerable acceleration (see, for example: Maddison 2010).

the whole Islamic world (Landa and Savateev 2015: 127). Both these thinkers were associated with this university.⁷

But there were forerunners of modern Islamism in other societies (especially since such thinkers often lived and spread their ideas in different countries of the Islamic world during their lifetime). These are, for example, Syed Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal, both originally from India, Muhammad Rashid Rida from Lebanon, Namik Kemal and Mehmet Akif Ersoy, both from Turkey (Graham 1974; Ansari 2001; Mustansir 2006; Soage 2008; Black 2011; Shafique 2014, Tsaregorodtseva 2017: 96; see also Osman 2016: 201). Thus, we see that Islamism had spiritual roots in many Islamic societies.⁸

But the fact that its practical embodiment found its place in Egypt was not accidental.

Thus, at the time described, Islamism began to form as the ideology of resistance to the West and the revival of Islamic culture in the respective countries of the Islamic world served, more precisely, as a practical political and organizational means for gaining popularity among the masses and their activation. The most important manifestation of this trend was the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, organized in the late 1920s, and the Muslim League in British India (and then in independent Pakistan). The All India Muslim League was founded on December 30, 1906 in Dhaka to protect the rights of the Muslim minority in India from the dictates of the Hindu majority. But it became especially active when Muhammad Ali Jinnah became its president in 1928; after a while the Muslim League began to seek the creation of a separate state for Muslims (see, e.g., Jalal 1994; Khan 2007; Wolpert 2013). Nevertheless, the beginning of the modern Islamist movement most often is associated with the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt in 1928. It was headed by the famous theologian and scholar Al-Banna (see, e.g., Husaini 1956; Mitchell 1993; Lia 2006; Mura 2012).⁹

Returning now to explaining the reasons for the appearance of modern Islamism, we will note some of the important features of it. Additionally, we will explain its heterogeneity and certain inconsistencies.

Modern Islamism was not only a reaction to the influence of the West. It was also the result of Western modernization, which by that time had already been embraced by a number of Islamic countries. As a result, it is important to note one feature that is seldom discussed, namely that modern Islamism, as a mass movement, emerged primarily in countries in which democracy, elections, and a system of political parties existed in one form or another. In fact, in absolute monarchies, modern Islamism as a politicized Islam was not needed as a weapon wielded by those in secular power. In a society where there is no electorate, there is also no need for grassroots political Islam.

⁷Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, in addition, created in Egypt a secret society with revolutionary aims (Keddie 1972).

⁸So Muhammad Rashid Rida also taught in Cairo and his lectures (as well as the works of the Islamic reformer from Lebanon Shakib Arslan) influenced the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood Society, Hasan al-Banna (Tsaregorodtseva 2017: 98).

⁹The first decades of this organization will be described in more detail below in paragraph 3.4.1 of the present chapter.

It is a different matter where commoners can already vote, then the role of political Islam becomes very noticeable. It is not surprising that the Wafdists began to involve the Muslim Brothers in the political struggle as early as the 1930s in Egypt, trying to get their support (Goldschmidt 2004: 191; Osman 2016: 4). The Muslim League also played an important role in the elections. Elections to Majlis somehow took place in Shah Iran, beginning with the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1911 (see on this further on). Democracy, political parties, elections are all Western institutions that were directly or indirectly promoted by the West to the East.¹⁰ Where they were established grassroots Islamism could be strengthened. In authoritarian regimes, non-participation in elections reduced the influence of Islamists. Islamism, of course, was not born of democracy, but the active introduction or expansion of democracy could significantly strengthen it. Below we will see examples when the West itself could strengthen Islamism, on the one hand, introducing democracy, on the other—destroying authoritarian regimes, plus helping Islamists directly.¹¹

Thus, Modern Islamism indirectly appeared as a result of the promotion of Western institutions to the Middle East. And although the Islamists may not be aware of this, the very attitude toward these institutions, the West, progress (and much more) strongly divides the Islamists into different directions. “However reactionary in intent, Islamism imports not just modern but Western ideas and institutions”, Daniel Pipes notes and adds: “Fundamentalists are Westernized despite themselves, the Islamists are Westernizers. Even in rejecting the West, they accept it” (Pipes 1995).¹²

Naturally, since the 1920s, Islamism has travelled along an intricate path. We can assume that modern political Islam, as an ideology, rose around the middle of the twentieth century. It was a result of the long sociocultural, political, and spiritual evolution of the world of Islam (Landa and Savateev 2015: 129). With regards to the reasons for the emergence of modern Islamism, we find different opinions, sometimes contradicting each other (see, e.g., Roy 1994: 339). Sometimes this is associated with the development of social groups formed as a result of the modernization of Muslim societies, that is, intellectuals, students, entrepreneurs, the bourgeoisie; sometimes this is associated with the reaction of traditional socioeconomic strata affected by

¹⁰Britain and France also introduced democratic bodies and elections in the Middle East in a rather direct way after receiving mandates from the League of Nations there (in particular in Transjordan and Syria).

¹¹The latest example could be observed recently when the expansion of democracy in some Arab countries gave the Islamists access to power as a result of the Arab Spring.

¹²The desire to be equal to the West and simultaneously fight it in Islam is felt, perhaps, as in no other ideology. And this duality was noticeable for a long time. This is what the French historians wrote about it more than 100 years ago: “... with every intellectual movement in the Muslim world, two factors must be taken into account, leading to the same result: the unconscious imitation of Europe, on the one hand, and the desire to fight against Europe, on the other, to arm Islamism to give it the opportunity to fight with equal strength. In the end, Islamism seeks to become liberal in order to defend itself against liberalism, and it is transformed from a sense of self-preservation. This explains why in this renewal of Muslim doctrines the main figures are the Muslim scholars, who are very attached to their religion and have a great tendency to identify with it their nationality” (Cahen and Metin 1939: 12–13).

modernization and experiencing discomfort. Apparently, both opinions are partially right, because the general cause of the growth of the influence of Islamism is undoubtedly connected with one or another impact of the processes of modernization, manifested in different ways in different layers of society, and in different societies (see also Huntington 1996).

3.2 Islamism as an Ideology. Islamism Versus Western Values

3.2.1 *Islamism as an Ideology*

Specific Features of Islamism as an Ideology Some ideas of Islamism (in particular, its negative attitude toward Westernization) have already been mentioned. The main thing that can be said is that Islamism believes that the covenants of Islam are a universal means for solving all (or almost all) social problems. “Islam is the solution” is a popular slogan today. According to such a worldview, Islamic sacred texts and laws constitute the code of conduct for humans in everyday life. These texts and laws are the vital core, and the program for the reorganization of society, as well as for the entire Muslim community (*ummah*). Moreover, some Islamic radicals propose the Islamic version of globalization, a global project for the reconstruction of the world based on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, a plan for the embodiment of the idea of providential selection of Muslims as saviors of mankind from the destructive consequences of secularism, nationalism, and neoliberal globalization (Levin 2014). Thus, Islamism finds its place in a series of other eschatological, providential and messianic ideologies, both religious and secular (see, e.g., Pipes 2001: 16).¹³ At the same time, it should be noted that, for example, in global socialism, along with Stalinist or Maoist radicals we can find quite constructively minded Social Democrats. Similarly, within global Islamism radical Islamism coexists with quite constructively minded moderate Islamists.

Islamism as a Totalitarian Ideology is Comprehensive Such teachings and ideologies have a very powerful unifying potential and organizing force. It can work both at the grassroots level, domestic as well as globally; it can be both the basis of social as well as political life. As any such ideology, it actively recruits its heroes on this path.¹⁴

¹³Samuel P. Huntington also notes that “in its political manifestations, the Islamic Resurgence bears some resemblance to Marxism, with scriptural texts, a vision of the perfect society, commitment to fundamental change, rejection of the powers that be and the nation state, and doctrinal diversity ranging from moderate reformist to violent revolutionary” (Huntington 1996: 111).

¹⁴Levin, for example, states: “Islam, claiming to be the religion of all mankind, is the only world religion that represents a comprehensive ideology of a totalitarian type, since in it the sacred and secular religion is inseparable, the religion and politics and prophecies of the prophet Muhammad are declared ultimate” (Levin 2014: 70).

On the other hand, it appears necessary to stress again that Islamism is very diverse, heterogeneous; it has many currents and interpretations (including those that cannot be called totalitarian). This will be discussed further.

3.2.2 Islamism and the Opposition to the West

Modern Islamism Is a Way of Opposing the West with Its Liberalism and Other Secular Ideologies Modern Islamism as an ideology and as a practical movement developed as a response to the colonial expansion of the West and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The latter demonstrated its enormous military and economic superiority over the Islamic world. Therefore, Muslim criticism of the West, and denial of all things Western, even curses against it became one of the ideological pillars of Islamism (especially its radical varieties). The United States and Israel referred to as “Great and Little Satan” by Ayatollah Khomeini provides a very vivid illustration of this relationship. “Radical Islam,” writes American political scientist Daniel Pipes, “offers modern people an alternative global model that rejects all the values of Western culture, consumer societies and individualism in order to create a closed order based on Islam” (cited by Mirsky 2009: 109).

One of the leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who was executed in August 1966, Seyyid Qutb, whose ideas still inspire many Islamists and whose work “Milestones on the Road” is a reference book of Islamists around the world, wrote: “All Western states are guided by one source, by a materialistic civilization that has no heart, no morality, and no conscience. It’s a civilization that does not hear anything but the sound of cars, and does not discuss anything except trade ... How I hate and despise these people of the West! All of them without exception!” (see Calvert 2010: 121). Leaders of al-Qaeda and ISIS build all their activities of their struggle with America and the West on the basis of this ideology.

But even if we turn our attention to Muslims who do not hold such extreme positions, we still find among them a dislike for the West (see Part 2 of the present monograph). The criticism of the alleged soullessness of Western civilization largely compensates for the sense of resentment and dissatisfaction arising from the situation that Muslim societies are backward compared to the West, and most Islamic societies are relatively poor. As a consequence of its adaptation to the hegemony of the West (they are soulless, traders, we are spiritual, they are barbarians with machines, etc.), Islamism brooks no compromise with Western values or practices. According to Huntington, the Islamic Resurgence—in its scope and depth—(Huntington 1996: 111–112, 162) is the last phase in the adaptation of Islamic civilization to the West and it expresses an attempt to find a “solution” in Islam and not in Western ideologies. It is an attempt to modernize without borrowing Western values and institutions, but rather, on the basis of a return to the supposed imperishable values of early Islam.

Islamism, therefore, takes a rather convenient and somewhat impenetrable position—forming an image of the enemy, compensating for dissatisfaction with the real situation, and, in some cases, fueling anti-Western campaigns. Islamists improve

their image in the eyes of the masses without worrying about the real causes of backwardness, on the contrary, preserving them, not answering for the consequences. At the same time, Islamists (and in particular moderate Islamists/post-Islamists) tend to accept many of the most important Western values and institutions, however, as a rule, without calling them directly “Western” (see below).

As we have said, Islamism has become an unexpected side effect of the penetration of the West into the Middle East; and its continued persistent desire to impose Western institutions and ideas there has made the West an easy target for Islamist opposition. Ironically, many of the ideologists and leaders of modern Islamism, including the aforementioned Siyyid Qutb, received Western education, traveled through Western countries, lived there, often for quite some time. As these leaders had first-hand knowledge of the West, the influence of the West on Islamism is also clearly there.

Islamist leaders tend to be well acquainted with the West, having lived there, learned its languages, and studied its cultures. Turabi of the Sudan has advanced degrees from the University of London and the Sorbonne; he also spent a summer in the United States, touring the country on a U.S. taxpayer-financed program for foreign student leaders. Abbasi Madani, a leader of Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), received a doctorate in education from the University of London. His Tunisian counterpart, Rashid al-Ghannushi, spent a year in France and since 1993 makes his home in Great Britain. Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s leading militant politician, studied in Germany. Mousa Mohamed Abu Marzook, the head of Hamas’ political committee, has lived in the United States since 1980, has a doctorate in engineering from Louisiana State University, and has been classified as a permanent U.S. resident since 1990. Though for years he was able to elude law enforcement, Abu Marzook was recently arrested at a New York airport on his way into the country to register his son in an American school. Indeed, the experience of living in the West often turns indifferent Muslims into Islamists. (Pipes 1995)

It is also remarkable that the Muslim Brother who was the President of Egypt in 2012 and 2013, Mohamed Morsi, received a PhD in materials science from the University of Southern California with his dissertation “High-Temperature Electrical Conductivity and Defect Structure of Donor-Doped Al₂O₃,” taught for three years in the California State University, Northridge, and worked with NASA, helping to develop space shuttle engines (Matthews 2012).

Confrontation with the West As we have already mentioned, modern Islamism emerged as an Islamic version of modernization. But it is worth noting a profound idea of Huntington’s that, like other manifestations of the global religious revival, the Islamic Resurgence is both a consequence of modernization and an attempt to fight modernization (Huntington 1996: 111–112). Elsewhere, he adds that, whatever the political or religious beliefs of Muslims, the representatives of Islam agree that there are fundamental differences between their culture and Western culture.

But even without taking into account the hatred of the radicals for the West, it is obvious that the long historic rivalry between Islam and Christianity should have left a definite mark on the minds of Muslims. They need some sort of psychological compensation in regard to the apparent superiority and luck of the West, which often take the form of the idea of moral superiority of Islamic ideology and morality over the West. The modern Syrian philosopher Sadiq Jalal al-Azm writes the following about the moods that imbue modern Islamic literature:

As Arabs and Muslims... we... imagine ourselves as conquerors, history makers, pace setters, pioneers and leaders of world-historic proportions. In the marrow of our bones, we still sense ourselves as subjects of history not its object, as its agent and not as its patient. We have never come to terms realistically with, let alone reconciled ourselves to, the marginality and reactivity of our position in modern times. In fact, deep down in our collective soul, we find intolerable this monstrosity of a supposedly great umma (nation) like ourselves standing helplessly on the margins not only of modern history in general but even of our local and particular histories. We find no less intolerable the condition of being the object of a history made, led, manipulated and arbitrated by others, especially when we remember that those others were (and by right ought to be) the objects of a history made, led, manipulated and arbitrated by ourselves. Add to that a no less deeply seated belief that this position of world-historical leadership and its glories was somehow usurped from us ... by modern Europe. With this belief goes the no less deeply seated conviction that eventually things will righten themselves out by uncrowning this reigning usurper, whose time is running out anyway, and by restoring history's legitimate leaders to their rightful place, former station and natural function. (al-Azm 2004: 123)

Such attitudes also largely shape the relations of educated Muslims with the West. On the other hand, note that Westerners also have this attitude of superiority, and thus, it is a feedback loop not just one sided.

3.2.3 *Islamism and Human Values*

In this section, we briefly touch upon this very important question; this topic will be discussed in more detail in the second part of the book. Islam from the outside may seem something "terrible," unacceptable for Westerners (and there is a lot of truth here). At the same time, moderate Islamism, undoubtedly, has its positive sides, including some of its moral aspects. In particular, it emphasizes the values of collectivism (the priority of the ummah) and calls for brotherhood between Muslims (though, usually only within a certain branch of Islam). It is also believed, and not without reason, that it welcomes spiritual priority over material desires and limits the greed for profit, requires help to the poor and mutual assistance. Islam makes all Muslims in principle equal before Allah and, therefore, according to its law. In this regard, Islam (and especially modern Islamism) is democratic, it allows a person upward social mobility in accordance to his deeds and merits within the framework of the Islamist movement, regardless of the initial starting level (which we will talk about in paragraph 3 below). Islamism as a whole is a moral movement, because it is based on the canons of Islam, protects family values and justice (as understood in Islam); Islamists prohibit sex outside of marriage, drunkenness, and sometimes even smoking.

At the same time, Islamism does not reject and does not despise such universal values as education, the pursuit of wealth, the improvement of life. On the contrary, in modern conditions, literacy and the ability to independently comprehend and interpret the Quran and other sacred texts, is regarded as a virtue and, in many ways, necessary. Among Islamists, many are not just literate, but well-educated people (e.g., Yapp 2004: 181).

In short, Islamism represents a whole system of moral and spiritual values that look quite modern in some respects and that may suffice as a blueprint for leading a normal, successful life (by modern standards) for most people and even entire societies.

What is the problem of Islamism with respect to modern values? In our opinion, it can be expressed in two aspects. The first aspect: Islamists, especially radical Islamists, figuratively speaking, look not forward, but backward. And here the trouble lies in the obscurity of the ideologists of radical Islamism, as they are unable to understand that it is impossible to go far in an old “vehicle” (see also Osman 2016: 249, 251). The second aspect: Islamists are not ready to accept a number of modern values, mostly of Western origin, which have proved their importance and progressiveness. These values are often denied, not because they are considered bad in themselves, but because they do not fit the dogmas of Islamists (i.e., they are bad because they contradict the Quran or Shari’ah). Along these lines, it is important to note that Islamists seek to impose their views on the rest of society, justifying them by claiming that they have a higher power sanctioned from above. In particular, Islamists, to one degree or another, seek to limit the most important values of the West: personal freedom, including freedom in habits, clothes, way of life and many other things. This freedom is limited (in the case of moderate Islamism), punished, and even may be persecuted (in the case of radical Islamism).

Most large Islamist groups seem to have recognized pluralism. But in Muslim-majority societies, this does not mean the recognition of freedom from Islamic traditions and laws. The recognition of pluralism has always been conditional and limited (Osman 2016: 240). “Far from the pluralist ideal of democracy, the Islamist version evokes what John Stuart Mill called ‘the tyranny of the majority’”,—Bassam Tibi (2012: 133) writes in this regard.

However, for the sake of justice, we would note that the tyranny of the majority also dominated the West for centuries (sometimes—like in Geneva under Calvin, or in “Puritan” British colonies of New England—in combination with democracy). Only in the last 50–70 years, personal freedom overthrew these moral restrictions (we would add, however, that this happened not always to the benefits of society and to the growth of general morality). Therefore, the situation in the Islamic countries is quite understandable, it takes time for the growth of personal freedom, and this time is considerable.

Here it is important to observe that the discrepancies between the Salafis and strict Islamists, on the one hand, and the moderate Islamists, on the other, are great. However, there is still progress in this direction that will continue although perhaps not quickly and not linearly. In addition, too much individual freedom does not always combine well with social values and the rights of others. Therefore, it is reasonable to expand this personal freedom gradually. Secondly, most Islamic societies nevertheless follow this path, but in a special way, as we will see, for example, with regard to feminism, which in the Islamic world tends to develop in and Islamic rather than secular form.

The status of women in an Islamic society is one of the main problems of the relationship between the West and Islam. It is one of the main values around which

passions are constantly seething and clearly there are a lot of real problems. Yet, if you do not take into account some external signs (hijab, clothes, etc.), in the main respects, women's rights are recognized in most Islamic countries, including their electoral rights, rights to education, work and much more. Though there are many problems, the movement is in the right direction in terms of equal rights and personal freedoms (see para 3.6.3).

An important aspect of the problem of values is the concept of human rights and their correlation with the doctrines of Islamism. In traditional Islam, there is no doctrine of human rights, only God has rights, while people only have duties. Sayyid Qutb, the ideologist of the Muslim Brotherhood, asked a rhetorical question: "Who knows best, you or Allah?" (Qutb 1990: 69). The devotion of believers, their unconditional willingness to follow their leaders, is the power of Islam, which is what radicals use (Mirsky 2016: 26).

The growing influence of Islamism also led to a major problem associated with the deterioration of the situation of some religious minorities as has occurred, for example, in Egypt. Yet, much is changing even in Islamism, as it is forced to adapt to modern realities.¹⁵ On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that although irreconcilable Islamism sometimes acts in a completely open way, ignoring any other opinions, but at the same time, having gained some respectability, Islamism is forced, like other totalitarian ideologies, to change masks. In some ways, a certain hypocrisy can, of course, be seen here, but in some ways this leads to transformations and a shift in emphasis in the positive direction. In particular, many moderate Islamists view the issue of human rights differently than radicals. And, of course, the views of the modern Islamic establishment differ radically from Qutb's views on the human rights issue. Here it appears enough to mention such a document of the member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as "The Declaration on Human Rights in Islam," adopted in Cairo in 1990 (Organization of the Islamic Conference 1990),¹⁶ as well as the Arab Charter on Human Rights adopted by the Council of the League of the Arab States on the 22nd of May, 2004 (League of the Arab States 2004).

It is also important to bear in mind that maximized individual rights of people begin to really come into conflict with the social values and rights of other people. In the USA, for example, this is clearly manifested in the right to bear arms. Thus, it is also better if the expansion of the scope of human rights goes gradually, so that societies could better adapt to this expansion.

Another extremely painful question is about the relationship between Islamism and democracy. It is also a question for which the Islamists have no unity. Radicals as a whole have a negative attitude toward democracy, as well as toward participation in legal political life in general. So Islamist Muhammad, an Algerian, was asked the following question: "Is Islam and democracy incompatible?" He answered: "Yes.

¹⁵For example, as has been recently demonstrated by Achilov and Sen (2017: 620), "politically moderate Muslims show a considerably higher degree of religious tolerance toward non-Muslims than political radicals."

¹⁶See also Brems (2001: 241–284).

In Islam, the majority is not legitimate. What the majority says is not necessarily good ... In Islam, people with wisdom, deep knowledge of religion, not interested in worldly goods are trusted ... In Islam there is another form of unanimity—the agreement between the *ulama*” (Khosrokhavar 2006: 107–108).

This, one must recall, is only one of a number of versions of Islamism. In principle, moderate Islamism does not contradict democracy and respect for certain human rights, but, of course, in accordance with the Islamic version of human rights. As the Islamists integrate into the political landscape, the notion of democracy as a value also increases. Much, of course, depends on the political moment. Thus, a spokesman for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement said in July 2013: “We have our own belief in the democratic system and we are ready to die for it” (Chumley 2013). But today the Muslim Brotherhood is in the underground, so many people’s mood and attitude toward democracy has clearly changed (see this in the final paragraph of Sect. 3.6).

And this shows that only an alliance among moderate Islamism against radical Islamism can strengthen confidence in democracy and increase its perception as a value. In a number of countries in the Islamic world (as we shall see in Sect. 3.5 below), democracy is of great value even in the eyes of Islamist parties, who see this as an opportunity for their political success. Today we see that peaceful rivalry between different parties in the political field and during the elections is quite typical for many Islamic countries. This is, in fact, a victory of the Western constitutional spirit. But it does not appear reasonable to demand that this spirit of constitutionalism be faithfully copied. Not only for now, but maybe in principle, this cannot be and, probably, should not be. For the time being, it is important that this constitutional spirit be firmly realized at least through Islamic democracy. Because it is extremely dangerous to demand democracy in its pure form and immediately according to the highest Western standards. Therefore, we do not agree with such arguments, as, for example, in the book by Bassam Tibi *Islamism and Islam* (2012: 133): «Is there a democracy at the end of this tunnel? The major Islamist movements claim to have abandoned jihadism in favor of a democratic Shari’ah state. But their understanding of the concept is shallow at best». We believe that any form, even a stripped down and incomplete democracy in Islamic countries is much better than radicalism. It is also wrong to equate democracy with freedom of thought, as Fatema Mernissi tries to do in her book “Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World” (2002). In this respect Yapp (2004: 167) notes quite reasonably: “One wonders what meaning Mernissi herself ascribes to freedom: she equates democracy with freedom of thought but a democratic majority may and often does abridge freedom and can destroy a minority totally.” In the same USA in the eighteenth century, democracy was quite compatible with the dictates of the fundamentalist majority of Protestants of different kinds within the communities. There was no freethinking there. Islamic countries, where there is Islamic democracy, are now at the same level of cultural–political development as was the USA in the eighteenth century. It should be noted that the rapid growth of popularity of democratic ideas among many Islamists is due to the fact that Islamist views enjoy the broad support of the population in a significant number of Muslim countries, which means that Islamists have real chances to come to power

in those countries in a democratic way. Indeed, free elections there quite often ends with the victory of Islamists, which naturally makes many Islamists appreciate this form of political organization of the state.

We are faced with another important point that under democracy, the power belongs to those who are in the majority. Of course, this majority does not always use their power intelligently. Bassam Tibi writes: Anthony Shadid quoted the following comment from a 26-year-old Islamist in Cairo, Mohammed Nadi: “Is democracy the voice of the majority? We as Islamists are the majority. Why do they want to impose on us the views of the minorities—the liberals and the secularists?” (Tibi 2012: 133). “Almost all secularists came to the painful conclusion that... the Islamists would continue to win elections” (Osman 2016: 99). Indeed, minorities, including religious minorities, can in some way be infringed under an Islamist democracy. We have noted above that a democratic majority may abridge freedom and can destroy a minority (Mernissi 2002). These are real problems. But we must clearly understand that if society is not yet fully prepared for democracy, then it is dangerous to try to impose it by force (see more about this in Chap. 4). But with the development of certain institutions, society can approach it. In particular, this can be greatly facilitated by the development of civil society. Some researchers believe that the most successful process of expanding the political participation of the population (and consequently democracy) was in those countries where both state institutions and civil society institutions were equally well developed—primarily in Tunisia and Morocco (Kuznetsov and Salem 2016: 181).

The Islamic world is moving toward a promising direction (although this movement is very difficult and slow and there are serious exceptions). In addition, as the world develops, there is a convergence in the understanding of certain core values. In particular, the development of information technologies has led to the adoption of information and the possibility of obtaining it as a value both in the West and in the East. But in general, the differences in the understanding of values are still very great (see this in more detail in the second part of this monograph), and in the near future they will not be smoothed (if they will ever be smoothed out).

3.3 General Characteristics and Functions of Islamism

Let us try to consider Islamism in its various aspects, which is quite justifiable, given its versatility, and also that Islamism has many dimensions (Osman 2016: xviii). In this chapter, we present our own vision of the reasons and grounds for the extensive and deep integration of Islamism into Muslim societies. We will present our views on this issue using our own system for organizing its broad functions and aspects. It should be noted that insufficient attention is paid to a number of functions (see, in particular, Yapp 2004), and in passing these by, researchers’ understanding of Islamism is distorted.

3.3.1 *Mass Character of Islamism, Its Intelligibility and Usefulness*

Islamism is a Mass and Ramified Movement In this chapter, we will express our general ideas on the functions of Islamism and the basis for its compatibility with Muslim societies, and then these ideas will be more or less developed. Islamists operate in many, if not almost all, social groups. It is important that many of these groups come from the lower strata of society where there are even more sympathizers to their cause than in other social strata. These are largely the strata from which their strength originates. Although the organizations themselves may be numerous, their number is naturally limited due to certain requirements for members, especially if the organization operates underground or semi-underground. But the number of sympathizers is very high. Especially, we repeat in the poor strata, but also in the lower stratum of the middle class (see Osman 2016). Islamists actively penetrate into business, education, even in the lower municipal bodies. They also organize medical assistance, mediate in the delivery of money to families of migrants, and so on. Islamism not only spiritually but also functionally permeates the social fabric of society. Therefore, even with a strong secular state, bans on Islamism and repression against its activists, it is extremely difficult to squeeze it out of society. Islamism also relies on culture and ideas that are understood by the absolute majority of people, regardless of their level of education, namely religious and cultural and religious–political ideas. This is its other advantage over other political trends. Being a grassroots movement, Islamism is also, most often, an opposition movement. Its strength is also likely to exist in its role as an opposition movement. Since there are always such things for which the authorities and the elites could be criticized, their accusations on the part of Islamists are understandable; one might say that criticism itself appeals to the masses. Do not forget about the historical egalitarianism and even democratism of Islam, in the sense that it did not have a hierarchy of clergy. It is on this basis that Islamism is possible as a broad current based largely on popular activists, and not just high-level intellectuals.

Islamism and Self-organization of Islamic Society However, Islamism is not only a mass movement, it is also a form of self-organization by the population both locally and—through the cells of organizations—on a broader (up to pan-Islamic) level. American researcher Graham Fuller believes that “Islamism is not an ideology, but a religious, cultural and political framework for doing things that primarily concern Muslims in a political aspect” (Fuller 2004: 193). Perhaps self-organization on a local level is especially important, given that the mosque is an exceptionally convenient way for discussion and for the distribution of benefits, as well as for organizing protests. This in fact was proven by the events of the Arab Spring.

Islamism in Egypt and in a number of other countries took shape as a process that can be characterized as the self-organization of society from below to improve life,

religious education, mutual aid, and propaganda of the provisions of Islam.¹⁷ Originally Islamism was more of an educational and missionary society, something like Christian medieval monastic orders, which went to the poor in order to renew their faith in the religion and its institution, the church. Due to participation in political life, and then just after the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and resulting persecutions, the movement of Muslim Brothers became political and took on the role of the opposition to the government. The proliferation of Muslim Brothers in various countries contributed to the spread of Islamism through the model of self-organization in different parts of the Islamic world (see below, for example, about Sudan). We must understand that the success of the self-organization of Islamists is quite naturally derived from the nature of Islam itself, its support for the communities of believers of different levels from local levels to the level of Islamic *ummah* as a whole.

This self-organization allowed Islamists to accumulate certain funds, collect donations, etc. Today these are very large funds, MBs have become one of the richest Islamic organizations (see Osman 2016: 26). This is facilitated by a wide network of intermediaries in the transfer of money, financial assistance, and other financial transactions from millions of migrants working in the Gulf countries—so-called *hiwalah* system (Osman 2016: 23–24), direct or indirect participation in business, donations, etc. This makes it possible to create a system of hospitals, schools, to build mosques and to do many other things that, on the one hand, are extremely necessary for the lives of the masses of people, and on the other, raise the authority of Islamist organizations (note, however, that after the 2013 counterrevolution the MB social network in Egypt has been greatly suppressed).

Self-organization from below allowed Islamists to realize a number of functions important for the population and self-expression of the lower social strata, it gave an opportunity to show themselves to a significant number of people. In contrast to the authorities, who, as a rule, do not notice ordinary people, in this organization a person and his affairs can get attention and care. In addition, it is worth mentioning the moral committees created from below, which control the behavior and morals of Muslims. As Huntington rightly pointed out, in essence, Islamist groups created an Islamic “civil society” that duplicated, surpassed, and often replaced the activities of the usually weaker institutions of secular civil society (Huntington 1996: 111–112; see also Woltering 2002: 1140; Berman 2003: 260; Ismail 2006: 100).

Islamist organizations became the main focus of community life in many parts of Egypt, especially in poorer areas. In addition, private, grass roots, voluntary associations run by Islamists became important providers of social goods normally associated with the state. As one activist put it, “We provide services for people who are not able to afford it [or] there are no government services at all” (Ismail 2006:100).

In Egypt by the early 1990s, Islamic organizations had developed an extensive network of organizations which, filling a vacuum left by the government, provided

¹⁷Originally it was more an educational and missionary society, something like Christian medieval monastic orders, when the movement went from below for the renewal of faith and the church. The spread of the Muslim Brotherhood in various countries contributed to the diffusion of self-organization model, but in general, the self-organization of Islamists quite naturally stems from their nature and is often created spontaneously.

health, welfare, educational, and other services to a large number of Egypt's poor. After the 1992 earthquake in Cairo, these organizations "were on the streets within hours, handing out food and blankets while the Government's relief efforts lagged." In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood consciously pursued a policy of developing the social and cultural "infrastructure of an Islamic republic" and by the early 1990s, in this small country of 4 million people, was operating a large hospital, twenty clinics, forty Islamic schools, and 120 Quranic study centers. Next door in the West Bank and Gaza, Islamic organizations established and operated "student unions, youth organizations, and religious, social, and educational associations," including schools ranging from kindergartens to an Islamic university, clinics, orphanages, a retirement home, and a system of Islamic judges and arbitrators... In these and other Muslim societies, Islamist organizations, banned from political activity, were providing social services comparable to those of the political machines in the USA in the early twentieth century (Huntington 1996: 112). In general, the scope of the activities of Islamist organizations is enormous. According to Alexander Ignatenko, in the middle of the 2000s there were more than 500 Islamist NGOs operating in the world (Ignatenko 2009: 181).

It is useful to note that in case of a weakening of the statehood, the potentialities of self-organization in Islamism can be very noticeable. So, for example, only 3–4 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, under the weakening positions of government bodies, traditional institutions of social self-organization began to manifest themselves and become actual, among which the religious structures were ones of the strongest. As a result, jihadist groups appeared in the North Caucasus (Savateev et al. 2017: 562). Self-organization was also evident in territories where the state structures of Iraq and Syria were not operating.

3.3.2 *Sociopolitical Functions*

Islamism is multifaceted not only in conceptual and practical terms but also in terms of moderation and radicalism, its shades of dogmatism, the scale of its application within countries, its ability to adapt to modern trends for self-preservation, its pursuit of political power, and much more. Islamism is very multifunctional in terms of its ability to replace other institutions (including state ones, as mentioned above). This diversity of Islamism is supported through the main, fundamental provisions of Islam which are often open to multiple interpretations. It is not surprising that among different Islamists, one can find completely different understanding of the laws of Islam. This also explains the flexibility and adaptability of Islamism. As a result, some Islamists may regard certain things as approved by the Quran and the sacred tradition, while others would regard them as forbidden, and condemn them.¹⁸

¹⁸For example, Clifford Geertz (1971: 15) notes that «In Indonesia as in Morocco, the collision between what the Quran reveals, or what Sunni (that is, orthodox) tradition has come to regard it

This, in fact, adapts Islam to the particular situation, without prohibiting much of what is taking place today (especially education, the use of modern technologies, contacts, etc.); and when some phenomena (e.g., women's participation in politics) finally is approved within the Islamic community, many Islamists will begin to proclaim that Islam has always supported it (or has always struggled with what is condemned in modern life¹⁹). Thus, Islamism, being a politicized form of religion, can be inclined, depending on the circumstances, either toward pragmatism or toward fundamentalism, which makes the possibilities of its adaptation to changes very high.

However, flexibility and adaptability are characteristic of other universal, totalitarian ideologies, for example, although Marxism directly says that private property is evil and it must be abolished, the Social Democrats and even the Chinese Communists fully admit private property and recognize its exclusive importance. Nazis in Germany recognized the Aryans as the highest race, but at the same time respected the Japanese Asians as their allies.

Islamism Is a Form for the Unification of Society in the Muslim World; the Form for a Single Culture Islam is the world religion which places above all not ethnicity and not belonging to a specific state, but belonging to the Muslim community (*ummah*). In Islamism (especially radical), one of the main provisions is the superiority of Islam over other religions and the belief in its future victory throughout the world. Even those who consider this point as absolutely remote from its realization, nevertheless are obliged not to be critical of it. Thus, Islamism is becoming an ideology that is potentially capable of uniting hundreds of millions of people in dozens of countries. In part, this has already happened, but it cannot happen completely, firstly, because the Islamists are split and quarreling with each other, secondly, because there is a constant struggle between Islamism and the secular direction of development. The above-mentioned huge number of Islamist organizations simultaneously shows both the strength of Islamism and its fragmentation. But one way or another, Islamism is international, which allows major Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood to open branches in many countries, have its own network in many places, and influence the inhabitants of different societies.

Islamism as a Special Way of Modernization Islamism is often interpreted as a reaction to the globalization and modernization that has swept the world, and in some cases as a search for a special form of Islamic societies in terms of modernization and globalization. In this last sense, Islamism allows Muslims to develop and adapt the achievements of the West without losing their own identity. Of course, Islamism by no means has proved its greatest effectiveness in terms of modernization, but

as revealing, and what men who call themselves Muslims actually believe is becoming more and more inescapable».

¹⁹For example, slavery. Recall that Nasreddin Shah (1831–1896), who carried out significant reforms in Persia, abolished the slave trade in the Persian Gulf only under the huge pressure of the British. The Shah refused to do this, arguing that slavery is not forbidden by the Quran, and there is no law higher.

nevertheless it performs a certain function. An example is Iran, where development is under the ideological leadership of politicized clergy, although there we are dealing with a special type of Islamism. In Iran, to a certain extent, there has been separation of ideology from direct political functioning, that is, there is some kind of ideological control, distinct from the political functionaries at the highest level. This allows the country to develop fairly well. Perhaps this is the result of the victorious Islamism, which has had to adapt the ideology of Islamism to that for ruling a country (about the same as is observed with the victorious Communism in China). The second point is that Islamism in Iran is of the Shiite variety; therefore, there is almost an equal sign in Iran between nationalism and Islamism, which is strengthened by the rather strong roots of statehood. At the same time, in contrast to the Iranian nationalism, Arab nationalism means belonging not to any particular state, but to the Arab super-ethnos.

Above, we considered the functions of Islamism at a macroscale (the entire Islamic community, the entire Islamic world). However, as already mentioned Islamism is a multilevel ideology. Accordingly, its functions can be traced at the level of the individual state.

Function of Political Opposition Islamism is an oppositional movement that, even when underground, does not allow autocratic regimes to forget that the opposition exists, it can resist, and in fair elections it can come to power. Thus, the presence of Islamists hampers authoritarianism.

The Controlling Function of Islamism Islamism is able to influence in one way or another political authorities and elites, forcing them to do certain things. Islamists are at the head of the organization of the struggle to fulfill certain requirements, etc. Hence, from this point of view, Islamism acts as a kind of control on society over and above the power and institutions of society itself. It also helps to convey protest voices in a world of injustice to those who can hear them. Since Islamism performs the function of effective opposition to the government, it also sometimes appears able to unite disparate groups of opposition-minded representatives of free professions and intellectuals. For example, by the end of the 1990s, the Egyptian “brothers” constituted a majority in the leadership of trade unions of lawyers, doctors, engineers, university professors (Akhmedov 2009: 150–151).

The Struggle for Morality Recall that Islamists are very active in the role of voluntary moral police, even in some of those countries where they are not in power. The merits of Islamists include the eradication of prostitution in many Islamic countries, which has helped to reduce the spread of AIDS in them (see, e.g., Shishkina et al. 2014). Also it has opposed and limited the trade in alcohol. As we have already said, Islamists support family values, sometimes they control the social order in an area, at least to a certain degree.

Like any providentialist ideology, Islamism performs a *compensatory function*, making the lives of many people meaningful and full of ideals. Islamism unites societies both within themselves and against the outside world, forming an image

of the enemy to be combated: “Our cause is right, the enemy will be defeated, and victory will be ours.”

In the field of social life, the functions of Islamism are also diverse. Above we have already talked about some of them: help and mutual assistance, a kind of social insurance, self-organization, accumulation of donations for the right things, etc.

Among other functions, we would mention the following:

Social Mobility Functions Islamism acts as a powerful social institution, which enable a social lift for many people. Accordingly, it gives great opportunities to prove oneself to those for whom the usual career paths, success in business, etc., are difficult. Since Islamism is a mass and grassroots movement, it gives ordinary people many opportunities to express themselves, develop their abilities, gain credibility, make a sort of career, etc. (while the current socioeconomic and political system does not give them the opportunity to achieve any significant success).

Islamism as an Extension of People’s Participation in Religious Interpretations and Preaching In addition, the peculiar Islamic reformation has expanded the opportunities for religious people to interpret sacred texts, write and speak on this topic, and thereby make their spiritual careers. Thus, the interpretation of sacred texts, preaching in different forms, comes, thanks to Islamism, far beyond the traditional Islamic religious custom. In fact, the “cadre” men of religion (*rijāl al-dīn*) lose a certain share of their popularity, forced to give it to unofficial Islamist spiritual leaders.²⁰ Already decades ago, in connection with the rising Islamic Resurgence, printed interpretations of the Quran appeared, which did not correspond to the traditional understanding (see Stepanov 1981: 183). And the theologians lamented the fact that people do not turn to fatwas for theologians, but “everyone who has an opportunity for it appears with fatwas” (see: Ibid.). There is a situation where the traditional “men of religion” remain within the framework of purely religious activity, and Islamism takes upon itself missionary activities and the implementation of the dogmas of Islam in practice. The decrease in the importance of traditional Islam and the Islamic “men of religion” is compensated for by the fact that Islam is increasingly being interpreted by all people who are not indifferent to it. That is, there is an understanding of Islam through personal perception, as is the case with the Reformation. It is possible that such a discrepancy between professional “men of religion” and Islamists in Sunni societies (in Iran, the situation is different) is due to the fact that most of the professional Sunni “men of religion” are an integral part of the state apparatus, while, usually Islamists function as the opposition to the state (Vasiliev

²⁰Therefore, in a number of cases, young people prefer secular education, and there are not enough enrollees for spiritual education, and as a result there is a shortage of religious professionals. This is observed, for example, in Egypt. This was the case already in the 1970s, when, according to the Al-Ahram newspaper, admission to religious institutions was declining every year. The same newspaper lamented that the youth “only knock on the doors of the faculty of the foundations of religion, when the doors of all other faculties are closed before them.” The same newspaper article notes that the Muslim men of religion themselves “are more than anyone else’s, trying not to send their sons to study in religious institutions” (Stepanov 1981: 185–186).

2017: 42).²¹ Indeed, the official religion with its dominant worldview is oriented to the preservation of the existing order of things and for this reason alone cannot be the ideology of political opposition.

3.3.3 *Social Base of Islamism*

Islamism Social Base Regarding the social base, it is worth noting that there are not enough studies of the social base, social roots, and conditions conducive to strengthening of Islamism. For example, Yapp (2004: 180) notes “the absence of sufficient attention to the social background of Islamists in general and jihadists in particular.”

Islamism has spread to almost all social strata of society, including the intelligentsia (doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, teachers, and civil servants), businessmen and politicians. However, the most popular support is mainly from sympathetic youth from the marginal sections of the urban population, people working in the informal sector of the economy (i.e., very large in Islamic countries), including rural migrants to cities (Levin 2014: 20). Since these people can hardly integrate into the urban environment, they often become marginalized, so they become likely objects of Islamist propaganda (on the situation of rural migrants within urbanization processes and their impact on instability, see Kepel 2000; Grinin and Korotayev 2009; Grinin et al. 2010; Korotayev et al. 2011, 2014; Korotayev 2014).

Huntington (1996) also considers migrants to cities from rural areas as one of the main sources of Islamist ranks. He reminds us that “throughout the Islamic world in the 1970s and 1980s, urban populations grew at dramatic rates. Crowded into decaying and often primitive slum areas, the urban migrants needed and were the beneficiaries of the social services provided by Islamist organizations. In addition, Gellner (1989) points out that Islam offered ‘a dignified identity’ to these ‘newly uprooted masses’” In Istanbul and Ankara, Cairo and Asyut, Algiers and Fes, and on

²¹It is important to note here that the first Iranian revolution (1905–1911) also had a very strong religious coloring, and the Muslim men of religion played a leading role, especially at the first stage (Doroshenko 1998: 8–9). The people, being ignorant, fanatically believing and bound by religious traditions, obediently followed their spiritual leaders rather than liberals. And when the Shiite men of religion turned away from the revolution, the obedient crowd followed them. According to Agaev (1981: 50), the participation of the spiritual leaders in the leadership of the revolutionary movement was associated with rivalry with secular authorities in the field of education, law, influence on the people, with the fact that the Shiite men of religion were interested in weakening secular power and preserving its influence on state policy. And the departure of *ulema*’ and mullahs from the revolution occurred when its “anti-Islamic potential” became clear for them (e.g., Keddie 1980: 6; Doroshenko 1998: 17). According to other researchers (e.g., Algar 1969: 252), the revolution of 1905–1911 was a “direct clash” of two ideologies; Islam and Western modernism (see also Doroshenko 1998: 18). The same can be said about the 1978–1979 revolution. And with this in mind, the Iranian revolutions (especially taken together), indeed, are unique phenomena and in a sense have no analogues in history (Ibid.: 8).

the Gaza strip, Islamist parties successfully organized and appealed to “the down-trodden and dispossessed” (Huntington 1996: 113).

Secondly, the number of migrants from poor countries to the rich grew rapidly. In 1975, there were about 1.2 million immigrant workers in the countries of the Persian Gulf, whereas by 1985 their number increased up to 5.15 million (Addleton 1991). Moreover, over 72% of them were from the Arab region (Stoklitsky et al. 1985: 29).

At the same time, these movements do not enjoy the support of rural elites (Huntington 1996). Young people play a huge role among both supporters and functionaries. It is not surprising, since already in 1975 in Muslim countries 60% of the inhabitants were children and youth up to 24 years old (Kepel 2000: 67; see also UN Population Division 2017). It is significant, for example, that of the 290 arrested members of the Egyptian extremist organization Al-Jihad, 70% were young people from 21 to 30 years old from the lower stratum of the middle class (43.9% of them were students, 14% were workers, 12.1% were representatives of free professions) and 10.7% were unemployed (Ismael and Ismael 1985: 119 in Levin 2014: 17). Among the ideologists of Islamists, there are many representatives of the intelligentsia who have received modern higher education; this is sometimes people with academic degrees. Among them, of course, one can find idealists who consider it possible to build “the state of Islam” on earth. As for leaders and activists, among them there are not a few who have a superficial image of Islam, but they have good organizational and practical skills that often allow them to achieve their goals. These people are mostly pragmatists from among educated urban youth of 20–30 years. They are mostly middle-class people who are dissatisfied with corruption and nepotism, and glaring social inequality (Yapp 2004: 181; Levin 2014: 19–20).

In general, young people of different backgrounds, both educated (students and intellectuals) and uneducated strata are important. At times they are the most important supporters of Islamists. “Looking at the wide variety of studies on Islamism, one is struck by the fact that the great majority of supporters of Islamist ideology are young people, and often most of them are well educate”—writes Woltering (2002: 1136) supporting this statement with references to Fargues (1993: 1–20), Sidahmed (1997); Levtzion and Pouwels (2000). He also adds that the dominance of youth in these groups of Islamists is not just an important moment, but also their distinctive feature.

“The leaders are young and the followers are very young”—notes Yapp (2004: 180) with respect to Islamists; note that this makes Islamists more consolidated, this also makes it easier for them to understand each other. “In this respect, they have much in common with many other radical and violent political movements”—Yapp (2004: 180) observes.

The fact that the youths are the most important social support of the Islamites was noticed quite a long time ago. Already Huntington maintained that, “as with most revolutionary movements, the core element has consisted of students and intellectuals. In most countries, fundamentalists winning control of student unions and similar organizations was the first phase in the process of political Islamization, with the Islamist ‘breakthrough’ in universities occurring in the 1970s in Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and then moving on to other Muslim countries. The Islamist

appeal was particularly strong among students in technical institutes, engineering faculties, and scientific departments. In the 1990s, in Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and elsewhere, ‘second generation indigenization’ was manifesting itself with increasing proportions of university students being educated in their home languages and hence increasingly exposed to Islamist influences. Islamists also often developed a substantial appeal to women, and Turkey witnessed a clear demarcation between the older generation of secularist women and their Islamist-oriented daughters and granddaughters” (Huntington 1996: 112–113).

Islamism has a strong social base, performs important functions in society, it is well organized, understandable to the masses, supported from below, so there is no ground to expect its weakening in the near future. The most important task is to promote its shift toward moderation, cooperation with the authorities and other countries, while focusing on enhancing modernization. Let us hope that the successes of modernization will support the processes of reducing radicalization of Islamism, making Islamists more pragmatists.

There are grounds to expect that with the growth of education and culture, Islamism will become softer. Achilov and Sen (2017) note that moderate Islamism correlates with higher levels of education—in contrast with radical Islamism. Also, the rise in the standard of living can contribute to a greater moderation of Islamism (Achilov and Sen 2017).

3.4 Milestones of the Development of Islamism and the Causes of Its Strengthening

Islamism (in spite of the fact that many of its adherents, figuratively speaking, look back to the past) is quite responsive to changes in society, the Islamic world, and the planet. Therefore, Islamism and Islamists, while preserving continuity, nevertheless noticeably change with time. Let us consider the main milestones of the development of Islamism.

3.4.1 Islamism Between the 1920s and the 1960s

The Rise of Islamic Self-consciousness in the 1920s. The First Decades of the Activities of the Muslim Brotherhood As we said above, in the 1920s in India, Egypt and a number of other societies, we see an upsurge of Islamic identity, which was reflected, in particular, with the activation of the All India Muslim League in British India (which included the territories of modern Pakistan and Bangladesh) and the Muslim Brothers (MB) in Egypt in 1929, led by al-Banna (Jalal 1994; Khan 2007; Wolpert 2013; Husaini 1956; Mitchell 1993; Lia 2006; Mura 2012). In the first period, under the leadership of al-Banna, the organization was primarily educational

and missionary, that is, it was a kind of educational club (Lia 2006; Mura 2012; Tsaregorodtseva 2017). However, the goals of MB were grandiose, they aimed, in fact, to re-arrange the Islamic world (Osman 2016: 3). In a relatively short period of time, the organization reached a huge number of members, according to various sources from 128 thousand to 450 thousand people in the 1940s (Osman 2016: 3; Tsaregorodtseva 2017: 100). Accordingly, the growth of the ranks made Bunna create an organization with contributions and structure. According to Husaini (1956) and Tsaregorodtseva (2017), he was a good organizer. Such numbers led to the fact that by the 1930s and 1940s, the Muslim Brothers were already involved in the political active life of Egypt; even the king welcomed them (Osman 2016: 4). In this period, the actions of the organization in the field dealing with independent cultural activities [e.g., the construction of mosques, madrassas, clubs, other important institutions (Mura 2012, Tsaregorodtseva 2017)] can be traced. The 1920s and the 1940s were an important stage in the emergence of modern Islamism from below, both as an ideology, an organizational activity, and as structures. Even at this time, Islamism created combat groups and bodies, as well as the expansion of the Muslim Brothers beyond Egypt and by the 1940s into Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The significance of Islamism as a whole, however, remained small. Therefore, in the described and subsequent periods (up to the present days, when the Muslim Brotherhood moved from the summit of power to deep underground in Egypt), it will be true to say that “the political and social situation in Egypt has experienced many changes during the Brotherhood’s lifespan, which have reflected on the work and principles of the movement” (Linjakumpu 2008: 60).

Formation of New Independent Islamic States Since the 1940s. Strengthening of Secular Regimes However, during this period, in connection with the revolutions, the establishment of new regimes, the emergence of secular nationalist leaders such as Nasser, the choice of a political path, numerous coups, personal dictatorships, entry into military blocs and many others, Islamism did not play too much role, and, as already has been stated above, in the Arab World, it was overshadowed by the ideology of Arab nationalism (Khalidi 1991; Tibi 1997; Goldschmidt 2004: 116; Dawisha 2016). Some ideologists of the new state-building, for example, Michel Aflaq (the founder of the Baath Party) called for treating the religious factor very carefully. They sought to create a symbiosis of secular and religious on a new basis. Aflaq himself, on the one hand, rejected the secularization of Syrian society and believed that such a policy was doomed to failure. However, being a Christian, given the multiconfessional nature of the Syrian society, he did not focus on any of the religions and attributed Syrian society not to the Muslim, but to Arab *ummah* (Devlin 1991).

However, secular leaders felt a greater threat to themselves. Therefore, in fact, in many countries, Islamist organizations were banned, and many of their leaders (e.g., Sayyid Qutb) were imprisoned (see, e.g., Goldschmidt 2004: 116; Calvert 2010). This was a rather sharp break, which strengthened the Islamists’ ideology of combating secular regimes. Of course, in addition to the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, there were other Islamist organizations, including more radical ones (see,

e.g., Goldschmidt 2004: 181), who were subsequently responsible for the attempted assassinations of Nasser and Sadat. With the ban in Egypt, Muslim Brothers began to spread its organization to a number of other Islamic countries, but these countries also had their own Islamist organizations. Also everywhere at this time (and earlier) many Salafi groups and organizations appeared and grew stronger both ideologically and politically. At that time, other ideologies competed in the political arena (secular Arab nationalism, socialism, liberalism, Westernism, etc.). At the same time, it even seemed that the heyday of Islam was over, and it would soon be waning. However, the Islamic Resurgence was ahead.

Confrontation with Israel A special role in the development of Islamism belonged to the confrontation of the Arab states (and Palestinians) with Israel. Already the formation of the State of Israel in 1948, which immediately deprived the Palestinians of the Palestinian state, became a powerful impetus to politicizing Islam and radicalizing Islamism (e.g., Goldschmidt 2004: 96). An even stronger impetus to the Islamization of social and political activity in the Muslim world was the defeat of the Arab armies in the six-day war with Israel in 1967 and the October War in 1973 (Levin 2014: 72). The struggle against Israel was and remains the most important axis of the functioning of Islamism (see the second part of the book about Anti-Semitism). In addition, the defeat in the six-day war of 1967 led by the Arab nationalist leaders of Egypt and Syria resulted in a sharp decline in the influence of Arab nationalism, which in many ways created a favorable environment for the strengthening of Islamism in the Arab World (see, e.g., Khayrullin and Korotayev 2017b).

3.4.2 *The 1970s. Islamism Victories*

The Rise in Oil Prices in 1973–1980 The beginning of the rise in oil prices is connected with the October 1973 war. The fact is that for the first time, developing countries were able to achieve a substantial victory over the economically developed countries (see Grinin and Korotayev 2015), and this affected the Islamist worldview in a very significant way. In addition, powerful financial resources emerged for independent development and for the funding of Islamist organizations; it changed the relationship and attitude toward the West, though, only a portion of Arab countries—Egypt, for example—was dependent on the USA in those years, which was accompanied by a significant increase in Islamism in this country.

The Victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Birth of the Idea of Its Export Imam Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, insisted on the presence of the political component in Islam, saying: “Islam is politics and only politics. Everything else is secondary” (quoted in Plastun 2003: 27). This is at odds with the generally accepted view of Muslims that Islam is a “middle religion” that does not accept extremes. “According to his (Khomeini’s) concept,” writes Vladimir Plastun, “politicized Islam includes religion, economy, the traditional way of life, jurisdiction, and international relations” (Ibid.). A colossal impulse to raise

confidence in the power of Islamism was produced by the confrontation of Iranian Islamists and the USA. However, the importance of the Islamic revolution in Iran in the global rise of Islamism should not be overestimated. As mentioned above, the Shiite character of this revolution made its ideas unacceptable for the Sunnis constituting the overwhelming majority of Muslims. In the Shiite part of the Islamic world, the Iranian revolution certainly led to a very significant increase in Islamism, but Shia is only 10% of all Muslims (Pew Research Center 2011). Therefore, the influence of the Iranian Islamic revolution on the global rise of Islamism was limited.

At the same time, the Iranian revolution contributed to the intensification by the USA of its struggle against Islamism, in particular by strengthening their support for dictators like Saddam Hussein and pushing him toward a war with Iran.

Afghanistan In 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan. This caused the rise of Islamic “patriotism” and, accordingly, the growing influence of Islamism (see, e.g., Kepel 2000). The Afghan Mujahideen were given huge assistance (in armament, training, financing, etc.) from the USA, as well as Pakistan and other Islamic countries.

This, undoubtedly, became a breeding ground for expanding the base of terrorists; until that time terrorism was mostly represented in the Middle East by the Palestinians and was mainly of a secular nature. Many thousands of Muslims, first of all from Arab countries, went to war to defend the Afghan brothers by faith from encroachments of the atheistic Soviet state. Those who passed the school of military operations in Afghanistan, later formed the core of Muslim extremist groups (Levin 2014: 66). The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is sometimes seen as a trigger event for the growth of Islamic terrorism (Laqueur 1998, 1999, 2001, 2004). The victory over the USSR greatly contributed to an increase in self-esteem among radical Islamists. In addition, the Islamist Taliban state emerged.

Assistance to the Mujahideen on the part of the US eventually turned into problems for the USA itself. After all, al-Qaeda actually grew out of Afghanistan and American aid.

“The Soviet Union,” bin Laden said, “entered Afghanistan at the end of 1979, and a few years later, with the help of Allah, its flag was lowered and thrown into the trash pit, and there was nothing left that could be called the Soviet Union. This freed the Islamic minds from the myth of superpowers. I’m sure that Muslims will be able to put an end to the legend of the so-called superpower America” (Mirsky 2016: 13). From here, it was already near to start an active struggle against “the Great Satan” of the USA.

The end of the 1970s in general became a very sharp turn in the development and rise of Islamism. These and other reasons (see below) contributed to what is called the Islamic Resurgence.

3.4.3 Between the 1980s and the 2000s—The Islamic Resurgence. Rise of Radical Islamism and Terrorism

The 1980s, the 1990s, and the Islamic Resurgence This period was marked by the rise of the Islamist movement in different countries. The Islamic Resurgence was a broad intellectual, cultural, social, and political movement that spread throughout the Islamic world. Moreover, the Islamic Resurgence affected Muslims in every country and most aspects of public and political life in most Muslim countries (Huntington 1996). The Islamic Resurgence was for many a completely unexpected turn. What seems to have become firmly established in the life of many Islamic societies, beginning with European fashions and lifestyle, suddenly began to curtail. In some respects, life seemed to be reversing. There was an increased attention to the observance of religious rites (mosque attendance, prayer, fasting), the active dissemination of religious programs and publications, the resurrection of mysticism (Sufism), the increase in the number of Islamic schools and the Islamization of curricula in public schools. According to Huntington, “in most countries a central element of Islamization was the development of Islamic social organizations and the capture of previously existing organizations by Islamic groups” (Huntington 1996: 111). Governments of different Islamic countries began to think how to use this broad movement for their own purposes.

But, of course, such a “backward” movement affected only a part of life. At the same time, in some respects, development accelerated. This in particular concerned the growth of education, including female education. Never in the Middle East have there been so many students. The growth of the economy and the level of culture led to the fact that already in the 1990s a certain shift toward active participation in political life began, and accordingly recognition of political pluralism and the importance of democracy (Osman 2016). One could observe a certain strengthening of moderate Islamism. But the recognition of political pluralism and the importance of democracy among Islamists were often incomplete and unstable, capable of reversing. And for many, the rejection of official life was very firm. Therefore, those years also saw a powerful growth of radical Islamism.

The 1990s and the Rise of Radicalism The 1990s were important for the growth of Islamism for a number of reasons. By this period, the financial, demographic, and political conditions that were suitable for the growth of Islamism formed. In particular, the USSR collapsed and an expansion of Islamism took place, which began to fill the ideological vacuum (which was produced by the collapse of Communism) in the Islamic territories of the former USSR (including some parts of Russia). Secondly, Islamic movements in the Balkans (in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo) rose. Thirdly, the Islamic communities in Europe grew rapidly. Fourthly, the rise of Chechen separatism and the temporary victory of Chechens in the war with Russia seemed to confirm the possibility of a victory over a superpower (some still considered Russia a superpower in the 1990s). And this fight against Russia was actively sponsored and supported not only by Muslim countries (as, e.g., Saudi Arabia), but also by Western states. Fifth, it is also worth mentioning the formation of Palestinian autonomy (the respective

agreement was reached in 1993). Palestinian autonomy itself was formed in several stages. Within the forces that have the greatest influence in Palestine, there are both secular national forces (mostly part of the PLO) and paramilitary Islamist groups of Hamas, the relationship between which is very tense. As a result, on the one hand, the political forces of the Autonomy are trying to achieve greater respectability, and on the other hand they are not able to contain spontaneous terrorism and radical Islamist formations in their territory.

Finally, it should be noted that since the late 1970s, but especially in the 1990s, the USA has done much to use Islamism as a geopolitical weapon to achieve its goals. Assistance to Afghan mujahedin is only a part of this. The Americans actively supported Islamists in Southern Europe, the Balkans, especially in former Yugoslavia. A particularly sad result of this is the situation in Kosovo, which, according to some observers, has become a disgusting drug mafia scam under the guise of a state (Escobar 2017).

Afghanistan after the American occupation turned into the largest exporter of hard drugs. Also, in fact, the USA and their Western European allies supported and gave respectability to Chechen terrorists.

The Terrorist Acts of September 11, 2001 are a new milestone in the growth of radical Islamism, in fact, an open declaration of the US war. Jihad against the USA, however, was announced five years earlier, in 1996. Perhaps it was the temporary victory of Chechnya that inspired bin Laden to do this. In August 1996, in Jalalabad, bin Laden, who returned to Afghanistan after a long absence, declared jihad against the USA. The text sent to many Arab newspapers was called “The Declaration of Jihad against the Americans occupying the country of the two holy mosques” (i.e., Saudi Arabia). As a reason for declaring “war” against the USA, al-Qaeda advanced American foreign policy, as a result of which, it claimed, the Muslims in the Middle East were suffering and dying (see Scheuer 2004, 2008, 2011 for more detail). Some American analysts have formulated al-Qaeda’s position as: “They hate us not because we are Americans, but for what we do,” that is, “not for our roots, but for our actions” (Pape 2005; Pape and Feldman 2010). But, of course, to a large extent this is a convenient ideological figure, drawing an enemy image with which they can unite Muslims.

Bin Laden listed the countries and territories where Muslims are subjected to humiliation and enslavement, this is, Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Chechnya, Bosnia, Tajikistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kashmir, Assam, Thailand, Burma and the Philippines and called for “washing away the injustice committed against the Muslim nation by a coalition of Jews and Crusaders” (Mirsky 2016: 12).

The US Campaign against Terrorism. Their Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 and the Further Rise of Radical Islamism Bin Laden’s plan to launch an open attack upon the USA and thereby provoke the USA to invade Islamic countries, in fact, worked. Naturally, the propaganda of radical Islamism has intensified many times. And the rallying of Muslims against the West also became stronger, although not as far as Bin Laden was hoping. But one way or another, the

September 11 action shocked not only American society, but the whole world, and eventually led to an American invasion of Afghanistan. At the same time, at first the victory over the Taliban was easy. But then the war became endless and unpromising.

In 2003, the USA invaded Iraq and quickly overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime. This entire operation, based on both a far-fetched motive and an incorrect analysis of the consequences, led to the beginning of the destabilization of the Middle East, the consequences of which are still felt today. Below we are talking about the fact that one of the factors contributing to the growth of radical Islamism is the destruction of strong regimes (that are mostly authoritarian in the MENA region). This is especially dangerous in societies that are multiconfessional and polyethnic, like Iraq (let alone Syria). The result of the collapse of the Iraqi authoritarian state was the vacuum of power, the change in the ratio of power between Shiites and Sunnis, the rise of the Kurdish national movement, and especially important for our topic—the emergence on the basis of the al-Qaeda branch of the movement, which later became known as ISIS or Daesh. As Yildizoglu (Yildizoglu 2014) writes, Daesh was formed as a result of two vectors generated by the fiasco of US imperial policy. The first is a Shiite–Sunni conflict that ignited at a time when the USA was unable to suppress resistance in Iraq (the Americans could not cope with religious and ethnic enmity that went out of control due to the overthrow of Saddam). The second is the vacuum of power and some uncontrolled territories that began to emerge in North Africa, the Middle East (in Libya, Syria) as a result of Arab uprisings. In this chapter, there is no way to dwell on its history, ideology, and practice (see about this in Grinin et al. 2016: Chap. 5; see also the second part of the present book).

3.4.4 The Arab Spring

Arab Spring, the Overthrow of Strong Regimes, the New Rise of Radical Islamism—2011–2017 Below in paragraph 5, we will talk about the opposition of secular regimes and Islamism (see also above). Obviously, a strong secular power can act as a deterrent to Islamism. And a strong power in the Middle East is still an authoritarian power. Meanwhile, strong secular rulers were not to the liking of the USA and its ally Saudi Arabia. As a result, the overthrow of strong secular leaders in Libya, Egypt, Yemen (as well as a vigorous attempt to overthrow the Syrian regime) only increased the rampage of radical Islamism, in its most brutal and cruel forms, the most extremist and radical Islamism, the synonym of which is the radical Islamist terrorism. As a result, one could observe the emergence of enclaves of militant and terrorist Islamism. This was primarily Daesh in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq, as well as others declaring themselves to be its branches or supporters, for example, al-Shabab in Somalia and Boku Haram in northern Nigeria. The series of monstrous terrorist acts in Europe, Africa, and Asia are all well known. It is also known that the emergence of chaos in the Middle East and the rampant terrorism became the impetus for the crisis of migrants to Europe, which in turn expanded the territorial base of the extremist and terrorist wing of Islamism.

Thus, one can draw an important conclusion. Although the radical and terrorist wing in Islamism has strong ideological roots in Islam itself with its teaching about jihad, as well as a fairly strong social and political base (see above), however, it is certain that the USA, which declared itself the main fighter against terrorism, made a very significant contribution to its strengthening. The overthrow of strong secular regimes, attempts to use Islamist extremists for political and geopolitical purposes, as well as giving them respectability, and much more—contributed to the increase of terrorism, its organizational and financial base, its professionalism, etc. *That is, the USA has a large share of responsibility for spreading and strengthening radical Islamism.*

The events of the Arab Spring are described in Chap. 4. But within the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that in the development of Islamism (even if not taking its radical case of Daesh), it is possible to trace several stages in this short period. First, it is the involvement of Islamists in revolutionary events, which were started mainly by secular forces (youth, student organizations, etc.). Secondly, we trace the coming of Islamists to power by democratic means. Note that this success was not accidental. Not only because the social base of the Islamists is broad and powerful (see above). But also because they have made a great evolution in the preceding decades, gradually moving to a respectable path of legal political struggle (e.g., Osman 2016: 243).

In 2013, however, the Islamists were removed from power (in Tunisia as a result of elections, in Egypt as a result of a military coup/counterrevolution). This led to a change in sentiment among them. Osman describes (2016: 243–244) that the rejection of Islamists by the authorities in 2013 led to the fact that many of them returned from the respectable path of legal political struggle to underground and terrorist campaigns. Currently, in some countries (especially in Egypt) there is a confrontation of Islamists and secular forces, a confrontation that often grows into a real armed war. The mere fact that on October 21, 2017, 58 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Egypt, including 23 officers and 35 privates, were killed in a battle with terrorists in the Al-Wahat area, speaks for itself. However, the situation in Tunisia looks calmer, since moderate Islamists there still remain on the path of legal political struggle.

In general, it can be concluded that Islamism is fluid, changing its outlines and, in case of complications, it tends to radicalize. Accordingly, it is extremely important to make Islamism more moderate and respectable.

3.4.5 Causes of Rise and Strengthening of Islamism

Riddle of the Islamic Resurgence The Islamic Resurgence and rise of Islamism in Muslim countries in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have been and remain a mystery as these happened against the backdrop of state power which, at that time, was in the hands of strong secular politicians who did much to impede the influence of Islamists against the background of the activization of the socialist countries, as increasing attempts by the Western countries to promote the ideals of democracy and liberalism. Despite the most diverse opinions, there are still no convincing answers in the literature to many questions related to this phenomenon.

Nevertheless, researchers on this subject have put forward many reasons explaining the rise of Islamism. Let us try to summarize them in the following aspects: *the features of Islam as a religion; the emergence of an ideological vacuum as a result of the decline of Arab nationalism and leftist and liberal ideologies; sociodemographic reasons; a special form of modernization and the result of the struggle of different trends; oil wealth.*

Peculiarities of Islam as a Religion Along with ideas that can be interpreted as appeals for peace and coexistence with other religions, there is an inherent belligerence, an appeal to convert the infidels to true faith, a call for jihad, etc. All this can be interpreted in different ways. This is one of the causes of the diversity of Islamism (as we discussed above), but also a ground for its ability to influence different audiences.

Islam almost from the very beginning became a political religion (if we do not take into account the short initial period, when Muhammad did not engage in political activities, but only preached, but then there was no Islam as such). It was Islam that could unite the scattered and warring Arab tribes and direct their energy to the conquest of many countries in Eurasia and North Africa.

It is impossible not to mention the peculiarities of the situation of Islam in the life of Islamic countries. In Islam, there was no clearly formulated idea analogous to the Christian one—“Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (Ἄποδοτε οὖν τὰ Καίσαρος Καίσαρι καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῷ Θεῷ) (Matthew 22:21). However, in relation to law, education, and a number of other institutions, Islam even acted as a restrictor of the monarch’s power. Such a dual power of political and spiritual life in the history of Islamic countries was observed quite often. Therefore, in many countries there was no final establishment of the primacy of political power over a spiritual organization. For example, in Iran, the confrontation between secular power and spiritual leaders eventually resulted in two revolutions (see above).

We must also say about the peculiarities of Islamic religious life, in particular, its democracy, the absence of the church hierarchy, and the popularity of Islam.

Thus, in the conditions when there was a belief that the religious component of life is in principle above the state, with a strong component in Islam itself, its politicization in the form of Islamism had strong foundations.

The Emergence of an Ideological Vacuum Here, firstly, we note the weakness of statehood and nationalism (as a counterweight to Islamism) in the Arab World (at least

since the 1970s; see Chap. 2; see also Grinin and Korotayev 2016: Chap. 3; Kuznetsov and Salem 2016: 175–177, etc.). Islamism, therefore, has power in the Arab World also because it replaces nationalism to some extent. As we mentioned above, by the beginning of the 1970s, the influence of the ideology of Arab nationalism was significantly weakened, which contributed significantly to the rise of Islamism in the Arab World.²² This has already been partially discussed above. But these reasons can mainly explain the potency of recovery and can only partially explain why the rise occurred precisely for this period.

Secondly, in the 1980s and 1990s, the secularist ideological vacuum in the Islamic world increased. By this time, the attractiveness of Western ideologies had significantly decreased, especially after the successful revolution in Iran and its confrontation with the US, American support for Israel, oil crises, etc. Let us recall some processes that have already been discussed above: the fall of the authority of secular power and secular ideologies, including socialism; the consolidation of the Arab countries in the struggle against Israel; the struggle against the USSR in Afghanistan and the fall of socialism. All these provided opportunities for the rapid spread of Islamism.

Sociodemographic Factors Above we have already talked about them: an increase in the share of youth in the population [due to the drop in infant and child mortality (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2011, 2014)]; the growth of the urban population (in 1950–1992, it increased almost fivefold in developing countries [Levin 2014: 17, UN Population Division 2017]) and at the same time the growth of protest in its ranks. Recall that it was young people who made up a huge mass of supporters of Islamism and its activists. Also, the growth of Islamism was promoted by the growth of education (see below), and the rise of terrorism was supported by the growth of media influence.²³

One cannot, of course, forget about the deep roots of Islam and, accordingly, Islamism in the main population of the country, as discussed above. And a little later we will return to this point. Further, it is the ability of Islamist organizations to take on a number of social functions, replacing states (see above).

A Special Form of Modernization and the Result of the Struggle of Different Trends A number of researchers have spoken about the fact that the Islamic revival and the growth of the influence of Islamism became a special way of modernization. Thus, the well-known African economist Samir Amin considers Islamism as “an

²²And by the end of the twentieth century, Islamism finally pushed into the background the ideas of Arab nationalism (Khayrullin and Korotayev 2017b: 36).

²³With the advent of television, the spread of radio and the high rating of newspapers, each terrorist attack became known to the whole world, which could not but provoke radical Islamists to intensify their actions; on the other hand, acting as heroes, about whom the media tell the entire Muslim world, they could not fail to become an example for imitation. The inevitability of the presence of this topic in the media allows terrorism to be a permanent news event, as well as to expand its media presence, researchers believe (Norris et al. 2003). Analysis of the transformation of the image of terrorism and in particular Daesh in the media, see Davydov et al. (2016).

Islamic alternative to capitalist modernization—a political rather than a theological phenomenon” (Komar 2007: 36 cited in Levin 2014: 8).

Levin (2014) believes that the politicization of Islam in the form of modern Islamism is ultimately the consequence of the processes of forced modernization and globalization that have engulfed the world. Undoubtedly, the modernization processes were to somehow affect the situation in the Arab countries. But this general answer is not enough. Why did the answer become such? Why did secular modernization begin to give up its positions? By itself, modernization leads to strong disproportions in society and an increase in social tension. At the same time, different trends arise in the society related to the form of modernization. These tendencies have their support in various sociopolitical forces in society. Since modernization is usually connected with borrowing various technologies and institutions, there are quite powerful forces represented by the political class and some educated people who are trying to pursue modernization according to the templates of Western societies. On the other hand, the masses, who feel uncomfortable as a result of modernization and, at the same time, are more conservative, and also more distrustful of the political course of governments, are inclined to rely on such ideas that are more understandable to them. If we recall the Russian Revolution, then we can detect similar trends: the Westernizing trend (especially related to the idea of private ownership of land), and the popular socialist trend, which went along the path of socializing the land and removing it from private property. In the end, despite the fact that Russian governments sought to modernize the society by Western models for a long time, the second trend unexpectedly won. It led to the creation in Russia/USSR of an unprecedented society. Undoubtedly, Soviet Socialism became for many decades an alternative to Western modernization

Similarly, in the Islamic countries there were different trends of modernization, but in the end the Islamist trend prevailed rather unexpectedly. First of all, because it had huge support among the population. This “popular” tendency can win, especially in those societies in which the rejection of Western ideology has firm roots (and Orthodoxy and Islam were just such ideologies).²⁴

To this we should add a reason that is less often mentioned—the growth of education in Islamic countries (see, e.g., Korotayev and Yuriev 2018). In the 1970s–1990s, its level reached a point where there were quite a few educated people in the countries, but even more were semi-literate or illiterate. And this is a favorable level for a religious Reformation, when a large number of believers cease to simply listen to the sermons of the official ministers of the cult, and try to read and interpret the sacred texts independently. At the same time, people open their eyes to the discrepancy between what is written and reality, which leads to a change in their consciousness and behavior. An intermediate level of education, strange as it may seem at first

²⁴Of course, the trends can intertwine and take quite a bizarre combination. Thus, the development of civil society is taking place in a number of Islamic countries. In particular, the number of registered volunteer organizations in the Arab countries increased in 1995–2007 from 120,000 to 250,000 (Kandil 2011). However, such work was connected not only with secular volunteer organizations, but was largely determined by the activities of Islamist organizations (Kuznetsov and Salem 2016: 178).

glance, leads to the growth of radicalism and terrorism as one of its expressions (see Akaev et al. 2017; Vaskin et al. 2018). The growth of students, as we saw above, also contributed to the rise of Islamism. In prerevolutionary Russia, there was a similar situation with regard to education, along with a significant number of highly educated people, many were semi-literate, and a huge number were completely illiterate. But among the youth the majority had attained the primary level of education.

Finally, the oil crisis and the growth of the wealth of Islamic societies fertilized the growth of Islamism and Islamic radicalism.

Growing Wealth of Oil-Producing Countries With the above-mentioned struggle of trends, historical contingency plays a very important role. Therefore, if we were asked about the most important reason that allowed Islamism to become so strong, then, in our opinion, it was a jump in oil prices, “which in the Muslim world encouraged Islamist rather than democratic trends” (Huntington 1996: 114). This had numerous consequences. First, the desire for modernization by the Western scheme weakened in the oil-producing countries, whose governments believed that by having money, they can solve all problems. Secondly, the emergence of oil wealth seemed to be ideologically backing Islamism—for many Muslims, it was Allah who could give such grace to the faithful. Thirdly, part of this money went to Muslim non-oil countries through different channels. And this strengthened the reference point not to Western countries, but to not the most developed Arab ones. Fourth, part of the money went to support the struggle against Israel (and against the USSR in Afghanistan), which contributed to the strengthening of radical Islamism and terrorism in particular among Palestinians and Afghans. Fifth, the intensification of Islamist sentiments in the 1970s was facilitated by a sharp increase in the flow of labor migrants from Islamic countries to the oil-exporting Islamist Arabian monarchies. The combination of what they saw there—economic prosperity combined with the Islamist order—gave rise to the belief that the imposition of such an order at home should lead their countries to the same prosperity. Sixthly, the sharp increase in the amount of financial resources in the hands of Islamist monarchies (and, above all, Saudi Arabia) allowed them to significantly increase funding and strengthen targeted activities to spread Islam (and Islamism in the world).

“During the 1970s and 1980s Saudi Arabia was the single most influential force in Islam. It spent billions of dollars supporting Muslim causes throughout the world, from mosques and textbooks to political parties, Islamist organizations, and terrorist movements, and was relatively indiscriminate in doing so” (Huntington 1996: 178). According to some sources, in the 1980s and 1990s Saudi Arabia, through the channels of its charitable foundations, spent about \$70 billion for the construction of Wahhabi-controlled mosques, madrassas, Islamic centers, as well as for support and training of radical militant Islamists in the world (including the creation of training camps, the purchase of weapons, the recruitment of mercenaries) in about twenty countries around the world (see Kaplan 2003; see also Pipes 2003; Ignatenko 2009: 177–178).

In general, if such a comparison is appropriate, without oil money, Islamism would grow anyway, but it would grow like a plant on scanty soil; oil money so fertilized

the soil for it, that it blossomed a magnificent color. The possibilities of those who advocated the Western path of development without oil money would increase, since poverty is their best argument; with the same petrodollar wealth, the arguments of the adherents of the Western modernization path became weak.

Geopolitical Factors The geopolitical significance of the Middle East region was also important: first, as an oil-bearing region; and second, as arenas for the clash between socialism and capitalism, the USSR and the USA; while the proximity of the region to the borders of the USSR increased the desire of the USA to dominate it; thirdly, in connection with the Arab–Israeli confrontation. As a result, the USA actively used radical Islamism to achieve its foreign policy goals, nurtured and armed it (in particular in Afghanistan), and fomented wars between Islamic countries (in particular, between Iraq and Iran), which indirectly also contributed to anti-Americanism, anti-Westernism, and radicalism.

Finally, a very important reason for the growth of radicalism was interference in the life of Islamic societies. All kinds of interference in the life of the state, the overthrow of political regimes, the collapse of the state order all contribute to the sharp growth of radicalism and terrorism. Intervention in Afghanistan eventually led to the fact that this state became a nest of radicalism and terror (not to mention drug trafficking), eventually al-Qaeda emerged just there. Intervention in Iraq eventually raised the level of terrorism there to an unprecedented level (see Fig. 3.1). And, finally, the external intervention in the affairs of Syria, together with the departure of the Americans from Iraq, opened the doors for Daesh. The revelry of Islamist terror is also observed in Libya. Thus, it is obvious that the path of military intervention only fuels radicalism. Let us also recall what was said above: With the weakening of state power, Islamism (including its radical varieties) very quickly organizes abandoned territories in its own way.

Thus, the rise of Islamism could occur in the conditions of the folding for this rather favorable situation. Undoubtedly, the victory of this trend was not an accident, but relied on strong support within societies. This makes one treat Islamism not as something that can be defeated or taken away, but as a trend that must be adopted; Muslim-majority countries must find ways to support the most acceptable trends within Islamism.




Fig. 3.1 Per year dynamics of the number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and Western Europe, 1970–2015 (Global Terrorism Database; URL: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>)

3.5 Confrontation with Secular Regimes. Islamism as an Opposition Movement and in the Role of State Ideology

3.5.1 *Islamism in the Opposition. the Fight Against Islamism and Secular Regimes*

Islamism as an Opposition Movement Huntington notes that “in the 1980s and 1990s Islamist movements dominated and often monopolized the opposition to governments in Muslim countries. Their strength was in part a function of the weakness of alternative sources of opposition” (Huntington 1996: 114). Being in the opposition made it possible for Islamists to use the discontent of the population in order to strengthen their own authority. However, when the Islamists come to power, the attractiveness of their propaganda often begins to weaken. The latest developments in Egypt and Tunisia, when the Islamists came to power relatively easily and peacefully, but could not hold in power, support this thesis. This is not accidental. The doctrines of Islamists, which require observance of the norms of Shari’ah and arrangement of life according to sacred books, come in a rigid contradiction with the realities of modern life, when they are put into practice, they could cause great damage to the economy, for example, the tourism industry. An example is the Afghan Islamists. They led an armed struggle with external forces, so here the doctrine of jihad, the

struggle with the infidels, was at the forefront. However, no one really expected any economic and social successes from the Taliban.

Huntington also maintained that in the mid-1990s

most of [Middle Eastern] governments, however, lacked any basis for justifying their rule in terms of Islamic, democratic, or nationalist values. They were “bunker regimes,” to use Clement Henry Moore’s phrase, repressive, corrupt, divorced from the needs and aspirations of their societies. Such regimes may sustain themselves for long periods of time; they need not fail. In the modern world, however, the probability that they will change or collapse is high. In the mid-1990s, consequently, a central issue concerned the likely alternatives: Who or what would be their successors? In almost every country in the mid-1990s the most likely successor regime was an Islamist one. (Huntington 1996: 114)

The researcher, as usual, guessed only a small part of the whole. First, the collapse did not come soon, only 15 years later, and in some cases (as in Libya), this collapse was actively provoked by the Gulf and West countries. Second, the arrival of the “successor”—the Islamist regimes—turned out to be very short-lived both in Egypt and Tunisia (while the attempt to impose it in Libya by the General National Congress produce a prolonged civil war and political stalemate—see Chap. 5 below). The Islamist regimes could not come to power in other countries (we do not consider Daesh in this case). This additionally shows that Islamism is most adequate as an opposition movement, even where it wins, as in Iran, after a while it somehow starts separating religious and secular authorities (see this in the last paragraph of the chapter).

Thus, we conclude that Islamism is especially strong either as an opposition mass movement or as moderate Islamism, pursuing a rational policy adapted to modern conditions, or as a totalitarian movement of a revolutionary type that requires a complete reorganization of society (as was the case in the first period after the Islamic revolution) or in the territory controlled by Daesh.²⁵ Note the latter can be identified as a state according to the level of its political organization corresponding to the archaic (or early) state (see Korotayev and Grinin 2017: 329, for early states, see Grinin et al. 2004; Grinin 2003; 2004; 2008a; b; 2011a; b): A certain level of government was present there. In particular, one could find within the Islamic State certain governmental department, administrative division into provinces were distinguished there, police, health and education services organized at some level (e.g., Bystritsky 2016: 73).

In some Islamic societies, it is more difficult for moderate Islamism to manifest itself in power, it begins to fluctuate, the threat of schism emerges together with attempts at radicalization and other things that can lead to its political defeat, which we saw in Egypt and Tunisia in the last few years. However, in other societies, moderate Islamists have demonstrated significant success in adapting Islamic principles to modern reality (see below).

²⁵ It is worth mentioning also the Palestinian Islamist organizations that also emerged as mobilization organizations, under special conditions of forced emigration and residence in the refugee camps. It is also important to stress that the movement of the Palestinians is not only Islamist, but also nationalist (Fatah is closer to the secular nationalist movement, and Hamas is to the Islamist one).

The Struggle Between Islamists and Secular Regimes Although at the dawn of the formation of modern Islamism, “there were periods when secular and Islamist thinkers worked together to shape forms of secularism that respected the decisive influence that Islam had had on the different cultures of the wider Middle East, as well as forms of Islamism that limited the religion’s presence in the public space” (Osman 2016: x), today in general this is not so. The disagreement between secularism and Islamism is very strong. True, in a number of countries where democratic procedures exist and moderate Islamists are involved in political life, the field for cooperation between secular and Islamist parties is very large.²⁶ But on the whole, one can speak of a constant, sometimes fading, then intensifying struggle between secular trends (primarily state power, statism) and Islamism. It is understandable why, being an opposition and popular trend, and also having a tendency to radicalization in the face of worsening of the situation or aggravation of the international situation, Islamism cannot but cause concern among autocrats, ruling regimes and the elite. Islamists belittle the value of the state and patriotism, and radical Islamists are constantly shaking the situation. As a result, there is a struggle between governments and Islamists, sometimes intensifying. Even such “orthodox” Islamic governments as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are actively trying to reduce the influence of the Muslim Brothers and some other grassroots Islamic organizations. It is equally important that in the event of confrontation between official Saudi Islamism and the unofficial Islamism of Saudi Muslim Brothers, we are dealing with the confrontation between opposing trends within Islamism (and confrontation within one ideology may even exceed the interreligious confrontation—let us recall the fierce conflict within Leninism between Stalinists and Trotskyists in USSR, or between the Maoists and the Soviet Communists).

The struggle between the secular state and Islamism took place, as we saw, from the very beginning. In Arab countries, secular regimes actively, sometimes ruthlessly fought with the Islamists’ desire to come to power (peacefully or militarily), and although the struggle was a mixed success, on the whole, victory remained for secular regimes. The most impressive example is the struggle in Algeria in the 1990s and the early 2000s.

The most acute phase occurred in 1992–2002. This decade received a dismal title “decade of terror”, “black decade”, “years of fire” (Vasetsova 2017). The victims were about 200 thousand people, both Algerian and foreign citizens (Dolgov 2015: 232). In general, the order in the country was restored and the society returned to peaceful life, however, Islamist terrorist organizations are not completely destroyed, continue to organize terrorist acts and acts of intimidation and remain a big threat that can become catastrophic in case of destabilization of the situation (Vasetsova 2017, Dolgov 2015). And taking into account the high conflict potential in the country (which is connected, first, with the poor health of the country’s President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the struggle for who will become his successor, the struggle of groups in the upper echelon, which could escalate into arrests and repression, and secondly, with the severity of the so-called “Berber issue”) and the deterioration of the economic situation due to the fall in oil prices, a new surge in the activity of radicals is possible. (Vasetsova 2017)

²⁶We should note a special case of a combination of secular and Islamist organizations in the Palestinian Autonomy. Here there is a kind of division into organizations—Hammas is an Islamist organization, and Fatah is a secular political nationalist one.

The military coup in Egypt in 2013 also showed that secular (military-police) regimes find the strength to push the Islamists away from power [while the latter are able to discredit themselves while in power (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2016)]. The struggle against radical Islamic on the part of the government continues in Syria.

An interesting example of the relationship between secular power and Islamist tendencies can be observed in Iraq. In 2005, a new constitution was adopted there, which was the result of a compromise between the influence of the US administration and the wishes of local forces (including local jurists). In particular Art. 2.1 of the Constitution states: “Islam is the official religion of the state; it is the main source of legislation.” Strange symbiosis is observed in paragraphs 1A-1C of Art. 2. of the constitution. Paragraph 1A of Art. 2 states: “It is not allowed to pass a law that contradicts the fundamental principles of Islam.” At the same time, paragraph 1B states: “It is not permitted to adopt a law that is contrary to the principles of democracy.” Finally, in paragraph 1C, it is said: “It is not allowed to adopt a law that violates the rights and fundamental freedoms declared by this Constitution” (see Khayrullin and Korotayev 2017c). Thus, we see the inner power of Islamism, which is that it is difficult to bend even for the occupying administration.

It appears appropriate to mention that in hard, secular, although authoritarian regimes, such concessions usually are not implemented. In neighboring Syria in the Constitution of 1973 and 2012, Shari’ah and Islam were not given any significant place at all (Khayrullin and Korotayev 2016). The same can be said, for example, about the first Yemeni constitutional law enacted soon after the revolutionary coup in Sanaa in 1962, or the constitution of pro-Communist Southern Yemen (Khayrullin and Korotayev 2017a).

It is impossible, of course, not to mention the large (albeit temporary) success of the radical Daesh Islamists in Syria and Iraq in 2014. But this is absolutely a totalitarian and extreme Islamist regime, which may have caused great damage to the ideas of Islamism, whose approaches are rejected by the majority of Muslims. On the one hand, it was a noisy (albeit temporary) success of ultra-radical Islam. But on the other hand, it provoked the intensification of the armed struggle with it on the part of the governments of Iraq, Syria, the secular forces of Kurdistan, as well as a wide range of external actors.

3.5.2 Islamism in the Role of State Ideology

Monarchism and Islamism There are Arab monarchical regimes that, in Huntington’s words, “attempted to invoke some form of Islamic legitimacy” (Huntington 1996: 113–114). He particularly referred to Saudi Arabia and Morocco. But they can be called Islamist only with certain reservations. Moreover, we cannot speak of Morocco as an Islamist regime, it is a country where moderate Islamists are present as a political force and participate in elections. It is extremely important to take into account that these are legitimate regimes, while their legitimacy stems from the very idea of monarchical power sanctioned by Allah and in one case sanctified by the royal

dynasty stemming from the Muhammad ancestry, and in another by the allegiance to the clan of the religious reformer and founder of the Wahhabi movement and the modern Saudi Islamist ideology (the authority of the Saudi kings is also sanctified by their status as “the Guardians of the Two Shrines”) (see, e.g., Vasiliev 1967).

Such regimes do not need other grounds for the legitimization of their authority; therefore, they not less than secular authoritarian regimes dislike non-system Islamists from below. Nevertheless, it still makes sense to call the Saudi regime Islamist, if only because it is the main state sponsor of the spread of Islamism (in its Salafi form) in the modern world. This process has been particularly active since the 1970s, concurring not coincidentally with the growth of the wealth of the Saudis, whose goal was to establish Islam as the leading force in the Arab region (Kepel 1987: 10–11).

Note that moderate Islamism exists, in fact, in other Gulf countries. However, Qatar, where its own Islamist regime is quite moderate, supports geopolitical Islamists, including radical Islamists, in other countries. The recent Saudi–Qatar conflict was largely a clash of these versions of state Islamism (and it is interesting that both sides accused each other of “supporting terrorism,” that is, essentially radical Islamism).

As for Morocco, the Moroccan king, due to a substantially democratic political system in the country and periodic elections, is sometimes forced to draw Islamists to the administration, but the main legitimacy, let us emphasize, still lies in royal authority. In Morocco, according to the constitution (2011), the king is the spiritual head of the Muslims of Morocco, and also a symbol of the unity of the nation, which strengthens the legitimacy of his authority over Muslims. Let us also note that the traditions of statehood and monarchism in Morocco are stronger than in many other countries of the Middle East. The royal power is inherited in the straight male line within the clan of the Alaouites (who have reigned in Morocco since the 1630s), who are the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. All this serves as additional anchorages that keep society from destabilizing. In general, Islamism in Morocco has not developed in a radical extremist form. Among the believing Muslims, the authority of the monarch, who is considered to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and who holds the title *Amir al-Mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful), was always high (Landa and Savateev 2015: 162).

A few more words should be said about how Islamism developed in Morocco and what situation there is with radical Islamism. In Morocco, Islamist thought arose largely under the influence of the Egyptian school of reformers (Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā – see above) (Orlov 2015: 287). However, unlike Egypt, where the development of Islamism has gone towards radicalism, in Morocco, reformers initially sought to adapt Islamic dogmas and values to the dynamic development of the surrounding world, to establish in the minds of believers the value of free judgment, democratic principles and economic initiative. At the same time, the process of synthesizing religious-reformist and nationalist world views began (Abu Shu’ayb al-Dukkali, Muhammad ibn al-Arabi al-Alawi, Allal al-Fasi). Later, nationalist leaders used religious concepts and values supporting the Alaouite monarchy to restore the traditions of the Moroccan society that were trampled down during the Franco-Spanish protectorate (1912–1956). Note that in the Arab political context, attempts to unite Islamism with nationalism did not work almost any-

where. There were other features of the development of Moroccan Islamism. In particular, unlike in Egypt, where theologians played a comparatively small role in the development of the Islamist movement, the audience of Moroccan reformers consisted of students from theological educational institutions. Finally, Islamism in Morocco was not an opposition movement seeking power, but on the contrary, after gaining independence, the influence of Islam on mass consciousness was in every way supported by the Moroccan kings Muhammad V (1927–1961) and Hassan II (1961–1999). The ruling circles of Morocco viewed Islam as a reliable means of national consolidation of the Arab-Berber population, a factor of mass political mobilization, strengthening the authority of the monarchy. Thus, Islam under these conditions became a political doctrine and political ideology. At the same time, the royal administration actively regulated the work of clergy and institutions through a special ministry and assigned it the task of educating young people for devotion to national and religious traditions, loyalty to the king as a “ruler of the faithful” (*amir al-mu’uminin*), critical attitude to Western culture and political theories. Thus, Islamism has become in Morocco a means of political ideologization from above. Not surprisingly, the moderate Islamist Party of Justice and Development Party has a majority in the Moroccan Parliament. This, of course, does not in any way mean that there is no radical Islamism in Morocco. It invariably appears always in one way or another, especially since for some time the government itself supported the radicals. But as soon as the radicals showed disloyalty to the throne, they were attacked by repression in the 1970s. However, there are fluctuations in relation to the power of the radicals – in particular, under the influence of negative events in Algeria in the early 1990s and a new wave of liberalization of relations between the Alaouite throne and Islamists. In general, Islamist groups in Morocco during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s were too few to exert pressure on the court and government. Nevertheless, the Morocco government went further, trying to split the Islamists, create loyal political Islamist parties and legalize the moderate Party of Justice and Development. As a result, the emergence of a legal Islamist party inclined to constructive political sharply complicated the relationship in the Islamist milieu (see Orlov 2015 for more details).

Islamism as a Victorious Ideology In general, modern Islamism rarely becomes an official state ideology in an explicit form, although there are several cases, and it makes sense to say more about them. Above we said that Islamism as an ideology has won in Pakistan, which was proclaimed at the very creation of this state. Islamism continued to play an important role in Pakistan after independence (especially for mobilizing the population against India, as well as helping the Afghan mujahideen). In particular, during the reign of M. Zia-ul-Hak, a large class of theologians also significantly improved their position (Chektrizova 2013: 110). But as we see, Islamism here had a traditionally state character. However, at the present time it no longer has such significance in the life of this country, as before, at the same time, apparently, it was integrated into the political life as one of its essential elements.²⁷

Further we will see that it has transformed to some extent into post-Islamism. As for radical Islamism, in Pakistan it has a decentralized and discrete character (e.g., Chektrizova 2013).

As for the victory of Islamism in Iran, let us note the following. Although in Iran one could see a victory of the Islamic revolution, in fact, Iran had a different Islamism than in the Sunni countries and especially Arab countries. In Iran, Islamism

²⁷However, there is Islamic Council, one of the advisory bodies under the government of Pakistan (it makes decisions about the compliance of norms and laws with Islamic doctrine), Chektrizova (2013).

was closely connected, almost equivalent to nationalism; in Arab countries, it was hostile to it. That is why there were no Islamic revolutions in the Arab countries (although Ayatollah Khomeini actively sought this); there Islamism could not rely on the nation. One should also bear in mind the important distinction about which Vasiliev (2017: 42) writes that in Iran the Shiite clergy historically was in opposition to secular authorities, considering it illegal, and in the Sunni countries most of the clergy are part of the state apparatus.

The main thing is that it was Shiite Islamism that won in Iran, that is why Khomeini really tried to spread it only to Muslim countries with a notable Shiite population (first of all to Iraq). On Sunni, which is about 90% of all Muslims in the world (see, for example, Pew Research Center 2011), the Iranian Islamic Shiite revolution could not spread almost by definition, due to its clearly Shiite character.

Islamists also succeeded in Sudan. However, here we must bear in mind two points. First, Islamism lay at the very origins of modern Sudanese statehood in the period of the Mahdist national liberation uprising (1881–1898). In fact, in these years the Sudanese themselves for the first time created and maintained their state. It was called Mahdiyyah and was a “theocratic state of jihad”, originally run as a military camp (Seregichev 2015: 368). Rarely states in modern times began in this way. Given the Sudanese lack of such experience in state building, reliance on Islamism was quite a natural option. Secondly, during the formation of modern Sudan in the 1950s, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood created in Sudan a very strong organization (note that Sudan was closely integrated with Egypt in the first half of the 20th century). It had a huge influence on strengthening Islamism in the country, and Islamists finally came to power in this country (see *Ibid.*: 370 ff.). In Sudan, two alternatives of the political evolution of Islamic countries were especially vividly demonstrated: military dictatorship and political Islam. At the same time, the coming to power of Islamists in the late 1980s was realized thanks to the union of military and Islamists (Kepel 2000; Fuller 2004). The 1994–1996 period can be called the time of the highest point of the influence of Islamists in the country. The Islamist project was changed in 2000 due to the intensification of the struggle between the military and Islamists. The Popular Arab and Islamic Congress was closed, and the leader of the Islamists al-Turabi was dismissed from the post of the National Congress General Secretary. But in general, Islamism, Islamist fundamentalism (in its moderate version) continues to act as a reliable support for the ruling regime in Khartoum. It generally stabilizes the situation in the country and satisfies the majority of Sudanese (*Ibid.*: 397). Some researchers believe that the consolidating role of Sudanese Islam and fundamentalism will continue to be one of the key factors for maintaining the political stability of the Republic of Sudan for many years ahead (see Seregichev 2015 for more details).

Moderate Islamism in Power Iran and especially Sudan are not the most revealing cases, because it is difficult to borrow their success stories. More interesting and more important for future development are the cases when moderate Islamist political parties fit into the political landscape of specific states and are institutionalized. It is this path that is most promising and most acceptable for all, including Western countries. This also applies to Iran, where the radical Islamism of Khomeini (which significantly undermined the country’s economy) quickly grew into the moderate Islamism/post-Islamism of his successors, who managed to achieve significant success in stabilizing Iran while also managing to foster the development of a sufficiently strong, functioning Islamic democratic system (see paragraph 3.6.3 for more detail).

As we have already said, moderate Islamists have demonstrated significant success in adapting Islamic principles to modern reality. There are examples when they, having come to power, conduct a sufficiently balanced and effective policy (Turkey, Morocco, and Malaysia). There are also several countries in which Islamist parties came to power on their own or in a coalition, like in Malaysia. This is possible because they are somehow integrated into the political system and recognize the rules of the game and the corresponding foreign policy situation. It should also be added that in these countries, there are certain counterbalances to Islamism. So in Malaysia, nationalism and nationalist parties are strong, in Morocco the royal power is the stabilizing factor. In Turkey, there is a mobile balance between secularism and Islamism. One can agree (at least partly) that Turkey can be regarded as a model for the rest of the Middle East, and the Muslim World in general, for coexistence of Islam, secularism, and democracy (Fuller 2014; Kirisci 2013).

What has been said about the tough struggle of secular regimes and Islamists, as well as the successes of moderate Islamists in a number of countries allows us to conclude that *only a policy of attracting moderate Islamists, ready to observe the constitution and work legally, will weaken radical Islamism, and eventually develop Islamic societies with less instabilities*. Attempts to squeeze Islamists out of politics lead to constant confrontation. Therefore, we fully agree with the following opinion: The experience of the Muslim world, at least since the early 2000s, demonstrates the failure of extreme secularism in such countries as Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey. In contrast, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, for example, are held up as examples of the contribution that Islam can make in national affairs within a democratic framework incorporating diverse religious, cultural, and ethnic identities (Weiss 2010; Rahim 2011; Hossain 2016; Ugur 2017).

Thus, what has been said shows that moderate Islamism can become a positive and promising wing of the political system of Islamic countries. But any radicalism, as well as a refusal to recognize the supremacy of the state and the law, leads to the fact that in such a situation and political-cultural milieu, Islamism is more fit to play the role of the opposition. In a word, this is a complex way in which the main hope, which promises success for the whole world, is to separate moderate (and legitimate) Islamists from radical Islamists.

3.6 Multifacetedness of Islamism and the Present Trends

3.6.1 *On the Typologies of the Varieties of Islamism*

Multifacetedness of Islamism The multifacetedness of Islam did not appear just recently; in many respects, it was present in the works of Islamic thinkers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their interpretations of Islamism were often

mutually exclusive.²⁸ Indeed, it is very difficult in the situation of coexistence of many directions, to indicate who can determine what true Islam is, what it entails, its core and essence, and crucially whether anyone can claim to represent it. Not surprisingly, the intellectual wars intensified (Osman 2016: xi). However, it is important to note that despite this struggle of ideas, the rejection of Daesh-type radical Islamism is observed among many moderate Islamists who are trying to dissociate themselves from its excesses. In one way or another, within the framework of Islamism there are many conflicting directions. Therefore, often the worst enemies of the Islamists are other Islamists. And it is in the split of the Islamists that one can see the most pragmatic and promising policy.

Moderate Islamism and the Other Varieties of Islamism It is impossible to full consider the different directions of even moderate Islamism in one chapter; therefore, we confine ourselves to a few remarks.

First, it is important to understand that due to the fact that all of the attention is focused on terrorist Islamism, moderate Islamism in media coverage remains often in the shadows. «Wahhabist Islam commands worldwide attention through fear and terror. In contrast, Turkish and Indonesian Islams, which temper religiosity with modern democratic and secular imperatives of globality, receive little notice»—correctly notes Nevzat Soguk (2011: 3). The issue of the differences between the moderate and radical Islamism has already been discussed at the beginning of this chapter.

Secondly, in addition to a moderate and radical classification of Islamism, there are also classifications in statist and non-statist Islamism. Statist Islamists (Islamist parties principally) are those that in their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate consensus building in national politics. Non-statist Islamists (from quietist salafi to armed jihadi) who prioritize the religious community over national politics are directly impacted by the interactions between statist Islamists and the state, and generally tend to benefit from the failure to build a consensus over democratic national politics (Volpi and Stein 2015). Non-statist Islamists are those who do not want to participate in political elections or affairs officially and in accordance with the rules; they are closer to radicals. In addition, the former are able to consider the possibility of convergence of nationalism and Islamism, and the latter—with difficulty. Although we do not think that such a division is productive, it is important that the authors unite both of them under the general term of Islamists. In addition, the authors show that “statist Islamists (Islamist parties principally) can contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the state when their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate consensus building in national politics.” On the other hand, “by contrast when these interactions are conflictual, it has a detrimental

²⁸In particular Tarek Osman writes the following: “The result has been a spectrum of ‘Islamisms’: some views that strongly invoke certain interpretations of Islam in political and social life; others that have adopted a light-touch approach. Several schools of thought have looked back to earlier episodes in Islamic history... Others have innovated, trying to redefine the parameters for applying Islam to their societies, delicately admitting that all the widely accepted interpretations of Islam (those that had dominated Muslims’ thinking over the previous few centuries) were failing to guide, let alone regulate, modern societies. A few thinkers went further and subtly tried to redefine Islam itself” (Osman 2016: ix).

impact on both the statist Islamists, and the possibility of democratic politics at the national politics” (Volpi and Stein 2015).²⁹

Sometimes the typology of Islamists is made even more complicated. In particular, Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai in their book *Political Islam in the Age of Democratization* (2013) subdivide Islamists into “participants,” “rejecters,” and “conditionalists.” Besides, The Turkish Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* = AKP) is treated under the special category of “post-Islamism.” It is difficult to say how productive this typology is. However, we concur with the final conclusions of the authors. Indeed, their book’s Conclusion states: “Our central argument is that Islamists have played a decisive role and will continue to do so in the years and decades ahead as the region transitions through the democratization process” (p. 185).

3.6.2 *Radicalism and Terrorism*

It is obvious that terror and terrorism are unacceptable and have no justification. It is also obvious that the aspirations of some Islamist fanatics to literally crush the West and return to the customs that existed more than a thousand years ago, destroying all who doubt the need for this, are for many the scariest dimensions of Islamism.

That is why “wide social segments across the Middle East have rejected Islamism, often vehemently” (Osman 2016: xix). However, so much has been written about Islamist terrorism that it is hard to say anything new. And we see no reason to repeat ourselves. Therefore, in this chapter, as already said, we will not deal in any depth with the problem of terrorism (some relevant information is given in Part 2 of the present monograph). We will limit ourselves to only some remarks on this topic, which seem to us to be important.

A Few Comments on Terrorism First of all, we note that there is no universally recognized definition of terrorism. In particular, the article by Paulo Casaca states that according to an expert committee on the radicalization of the European Commission, “There are in fact hundreds of definitions of terrorism” (Casaca 2017a: 31). Therefore, we are not going to delve into the nuances of this definition. We would still mention the definition of the Global Terrorism Database that appears quite appropriate in the framework of the present monograph: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”³⁰

²⁹“When, as in Tunisia, Islamist parties participate in a working multiparty system, accompanied by an increase in civil liberties, they can contribute to democratic consolidation, stability and enhanced state governance. Where Islamist movements are violently excluded, as in Egypt after the 2013 military coup and the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, the opposite results” (Volpi and Stein 2015: 290).

³⁰Global Terrorism Database Codebook 2016, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf>, p. 9.

Further when we consider terrorism as a universal phenomenon, we should note that terrorism is an instrument of the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority, and we underscore this is an important correlation. It is important to understand that radicals are still a minority in any society, even if they manage to lead it. Meanwhile, the modern media are generally unwitting allies of terrorists.

Second, Islamism tends to radicalize when the situation changes. You can always expect such a relapse (Osman 2016: xix). Sometimes Islamism (like any other current) changes on a new soil, in particular in Europe. It is well known that sometimes it receives new ideas and becomes especially radical (Osman 2016: 245). However, it is less well known that in Europe, Islamism begins to be modernized quite often in a rather positive direction (see below).

Third, let us now consider the question of the social base of radical, terrorist Islamism. Some adherents of explanations of the psychological conditioning of terrorism claim that the majority of participants in terrorist acts are ignorant, illiterate, stupid, or brainwashed³¹ (see Janabi 2015: 54–55). For example, al-Qaradawi's (2007) assessment identifies the lack of education as a leading cause for extremism and intolerance. We believe that this is still an oversimplification. Of course, brainwashing is always present in totalitarian groups and ideologies. And among the followers, there are a certain number of illiterate and near-minded people ready to succumb to suggestion. However, there is evidence that members of terrorist groups in some countries are characterized by a higher level of education than is observed on average for these countries. We could mention, for example, the sociodemographic analysis of terrorists performed by Russell and Miller (1977) who found that the absolute majority of the members of leftist terrorist organizations in Europe and the Middle East have a very good education, very often university degrees. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) also note that members of the military wing of Hezbollah as well as of Palestinian terrorist groups are rather highly educated. Researchers, after analyzing 350 biographies of terrorists from organizations around the world between 1966 and 1976, came to the conclusion that terrorists usually have a rather high education level (Krueger and Maleckova 2003). There are a few other studies of this kind. In particular, Claude Berrebi (2007) by analyzing Hezbollah members from 1980 to 2002 found that better education increases the probability to become a terrorist (however, events of recent years questioned the role of Hezbollah as a definite terrorist organization). Second, as we saw above, among the leaders of Islamist groups (including radical Islamist ones) we find many educated people. Third, we have already said that some moderate, well-educated Islamists can swing toward radicalism under certain conditions, as happened among the Egyptian Muslim Brothers after the overthrow of President Mursi. Fourth, according to this logic, the greatest rise in terrorism should have occurred in the 1960s, when illiteracy (as well as poverty) rates in Islamic societies were much higher than today. However, this was not the case.

On the contrary, the growth of terrorism is connected with the growth of literacy and education, since such movements cannot develop in illiterate societies. They

³¹Byman (2005, 2007, 2011).

rise in modernizing societies where the literacy rate is increasing, but in general the societies are still not sufficiently educated, with large differences in this plan between different groups of the population. In other words, as we noted above, terrorism is connected with the situation of intermediate literacy of the society, whereas further growth of schooling is associated with a significant trend toward a decrease of terrorist activity (see, e.g., Akaev et al. 2017; Vaskin et al. 2018). Note also the study of Achilov and Sen (2017) who compared systematically moderate and radical Islamists and came to the conclusion, “that politically moderate Muslims tend to have higher educational credentials and are more active in civil society” (Achilov and Sen 2017: 618); we also agree that “the higher levels of education, social class, associational social capital, and engagement in political activism also correlated with increased support for moderate views” (Ibidem). All this gives some hope that terrorism will gradually decline with the further growth of education and well-being.

With the development of life, technology, media, and also the level of education, it is obvious that terrorism itself is changing. There is no point in exploring this in detail in this chapter, but we should not forget about it either. Accordingly, with the rise of Islamism in the 1990s, the notion of the appearance of terror of a new type began to be strengthened.³²

Factors Contributing to and Hindering the Growth of Terrorism Finally, in concluding this section on terrorism, it appears necessary to discuss the place of radical Islamism in the general course of Islamism and the life of Islamic societies.

The acquisition of oil wealth in many ways fertilized radical Islamism. However, it is better to examine the phenomenon of radical Islamism through more eclectic lenses. Radicalism, in our opinion, is an integral part of a current that is an unpleasant and dangerous, but is a necessary and natural all-encompassing process in the development of Islamism. Many teachings have their radical wings. Therefore, the task is to create as few conditions as possible for the growth of radicalism. Meanwhile, the destruction of strong (albeit authoritarian) regimes under the flag of establishing democracy is one of the most important conditions for the growth of radicalism and terrorism. We will take a closer look at this in Chap. 4 (on the Arab Spring, see also Grinin et al. 2016). Thus, it is necessary to choose allies in the fight against radicalism. Such allies, albeit temporary, can often be authoritarian regimes. Attempts to establish democracy in countries with fragile statehood (what was, e.g., Libya) through armed revolution, intervention, and the overthrow of the government, unequivocally lead to rampant terrorism. Attempts to establish a socialist republic in countries such as Afghanistan (what the Soviet Union was trying to do) also failed. The invasion of Iraq gave birth to Daesh. Another factor contributing to the growth of terrorism

³²Paulo Casaca (2017b: 33) notes that this has been talked about since the 1990s. Among those who tackled the question, Walter Laqueur (1999) coined the expression “new terrorism;” Bruce Hoffman (1998) used both “contemporary terrorism” and “modern terrorism;” and Kepel (2000) was one of the first authors using the term “jihad” to indicate a new sort of terrorism. Gearson (2002) was perhaps the most prolific as he established a distinction between modern terrorism (1970s–1980s), superterrorism (1990s–2000s), and post-modern terrorism (after 9/11); he also foresaw a “new age of terrorism.”

is the attempt to use such organizations for geopolitical purposes. As already mentioned, al-Qaeda was to a considerable extent a product of Western reliance on radical Islamist groups in the fight against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

Osman (2016) considers the secular–Islamist conflict as the main issue in Islamic societies. In general, this is true. However, in our opinion, the transition to secularism and its victory is much more likely through moderate Islamism, that is, through cooperation with it. And if we consider that radical Islamism is the result of a violation of order in societies, then this order should be kept at any cost. Therefore, the problem is not a choice between authoritarianism and democracy, but the choice between a secular authoritarian regime and radical Islamism. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand that radical Islamism can be won (weakened) under current conditions only on the field of Islam proper, by supporting moderate and law-abiding Islamism and cooperating with it where possible.

Concerning democracy in the Arab World in general, the idea of the need for its implementation there prevails. The events of the Arab Spring, however, have somewhat sobered those who aspired to its early implementation. Therefore, more sober voices are heard. On the one hand, “we cannot fall victim of the Western obsession with democracy, on the other hand we cannot presume that the Middle East democracy “does not matter” or that it matters less than in other parts of the world” (Dalacoura 2015: 420). We do not agree either with those who claim that the Middle East democracy “does not matter,” but we emphasize that the path to democracy lies primarily through cooperation with moderate Islamism, even if for some time these Islamists can get the majority of votes. If in that case, there is a danger of more radical Islamists slipping into power, then, in our opinion, autocratic regimes are preferable as this is the lesser of two evils.

In conclusion, one may ask: What is the historical significance of Islamist radicalism? Obviously, it cannot become a victorious ideology on a broad front, because as any radical teaching it is not adapted to practical needs. In our opinion, its historical role is negative. It is rejected (gradually, albeit slowly) by most Muslims with its terrorism and denial of a lot of important things; on the other hand, it forces the West to communicate with Islam more cautiously; it gradually forces us to seek special ways of integrating Islamic countries into the world development.

3.6.3 Evolution of Islamism. Post-islamism

Aggravation of Contradictions in Islamic Societies As already mentioned, there are many different interpretations of the basic principles of Islamism, even among moderate Islamists. We also saw that in many countries, it is represented in different versions, for example, in the form of state Islamism of Saudi Arabia and other countries. In Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Islamism is transformed into post-Islamism (see below). With regard to Turkey and Morocco, one can speak of the moderate “democratic Islamism” of the Justice and Development Parties of both countries,

and Tunisian En-Nahda (on the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, see below) is worth mentioning.

Many moderate Islamists recognize pluralism and the need to adapt to change. Among the widely minded trends among the moderate Islamists, it is possible to mention in particular the modernists—the rationalistic religious, ethical, and political trend in contemporary Islamic thought, which tries to strike a balance between the tradition and the reality of the life of the *ummah*. “Renovationists” seek to overcome the backwardness of Muslim countries with the help of the West, but with the preservation of Islamic traditions. In particular, they believe it necessary to adapt the Shari’ah to the demands of the modern world, and they are ready to compromise (see Levin 2014: 78–82 for more detail).

In general, such groups are not sufficiently influential. The main divide takes place between moderate Islamists and radicals, who can coexist within the same movements, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood. This division corresponds in many ways to the internal division within a number of Islamic societies. It was noted that in some Islamic societies (e.g., Iran, Turkey, and Egypt), one deals with a clearly expressed cultural dualism (which can even be called a dualism of civilizations) that carries elements of instability for society (Vasiliev 2017: 42). Indeed, there is a contradiction in the components of society in Islamic countries, when alongside traditional (or pseudo-traditional) components there are modern (and pseudo-modern) tendencies. As in other (historical) cases of modernization, this creates tension in society and often its split. A similar situation, as we have already mentioned above, was, for example, in Russia on the eve of 1917, when the contradiction between European and popular ideas developed in this country.

The Arab Spring produced a new surge from the struggle between different trends in society: between representatives of secular trends and Islamists, as well as the struggle inside Islamists. As a result, according to Osman (Osman 2016 p. xiv), there was an unprecedented split in Islamic society. In this confrontation, something is revealed from the unity and struggle of opposites, which constitute a single whole. In this unity of opposites, perhaps, lies the source of the development of Islamic societies, but, of course, the source is contradictory and dangerous. From time to time, there is a shift to radicalism, then to rigid autocracy and even terror.

The Evolution of Islamism in Different Societies As we have already repeatedly mentioned above, Islamists are not necessarily hostile to modernity, on the contrary there are many of them (especially among moderate Islamists) which are among its proponents (see, e.g., Esposito and Burgat 2003). As regards the evolution of Islamism, the researchers note significant changes in it in recent decades (e.g., Osman 2016: 239). First of all, of course, this is the desire of many groups to fit into the political landscape and participate in elections. Note also that in a number of countries, for example, Iran or Tunisia, women are actively participating in elections and some become parliamentarians. In general, despite the increasing rigor in women’s clothing, in almost all Muslim-majority societies the role of women in society is increasing, and their situation is gradually improving. It is important to understand that the more women participate in political life, the greater the chances

of a drift from radical Islam to moderate, because, generally, Muslim women appear more likely than men to support politically moderate Islam, even after controlling for other social variables (e.g., Achilov and Sen 2017: 618).

As for the situation in Muslim communities in non-Muslim societies, Osman (2016: 251) maintains that “there are interesting innovations in religious thinking and practice led by Muslim women in the USA, Indonesia and South Africa”, adding an important note: “these indicate that, freed from certain cultural influences, Islamic thinking could make quick strides in areas where it has been held back for decades even centuries” (Ibidem). Indeed, we can expect that in Western countries, there will be new modernist trends in the development of Islamic communities and Islamism, especially with regard to the role of women in society. In any case, these changes are quite active. One should also note the role of the Organization of Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML), which works in many Muslim-majority countries in special regard to gender equality (Walzer 2015: 116–117).

Although the European media is preoccupied almost exclusively with terrorist Islamist organizations and actions in European countries, nevertheless, the movement toward the modernization of Islam is also very visible there. It can be seen in the broad adaptation of Muslim religious practices and practices to the Western conditions of life, particularly by abandoning the most archaic forms of the Islamic tradition. Sociological studies show that the level of religiosity of the Muslim population is lower for European countries than for developing countries in Asia and Africa [e.g., in Kosovo and Russia, religion is important for 44% of adherents of Islam, in Bosnia and Herzegovina—for 36%, and in Albania—only for 15% (Gorokhov 2015: 37)].

An example of the modernization of Islam is the reformist movement known as Euro-Islam (or reformed Islam), which has recently gained great popularity. Its leader, Tariq Ramadan, calls on his supporters to actively participate in the political and economic life of Europe (Ramadan 1999).

In this regard, many researchers point to the need for a reform in Islam (Gorokhov 2015: 37). This Reformation should bring the Muslim tradition closer to the needs of the modern world and at the same time “re-affirm Islamic values, revive faith by renewing Islamic philosophy and creating a new school of fiqh, that is, Muslim jurisprudence and a set of social norms” (Mirsky 2012).

Thus, imperceptibly from the outside world’s perspective, Islam is undergoing a process of modernization that inclines it toward the Western way of life rather than the Arab way of life. Researchers of these organizations and communities in Western Europe note that Muslim organizations are facing completely different challenges in West European countries in terms of participation in public debates. ... Although views about the integration of Muslims into Western societies and the ways Islam should develop in European countries vary extraordinarily from one organization to another (Klausen 2007; Roy 1994), most of them are well integrated into Western social and political institutions, and some have even become the official interlocutors of Western governments (Campana and Jourde 2017: 2). Thus, most Muslim organizations somehow fit perfectly into the European landscape.

However, the change in the status of women and even a kind of feminization of the political landscape can be found not only in Muslim communities of the West,

but also in countries where Islamism dominates—but let us emphasize—only in moderate Islamist or post-Islamist countries. For example, Mir and Khaki (2015: 74) maintain that there are “two different feminist perspectives, namely secular feminism and Islamic feminism in the Iranian context.” They note that “Islamist women are discernible by their dress, the Islamic hijab. These would prefer to veil but at the same time they oppose to second-class citizenship status of women. They demand a friendly reinterpretation of Shari’ah rulings pertaining to women which according to them has been centuries back interpreted in a man dominated society” (Mir and Khaki 2015: 89).

In general, the path toward equality of women in Arab and Islamic countries does not seem to lie on the direct road of secularism (or not only on it), but along the road of the evolution of Islamism.³³ For example, the authors of the article “Islamism, Secularism and the Woman Question in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring: Evidence from the Arab Barometer” (Fox et al. 2016) conducted research in the period after the Arab Spring in different countries (Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine). They claim to find that support for “Muslim feminism” (an interpretation of gender equality grounded in Islam) has increased over the period, particularly in Arab Spring countries, while support for “secular feminism” has declined. In most of the countries examined, relatively high degrees of support for gender equality coexist with a preference for Islamic interpretations of personal status codes (Fox et al. 2016; about the concept and practice of Islamic feminism, as well as post-Islamist feminism see also Holdoa 2017).

Post-Islamism In some countries where Islamism has been victorious, such as Iran, Pakistan, or Bangladesh (which was part of Pakistan), Islamism differs substantially from Islamism in Saudi Arabia or Sudan. The fact is that it gradually transforms into *post-Islamism*.

Post-Islamism has been a popular term among scholars seeking to understand the goals of Islamist movements and the social conditions and opportunity structures they face (Holdoa 2017: 1800).

Post-Islamism today is not a new term (Shahibzadeh 2016). Scholars started talking about post-Islamism in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Naturally, there is no single definition, but all the definitions underscore the moderation of post-Islamism, its softness in comparison with Islamism, its connection with human rights, not so rigid link with religion, and to some extent its connection with democracy. For example, Bayat (2007: 19) defines post-Islamism as follows: “post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular. Rather it represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty... In short, whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights” (see also Bayat 2013). In a practical sense, the emerging political system incorporates democratic and secularist ideals and principles within “Islamic ethical, moral, cultural, and value systems” (Hossain 2016: 214). The post-Islamist parties have

³³One can be dissatisfied with the emergence of a virulent feminist leadership within the fundamentalist parties (Mernissi 2002), but if events develop in this way, one must try to use this.

shifted their focus to minorities, youth, and gender concerns and adopted a rights-based approach—this is a practical manifestation of post-Islamism (Rana 2017; for an analysis of post-Islamism in Bangladesh, see Hossain 2016; for Pakistan see Amin 2017). On the one hand, despite making some visible intellectual contribution, post-Islamist movements have failed to transform their ideas into a popular social movement (Shahibzadeh 2016). Nonetheless, the ideas of post-Islamism find quite practical application in the everyday life of a number of Islamic societies, as we saw above.

In our opinion, the most interesting case is Iran. Islamist modernization (as the Islamic reaction to secular modernization) began in Iran long ago. For example, back in 1896, the Iranian Shah reformer Naser al-Din Shah Qajar was killed by the follower of al-Afghani (as we remember the spiritual father of Islamism) Mirza Rezi Karmani. Thus, several generations of Islamists changed in Iran. Rajaei (2007) maintains in his monograph *Islamism and modernism: the changing discourse in Iran* that “Islam-minded Iranians have displayed four responses to modernism, corresponding to four generations in the evolution of the Islam-centric discourse in Iran. Only the views and practices of one generation could be termed “Islamism,” namely that of the third generation.”

Since the late 1990s, the fourth generation appears, which, in view of some analysts, can no longer be defined by the term Islamism, but rather post-Islamism. This generation tends to listen to the voice of reason.

Shahibzadeh (2016: vii) believes that post-Islamism in Iran is a result of critical interpretations of Islamism and its political consequences. He pays special attention to the point that “the new interpretation of the electoral rights of the people by Iran’s leader as inviolable rights of the people reinforces the argument put forward by post-Islamists and prodemocracy constitutionalists in Iran” (Shahibzadeh 2016: 235). Of course, this contradicts those conservatives who have argued that, first, the constitution cannot weaken the position of the leader as the final arbiter in political conflicts within the system. Second, the same constitution has authorized the Guardian Council as the constitution’s sole interpretive authority (Ibidem). However, we should not forget that we are dealing with Islamic, rather than Western democracy.

Thus, in post-Islamism we see a noticeable evolution of Islamism as a whole in the mainstream in the general human sense, although with a great Islamic specificity.

3.6.4 *Modern Trends*

The military coup in Egypt in 2013 (see Chap. 5) and the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power, to which they came in a legitimate way, greatly changed the mood among the Islamists, and at the same time undermined the belief held

by many Muslims in adopting a peaceful way of integrating Islamists into formal political life. As a result, many Islamists have drawn incorrect conclusions from recent events. Tarek Osman considers this a very serious fracture and, possibly, a turning point. He writes that Islamists who return to sacrifice, that is, to terrorist activities, risk being sent to prisons, whereas, what they foremost need to do is to rebuild. At this time (i.e., in 2013), Islamists returned to the idea of influencing social morality instead of participating in political life. Hence, the situation is rolled back to the beginning of the political evolution of the Islamists, the danger of a new radicalization of Islam is growing. This diminishes the significance of their recent political success (in 2011–2013) and reduces expectations for political success in the future (see Osman 2016: 244–248).

Those Islamists who return to the strict norms of Islam, conservatism, may not be understood by young people who have begun to live differently. According to Osman, Islamic youth are no longer ready for blind obedience, as before. On the contrary, large groups of young people tend to make up their own mind and thus introduce innovations into their understanding of Islam (Osman 2016: 245–246).

Indeed that which is the power of Islamists can also become their weakness in the event that some youth lose interest in the movement. Moreover, the fact that the youths are the mainstay of Islamists gives us a chance to hope that as they grow older the social support for Islamism will be reduced.³⁴ From the above discussion, we can conclude that Islamism is a phenomenon of transition (Yapp 2004: 181). But this transition may take a really long time. M. E. Yapp notes that “in two ways Islamism is a phenomenon of transition: First, it is linked to modernization and may lose its force when newly mobilized men and women adapt to the new environment; and, second, it is a feature of youth and youth itself will pass. The rising birth in the Muslim lands is scheduled to peak in 2025 and then Muslims, like the rest of us, will start getting older. It is not cures we want but palliatives to get us through until then” (Yapp 2004: 181). Yapp was not quite right in his predictions, the population aging in the Muslim lands has already begun (UN Population Division 2017), but we agree that Islamism is not eternal and its base will somehow melt.

In any case, the struggle for youth is the most important front in relation to Islamism. The state and secular organizations have much to do here. And moderate Islamists need to be able to moderate the rigidity of ideological dogmas as much as possible in order to actively fit into the modern political landscape. Thus, Islamism is on the verge of change, although the danger of its radicalization is still strong. But we hope that as the society develops, Islamism will begin to transform more and more into post-Islamism.

³⁴There is a significant, though not so strong, correlation between the age of the adherents of Islamism and their belonging to moderate or radical Islamism. “Politically radical Muslims appear to be slightly younger than moderates. Approximately 21% of politically moderates, and 26% of politically radicals are under the age of 24 (range 18–24)” (Achilov and Sen 2017: 618).

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Chapter 4

Perturbations in the Arab World During the Arab Spring: A General Analysis



4.1 Introduction: Events of Special Importance?

The Arab World (and the MENA region in general) tends to be perceived as a zone of instability where various wars, violent conflicts, and other upheavals are likely. The protests and revolutions of 2011, known as the “Arab Spring,” fit quite well into the stormy history of this region (e.g., Korotayev et al. 2016a, b; Grinin et al. 2016; Grinin and Korotayev 2016b). After decades of political hibernation (Gardner 2011), one could hardly fail to be impressed by the unexpectedness and energy of the social explosion, the enormous geographic scope of the Arab Spring “from the Ocean to the Gulf” (e.g., Mirskiy 2011), the synchronicity of the “color revolutions” and social protests, the prevalence in 2011 of sociopolitical (rather than interethnic or interconfessional) motifs. Upheavals and protests involved more than a dozen of the Arab countries, including some Gulf countries, large-scale social explosions and revolutions were observed in five countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain). In Libya, they led to regime break down and a civil war (in Syria, civil war began in 2012, and in 2015, it started in Yemen). In 2011, most of the other

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Arab countries (and many of their neighbors¹) experienced a considerable degree of sociopolitical destabilization.²

What is important is that those events appear to have some features that are definitely new in comparison with earlier events in the Middle East and North Africa. We do not have any more an impression that the Arabs are only capable of waging anticolonial liberation wars, military coups, rebellions “under the green banner of Islam” (Mirskiy 2011), or developing Islamist movements of different versions (see Chap. 3). Gil Yaron (2011: 38), a journalist, expressed this with the following words: “Finally, history is being made in the Middle East.” The article went on to say: “Thomas Friedman, one of the most influential American political commentators, maintained not long ago that the Arab Middle East had not been a place where History was made for more than a century. Up to the early 21st century the Arab countries were dominated by feudal structures that suppressed all ideological novelties.³ However, since the start of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt this defect has been mended. In early 2011 there was no lack of facts indicating that History was being made in the Middle East” (Yaron 2011: 38). Thus, it is hardly surprising that the number of studies of the Arab Spring is very large, and this number continues to grow (e.g., Anderson 2011; Eltantawy and Wiest 2011; Gause 2011; Johnstone and Mazo 2011; Khondker 2011; Lotan et al. 2011; Bellin 2012; Brynen et al. 2012; Campante and Chor 2012; Dabashi 2012; Malik and Awadallah 2013; Wolfsfeld et al. 2013; Hermida et al. 2014; AlSaiyad and Guvenc 2015; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016; Davis 2016; Hänska 2016; Hehir 2016; Rougier 2016; Abdelzaher et al. 2017; Acemoglu et al. 2017; Haas and Lesch 2017; Steinert-Threlkeld 2017).

4.2 Revolutions: Causes, Regularities, Conditions, and Driving Forces

An analysis of theories of revolution (and sociopolitical destabilization in general) goes outside the scope of this chapter (for this analysis, see, e.g., Sztompka 1993:

¹“The echo of the North African revolutions has even reached the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan... Though those two regions differ significantly from each other, they have much in common: dependence on carbohydrates, mass poverty, long rule of political leaders, and the absence of democratic transitions of power” (Nabitovski 2011). Note that in the quote above the poverty of the two regions in questions is grossly exaggerated—by the Third World standards the living standards in both regions is fairly high (especially, in comparison with Tropical Africa or South Asia) (see below, or, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b). Actually, the mass media of the Arab Spring period were full with such exaggerations.

²See, e.g., Austin Holmes (2012), Goldstone (2011), Beck (2011), Lang and De Sterck (2014), Korotayev et al. 2013, Korotayev et al. (2014a), Grinin and Korotayev (2011, 2012a, b), Howard and Hussain (2013), Brynen et al. (2012), Weyland (2012), Wilson (2013), Beissinger et al. (2015), Sumiala and Korpiola (2017) etc.

³Of course, this is an exaggeration, especially in relation to countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, etc. This shows the level of understanding of Islamic countries, as well as Islamist movements on the part of the media.

302–305; Grinin et al. 2010a; Korotayev et al. 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2014, 2015c, 2018; Goldstone 2001, 2014a; Tsirel 2012a; Korotayev 2014; Lawson 2016; Korotayev and Zinkina 2015; Grinin et al. 2017; Korotayev and Vaskin 2017; Grinin 2017a, b). At this point, we shall mention just two typical definitions of revolution:

any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional and/or violent fashion (Goodwin 2001: 9);

an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine authorities. (Goldstone 2001: 139)

As one could see, some of the Arab Spring events (especially in Egypt and Tunisia) fit such definitions rather well. The recent Arab revolutions, revolts, and rebellions (as well as any other similar major unexpectedly starting events) are produced by complex and unique combinations of numerous (objective and subjective, exogenous and endogenous, social and personal) factors. Note that disputes on causes of such events may continue for centuries (see, e.g., Grinin et al. 2010c, 2016). However, it is useful to try to systematize such factors. We begin by analyzing the division of factors into internal and external (and, especially, global). It also appears important to consider that the same factors could act as both endogenous and exogenous forces and that global causes may lead to very different outcomes in different social systems.

Below, we shall try to single out a few conditions that were observed as regards the Arab (and many other) revolutions (see also Chap. 5):

1. We start by examining some structural societal features that generate serious economic and social problems. For example, in Russia, before the Revolution, a fast demographic growth in conjunction with the strong village community generated an acute deficit of arable land. With respect to the Arab countries, a salient role appears to have been played by certain demographic structural factors, like the one of the “youth bulge” that will be discussed in more detail below (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2012a, b; see also Grinin et al. 2010b; Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, d, e, f; Korotayev et al. 2011a, b, 2014b; Grinin 2011; Korotayev 2014).

Many researchers regard the rapid growth of the youth share in the population to be a major factor of political instability. For example, Jack Goldstone argues that

the rapid growth of youth can undermine existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large youth cohorts are often drawn to new ideas and heterodox religions, challenging older forms of authority. In addition, because most young people have fewer responsibilities for families and careers, they are relatively easily mobilized for social or political conflicts. Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the existence of a “youth bulge” (an unusually high proportion of youths 15 to 24 relative to the total adult population) has historically been associated with times of political crisis. Most major revolutions ... [including] most twentieth-century revolutions in developing countries—have occurred where exceptionally large youth bulges were present. (Goldstone 2002: 10–11; see also Goldstone 1991; Moller 1968; Mesquida and Weiner 1999; Heinsohn 2003; Fuller 2004; For more discussion of demographic structural factors see our earlier publications: Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, d; Korotayev et al. 2011b, etc.)

The role of this factor may be played by economic and distribution disproportions, by certain structural political factors which we shall discuss in more detail below—e.g., “hybrid” political regimes that are neither consistently democratic, nor consistently authoritarian; or non-monarchic political systems where one person remains in power for a critically long period, and so on. A certain role may be played by disproportions in the education systems (e.g., in Egypt, this led to a particularly high proportion of unemployed with university degrees [see below]).

There is another such aspect connected with societal modernization. The point is that modernizing societies systematically “overgrow” old forms, and its members seek to acquire new forms even if respective social systems are not ready for them (whereas this readiness [or unpreparedness] often only becomes clear in retrospect). As a result, modernizing systems frequently find themselves in a sort of “modernization trap” (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2012a). On the connection between modernization [(even when it proceeds successfully) and revolution, see Chap. 5; see also Grinin 2011, 2012b, 2013a, b, 2014, 2017a, b; Korotayev 2014; Korotayev et al. 2011a, 2014b].

2. Regime rigidity. Revolutions do not happen within consolidated democratic political systems. Revolutions are directed against rigid regimes that try to control everything (and, thus, appear to be responsible for everything). Consequently, everything wrong (actually or imaginarily) starts being ascribed to those regimes and their leaders. Any regime has certain defects resulting from the features of its peculiar institutions and personalities. In particular, the authoritarian regimes in the Arab World had certain defects that are typical for almost all authoritarian regimes of the world: corruption, abuse of power by security forces, absence of truly independent courts of law, falsified elections, and so on. It appears almost impossible to eliminate such defects within such systems (especially, as they are based on the regime of personal power of a certain political leader) even when the government understands the presence of those defects (see also Sect. 5.3 below).

3. Decline of governmental authority and political structure peculiarities. In the course of time, one frequently observes among people accumulation of resentment caused by corruption, preponderance of members of certain clans and cliques, breaches of justice, nepotism, impossibility to realize one’s life plans, etc. This resentment is never without some substantial grounds. For example, with respect to Egypt, in addition to the aforesaid problems, one may mention that the decades of the state of emergency created the situation of uncontrolled activities of security forces, which led to massive usage of tortures against those opposed to the regime; one may also mention a particularly high level of falsifications that was recorded for the parliamentary elections that took place in Egypt just two months before the revolution. When social peace and order are based on a particular personality (which is typical for authoritarian regimes and dictatorships), the decline of governmental authority below a certain level may make a regime unstable. Thus, under certain circumstances, social protests could easily topple a regime (especially, against the backdrop of intra-elite conflict). Note that in absence of sufficient internal ties this may lead to a disintegration of the state.

The preconditions of revolutions are almost always connected with the growth of dissatisfaction with authorities, on the one hand, and with the weakness (confusion, indecision) of the authorities, on the other. This is one of the most important features of the revolutionary situation (for an analysis of such situations, see, e.g., Goldstone 2014b; Grinin 2017a). And what is important is that the longer the rule of an authoritarian leader, the more likely the loss of authority. As is noted by Sorokin (1992: 278), when the halo of authority evaporates, the population develops significant doubts if the preservation of regime makes sense. Note that the Arab Spring has provided additional evidence in support of the finding reported in the *State Failure Task Force Report* (Goldstone et al. 2000: vii–viii, 18–25) that the non-monarchic regimes with political leaders staying in power for very long periods (more than 14 years) are more unstable. Indeed, all the heads of the Arab states that lost their power as a result of the Arab Spring events (in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen) had stayed in power longer than the period indicated by Goldstone and his colleagues.⁴ In general, one can hardly ignore the fact that the restriction of the rule of the head of state by two terms that is found in most present-day democracies looks like a rather successful evolutionary finding that appears to be rather congruent with the human political psychology (after two terms more and more people tend to “feel tired” even with a very effective political leader, and after 14 years, this may reach a critical level).

Note also that the analysis of correlates of political instability performed by the State Failure Task Force Report project through a multiple regression indicates that the highest risks of political destabilization are observed with respect to hybrid regimes (that is, such political regimes that combine certain features of autocracies and democracies), whereas both consistently authoritarian and consistently democratic regimes are characterized by a much higher degree of stability (Goldstone et al. 2000: vii–viii, 18–25; see also Gurr 1974; Gates et al. 2000; Goldstone 2014b; Goldstone et al. 2010; Korotayev et al. 2013, 2015b, 2016b; Grinin et al. 2016a; Malkov et al. 2013; Slinko et al. 2017; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Marshall and Cole 2008, 2012; Ulfelder and Lustik 2007; Vreeland 2008). We will further touch upon this important point in our next chapter.

This regularity has become especially salient in the present-day rapidly globalizing world. The point is that with respect to the present-day non-monarchic modernized societies, democracy is the only accepted (practically without any realistic alternatives) mode of political power legitimization (see, e.g., Furman 2010: 21; Tsirel 2012b). This is important from the point of view of both internal and external legitimization (whereas the latter might be more important for a regime when it is stable, however, in the case of a sociopolitical explosion, the former, naturally, becomes much more important). The Arab Spring events have demonstrated again that the traditional monarchic mode of legitimization still remains rather effective, but in the present-day world, it can hardly be returned to those countries where it

⁴For example, Ali Abdullah Saleh was in power in Yemen for 34 years; Hosni Mubarak in Egypt was for 30 years, Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya was for 42 years, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia was for 24 years, whereas Bashar al-Assad by the present moment has been occupying the position of the President of Syria for more than 17 years....

had been abolished some time ago (however, generally speaking, the constitutional monarchy looks like the most effective and bloodless version of an intermediate phase of democratic transformation). In any case in the present-day world, even the most authoritarian (but non-monarchic) regimes have to use for their legitimization some formally democratic procedures (note, by the way, that even the most consistently authoritarian regime of the present day still position itself as “the Korean Democratic People’s Republic”).⁵

Thus, from time to time for their legitimization, most non-monarchic authoritarian regimes have to conduct elections, which by definition are performed with certain violations of democratic procedures⁶ (including direct falsifications of election results). The hybrid political regimes tend to have certain civil society institutions (e.g., in Egypt, these were a few legal or semi-legal parties and movements, some more or less independent media, a considerable number of NGOs—including even ones concerned with, say, human rights, numerous Internet networks, and so on [e.g., Montada 2016]). The presence of such civil society institutions tends to hamper falsifications of election results, as it helps both to detect facts of such falsifications and to diffuse the information on them through independent media (of course, in the present-day world, this is first of all the Internet) among a very large numbers of socially active persons. As a result, within such a context, any new elections tend to be accompanied by more and more serious protests. In addition, Internet/Twitter networks make it possible to organize specific mass actions of protest (see, e.g., Schroeder et al. 2012; Khamis and Vaughn 2014; Steinert-Threlkeld 2017). Yet, in the countries in question, only a minority of the population can join such networks (and a very large part of this minority is constituted by rather well-to-do representatives of the middle class). As the experience of recent years clearly indicates, these are just those people who tend to react in the most negative way with respect to the facts of salient falsifications of election results; these are just the people who are ready to act as a vanguard of protest movements. Such protest movement may get an especially wide sweep in those modernizing countries that have an especially high proportion of youths in their population (the so-called “youth bulge”). As we shall see below, these were the demographic structural characteristics of the Arab countries.

4. Ideological preconditions. Essentially, most revolutions are produced by a combination of protest moods, discontent, hatred, the desire to shift the burden of responsibility for difficulties and hardships on the government (with which you are completely fed up), on the one hand, and by strong aspiration for new ideas, ideals, relations, etc.—on the other. Revolutions are hardly possible in those social systems where nobody seeks to change them. They are hardly possible in those systems that

⁵Incidentally, in most modern revolutions (with the exception, perhaps, of some revolutions led by communist, ultra-right, or radical Islamist leaders), the demand for freedom and democracy occupies an important, if not the most important, place. And even during the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978–1979 at least part of the revolutionary forces opposed the authoritarian monarchy and fought for freedom and democracy.

⁶This is just by definition, as otherwise such regimes would be classified as democratic.

lack appropriate ideologies, idealized models of better life (in such systems one would rather expect riots, mutinies, and so on).

Thus, the genesis of revolution needs serious complaints against the government, inflated expectations, and ideas that it would be possible to make life better, more just, more honest if this were not hampered by the bad (corrupted, criminal, antinational, etc.) government. It is evident, that the post-revolution reality tends to correspond very little to pre-revolution expectations; however, this only becomes clear after the victory of the revolution. Inflated expectations (generated in part by the orientation toward more developed countries) create ideological grounds for protests and anti-governmental actions.

On External and Internal Factors Contributing to the Revolution Often, the question arises about the influence of foreign forces on the revolutions in the Middle East. In some respects, these influences can be traced very clearly (see Chap. 5; see also, e.g., Grinin et al. 2016). But it is important to understand that revolutions are never determined solely by external influence; they are always the result of an internal crisis (the reasons and conditions for such a crisis in relation to a number of Middle Eastern countries, see, e.g., Goldstone 2011, 2014a; Grinin and Korotayev 2012b, 2014c, 2016a; Grinin et al. 2016; Korotayev et al. 2013, 2014). The role of external factors, however, is significantly different from country to country, depending on its level of development and features. If revolutions in such states as Egypt and Tunisia were determined by internal social tension, then in a number of other Arab countries, the upheavals were caused by the fact that internal ethno-confessional contradictions were set in motion. They never really disappeared and gained momentum due to a whole set of factors that included, in addition to the actual social discontent, the example of other countries, the inspiration of protests and active help from outside. This we see in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, where the factor of external intervention unleashed a knot of ethnoconfessional hostilities. The latter were only restrained by sufficiently strong authoritarian regimes. And it was only necessary to overthrow or weaken those regimes, in order for chaos to begin in the countries.

We consider it necessary to re-emphasize what we noted before: For countries lacking a strong statehood and where the majority of residents are at a low level of human development, the idea of revolution is extremely dangerous and can lead to serious destabilization. One of the main opportunities for the revolution is the absence of clear mechanisms for the transfer of power within authoritarian regimes. Proceeding from the essence of any authoritarian regime, the transfer of power must follow the classical or Byzantine monarchical principle (to the son or relative or to the appointed successor). However, in modern conditions such attempts obviously contradict the declared principles of democracy. Thus, democratic ideas come into collision with the need for stability; as a result, the process by which power is transferred in authoritarian regimes becomes their vulnerable point.

The countries in which the consequences of the Arab Spring have turned out to be the most damaging are predominantly non-monarchies with poorly developed traditions of statehood. This is aggravated by the fact that modern borders have not yet had time to gain a foothold. It is not surprising that in these countries the ruling

regimes tried to compensate for the weakness of statehood by quasi-monarchist attempts (Syria, Yemen, and Libya). That is, attempts to transfer power in one way or another by inheritance. This took place even in Egypt (in an attempt to transfer power from Hosni Mubarak to his son Gamal).

Elite Conflicts and Wide Oppositional Alliances Analysis of the distribution of social forces in the Arab revolutions requires special investigation, since in each country it was quite specific. Nevertheless, to some extent, elite conflicts and wide opposition alliances mentioned in the title of this paragraph were observed in all the countries with victorious Arab revolutions. Below, we show this with respect to Egypt. This will also additionally explain the reasons for such a quick victory of the Egyptian revolution in February 2011.

First of all, this was a very strong elite conflict (that is so important for the success of revolutions in general [e.g., Goldstone 2001] and that was especially important for the success of the Arab revolutions in 2011 [see, e.g., Nepstad 2011; Malkov et al. 2013; Issaev et al. 2013; Korotayev et al. 2013, 2014a, 2014b]). This was mostly the conflict between the military ('the old guard') and the economic elite ('the young guard')—a group of the leading Egyptian businessmen headed by Gamal Mubarak. The military group controlled (and controls) not only the Egyptian Armed Forces, but also a major part of the Egyptian economy. And these are not only military factories, but also large pieces of land, various real estate, fuel stations, construction and transportation enterprises, as well as numerous factories that produce not only military production, but also things like TV sets, refrigerators, spaghetti, olive oil, and shoe cream.⁷ Estimates of the share of the Egyptian economy controlled by the military range between 10 and 40%⁸ (Roy 1992; Nepstad 2011: 489; Tadros 2012; Marshall and Stacher 2012). This group of the Egyptian elite was frightened by the ascent of the "young guard" of the leading Egyptian businessmen (under the leadership of Gamal Mubarak) who controlled the economy block of the Egyptian government. Since 2004, this government had been implementing rather effective economic reforms that led to a significant acceleration of economic growth rates in Egypt (e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c).

Over the past decades, the Egyptian military has not limited its focus to security matters; it has also acquired valuable real estate and numerous industries. By one estimate, the military commands up to 40% of the Egyptian economy. Before the events of 2011, Egyptian officers expressed concern about President Mubarak's plan to appoint his son Gamal as his successor. If Gamal took office, many believed that he would implement privatization policies that would dismantle the military's business holdings. (Nepstad 2011: 489; see also Roy 1992; Tadros 2012; Marshall and Stacher 2012)

Indeed, there were sufficient grounds to expect that in case of Gamal Mubarak's coming to power the leading Egyptian businessmen from his circle would have established effective control over the generals' economic empire—and it would be

⁷Note that military factories (virtually possessed by Egyptian generals) have a clear competitive advantage, as they can exploit virtually free labor of the conscripts (see, e.g., Tadros 2012).

⁸However, the latter estimate appears to be clearly exaggerated.

rather easy to justify this pointing to a (quite real) ineffectiveness of exploitation of the respective economic assets and the necessity to optimize it.

The conflicts between Egypt's elite allow us to understand some events of the Egyptian Revolution that may look mysterious at first glance. For example, throughout the revolution, the army guarded quite rigorously all the official buildings, effectively blocking all the attempts by the protesters to seize them. However, already on the first days of the Revolution (on January 28–29, 2011) the army let protesters seize, demolish, and burn down the headquarters of the National Democratic Party (the ruling party led by Mubarak). However, at a closer inspection, one will not find here anything strange—as the real head of this party was just Gamal Mubarak; thus, the military elite delivered a very strong blow upon its archenemy with the hands of the protesters (see, e.g., Issaev and Shishkina 2012).

Within the context of the still rather fashionable interpretation of the Egyptian events of January and February 2011 as a sort of “confrontation between revolutionary people masses and the repressive authoritarian regime,” one could hardly understand the apparently enigmatic (but extremely famous) “Battle of the Camel,” when there was an attempt to disperse the Tahrir protesters on the part of a motley crew of cameleers—workers of tourist services operating in the Pyramids area and engaged in renting horses and camels to tourists; the cameleers attacked the protesters while riding camels and horses (which, incidentally, rendered a specific exotic color to events of February 2—and to the Egyptian 2011 Revolution, in general). However, if this was indeed “the confrontation of popular masses and the repressive authoritarian regime,” why was it necessary for the “authoritarian regime” to employ such strange amateurish figures, and not to use such a simple thing as the professional repressive apparatus? The point is just that, already on the 2nd of February, Tahrir protesters confronted not the professional repressive apparatus controlled by the “old guard” (that took the position of friendly neutrality toward the protesters), but the economic elite clique that in order to counteract the protesters (who demanded the removal of the businessmen's leader) had to employ semi-criminal elements rather than the professional repressive apparatus (see Essam El-Din 2011; Issaev and Shishkina 2012: 70–73; Issaev and Korotayev 2014 for more detail). Thus, already in early February 2011, the protesters in Tahrir were countered not by the repressive apparatus of the authoritarian state, but by a clique of the businessmen who were very rich indeed, but who did not control the repressive apparatus—which accounts for a very easy “victory of the revolutionary masses” up to a very considerable extent.

The second point that secured an unexpectedly fast success of the protesters was the formation of an unexpectedly wide opposition alliance, which united in a single rather coordinated front very diverse forces including not only all the possible secular opposition groups (liberals, leftists, nationalists and so on), but also Islamists in general, and the Muslim Brothers in particular (e.g., Bakr 2016).

4.3 Additional Notes About Causes of the Arab revolutions

Famine, Inflated Expectations, Corruption, or Yearning for Freedom? Some analysts suggest as a major cause of the Arab revolutions extreme deprivation and mass poverty caused by economic stagnation, catastrophic unemployment and food price growth (Al-Arabiya 25.01.2011, al-Lawati 14.02.2011, Stangler and Litan 12.02.2011, AFP 25.01.2011). The self-immolation acts seem to confirm this. Nevertheless, it appears wrong to interpret events that took place in Egypt, Tunisia, or Bahrain (and, in the Arab countries in general, with some exception of Yemen where the average per capita food consumption did not reach the level recommended by the World Health Organization⁹) as “revolutions of the hungry.” If we take Egypt as an example, we will see that the percentage of Egyptians who lived at less than one dollar per capita per day (the UN defined level of abject poverty) was at the eve of the revolution extremely low, even compared with the one found in the most developed countries, like the USA or UK (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c).

The point that the Arab Spring was in no way a “revolution of the hungry” is supported by data on the dynamics of per capita food consumption in the Middle Eastern countries since 1961 (see Fig. 4.1). As we see, still in the early 1960s, the level of per capita food consumption in all the countries represented in the diagram was below the level recommended by the World Health Organization (2300 kcal per capita per day), whereas in such countries as Iran, Yemen, or Algeria, it was critically low. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, almost all the countries represented in the diagram achieved impressive results, and already in the early 1980s, the level of food consumption in some of them (e.g., in Egypt and Syria) exceeded 3000 kcal per capita per day (that is actually the level of clear overeating¹⁰).

This is convincingly confirmed by a map below (Fig. 4.2) compiled by the World Food Program.

⁹However, even with respect to Yemen one could not observe any substantial trend toward the decline of the level of life of its population in the pre-Arab-Spring period; hence, even with respect to Yemen such an explanation does not look convincing at all.

¹⁰To understand how false is the fashionable interpretation of the Arab Spring as “a revolution of the hungry”, it appears appropriate to mention the percentage of obesity among the Egyptians by the start of the Arab Spring was one of the highest in the world (e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b; Martorell et al. 2000). According to Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey (conducted in 2008), 40% of Egyptian women and 18% of men were overweight because of overeating (Egypt Ministry of Health et al. 2009). According to a bit more recent data, these figures equal 22% for males and 48% for females just by the beginning of the protests under a hypocritical slogan “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice!” (Badran and Laher 2011: 3). The Egyptian liberals have to recognize now that there was much more freedom and social justice before the revolution (Grinin et al. 2016: 237–258). And in January 2011 it was difficult to find in the world a population better provided with the bread than the population of Egypt (Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b). If anything, the Egyptian 2011 revolution was “a revolution of the fat”. As we have shown earlier, by 2011 a substantial proportion of Egyptians continued getting food subsidies from the government while suffering serious obesity problems (Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b; see also Korotayev and Zinkina 2015: 413).




Fig. 4.1 Food consumption dynamics, kcal per capita per day, 1961–2007 (FAO 2017b)




Fig. 4.2 “HungerMap” 2011 (World Food Programme (<http://www.wfp.org/content/hunger-map-2011>))

It is very remarkable that all the Arab Spring countries (with a single exception of Yemen) belong to the first category (together with the most developed countries of the world) indicating that the problems of hunger were totally irrelevant for them at the eve of the Arab Spring.




Fig. 4.3 Dynamics of life expectancies at birth (years) in some Arab countries, 1960–2009 (dynamics of life expectancy in Russia is presented for a comparison) (World Bank 2017; Surinov 2010: 101)

And, in general, the level of “pauperization” was not high at all. In addition, in the most important Arab country, in Egypt, the poor were very strongly supported by a very developed and sophisticated system of food subsidies (Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b).

Actually, in recent decades, one could observe in the Arab countries rather steady trends toward the increase in the living standards of the majority of the population which resulted, e.g., in a spectacular growth of life expectancies (see Fig. 4.3):

On the other hand, according to official data, total number of the unemployed on the eve of the Egyptian Revolution was about 2.5 million (Abd al-Rahman 2010: 4), whereas almost half of them were young people aged between 20 and 24 (and almost half of them had university degrees) (CAPMAS 2010; Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, d; Grinin and Korotayev 2012a: 2/5). Many analysts (see, e.g., Ignatenko 2011; Muhammed 2011; Bubnova and Salem 2011; Khalaf 2011; see also Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, d; Korotayev, Zinkina et al. 2011; Grinin and Korotayev 2012a: 2/5) indicate that the young people were the main impact force of the Arab revolutions. This is not surprising, as in the recent decades, the young population of those countries grew in a truly explosive way and this was produced just by the successful modernization of the Arab countries that resulted in the precipitous declines of the death rates in general, and the infant and children mortality rates in particular (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, d; Korotayev et al. 2011b).

Many analysts indicate a high level of corruption as a major cause of the Arab Spring. Let us consider this indicator in more detail (see Fig. 4.4):




Fig. 4.4 Corruption Perceptions Index values in the countries of the world, 2010 (the lower, the worse) (Transparency International 2010: 2–3. In this map the lighter the color, the lower its perceived corruption level (accordingly, the darker the higher)

According to *Transparency International*, the overall level of corruption in the Middle East is very similar to the one found in countries of the Third World (and the former Soviet Union) in general (in almost all of those countries, one finds a level of corruption that either high or very high). It is quite clear that countries with low levels of corruption are much less liable for major sociopolitical upheavals with large death toll (Grinberg et al. 2017). For example, there were no such upheavals in those countries in the recent decade. However, in the recent decade, very many countries with high levels of corruption (China, Turkmenistan, Vietnam, Italy, Indonesia, Mexico, and so on) were also characterized by a very high level of political stability. This already indicates that we should look for some other factors in order to explain the wave of sociopolitical destabilization that covered the Middle East in 2011. Note also that the Middle Eastern countries differ between themselves as regards their corruption levels in a rather substantial way (see Fig. 4.5):

For example, such Arab countries as Qatar, Oman, or Bahrain are not classified as highly corrupt by Transparency International, whereas in most countries of this region a rather high level of corruption is observed. However, a relatively low level of corruption has not “saved” Oman, Jordan, and especially Bahrain, from serious sociopolitical upheavals. Generally speaking, serious political upheavals were observed in highly corrupted Libya and Yemen, in Tunisia and Egypt with their medium level of corruption, but also in such countries with a relatively low level of corruption as Bahrain and Oman. This suggests that a high level of corruption can hardly be regarded as the main cause of the Arab revolutions (though, of course, a high level of corruption that is typical for most Arab countries has made a certain contribution to the genesis of the Arab Spring).




Fig. 4.5 Corruption index for some Arab and non-Arab countries of the world, 2010. *Note* The corruption index is based on Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2010: 8–14.) and is obtained by extracting the basic index out of 10

This makes it possible to agree with those analysts who believe that the dominant role in the Arab Spring was played by political demands: freedom, democracy, accountability of the authorities (Khalaf 2011). This is not contradicted by the fact that the impact force of the Arab revolutions was constituted by the highly educated young unemployed. Those people felt insulted by the government and saw causes of their unsatisfactory situation in the absence of democracy and freedom, in defects of authorities and regimes (those very regimes that achieved an immense expansion of the Arab university education [this is especially visible with respect to Egypt—Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b]). That is why in addition to the demand that is typical for all the revolutions—“Go away!” (*Irhal!*), they also demanded such things as free elections, the abolition of the emergency rule, freedom, and democracy.

On the other hand, it appears possible to speak about a certain excessiveness of some demands directed toward the government that had done a lot for the development of education, for the economic growth and the growth of the level of life; this excessiveness seems to have been created just by inflated expectations, by demonstration effects produced by the level of life in much more developed countries, as well as by a relatively long period of the actual growth of the real level of life (which can be traced, e.g., through the life expectancy dynamics [for the relative deprivation theory of Gurr and Davies, see the next chapter]).

4.4 Revolution and Modernization

The Impact of Modernization on the Level of Life and Expectations of the Population and Its Specific Groups Various studies suggest a link between revolutions and the degree of modernization of a society [see, e.g. Lipset 1959; Cutright 1963; Moore 1966; Huntington 1968; Dahl 1971; Brunk et al. 1987; Rueschemeyer

et al. 1992; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Londregan and Poole 1996; Epstein et al. 2006; Boix 2011; Goldstone 2014a; Grinin 2012b, 2013a, b, 2014, 2017a, b; Grinin and Korotayev 2014a, b, 2015; Bilyuga et al. 2016; Hobsbawm 1999; Starodubrovskaya and Mau 2004].

Our research reveals that the very processes of modernization, regardless of the level of consumption and the rate of population growth, is closely and organically linked to the risks of social and political upheavals, which can easily escalate into devastating revolutions and civil wars.¹¹

The revolutionary sentiments are especially fueled by spreading of radical ideas and ideologies in a society, as well as by a rapid urbanization, growing youth share in the demographic composition and rapidly increasing education level of a part of population in combination with illiteracy and poor education of the other part (see, e.g., Grinin 2011; 2013b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012b; Grinin et al. 2016; Korotayev et al. 2010, 2011b, 2012, 2014b; Korotayev 2014). All these factors were obviously present in the Arab countries on the eve of the Arab Spring (see also Chap. 5).

Pitirim Sorokin who studied history and typology of multiple revolutions in the ancient world (note that in Greek *poleis* and Roman *civitas*, intense sociopolitical struggle between citizens for power and rights was much more frequent than peaceful periods¹²) pointed that famine and/or a war often trigger a revolution (Sorokin 1992, 1994). Lenin also considered the “aggravation of the masses’ distresses below usual levels” as one of the main characteristics of the revolutionary situation (Lenin 1958 [1917]). However, more recent research demonstrate something different: Revolutions are often preceded by a rather long period of growth of living standards (see, e.g., Davies 1969; Goldstone 2011; Korotayev 2014; Korotayev et al. 2011, 2012; on the Egyptian revolution see Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c; Grinin et al. 2016; Grinin and Korotayev 2016b; Grinin 2012a, 2013b, 2017a, b; Korotayev 2014). But such a growth often combines with exactly the same and sometimes with even larger increase of social inequality and stratification (see, e.g., Olson 1963; Huntington 1968; Grinin et al. 2017). This increases social tensions in society and brings to life the idea that the living standard achieved by a part of population should become the majority’s property. At the same time, the modernization of society brings the formation of a more or less large stratum of intellectuals (and students/recent graduates as its “striking force”) who strive for higher (adequate to their education level) living standards, but, naturally, the number of lucrative positions is always limited.

Thus, in the initial periods, modernization can worsen the living conditions of certain population layers (Olson 1963; Huntington 1968). A classic example here is the weavers in Britain. The development of mechanization decreased their earnings, and as a result, in the 1830s–1840s, many of them became poor and were

¹¹See, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev (2012, b), Grinin (2012a, 2013b, 2017a, b), Korotayev et al. (2011) etc.; Korotayev (2017).

¹²For example, in Athens since Solon’s times there operated a law that claimed that when the city was torn by civil strife everyone who refused to join one of the warring sides and place his arms at the disposal of either side would be deprived of civil rights (see Aristotle 8.5; Kautsky 1931: 334–335). The situation of civil strife was called *stasis* (for details about it see Finley 1984a, b; van der Vliet 2005; Berent 1998). About the peculiarities of ancient democracies, the overthrows of power and civil strifes in them see also Grinin (2004).

entirely ruined. In Britain and a number of other countries, at the early stages of industrialization, mechanization would reduce the male workers' earnings since they could be substituted by women and children who were paid considerably less. This led to social unrest. However, modernization generally leads to increasing society standard of living. Thus, Davies (1969), Huntington (1968), Gurr (1968) and other scholars showed that revolutions are frequently preceded by the increase in living standards. The achievement of modernization is the improved quality of life which, however, can increase or create new lines of inequality to which people are not accustomed, and this can provoke discontent. In particular, Pitirim Sorokin noted that one of the reasons why cities are more revolution-prone (in comparison with villages) is that in the city the workers constantly observe the huge inequality of condition and opportunities (Sorokin 1992: 287).

The Paradoxes of Modernization Thus, although it may seem strange at first glance, revolutions often take place just in the periods after a relative (and sometimes long-lasting) improvement of population living standards. It was Alexis de Tocqueville who first revealed this fact while studying the "old," that is the pre-revolutionary (prior to 1789), order in France (de Tocqueville 1997). Therefore, the cases of crisis-free development in the context of modernization and an exit from the Malthusian trap should be considered exceptions that need special explanations. Moreover, true revolutions often occur in economically successful or even very successful modernizing societies. Meanwhile, this very success leads other economically less efficient and less modernized societies to unrealistic expectations which later become the ideological basis for social upheaval. By the 2010s, the situation in such countries as Egypt and Tunisia developed following this model.

Another paradox of modernization is that although underdevelopment and poverty lead to social unrest, inequality can increase just due to the attempts to eliminate poverty and backwardness. Thus, in the early twentieth-century Russia the efforts of Stolypin's government to tackle agricultural backwardness and peasants' poverty by elimination of the commune system and vesting peasants with rights in land in the individual household contributed to the growth of inequality and tensions in villages and in the society in general. In addition, the development of education in Russia (as well as in some other countries) increased the number of people whom it was easier to agitate against the government.¹³ The series of labor law Acts mitigated the problems for a while but did not calm down the workers. Meanwhile, the creation of parliament (or of a representative assembly), even possessing the restricted rights, only increased the liberals' desire to demand new concessions (see Grinin 2017b for details). This shows the difficulties of escaping the modernization trap. Besides, sometimes the delayed reforms may only worsen the government's position. Actually, the regime should employ the Bonapartist policy of balancing between different social layers and groups and using the concessions and repressions in an optimal way in order

¹³As we already mentioned, the growth of education stimulated the expansion of social basis of Islamism by increasing the number of people capable of independent reading of spiritual literature and trying to make sense of the issues important for them. The same occurred during the sixteenth-century Reformation in Europe.

to advance the country. Few regimes, especially the monarchic ones, are capable of adopting such an optimal strategy and seldom, if ever, do the ruling elite have the abilities and wisdom to employ them.

Summarizing the above, one may say that revolutions frequently occur just in the economically successful and very successful societies. However, this very success can provoke elevated expectations and a more severe criticism of the government which may become the ideological basis of social upheaval.

Growing destabilization is supported by the fact that modernizing societies are either authoritarian or insufficiently democratic and possess a rigid structure.¹⁴ That is why they are more prone to revolutionary breaks in contrast to the societies in which social discontent can be canalized in legal (i.e., democratic) forms.

For example, in 1848 in Europe and Britain, there was observed a rise of social activities. In Britain, the peaceful forms (Chartism) would prevail while Continental Europe would face revolutions. In our opinion, the most dangerous in terms of social upheaval are the situations of a partial (not-institutionalized) democracy when the zero-sum game starts between the authoritarian and radical forces and also the situation when influential radical forces, which are not democratic in their nature and views, use democratic freedoms and elections to take power. That was the case in Russia in 1917 and in Germany in 1933. And such situations continue to take place. This also happened in Egypt after the Islamists' victory at the elections.

The Increasing Living Standards, Modernization Traps, and Revolutions It is of utmost importance that there emerge excessive expectations when the growth of living standards fails to meet the expectations of the majority of population. Increasing inequality and violent breaches of common justice on the part of the men in power further “fuels” the discontent. Here, the most volatile situation occurs after a period of sustainable growth when there happens an interruption. In this case, the people's expectations (as well as those of the elite) continue to grow by inertia, while the level of real satisfaction decreases (the so-called Davies' J-Curve [Davies 1969; see also: Grinin and Korotayev 2012b]).

During periods of modernization, societies can develop at an accelerated rate (compared to previous periods) which leads to deformations emerging not only in social development but also in the level of expectations (Olson 1963). Moreover, expectations are usually higher than it is possible to achieve under the circumstances of available productivity and the system of social distribution. In the course of modernization, the boundaries between social layers start to change which is accompanied with changing social context and increasing people's awareness since they start more actively comparing the living standards and lifting the psychological level of minimal requirements. Money starts to play the role of a measure of social success, which also breaks with the former perceptions.

The elevated but still not satisfied expectations provoke feelings of discontent, and the strife to pass responsibility for one's difficulties onto the government and upper

¹⁴Meanwhile, the insufficiently democratic regimes are even more vulnerable to destabilization risks than the monarchic ones. Under certain circumstances the former experience a more considerable collapse in case of a successful revolution.

classes, the desire to change the social regime and make it more fair (in the opinion of certain strata and individuals) creates a favorable atmosphere for revolutionary agitation. The proponents of the deprivation theory originating with Davies (1962; 1969) and Gurr (1968; see also: Gurr 1970, 1974) think that a revolution (as well as a revolt and civil war) can be caused by the fact that the expectations generated by modernization turn unsatisfied, and this sometimes makes people take action in public to demand the improvement of living conditions. The social crisis becomes all the more possible when the achieved level of satisfying the needs somewhat decreases (which often happens as a result of price increase, economic crises, failed wars, or other negative events)¹⁵ while the expectations continue to grow (especially the ones encouraged by agitators). There emerges deprivation which is a state of a considerable human dissatisfaction with the situation after an individual is deprived of habitual living conditions considered indispensable; either he considers life unsatisfactory without them or a person cannot admit himself as an outsider, etc. The gap leads to frustration; the situation seems unbearable and humiliating, so people seek a guilty party. Consequently, the discontent is directed against the government and leads to civil unrest.

Thus, the rapid unregulated changes and increasing structural disproportions may bring a society to a specific—modernization—trap which often causes revolutions and other political upheavals. As a result, the gap between expectations and their satisfaction reaches a critical level and triggers a social explosion. With respect to Egypt, this refers both to Mubarak and to Morsi—it is just after the January 25 Revolution that the metropolitan citizens' expectations radically grew while their satisfaction drastically declined which brought the “difference of potentials” which in many ways led to the fall of the first democratically elected President of Egypt. But the same “difference of potentials” may also turn fatal for new Egyptian regimes.

4.5 Global Aspects and Factors of Synchronization of the Arab Spring Events

Egyptian Revolution as the Third Attempt The analysis of the factors of the Arab Spring social explosions has led us to the conclusion that an especially important role in their genesis was played by external (and, in particular, global) factors and causes, or—taking into consideration the point that some factors may be regarded as simultaneously exogenous and endogenous—by the global aspect of those causes (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2012b, 2016a; see also, e.g., Beck 2011 who arrives at similar conclusions).

¹⁵In particular case of the Arab Spring it was the coincidence of economic crisis and increase in food prices (see below). Let us add that the emerging problems are often reinforced by the accelerated demographic growth which usually occurs due to the above-mentioned “improvement of quality of life” (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2011, 2014b, 2015a).

It appears necessary to mention that such a combination of external and internal factors may lead protests to the level of a revolutionary storm; however, for its victory, special conditions are necessary. In particular, it appears important to mention that the 2011 Egyptian Revolution may be regarded as the third attempt. The first took place in 2005 when the *Kifayah!* (“Enough!”) movement organized a demonstration (precisely at famous Maydan al-Tahrir) against the re-election of Mubarak for a new presidential term. That time organizers managed to mobilize a few thousand. The second attempt took place in 2008. Some protesters demanded the resignation of Mubarak, but they did not find a sufficiently wide support (Ignatenko 2011; Montada 2016). Note that the central event of that wave of protests¹⁶ was the strike of spinning and weaving factory workers in the industrial city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra which started on the April, 6, 2008. The worker’s dissent was aimed first and foremost at the decrease of living standards caused by food price growth (produced, in its turn, by the wave of the global explosive food price growth/“agflation”). Egyptian bloggers supporting the strikers launched a Facebook group called “April 6 Youth Movement.” It is known that this movement played a crucial role in the Egyptian Revolution 2011. Still more important was social self-organization through Facebook which was first successfully tried in spring 2008 by this youth movement and proved its efficiency in 2011 events (see, e.g., Ghoneim 2012).

Global Influence Incidentally, Fig. 4.6 indicates that some global influence of a rather special sort seems to have taken place in this case. We can see that the emblem of the Egyptian “April 6” youth movement is astonishingly similar with the ones of some other youth movements which played an exceptionally important role in organizing the “color revolutions,” such as Serbian “Otpor!” and Georgian “Kmara!”, which led Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Interestingly, “Kmara!” is translated from Georgian as “Enough!”, the same as the name of the Egyptian “Kifayah!” movement is translated from Arabic (for a more detail on these movements see, e.g., Beissinger 2007).

It was only the third wave of 2011 that turned out to be successful—being supported by a new wave of the global explosive food price growth, the especially high level of falsifications attested in Egypt during the parliamentary elections of November–December 2010, new opportunities provided to the revolution organizers by the further development of the Internet technologies, the success of the revolution in Tunisia, and so on.

We shall start our analysis with those factors that can be regarded as simultaneously internal and global (or, to be more exact, as the transformation of global factors into internal problems). Ideological spectrum of a society and its spiritual mood are always regarded as its major internal characteristics (what is more, they are particularly important as regards revolution analysis). However, where did the slogans of the Arab revolutions (as well as modes and technologies of their dissemination) come from? It is quite clear that ideas of superiority of democratic political systems,

¹⁶By the way, it took place at the peak of the first wave of global food price explosion, so called “agflation” (see below for more detail on the agflation factor, see also Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b).



Fig. 4.6 Emblems of some youth movements: top left—Egyptian youth movement «April 6» (Source http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:April_6_Youth_Movement.jpg); top right—Serbian youth movement «Otpor!» (Source <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Otpor.png>.); bottom left—Georgian youth movement «Kmara!» (Source http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Kmara.png.); bottom right—Russian youth movement «Oborona» (Source http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Файл:Логотип_Обороны.jpg.)

ideas that governments are responsible for everything and must secure a decent level of life for the population, that any holder of a university degree must be guaranteed with a highly paid job, and so on are evidently a result of the influence of the most recent Western social culture (we are speaking precisely about the most recent West, as before the mid-twentieth century universal social guarantees did not look necessary even in the West). It also seems necessary to emphasize that the diffusion of the ideology of “color revolutions” that have been occurring quite successfully since the start of the twenty-first century (as well as their active stimulation from abroad [e.g., Beissinger 2007]) acts at the same time as an external factor (Beck 2011). In the case of the Arab revolutions, a certain contribution of some Western organizations is also evident. Certain support and funding to democratic opposition groups were provided even through official governmental channels (though, e.g., as regards such funding provided by the USA to democratic opposition groups in Egypt, its amount decreased very substantially in years preceding the Egyptian revolution [see, e.g., McInerney 2009: 22–27]). An important role was also played by some Western NGOs¹⁷ (note that there is no doubt that the activities of many of them were

¹⁷See, e.g., Aftandilian (2009).

not commissioned or directed at all by Western governments; many were propelled by a sincere quasi-religious urge to “diffuse democracy at any cost”).¹⁸

Global Factors and the Genesis of the Arab Spring Events Thus, globalization in general (including a fast diffusion of modern information-communication technologies as well as ideas of norms, relationships, and lifestyles that should be regarded as acceptable and desired) played an immense role in the genesis of the Arab Spring events (Grinin and Korotayev 2012b, 2016a; Beck 2011).

If we look further back in recent history, we will find one synchronization impulse in 1973—this was a sharp increase in the world oil prices (see Chap. 3 for the discussion of the influence of this factor on the Islamic Resurgence and the rise of Islamism). A rain of petrodollars pored over the Arab World. Naturally, their primary receivers were the oil exporting countries, but finally every Arab country received some piece of the “oil pie.” For example, both Yemens received some parts of this pie—through the channels of the Arab aid, but also through massive remittances sent back to their countries by Yemeni labor migrants from the Arab oil exporting countries. This significantly contributed to the acceleration of modernization in the Arab countries. One of the main components of modernization among the Arab countries was constituted by the development of modern healthcare systems. Petrodollars helped to construct networks of hospitals, maternity wards, clinics, etc. As a result, in the 1970s and 1980s, we observe a precipitous decline of death rate in general (see Fig. 4.7), and infant and child mortality in particular, which against the backdrop of still high birth rates¹⁹ led to the explosive growth of the young population (aged especially between 20 and 24) in the Arab Spring countries (Korotayev et al. 2011).

The 2008 world crisis should be regarded as mostly a global factor that was able to affect substantially the destiny of the world and that became a major destabilization factor in every country of the Arab Spring. It contributed significantly to the synchronization of political upheavals in different countries (including even such prosperous countries as Bahrain). A special role here was played by “agflation” (a steep rise of the agricultural commodity prices) whose peak was observed just in January and February 2011 (see Figs. 4.8 and 4.9):

The explosive global growth of food prices led to a corresponding growth of protest demonstrations in most countries of the world (see, e.g., Ortman et al. 2017).

¹⁸As regards purely conspirological explanations of the Arab Spring, the following observation of William J. Dobson appears to be very relevant. He calls conspiracy theories “the last refuge of dictators” and maintains: “It was true that these countries did have Western civil society organizations working there. But it has never been explained how a handful of employees from a few poorly funded nongovernmental organizations were capable of toppling a string of authoritarian regimes” (Dobson 2011). What is even more important that the mainstream governmental structures of the West (like the CIA) had no reason to topple Hosni Mubarak, a faithful ally of the USA, which implies that the respective NGO frequently acted against the interests of their governments and not under their orders. Hence, if this could be called a conspiracy then it is a conspiracy of a very specific sort.

¹⁹In complete accordance with the demographic transition theory the decline of the birth rates in the Arab World lagged significantly behind the decline of the death rates (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b).




Fig. 4.7 Dynamics of crude death rates (per 1000) in some Arab countries, 1973–1995 (World Bank 2017)




Fig. 4.8 World food price dynamics (FAO general monthly food price index, 2002–2004 = 100, inflation adjusted), January 2003–June 2011 (FAO 2017a, b)

Of course, the role of this factor should not be exaggerated either (finally, in most countries of the world, the growth of protest moods induced by the second agflation wave did not lead to revolutions); however, in sociopolitically misbalanced Arab countries, this factor appears to have played a major additional role in the




Fig. 4.9 World food price dynamics (FAO general monthly food price index, 2002–2004 = 100, inflation adjusted), July 2010–June 2011 (FAO 2017a)

genesis of sociopolitical explosions (see, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, d; Grinin 2012a; Khodunov and Korotayev 2012; Grinin et al. 2016); on the other hand, it acted as one of the most important impulses of the synchronization of the Arab Spring events. Note also that this wave pushed a mass of low-class Arabs (who found themselves below the poverty line as a result of the explosive food price growth) to join the vanguard force of the Arab revolutions—the highly educated unsettled youth. Naturally, this gave the protests the force that was necessary to topple regimes.

A very important role in the synchronization of those events was played by new information technologies (see, e.g., Vasiliev 2011; Akaev et al. 2017). Naturally, one should take into account the point that long before the Arab Spring one could observe in the Arab World the formation of a unified Internet space (see, e.g., Abdulla 2007) where, in 2011, inhabitants of those Arab countries that had not been reached yet by the Spring protest wave could communicate freely with the inhabitants of the countries already covered by the “Tsunami of Revolutions” (Vasiliev 2011) in Standard Arabic comprehensible for all the Internet-literate Arabs. Note that if even one of the authors of this chapter (living thousands of kilometers away from Cairo) got through Facebook an invitation to join protests in Cairo on the January, 25, 2011, then it should be clear that millions of Internet users (both inside and outside Cairo and Egypt) must have received such invitations. It should be also noted that during the Arab Spring one could observe the proliferation of not only the European know-how, but also of genuinely Middle Eastern ones (like the exploitation of the especially favorable opportunities to organize protest meetings and demonstrations on Fridays [see, e.g., Ignatenko 2011]).

A very special role in the synchronization of the Arab Spring events was played by pan-Arab satellite TV channels—first of all, *al-Jazeera* and *al-Arabiyyah* (see, e.g., Tausch 2011). One should take into consideration the point that in the Arab World the 2000s observed a sort of media revolution that expressed itself, *inter alia*,

in the emergence of extremely professional high-quality pan-Arab TV channels. Of course, al-Jazeera is the best known of them, but, say, al-Arabiyyah, the Saudi-Emirate analogue of al-Jazeera, is quite comparable to the latter as regards the level of professionalism. With respect to those TV channels, one can speak unequivocally about a world level TV journalism (and of special importance, of course, is the point that by the eve of the Arab Spring they had become immensely popular in the whole Arab World—including those countries where mass media were under a strict state control).

Those who in course of the Arab Spring observed broadcasts of those channels in a language comprehensible in the Arab World as a whole, those who saw the work of their talented TV journalists who broadcasted in real time to all the corners of the Arab World exceptionally vivid images of explosive popular protests, have no doubt that they played an immense role in the genesis of the sociopolitical tsunami of the Arab Spring. It is very remarkable that the Arab Spring wave produced a much stronger effect inside rather than outside the Arab World—even in those countries that were rather close to the countries of the Arab Spring as regards their demographic structural and political characteristics, but that did not receive continuous streams of vivid images of popular rebellion whose participants shouted out immensely attractive slogans in one's own language. We believe that a certain role was even played by the brilliant main slogan of the Arab Spring that was born during the first, Tunisian, revolution—*al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nizam*. In addition to its excellent inflammatory (but only for those who know Arabic) rhythmic structure, it also played its role through its meaning—“the people want to bring down the regime”—thus, it was directed not against some particular ruler or regime, it can be used in any Arab country without any modification, and in any Arab country, it produced very strong repercussions.

Of course, the “revolutionary tsunami” would not have gone throughout the Arab World if the Tunisian Revolution had not been so swift and relatively bloodless, thus, creating a feeling that any “oppressing” Arab regime can be toppled in a similarly swift and bloodless way.

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Chapter 5

Arab Spring, Revolutions, and the Democratic Values



5.1 Introduction—Perils on the Path to Democracy

In the previous chapter, we have considered some important causes of the Arab revolutions. In the present chapter, we are going to discuss some important events of these revolutions both at their initial stage and at subsequent phases. However, in the present chapter we will not follow the chronological order of events but focus on other aspects. In particular, we will define similarities and differences in the course of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and pay special attention to the turning points of the Arab revolutions, especially, the overthrow of July 3, 2013, in Egypt.

The present chapter makes an attempt to analyze different versions of the transition to democracy, to show the costs and political, economic, and social perils of the struggle to establish democracy quickly and by radical means (using the example of the recent events in Egypt). This chapter studies the issue of democratization of Egypt and some MENA countries within a globalization and historical context.

The present chapter makes an attempt to show in which measure and to what extent revolutions correlate with democracy. It points to the unreasonably high economic and social costs of a rapid transition to democracy as a result of revolutions or of similar large-scale events for countries that are unprepared for it. The authors believe that in a number of cases authoritarian regimes turn out to be more effective in economic and social terms when compared to emerging democracies, especially of the revolutionary type that are often incapable of insuring social order and may have a swing back to authoritarianism. Effective authoritarian regimes can also be a suitable form of transition to an efficient and stable democracy. This chapter investigates

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various correlations between revolutionary events and the possibilities of establishing democracy in a society on the basis of historical and contemporary examples as well as post-revolutionary events in Egypt. The authors demonstrate that one should take into account a country's degree of sociopolitical and cultural preparedness for democratic institutions. In the case of a state having a favorable background, revolutions can proceed smoothly ("velvet revolutions") with overwhelmingly positive outcomes. Alternatively, in those states without a favorable background, democracy is established only with much difficulty. Such states are characterized by throwbacks, returns to totalitarianism, and with attendant outbreaks of violence and military takeovers. Such countries tend to have high illiteracy rate, a disproportionately large rural population, with low status for women, and widespread religious fundamentalist ideology. These are countries where a substantial part of the population hardly ever hears of main principles of democracy (whereas liberal intellectuals idealize this form) and where the opposing parties are not willing to respect the rules of democratic game when defeated at elections.

The stability of sociopolitical systems and the risks of their destabilization in the process of political transformation are among the most important issues of social development. In this respect, the transition to democracy may pose a serious threat to the stability of respective sociopolitical systems. The dangerous attempts to establish democracy as well as the threats to young democracy in modernizing states may manifest themselves in different ways depending on the peculiarities of various societies' historical paths and their cultural and religious characteristics as well as depending on the general cultural-economic level of development, ethnic peculiarities, and external environment. In this context, it becomes clear in what way the political crisis in Ukraine [that lacked its own statehood until 1991 and whose society was under different cultural–geopolitical impacts—those of Russia and Europe (for details see Grinin 2014, 2015; Grinin et al. 2015)] considerably differs from the situation of implementation of democracy and related crises in the Muslim MENA countries where the struggle unfolds between secular regimes and Islamist movements (see Chap. 3). But even among the Muslim countries, the situation differs considerably depending on confessional peculiarities (e.g., Shia Muslim Iran differs from the Arab Sunni Muslim societies) and on the fact if statehood has been relatively stable for lengthy periods of time (as in Turkey, Egypt or Iran) as opposed to one just established (as in Libya). As we have already pointed out in Chap. 2, the weak tradition of statehood in a number of MENA countries considerably strengthens Islamism and increases the prospects of social unrest (about the correlation between the age of statehood and risks of state's destabilization, see Grinin et al. 2017).

Thus, one should take into account these and other factors when analyzing the situation in a particular country, specifically with regard to the causes of emerging revolution and destabilization. However, there are many similarities in the origin of crises in modernizing states (in previous Chap. 4 we discussed this in detail); meanwhile, the MENA countries are just at different stages of modernization. Let us point out that unfortunately a successful modernization involving the development of education and other spheres is no guarantee of determining specifically how much time it will take a particular society to transit to democracy. On the contrary, a rapid

transition to democracy (for countries unprepared for it) resulting from revolutions or similar large-scale events often demands high economic and social costs.

Sociopolitical destabilization may be produced by rather different causes. However, sociopolitical transformations may be considered among the most powerful of those causes. This may appear paradoxical, but attempts of transition to democratic forms of government may lead to a very substantial destabilization of the society in transition. The present chapter analyzes the relationships between revolution, democracy, and the level of stability in respective sociopolitical systems.

As we saw in Chap. 3, the situation with the transition to democracy, especially to the liberal version, is complicated in the countries where the majority of population supports Islamist ideas. In this case, the endeavor for an immediate transition to liberal Western-type democracy which recognizes various individual freedoms and minorities' rights faces considerable difficulties. Since democracy means majority rule, the Islamist parties may win elections which becomes unacceptable for secular parties and often for the state (military) bureaucracy. This may bring the return of authoritarianism. That is why the transition to Islamist democracy may appear a more promising path to democracy. However, this path is also fraught with dangers, since in certain periods the Islamists may make the society reject a number of previous achievements. Thus, for Muslim states the path to democracy may lie between Scylla of authoritarianism and Charybdis of reinforced Islamism. In other words, this is a rather complicated path, and to steam ahead would be politically unwise. It is not surprising then that in seven years none of the revolutions of the Arab Spring has solved any urgent issues. Unfortunately, this was probably never a possibility.

5.2 Where Will the Revolutions Go? Why Did Islamists Rise?

Some Reflections on Historical Trajectories History does not always follow the line of the smallest losses, i.e., the path of least resistance, for population and society, whereas the influence of global factors often turns out to be decisive as regards the choice of a developmental path. Certain countries are often “sacrificed in favor” of mainstream World System development. In particular, the general vector toward the weakening of national sovereignty contributed to the disintegration in the late twentieth century of a few multinational states, which might have not been the best possible developmental pathway (for our analysis of nationalism and general globalization trends, see Grinin 2009, 2012a; Grinin and Korotayev 2016a). In this respect, we believe that the existence of soft authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt might have been a better version of the transitional modernization form (from an economic, and possibly even a social standpoint) than their revolutionary overthrow with indefinite consequences. Equally, in 1917 the transition to a full-scale constitutional monarchy in Russia would have been a better outcome for Russia than the outright overthrow in course of the February Revolution (the same might be said, e.g., about the 1979 events in Iran).

One cannot exclude the threat of disintegration of a number of Arab countries. Of course, this possibility is especially salient in Libya (see, e.g., Anderson 2017; Bandeira 2017; Willcoxon 2017). On the other hand, the civil war in Syria led for some time to the situation that was rather close to the complete disintegration of the Syrian state and, thus, to the expansion of the conflict to some other parts of the Middle East (see, e.g., Wege 2015; Abboud 2016, 2017; Phillips 2016; Baczko et al. 2017).

It might make sense to outline some results and possible scenarios of development in some Arab Spring countries. Consider first the situation in those countries where revolutions won—in Tunisia and Egypt. Khalaf (2011) noted that the political transition period in Egypt and Tunisia proceeded in a chaotic way—the expectations for revolutionary success by far exceeded the resources in possession of Egyptian transitional governments. However, it is important to note that those chaotic features were not the most important characteristic of the post-revolution outcome in those countries. The period after a victorious revolution never proceeds in an organized way; this is always a rather muddled time. From the very beginning, it was clear that there was no guarantee that the transition to the civilian government would lead to the stable pacification of the country, especially taking into consideration the deterioration of the economic condition. In Tunisia after the election victory by moderate Islamists, one could observe the start of the protests of supporters of secularist parties—that is, according to a classical scenario we see confrontation in the camp of the “winners.”

Secular or Islamists Vector? Of course, already in 2011 the most burning question was whether in the Arab Spring countries political power could finally find itself in the hands of the radical Islamists. This possibility was noted by many analysts as early as in 2011 (see, e.g., Mirskiy 2011). And, of course, after the Arab Spring one could observe, say, in Egypt and Tunisia, a clear activation of Islamists, growing demands to introduce “Islamic” laws, etc. Note, however, that the leading positions here in 2011–2012 belonged to moderate rather than radical Islamists. In Tunisia in October 2011, the most successful party at the Constituent Assembly elections turned out to be a moderately Islamist Ennahda. Under the toppled former President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, this party was strictly banned. In Egypt in the post-revolution parliamentary elections held in November 2011–January 2012 45% of all the seats in the parliament were won by the moderately Islamist Freedom and Justice Party [a political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (see Chap. 3 above for the history of this organization)] and its allies. Twenty-five percent of seats were obtained by the ultra-conservative (“Salafite”) Islamist al-Nour Party and its allies [note, however, that this party demonstrated a very high level of pragmatism in 2013 (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2016b; Korotayev et al. 2016)]. Thus, by January 2012 the Islamist parties obtained a qualified two-thirds majority—though the growing disagreement between them (fueled by the Qatari-Saudi competition) did not allow them to form a solid parliamentary block. The rest of the seats were divided first of all between the oldest Egyptian secular political (liberal) party Wafd (9.2%) and the social liberal Egyptian Block (*al-Kutlah al-Misriyyah*) (8.9%). One

could not exclude the possibility of further intensification of the struggle between the forces of modernization and fundamentalism as many aspects of modernization became somehow frozen in 2011 (especially as regards family and gender aspects). Yet, there were grounds to expect that in the immediate future we would see a definite consolidation of the positions of Islamists—at the very least because their movements were much more organized than the secular ones (Khalaf 2011).

Such developments are rather usual during revolutionary periods. Regimes are toppled by the most ideologically advanced groups, whereas the post-revolution voting often goes in favor of conservative forces that are based on a rather conservatively oriented primary mass of people. Some parties of secular revolutionary liberals try to protest, crying about the “betrayed revolution,” or the “stolen revolution,” but they seem to be late. We will discuss this in detail in what follows.

The Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu noted in his speech in Knesset on the February 1, 2011: “The recent history of the Middle East demonstrates numerous precedents when Islamist elements used for their criminal aims democratic rules of game in order to come to power.” He cited Iran, Lebanon, and the Ghazzah Strip as examples (Yaron 2011). Already in February 2011 Israeli analysts believed that the Muslim Brothers’ coming to power was only a question of time, as they were the largest and most disciplined opposition movement in Egypt, and the further events in general supported this forecast—at least till July 2013 when the Egyptian military, in alliance with a wide coalition of forces (ranging from the Egyptian Trotskyists to the salafis of the Nour Party), overthrew the first democratically elected president of Egypt. This led in turn to the radicalization of the Egyptian Islamists (e.g., Bakr 2016).

In Iran, the overthrow of the Shah’s power was also brought about predominantly by secular democratic radicals, whereas finally the power in Iran found itself in hands of rather radical Islamists (Yaron 2011). However, purely political slogans of the Arab revolutions, the prevalence of the educated youth among their vanguards, a special position of the army, as well as the prevalence of moderate groups among the Islamists, made it possible that the Islamists, after their coming to power in some Arab countries, would have to act very cautiously, and as a result, we would not see anything similar to a “second edition of the Iranian Revolution” (e.g., Kudelev 2011). Note that these expectations were realized to a considerable extent in Tunisia and Morocco (and even partly in Egypt). However, another prospect was realized with the formation of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in 2014 (e.g., Lister 2016; Mabon and Royal 2016)—which, however, was mostly destroyed by a wide coalition of internal and external forces by 2018.

Indeed, as we already noted in 2012 (Grinin 2012a), there were some factors that could reduce the possible reinforcement of Islamism, in particular, the fact that there was no agreement among Islamists, and Islamist parties had different wings while a considerable portion of the actors (especially, the young ones) took a more moderate position disposed to democracy. And indeed, no monolithic Islamist coalitions have ever emerged which allowed to stop backsliding to a religious state both in Tunisia and in Egypt. Another point concerning Egypt is a traditional role of considerable importance for the army, which tried to preserve the levers of influence and (as

the events of July 2013 showed) was ready to regain power even by means of a military takeover (for details, see Grinin et al. 2016: Chap. 2). Less evident but more efficient was the factor of the greater journey taken by the Tunisian society with regard to secularization which allowed the society to confront attempts to introduce Muslim legislation and a Muslim constitution in the country (see also Vidyasova and Gasanbekova 2014).

At that time, they hoped that the Islamists' integration into political system would make their positions more moderate, since the society would foster more progressive views with regard to those positions (see Khalaf 2011). The subsequent events proved highly relevant for those hopes (especially with respect to Morocco and Tunisia, and partially even for Egypt and Yemen).

On the whole, the subsequent development proved that both positions were partially right: those who were afraid of strengthening Islamism and those suggesting strong restrictions for this to happen. And as it often happens, the events took a turn in many respects different from the forecasts.

Victories of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia Both in Tunisia and Egypt, the free expression of will by people led to victories for religious parties and this has proved again the right statement, i.e., that in a society not ready for democracy general elections may bring authoritarian forces to power. Yet, Islamists in the countries under study cannot be blamed of trying to eliminate democracy (they simply did not need to do it). However, there were more than enough attempts to impose religious control (i.e., to reduce civil rights). Both in Egypt and in Tunisia, the Islamists became active and demanded the application of Islamic law but they were defeated as a result of a consolidated struggle against this trend.

The Comparison of the Development of Revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia Let us make a few remarks on the events in Tunisia. A year after the revolution, on October 23, 2011, during the elections to the National Constituent Assembly—the body that was actually to determine the country's future—most votes (not the majority) were given to the Islamist party An-Nahda (89 places out of 217). This party supported the application of Muslim norms in the country and in coalition with other parties formed the government.¹ The leaders of the coalition confirmed that a year after approving a new constitution in Tunisia the general elections of new governmental bodies would have been held. However, the subsequent events (similar to Egypt) showed that this ideology had failed to develop the economy and, on the contrary, pushed it into crisis. The Islamists tried to cover for economic difficulties by actively imposed ideas of “spirituality” (this is typical for revolutions and is also observed in Ukraine today). Those who objected to this existing development would be sent to prison by the new government or driven to the grave (Yakovina 2013; see also Sargentini 2013). As a

¹Its leader Rached Ghannouchi, a prominent ideologist of political Islam, is famous both in Tunisia and beyond. During the Bin Ali's rule, the party An-Nahda was accused of the coup d'etat attempt, its activity was forbidden, and Rached Ghannouchi had to migrate and lived in the United Kingdom for twenty years. He returned to Tunisia on January 30, 2011, after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. Ghannouchi claimed he “was not going to become Tunisian Khomeini” and after An-Nahda's success at parliamentary elections confirmed its adherence to democratic principles (Dolgov 2012).

result, similar to Egypt, a powerful opposing movement developed in the country demanding to change the government. The major debates were conducted around the constitution which delayed its adoption for a year. In January 2014, the constitution was finally adopted.

On the one hand, the events in Egypt and Tunisia were similar in many respects; on the other hand, the society's reaction was different in each, which reflected both the countries' historical peculiarities (e.g., a considerable role of Egypt's army) and the level of secularization which in Tunisia, in our opinion, was higher. In none of the countries would the Islamists' rule inspire growing enthusiasm concerning their agenda; on the contrary, their one-year term in power would raise strong protests. But each country has its own specific path. Egypt's military overthrew the Muslim Brothers and declared them outlawed. In Tunisia, the opposition forced the ruling block to search for a compromise and create a transitional government and also to adopt an appropriate constitution (about protests in Tunisia, see Grinin et al. 2016: Chap. 6).

The differences between the two Arab republics manifested themselves in the relations between authorities and religion. Thus, as Sultangalieva (2014) writes, the democratic coming to power of the Islamist-oriented parties that used to be underground under the former regimes (Muslim Brothers in Egypt and in Tunisia—An-Nahda) had different consequences in each country. In Egypt, the Islamists, due to various reasons, failed to overcome the economic and political crisis, as well as to consolidate the society. This ultimately launched a new wave of violence and turnovers as well as radicalized the opposition. Meanwhile, in Tunisia, the Islamist party, having acceded to the majority's claims, passed the power on to the transitional coalitional government. As a result, the compromise between Islamists and secularists became possible. Their willingness to search for common ground resulted in the adoption of a new constitution which is considered the most up-to-date in the Arab and Muslim world. It recognizes the freedom of conscience, religious freedom including atheism, and also equal rights for women. It is significant that the new Tunisian fundamental law confirms the priority of law and citizenship.

The Tunisian presidential and parliamentary elections were delayed several times (as in Egypt). Finally, on October 26, 2014, the elections took place at which the major secular party Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia) won while Al-Nahda lost, having earned second place (85 and 69 places respectively). At the very end of 2014, in the second tour of the presidential election in Tunisia, Beji Caïd Essebsi, the founding leader of the secular party Nidaa Tounes, was elected President with more than 55% of the votes. His competitor, the interim President Moncef Marzouki, was supported by a bit more than 44% of voters.

Thus, Tunisia succeeded in escaping a large-scale political crisis that could have been accompanied by violent political struggle between secular and religious forces. The Tunisian peculiarities manifested themselves in ways the issues of political transition in the country were resolved. While in Egypt this was mostly done through protests in streets and squares, in Tunisia the issues of political transition were mostly settled at the negotiating table (Sultangalieva 2014), yet numerous anti-governmental demonstrations took place in Tunisia as well (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2015b, c).

Despite great difficulties, the internal societal crisis was resolved within the legal framework. However, the bloody attack on foreign tourists in March 2015 in the museum in the center of the Tunisian capital and another in June of the same year (specifically a massacre on a beach in the Tunisian resort town of Sousse), which were both claimed by the Islamic State (ISIS), as well as the attendant imposed state of emergency showed that the political situation remained unstable (see also Stogov 2015; Haszczyński 2015; Yakubi 2015). Besides, one should bear in mind that an experienced politician, specifically the current President Essebsi, is actually a compromise figure since he is already 91 years old. One can hardly expect any efficiency or stability in this context. The economic situation in the country also does not look good. In particular, youth unemployment grows and what is more disturbing—among the educated portion. This indicator grew to 40% of the total number of unemployed people. The number of migrants also remains large.

Thus, along with strong similarities here we deal with a considerable difference between Tunisia and Egypt consisting in the fact that after the 2010–2011 events in Tunisia, despite the internal opposition, the crises were resolved in a constitutional way via compromises, while in Egypt it was actually resolved via military coup d'état. As a result, in Egypt both liberal and Islamist variants of democracy failed, while in Tunisia it is still preserved, with the Islamist parties enjoying a wide support from the population. The path of compromises appeared far less costly than the use of force, not to speak of a high level of endemic terrorism in modern Egypt.² However, it is important to understand that the economic achievements far from always depend on the level of democracy in a country; let us also note that, despite all the above-mentioned negative factors, economic growth rates in Egypt are greater than in Tunisia (see, e.g., Trading Economics 2018a, b). And this is probably not by chance. In the following section, we are going to discuss this issue.

5.3 Which Road to Democracy Is More Preferable?

'Democracy Above All', Revolutions for the Sake of Democracy and Economic Results There is a widespread opinion that globalization contributes to the spread of democracy. Besides, there is a conviction, which is more widespread among the politicians and ideologists than among the scholars that democracy contributes to a faster and/or more adequate economic growth. The following quotation passionately expresses this conviction: "For the past three decades, globalization, human rights, and democracy have been marching forward together, haltingly, not always and everywhere in step, but in a way that unmistakably shows they are interconnected. By encouraging globalization in less developed countries, we not only help to raise

²Still, in Tunisia the state of emergency that was imposed in late 2015 after a terrorist attack in the capital Tunis left dozens dead, including security personnel, since that time has been extended many times (last time—in February 2018).

growth rates and incomes, promote higher standards, and feed, clothe, and house the poor; we also spread political and civil freedoms” (Griswold 2006).

In this context, many supporters of democracy consider it extremely disappointing that at times democracy does not work properly and consequently the waves of democratization get weaker. Huntington (1993) called the period of a rapid spread of democracy in the 1970s–early 1990s “the third wave of democratization.” On the threshold of the twenty-first century, many researchers noted that the number of democratic regimes ceased to grow and that it would be a dangerous intellectual temptation for the democrats to consider that the world is inevitably moving toward some final natural democratic state (see Diamond 1999, 2004, 2008). In this context, the trend has strengthened which promotes democracy in all countries with non-democratic or partially democratic regimes. This trend, on the one hand, is based on the global geopolitical goals of the USA and the West (see, e.g., Brzezinski 1998) and, on the other hand, relies upon the active support of a broad ideological and informal movement. And this justifies the efforts to support democracy and to encourage democratic opposition for the purpose of increasing chances of victory of democracy in case of the crisis of authoritarian regimes (Diamond 2000). In Beissinger’s words, “democratic revolution has come to the center of attention within the American government and democracy-promoting NGOs as a strategy for democratization” (2007: 259). He notes that “foreign democracy-promoting NGOs were not a significant part of the Portuguese Revolution, the ‘People Power’ revolutions of East Asia, or the 1989 revolutions in East Europe. But under the influence of the civil society communities that they serve and their government funders, and often under pressure from repressive states themselves, a number of American-based NGOs (Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the Soros Foundation) have quietly come to embrace more confrontational modes of fostering change, even while seeking to promote democratic evolution from within” (Beissinger 2007: 261–262).

The intensive efforts led to a number of interventions and color revolutions. The Arab Spring was the most powerful wave of such revolutions in the last decade, though its internal causes (see above) were also of immense importance, and the importance of the external democratizing activities in the case of the Arab Spring must not be exaggerated.

Undoubtedly, the trend of globalization is clearly connected to the growing number of democratic regimes. One can hardly object that in the recent decades the general vector was moving toward the expansion of democracy. However, *the connection between democratization and economic success is not that evident as many new democratic regimes failed to advance substantially either in the economic or social spheres*. That is why the intervention and propagation of democracy arouses much criticism. Besides, an increasing number of people support the idea that people should create their own democratic models which can significantly differ from the Western model (Weinstein 2001: 414).

Thus, we suppose that some delay in the spread of democracy in the 2000s was due to the formation of rather successful economic models of development which do not require democracy and even contradict it.

Hence, in practice the relationship between democratic governance and economic growth is not all that simple as the political philosophers, political scientists, and politicians used to think. First of all, an explicit connection between a democratic regime and economic success is not always present; one could even say that it is present in the minority of cases. There are rather few studies which clearly demonstrate such a connection especially with respect to emerging democracies, but at the same time there are abundant works that prove the opposite (see Polterovich and Popov 2007).³ On the contrary, in most cases it is precisely the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes that achieve considerable economic success, as they can better concentrate resources and invest (*ibid.*). Of course, the most telling example here is China where authoritarian rule is the basis for economic progress. Such countries as Singapore, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan are also rather illuminating examples, as well as Egypt and Tunisia before the Arab Spring events (the cases of South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile, which are also relevant here, will be discussed below).

That is why we believe that in a number of cases authoritarian regimes turn out to be more effective in economic and social terms than emerging democracies, especially those of a revolutionary type, which are often incapable of ensuring social order and may have a swing to authoritarianism. However, effective authoritarian regimes can also be a suitable form of transition to an efficient and stable democracy. In any case, the authoritarian regimes in the MENA countries succeeded in achieving impressive growth rates in the period before the Arab Spring (see, e.g., Grinin et al. 2016). This does not imply that Muslim countries with democratic regimes are unable to become economically successful, and here Turkey and Malaysia can serve good examples (even a poor but quite democratic Muslim country, Bangladesh, has been rapidly developing recently). But these are countries with stable regimes, while the states, where revolutions took place in the 2010s, have generally either decreased their developmental rates (as Egypt or Tunisia) or were thrown back for many years (as Libya, Syria, or Yemen).⁴

There is a peculiar enclave of monarchic regimes of the Gulf region that also achieved rather salient economic successes. And even despite low oil prices, this development continues.

A successful economic development may contribute to the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Griswold (2006) claims the following:

In the past two decades, a number of economies have followed the path of economic and trade reform leading to political reform. South Korea and Taiwan as recently as the 1980s were governed by authoritarian regimes that did not permit much open dissent. Today, after years of expanding trade and rising incomes, both are multiparty democracies with full

³Even the UN Report stated that there is no direct relationship between democracy and economic growth (UNDP 2002). It is also noted that the total effect of democracy on the economic growth can be characterized as weakly negative (see Barro 1996).

⁴On the other hand, the weakening of the economic engine in traditional democratic countries of Europe also leads to certain distrust to democratic institutions (see Lowi 1999). And what can be the result of the process which has already been considered, in particular by Robert Dahl who argues that extending the sphere of supranational activity reduces the citizens' opportunities to control their vital problems through the national means of rule (Dahl 1989).

political and civil liberties. Other countries that have most aggressively followed those twin tracks of reform include Chile, Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, and Tanzania.

In fact, such transitions from authoritarianism to democracy did clearly occur. But one can hardly describe their way to democracy as a quick and easy one. Besides, it is important to keep in mind that such countries as Taiwan, South Korea, and Chile achieved their main economic breakthroughs right under the governance of authoritarian regimes. And it is far from certain that if a political democracy had been immediately established there (or preserved as in case with Chile) that these countries would have shown the outstanding results at the onset of their economic rise (we can even suppose that this would not have come true). Finally, there are many examples when a rapid transition to democracy leads to economic and often associated social decline, as well as to hard times in these countries' histories. Rather tragic events occurred in the development of the former USSR and a number of socialist countries among which Rumania and Bulgaria are only now recovering from their problems. The revolutions occurring in Ukraine under the banner of a great democratic enhancement have also exacerbated economic difficulties (after the period of economic growth). Here, we can conclude that ideology aimed at introducing democracy in countries with non-democratic or partly democratic regimes can bring drastic consequences for the people of those countries; the application of democratic ideology does not bring prosperity but, on the contrary, can cost the country massive and unnecessary sacrifices. "Democracy above all" is a dangerous slogan, and the policy supporting the radicals and revolutionaries does not hold true from the point of welfare for those countries to which revolution is exported or where it is introduced.

It was demonstrated quite some time ago that revolutions in general tend to impede rather than to promote the economic growth: "One might expect revolutions to unleash great energy for rebuilding economic systems, just as they lead to rebuilding of political institutions. Yet in fact this rarely if ever takes place. For the most part, long-term economic performance in revolutionary regimes lags behind that of comparable countries that have not experienced revolutions" (Goldstone 2001: 168; see also Eckstein 1982, 1986; Zimmermann 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Weede and Muller 1997).

The Problems of Imperfect Democratic Regimes and Choosing the Path to Democracy The problems of young democracies have been known for a rather long time. In what follows we are going to reconsider these problems. Unfortunately, in recent decades politicians and some scholars have forgotten that young democracies are not simply imperfect; some of their characteristics may become dangerous for the countries' development. As a result, in the last two decades most experiments to establish democracies by revolutions beyond Europe have been hardly successful. Moreover, they have led to drastic consequences in a number of countries including the Arab Spring countries. Inglehart and Welzel note that "the Third Wave [of democratization] gave birth to a large number of new democracies that were initially greeted with enthusiasm" (Pye 1990; Fukuyama 1992). Subsequently, however, a growing number of observers have noted that many of the new democracies show severe

deficiencies in their actual practice of civil and political liberties (Ottaway 2003). Widespread concern has been expressed about “low intensity democracies,” “electoral democracies,” “defective democracy,” or “illiberal democracies” (Collier and Adcock 1999; Bollen and Paxton 1997; Merkel et al. 2003; O’Donnell et al. 2004). Many writers emphasize the need to distinguish between merely formal democracy or electoral democracy and genuinely effective liberal democracy (see, e.g., Gills and Rocamora 1992; O’Donnell 1996; Bunce 2000; Heller 2000; Rose 1995). Using this distinction, a crucial point becomes evident. Formal democracy can be imposed on almost any society, but whether it provides genuine autonomous choice to its citizens largely depends on mass values” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 149).

Of all the values associated with efficient democracy, the above-mentioned authors consider the opportunities for personal expression as the most important (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

The latter assumption seems rather debatable. However, we consider important and promising the idea that (positive or negative) changes that democracy can bring to the citizens of societies where it is introduced depend on the dominant values of society. If one adopts this idea, it becomes clear that in the societies with predominantly Islamic values (which make an absolute majority in the Middle East as we saw in Chap. 3) one can hardly expect that the liberal values can be imposed via democratic means.

The events of the Arab Spring demonstrated the heterogeneous character of revolutionary movement, the changes in the forces underlying the revolutionary protests, the way the banner of revolution raised by secular forces passed to those who consider religious ideals to be more important. That was the case in Egypt and Tunisia, where Islamists temporarily came to power. That was also the case in Syria, where revolution started under quite secular mottos of freedom and democracy, but later the most important role in the struggle with Assad shifted to the Islamist armed formations—Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Ansar al-Islam, and others (see, e.g., Wege 2015; Abboud 2016; Phillips 2016). It is worth noting that the Islamists were much more organized and effective than the secularist “free opposition.” The Islamists quickly replaced the protesters under secular mottos in Libya (yet, the secularist nationalist forces currently control the most part of the country—see Sect. 5.8.2 of this chapter). In Yemen, the collapse of strong government inspired the Yemen Islamists, the Houthis, to join the struggle for power; however, one should point out that having entered the struggle by political means, they became considerably less radicalized (about the Houthis see in Sect. 5.8.1).

The true radical Islamists took advantage of the weakening state; as a result, in Yemen many territories fell under control of al-Qaeda’s and ISIS Yemen branches. The coming of ISIS along with civil war in Syria led to the final formation of a kind of Shiite alliance in the Middle East in the form of union and interaction between Hezbollah, Iran, Iraqi, Syrian, Yemen, Saudi, and Bahrain Shiites. Thus, although the Arab Spring had hardly critically reinforced Islamism in many societies, still Islamism was agitated and boosted which allowed radical terrorist groups to rapidly spread beyond the Arab World.

The events of the Arab Spring also demonstrated that many revolutionary forces including revolutionary Islamists appeared not ready for that democracy whose implementation used to be the major motto of revolution. They also showed that the revolutionary majority far from always wins, while the revolutionary-minded masses even though inferior in number to the rest of population, can significantly influence political transformations due to their activity and/or solidarity. However, at democratic elections the majority usually defeats the minority. And correspondingly in Muslim-majority societies, ideals of liberal democracy have few chances to be approved in democratic elections. Thus, in such societies liberal values can be imposed only by force or through the restriction of democratic rights. But should one choose this very path to democracy? The answer is evidently, no.

So when answering the question in the heading of this section, we may say that a longer and more peaceful path with a gradual strengthening of achievements is much more preferable than a revolutionary one; the latter does not actually rely on the majority of population values. Thus, we suppose that, first, an authoritarian regime is much more preferable than revolutionary anarchy; second, Islamist democracy, if established, would be preferable at least in order to promote the very institution of democratic elections and change of government. In this respect, when analyzing the outcomes of the Iranian revolution in 1978–1979, one may say that in terms of modernization the Shah regime would have been more preferable. Nevertheless, the establishment of Islamist democracy in Iran brings it closer to the completion of modernization and establishment of a higher-level democracy. The upheavals in late 2017–early 2018 show that the anticlerical forces are gaining in power; however, their impact remains rather weak.

Thus, one may conclude that there is generally a need for quite a long transitional period to democracy; moreover, it may often turn out that an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime is quite capable of such a transitional function. So to evaluate a regime positively, one should estimate it not in terms of its concordance with democratic values, but in terms of its economic success and social orientation, as well as the efficiency of its state institutions contributing to order, stability, and secure and consistent policy implementation (on the particular importance of a strong order, state institutions efficiency see among others Liew 2001; Barro 2000; Polterovich and Popov 2007). With a country's economic advancement toward greater opportunities for people, such regimes are very likely to move toward larger liberalization. Here, it is sufficient to encourage the regime's actions contributing to liberalization but definitely not to rely on radical forces that can overthrow the regime under the banner of democracy, hurling a country into chaos.

The experience of a number of successful countries, in particular of South Korea and Indonesia, shows that at a certain stage of modernization authoritarianism may contribute to its expansion (Indonesia is a good example for our study, because it is mostly a Muslim society). However, just in this case it objectively paves the way for its own limitation and consequent political democratization (for details, see Prosovsky 2009). Still one should note the authoritarian stage often becomes an extremely important and necessary stage in the development toward modern democracy.

One should note that the context of globalization combined with the general recognition of people's rights and the condemnation of violations of justice and law and with a demand for legitimacy (that is electivity) of government can by itself generate a positive trend and in certain respects restrain authoritarian rulers. With decreasing illiteracy and a growing population-wide self-consciousness which is necessarily accompanied with enlarging personal political experience, a transition to democracy may proceed much easier, smoother, and more effectively than the attempts to establish democracy through revolutionary ways.

In what follows, we discuss the correlation between revolution and counterrevolution in Egypt and investigate why the revolutionaries could diverge from democratic ideals. Also discussed will be weaknesses of young democracies and the correlation between Islamic and democratic values, along with some other aspects.

5.4 Revolution and Counterrevolution in Egypt: An Analysis of Conflicting Forces

In Chap. 4, we previously examined the causes of revolutions in Egypt (and other Arab countries) and the balance of power on the eve of these revolutions. In this section, we would like to show the changing balance of power in the country during the revolution and discuss why the disposition of the elected president became possible. We describe the split of elites before the 25 January (2011) Revolution, which by early 2013 had transformed into an alliance of elites.

It is extremely important to point out that over the two revolutionary years the power landscape among the revolution's former proponents had significantly changed, which was quite natural. Let us define the most important transformations which had contributed to the start of counterrevolution in July 2013. By the way, one should note that it is difficult to define them explicitly. On the one hand, a military takeover took place. But it occurred when a new revolutionary wave against Muslim Brotherhood government was rising among the secular (civil) part of the revolutionary forces and their supporters. Such waves are common phenomena for revolutions. But their completion specifically with a military coup (launched by the military and not by the revolutionaries) is far from a common phenomenon.

Firstly, the Egyptian Revolution made the Egyptian economic elite reconcile with the military, and in June 2013 they acted together in a well-coordinated front that allowed such a swift overthrow of President Morsi (see Issaev and Korotayev 2014a; Korotayev et al. 2016 for more detail), whereas no serious cracks in the new coalition of the Egyptian military and economic elites (that was formed in the first half of 2013) appear to be visible yet. In 2011–2012, the economic elites understood that for them it turned out to be extremely counterproductive to continue any serious attempts to get hold of any economic assets controlled by the military and that it was much better for them to recognize the dominant position of the military in the ruling block, as well as the immunity and inviolability of the generals' economic empire (among other

things—through direct constitutional amendments). The economic elites understood that any serious attempts on their part to get dominant positions in the ruling block might result in their losing incomparably more than what they could gain.⁵

Secondly, the Revolution with the subsequent counterrevolution led to an extremely deep split in the January (2011) opposition “macroalliance.” What is very important is that this split took place along many lines. Within this macroalliance even the Islamist alliance was split—as the July 3 coup was supported by the second strongest Islamist party—the party of Islamist fundamentalists/salafis Hizb al-Noor (the coup was also supported by a number of prominent Islamic figures outside this party, for example, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar). Of course, the support of a secularist-military regime by the Egyptian Salafi Islamists needs a special commentary [a special commentary is also naturally needed for the fact that in July 2013 the archconservative Islamist Saudi Arabian regime acted as a faithful ally of the anti-Islamist alliance that included an exceptionally wide range of forces—liberals, nationalists, leftists, ultra-leftists—up to Trotskyists (Abdel Kouddous 2013; Baer 2013; Nasr 2013; al-Alawi and Schwartz 2013; al-Rasheed 2013)]. The main point here appears to be connected with the fact that Saudi Arabia acts as the main financial sponsor of Hizb al-Noor (Daou 2012; Lavizzari 2013). And as regards Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brothers pose a real threat to the respective country’s regime. In 1937 in the USSR, it was much less dangerous to proclaim oneself a Slavophil rather than a Trotskyist (in 1937 the latter [but in no way the former] would have led to an almost immediate execution)—whereas for non-Marxists the difference between Stalinists and Trotskyists could look entirely insignificant (in fact, both Stalinists and Trotskyist could well be classified as Marxist extremists/ultra-radicals). Similarly, for the Saudis, Trotskyists are a sort of unreal class of exotics, whereas the Muslim Brothers for the Saudis are almost the same as the Trotskyists were for Stalin—they are precisely those leftist Islamists who question effectively the very basics the regime legitimacy and may even take concrete steps to overthrow it (Baer 2013; Nasr 2013; al-Alawi and Schwartz 2013; al-Rasheed 2013). And against such a background, one can easily understand the readiness of Saudi Arabia (+the UAE and Kuwait that have similar problems) to ally with anybody (including anti-Islamist minded liberals and Communists, let alone Egyptian military and economic elites) in order to weaken in its own homeland the enemy that threatens the very survival of the Arabian monarchies (with the natural exception of the Qatar monarchy allied with the Muslim Brothers). On the other hand, for the Egyptian Salafis the removal of the Muslim Brothers from the legal political arena was somewhat advantageous objectively (irrespective of any connections with the Saudi interests), as it seemed to open opportunities to strengthen significantly their own positions, including the potential further widening of its presence in the Egyptian parliament—as the present-day

⁵Emergent cracks in the ruling coalition are rather connected with the participation in this coalition of some leftist secularists [first of all, Hamdeen Sabahi and his Egyptian Popular Current (*al-Tayyar al-Sha’biyy al-Misriyy*)], whereas the continuation of the cooperation of this part of the ruling alliance with both military and (especially) economic elites can in no way be guaranteed—one would rather expect to see eventually the final split between the left-wing and right-wing secularists in Egypt.

main legal Islamist party of the country (note, however, that Hizb al-Noor failed to materialize this opportunity, underestimating al-Sisi's authoritarian desire to monopolize power in his own hands, avoiding sharing it with any serious political parties, including Hizb al-Noor).

The secular leftist–liberal alliance was also split, as the majority of its members were so frightened by a year's rule of Muslim Brothers that they continue to support the present regime. However, the forces that continue to oppose the regime remain deeply split—as the anti-regime leftist liberal-revolutionary youth still refuses any idea of a new alliance with the Muslim Brothers; suffice to say that one of its main slogans *Yasqut, yasqut illi khan, in kana 'askar aw ikhwan* is translated as follows: “Down, down with all those who betrayed—be they military, or Muslim Brothers!” We will not be surprised if we witness new revolutionary paradoxes in Egypt in the future.

Finally, let us make a few remarks about the revolution–counterrevolution relationship in its unity and contradictions. Our young Egyptian friends (a sort of “leftist liberal revolutionaries”) consider the post-July 3 (2013) events in their country as “counterrevolution.” And we would tend to agree with them—though with some important differences. Almost by definition, revolutionaries regard the “counterrevolution” as something unequivocally negative, whereas we believe that the present-day political regime has serious positive features (though, no doubt, its formation has led in the recent years to a significant growth of the authoritarian tendencies as well as an increase in the intensity of Islamist terrorism). Yes, it may well be denoted as “counterrevolution,” as this event returned to power that very block of military, economic, and bureaucratic elites that had ruled the country before the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. However, as we have mentioned previously (see, e.g., Grinin 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012a, b: 251–289; Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c; Korotayev et al. 2012), this block ruled Egypt in a rather effective way, securing in the years preceding the Revolution a rather successful (especially, against the global background) economic and social development of this great country.

It is curious to observe the reverse assessments of events in the course of this revolution. In what follows, we describe how those who passed judgement upon the Mubaraks later were accused of some absurd and strange things (e.g., escaping from prison during the revolution). Soon after the military coup of July 3, 2013 (which ended the protests that took place from June 30, 2013), some would argue that “a true revolution took place only on June 30, while January 25 was the day of the conspiracy that allowed Muslim Brothers to take power” (see Letter 5 in the Appendix to this chapter). Of course, this provoked the revolutionaries' anger (*ibid.*). However, as we already pointed, during the disposition of Muslim Brothers everything was considered to be right, so that any criticism on the part of those who disliked the betrayal of democracy was violently opposed to.⁶

⁶Let us cite Samiha Razeq again (see Letter 2 in the Appendix to this chapter). “I'm just infuriated! I really wanna blow up all Western media that makes the success of Egyptian revolution after three years of struggle [that is, the overthrow of Morsi's government] seem as if it's a crisis and failure to so-called democracy, that's in fact only a theocratic religious regim by a group that hijacked the

Thus, revolutionary events often assume a paradoxical character. For example, one may sometimes come across such revolutions that the revolutionaries do not expect. Revolutionary repressions may often turn against those who were actually meant to benefit from revolution. And those whose names were on the banners when overthrowing the old power may join on a mass scale the counterrevolutionary camp. Zealous monarchists or henchmen of authoritarianism suddenly turn into democrats, while those who considered democracy as the highest value get ready to establish a dictatorship.

5.5 Revolution Versus Democracy

The Events in July 2013 in Egypt and “Berdayev’s Law” The general mood in Egypt in July 2013 was exultant, the revolutionaries were also exultant, and their slogans demanded true democracy. They were exultant because the Egyptian military had ousted the legitimately, publicly, and democratically elected president.

Paradoxically, the Muslim Brotherhood’s post-revolutionary political rhetoric sounded incomparably more advanced than their opponents’ archaic political rhetoric. The secularists (as well as the military, supporting them) in an absolutely archaic manner identified “the people” with the crowd in Tahrir Square; the Brotherhood, in turn, appealed to formal legitimate democratic procedures.

Why were the revolutionaries excited with the overthrow of the legitimately elected president? What was this? An absurdity, a paradox, a peculiarity of Egypt? No, this paradox is just a common and quite expected outcome of revolutionary events. So the major issue to be discussed in the present chapter is whether the revolution and democracy are always closely related.

‘Every revolution ends in reaction. It is inevitable, it is a law’ wrote the famous Russian thinker Berdayev (1990: 29) who elaborated this profound idea through hard intellectual efforts and personal political experience.⁷ Of course, Berdayev was limited by the historical background of the early twentieth century. The past and the present century have shown that the stability of democratic accomplishments of a revolution to a huge degree depends on the phase in which a society finds itself in its transition to modernization, on its cultural traditions, environment, and a number of other factors. So successful democratic revolutions (or the reforms of a revo-

beginning of the revolution with the help of SCAF, and serves the interests of US, Israel, and the West in the region, to deserve being labeled a democracy by their catastrophic media”.

⁷However, after the French revolution there emerged the term Thermidor, which later was used to denote the phase in some revolutions when the political pendulum swings back, the revolutionary radicalism steps back and a less radical revolutionary regime is established which gradually reduces the revolutionary excesses. Revolution tries to eliminate its own unnecessary (Ustryalov 1921) and passes to a reasonable account of the situation. The term Thermidor was widely debated after the Russian Revolution of 1917 (see e.g., Ustryalov 1921; Trotsky 1935). Thermidor may be also replaced by dictatorship regime which Marx called Bonapartism (Marx 1957). About the phases of revolution see Grinin (2017).

lutionary kind) tend to happen in countries with a high level of sociocultural and economic development, and where a long period of fascination and disappointment in democracy (as well as cycles of democracy and authoritarianism) has already past; after such revolutions, a rather stable democratic regime is established. One can set here the examples of “the Carnation Revolution” in Portugal in 1974 [in reality, it was rather a military takeover than a true revolution (see below)] or “the Velvet Revolution” in what was then Czechoslovakia in 1989.⁸ Besides, such successful revolutions—“glorious,” “velvet”, and usually nonviolent—would proceed quite quickly.

The history of such political overthrows starts from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, but the recent decades of human history have witnessed a large number of them. However, if a society is not properly modernized (also in terms of demography⁹), if there are many illiterate people, if non-urban populations constitute a large share of the total population, if there is a strong influence of the traditionalists and so on, then “Berdayev’s law” of a revolution’s transformation into reaction has a large probability of coming. The less developed a society and the weaker its statehood traditions are, the greater are the chances that the throwback will be not to a reactionary but to chaos without strong and responsible government and to violent civil war. The cases in point are Libya, Yemen, and Syria (see below, Sect. 5.8). If Berdayev’s Law is to be expanded, one can argue that in some cases the “reaction” may bring long-lasting and bloody chaos. Thus, the revolution in Afghanistan in 1978 led to its destabilization which has lasted for almost four decades. Such revolutions can turn states into the failed ones.

After some time has passed in those societies that have gone through a revolution which was unable to established democracy, the idea of democracy can again start generating a new revolutionary explosion. Still there are historical precedents when democracy and authoritarianism alternated more than once (e.g., Iran and Egypt). Besides, one should point out that in such societies a revolution faces really large-scale challenges, and respectively its intensity can provoke strong resistance.

⁸In addition, scholars also tend to characterize as such some other revolutions/revolutionary reforms in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the 1986 Revolution in the Philippines, as well as the revolutionary reforms in South Africa in the early 1990s: ‘Until very recently, revolutions have invariably failed to produce democracy. The need to consolidate a new regime in the face of struggles with domestic and foreign foes has instead produced authoritarian regimes, often in the guise of populist dictatorships such as those of Napoleon, Castro, and Mao, or of one party states such as the PRI state in Mexico or the Communist Party-led states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the struggle required to take and hold power in revolutions generally leaves its mark in the militarized and coercive character of new revolutionary regimes (Gurr 1988). It is therefore striking that in several recent revolutions—in the Philippines in 1986, in South Africa in 1990, in Eastern European nations in 1989–1991—the sudden collapse of the old regime has led directly to new democracies, often against strong expectations of reversion to dictatorship’ (Goldstone 2001: 168; see also Foran and Goodwin 1993; Weitman 1992; Pastor 2001).

⁹The structural-demographic factors regularly generating social explosions in the modernization process are thoroughly investigated in our earlier publications (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2006, 2011a, b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, c; Korotayev and Khalitourina 2006; Turchin and Korotayev 2006; Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, b, c, 2014; Grinin 2011, 2012a, b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012a; Zinkina and Korotayev 2014a, b); hence, we will not describe them here.

Extending his idea, Berdyaev wrote: “The more violent and radical is a revolution, the stronger is the reaction. The alternation of revolutions and reactions makes a mysterious circle” (Berdyaev 1990: 29). A rather typical example here is China which after the first modern revolution in its history, the democratic Xinhai Revolution of 1911, yielded to Yuan Shikai’s dictatorship. Then, the Chinese tried to restore democratic institutions, but China eventually plunged into a long-lasting anarchy and civil war that ended with an unusually durable Communist dictatorship.

Only the revolutions which occur at the very end of the modernization and transformation wave (including the recurrent revolutions) can appear relatively low cost in social terms, i.e., “velvet,” and progressive. Among the revolutions which trigger sociopolitical breakdown and transformations, the most productive are the failed ones (although it may seem unexpected). Having prevented the society from complete collapse, such revolutions become the drivers forcing the governments to reform political and social systems; moreover, since governments receive a certain “vaccination” of the fear of revolution, they are often pushed to further reforms (as it happened during Bismarck’s rule in Germany). This was the case with the revolutions of 1848–1849, which led to the emergence of capitalism and democracy in the European states. And, by the way, after the fright experienced by the Austrian monarchy during the Hungarian revolution of 1849, the defeat in the war with Prussia in 1866 forced it, without waiting for a new revolutionary outbreak, to turn the Austrian empire into the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary. All this allowed it to exist for another half a century.

That was the case of the Russian Revolution in 1905–1907 which gave a powerful impetus to the country’s development including its parliamentary system. Should the country have passed through another such failed revolution the government would have been forced to continue reforms including the ones in the sphere of forcible delineation of landowners’ lands, in the sphere of national relations and other aspects of reforms. Then, the country would have chosen a more peaceful path of development (yet, in retrospective, one may suggest that the epoch of Great Depression of the 1930s with falling bread prices could have been very difficult for Russia in social terms in almost any case).

The Path to a Stable and Sustainable Democracy So as we have already said, the path to a stable and sustainable democracy is rather long and complicated.¹⁰ In any case, it requires a certain level of society’s economic, social, and cultural development. Let us emphasize again that liberal democracy as a rule (which still has some known exceptions) will not endure long in those countries with large shares of illiterate and rural population, and with low living standards. Modernization in (more or less large) countries always proceeds unevenly. As a result, in modern-

¹⁰Both in a particular country and in the world in general. It may seem paradoxical but in 1990, democratic regimes were established in approximately 45.4% of independent countries of the world, that is almost the same rate as it was seventy years earlier in 1922 (Huntington 1993). On some factors affecting the genesis of democratic institutions see also, e.g., Korotayev (1996), Korotayev and Bondarenko (2000), Bondarenko and Korotayev (2000), Korotayev (2003a, b), Korotayev and Cardinale (2003).

izing countries a rather modernized “core” is formed while the periphery remains rather weakly modernized and prone to conservatism with the majority of population (the people) living in this condition. In this context, it turns out that revolutionaries (who claim to care for the people) regularly become disappointed in the people and the people’s conservatism, and in that at some point the people start voting in a way different from the liberals and radicals’ expectations (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2015c) and consequently would prefer order and stability and also would prefer familiar and clear forms of government to some unfamiliar political and ideological appeals; moreover, the people would prefer something material to superficially ethereal freedoms. Citizens should go a long way, to gain their own political experience of several generations, to gradually emancipate their own consciousness, and to support cultural-humanitarian development, so that freedoms and democracy would receive the status of the values that are precious to the majority.¹¹ One should also realize that the stability of democracy does not depend on to what extent a constitution is democratic but on how political institutions and actors coordinate with each other and are ready to play the game. An outstanding French sociologist Raymond Aron fairly notes in his profound study *Democracy and Totalitarianism* that “the stability and efficiency are supported not by the constitutional rules as such, but by their harmony with the party system, with the nature of parties, their programs, and political conceptions” (Aron 1993: 125). This naturally takes much time to achieve. Similar ideas on high requirements to society, its leaders and bureaucracy, were also pronounced by Schumpeter (1995: 378–385). In particular, he argues that for a successful functioning of the democratic system “the human material of politics” (that is people who operate the party machines, work in the executive branch, and take part in broader political life) “should be of sufficiently high quality”; it is necessary that the bureaucracy should also be of high quality and have a developed sense of duty and esprit (this notion will naturally exclude corruption and nepotism). “Democratic self-control” is also needed (ibid.).

Let us cite again Inglehart and Welzel: “Democracy is not simply the result of clever elite bargaining and constitutional engineering. It depends on deep-rooted orientations among the people themselves. These orientations motivate them to demand freedom and responsive government—and to act to ensure that the governing elites remain responsive to them. Genuine democracy is not simply a machine that, once set up, functions by itself. It depends on the people” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 2).

In other words, it is not enough if a revolution introduces democracy by force. There should be present the institutions and social groups supporting them that

¹¹This means that one should first achieve the cultural-humanitarian level allowing a true democratic transformation, namely, there should be present an intellectual stratum, a certain level of borrowings from the world culture, and certain political forms. But to establish democracy an even higher cultural-humanitarian level is needed as well as a dramatic change in social and economic situation (see, e.g., Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Besides, democracy is not just an idea but a mode of life; and to take the root it should become a really important part of everyday life. But since in newly democratic states the idea of democracy is quickly discredited, thus it fails to become a really important constituent of everyday life. Here we observe a vicious circle which can be broken only after several attempts and under certain social and economic conditions.

will endeavor to reproduce the democratic system. Meanwhile, the revolutionary trajectories (as we show below) often lead just to the authoritarian and violent means.

Thus, the people (or the majority of people) can eventually and unconsciously betray the ideas of revolution and the very notion of democracy. On the other hand, the population's sensible pragmatism can prove to be wiser than the educated radical and revolutionary minority's lofty ideals and aspirations. Then, people will by intuition choose a leader who (with all his drawbacks, vices and egoism) will generally choose for the country a moderate and more appropriate course (diverging in the most important aspects from the previous prerevolutionary policy but at the same time not longing to implement at all the accounts of the revolutionary slogans). Napoleon III's activity serves a quite typical example here.¹² There are many other such examples.¹³ But at the same time (as we witness this today in some Near Eastern countries), it can happen that even the revolutionary minority itself that has previously strived for power under the banner of establishing democracy can give up democratic principles. Thus, the conservative majority can turn out to be more democratically oriented. And this is not surprising. As already stated, in the process of modernization, a country's core is modernized more quickly and thus, the "liberal-revolutionary" minority in "capitals" turns out to be surrounded by the conservative, not to say "counterrevolutionary," majority of provinces (e.g., Korotayev et al. 2015c). Against this background, the increasing adherence to democracy on the side of the conservative ("reactionary") majority is quite natural as with fair elections they have good chances to come to power through an absolutely democratic procedure. Meanwhile, among the revolutionary ("progressive") minority, the adherence

¹²In December, 1848 Louis Bonaparte, the nephew of Napoleon I, was elected the President of the French Republic, which was formed as a result of the February revolution of 1848. He was elected by the French peasants, while the Parisians who made the revolution were against him. His further career is extremely interesting in terms of the relationship between revolution and democracy. On the one hand, he betrayed the Republic, having made a military coup on December 2, 1851. A year later he became the Emperor Napoleon III, which, as one can see, was quite logical and typical for the life cycle of revolution. But on the other hand, he also applied democratic methods. Thus, the extension of his mandate for ten years was approved by the referendum on December 21, 1851 (it took place three weeks after the coup). Later, the transformation of the presidency into monarchy was approved by the referendum on November 21, 1852. On both referenda Louis Bonaparte's actions were approved by an overwhelming majority of votes. Thus, one can see a contradiction between the liberal French capital, aspiring to a liberal and democratic republic and a conservative French village that yearned for a strong imperial hand. If the revolution had introduced limited suffrage, the urban residents could have won; meanwhile, the universal suffrage gave the advantage to the conservatives. The same dilemma between universal democracy and the strife for a higher-level democracy exists in Muslim countries, where secular forces are consistently a minority. The same refers to a number of countries with an authoritarian regime outside the Islamic world.

¹³One can also recall that during the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly the principal Russian liberal party (the Constitutional Democrats) whose main objective was just to establish a system of universal, direct, equal, and secret polls, during the first Russian truly universal, direct, equal, and secret poll only got a tiny minority of votes, whereas the majority of votes were got by the peasant-oriented party of "Socialist Revolutionaries" (however, as is well known, this did not prevent the political power in Russia from being grabbed by a third political party that also got a minority of votes—the Bolsheviks).

to democratic ideals can be undermined, as for them fair elections are likely to end with defeat.

Even with an election falsification in the societies where democracy appears restricted through the manipulation of the “party in power,” quite a large share of society or even its majority is loyal to power (even if they are discontented with something) and, consequently, conservative. The rulers can win even fair elections but certainly with less advantage than with a faked vote (with 80–90% of votes). Put another way, in theory they could do without vote falsification but here this system of “controlled democracy” starts operating in its own way and forces the local authorities to demonstrate their loyalty, because an unconvincing majority at the elections is considered as a motion of no confidence to an authoritarian ruler.

In many respects, there is a rightful opinion that the possible existence of stable and effective democracy in a society is determined by the characteristics of the elites of that society. Indeed, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) maintain that

elite integrity makes the difference between formal democracy and effective democracy – between democracy in name only, where elections are held and where civil and political liberties exist on paper but the governing elites feel free to ignore people’s rights and govern on their own behalf; and democracy that is genuinely responsive to mass preferences and respects people’s civil and political liberties. For elite corruption can make the best democratic constitution meaningless, rendering people’s civil and political liberties ineffective. And elite integrity, itself, is largely determined by the strength of self-expression values in the society. For a public that emphasizes self-expression values tends to put its elites under pressure to govern according to the rule of law, and a society that emphasizes these values tends to produce new generations of elites that are themselves likely to have internalized emancipative ideals. (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 299)

However, let us note that it is not always appropriate to speak about elites’ decency. The last election in the USA has shown that in order to win, the elites are ready to use a number of inappropriate means. One may speak about a certain range of possible actions so that countries with institutionalized democracy should not or are unable to cross the line, yet they may strive to.

Returning to the issue of a correlation between revolution and democracy, one can remember that the brilliant politician Vladimir Lenin emphasized that “the key question of every revolution is undoubtedly the question of state power” (Lenin 1958: 145). At the early stages of modernization, the revolutionaries who are too devoted to their initial slogans inevitably fail, because their appeals, although being attractive and inspiring for the masses, are still unrealizable under existing conditions. That is why the logic of revolution either makes the revolutionaries in power ignore democracy and even suppress it (as it happened when the Bolsheviks illegitimately terminated the democratically elected Russian Constituent Assembly), thus continuing the escalation of violence, or those who are too devoted to democratic revolutionary ideals are substituted (in a non-democratic and less frequently, in a democratic way) by those who are less democracy-driven but are more prone to radicalism, to the deepening of forced changes and in reinforcing power for themselves. The history of the Great French Revolution of 1789–1794 and Napoleon serves here as a classical example.

Democracy, Values, and Revolution Let us remind ourselves that in order to introduce democracy, even with a marginal hope of success, it is necessary to have a certain level of societal development. In particular, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) note, effective democracy is likely to emerge in any country once at least 45% of the society holds self-expression values. The relationship is stochastic and not deterministic, but the statistical correlation is very high (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 155). Even “formal” democracy usually emerges where 30% of the population of a given country emphasizes self-expression values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 155–156). If we consider self-expression values, one can notice that they are closely related to human development and social and economic development, and, together with democratic institutions, they represent the factors which promote the expansion of personal choice.¹⁴ According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005: Chap. 7), socioeconomic development tends to make people materially, intellectually, and socially more independent, and it nurtures a sense of existential security and autonomy. A growing sense of existential autonomy leads people to give priority to humanistic self-expression values that emphasize human emancipation, giving liberty priority over discipline, diversity over conformity, and autonomy over authority. As growing socioeconomic resources broaden the range of activities that people can choose, values of self-expression broaden the range of activities to which they aspire. Rising self-expression values lead people to demand the institutions that allow them to act according to their own choices. Accordingly, values of self-expression motivate people to seek civil and political rights that define liberal democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: Chap. 7).

One should mention that Egypt, Tunisia, and some other countries (though to a lesser extent) followed the path of socioeconomic development, so their human capital used to increase. This explains why formal democracy has gained strength in Egypt, Tunisia, and even Syria.

But this advance which generally promoted people’s self-consciousness and understanding of new values as well as changed their behavior would proceed in different ways in different regions of countries and among different sociodemographic layers. And, further, this diverse diffusion of new ideas, trends, and values significantly separated the core (where the above-mentioned process unfolded much faster) from the periphery, as well as the urbanized and rural regions also in terms of self-expression values and democracy. Besides, in the core and some cities there was also a strong divergence between educated and uneducated people, between the young and the elderly. First, most of the population was united by discontent with the government, but this discontent was caused by different reasons, so the basic requirements would be formulated in different ways. In fact, self-expression and democracy values were important only for the minority. This becomes evident if one

¹⁴They think that three factors, namely, social-economic development, self-expression values, and democratic institutions, make a unity having human development as an underlying theme (ibidem). But this does not seem an ultimate truth to us. The human development proceeds in any society in the course of getting an education, especially at college level, an occupation, choice of the way of life, gaining certain spiritual values, etc. The human development proceeds rather successfully even under totalitarian regimes.

reads the letters from Tahrir (see the Appendix to this chapter) which demonstrate the evolution from the euphoria connected with the overthrow of the Muslim Brothers to a deep disappointment with the situation in the country and the fate of the revolution that emerged as a result of the military coup. This disappointment was caused not the least by the fact that democratic values appeared to be important only for a revolutionary minority and not for everyone.

Here, we should draw a conclusion which is of primary importance in relation to the subject matter of this book. The true religiosity (which is characteristic of the majority of the population in Muslim-majority countries) is in many ways hardly compatible with the values of self-expression and personal liberties (not to mention self-expression and freedom for women). Religious taboos and the belief that certain people (mullahs, saints, sheikhs, imams, etc.) know better how to live, contradict the endeavors of those who aspire for self-expression. Consequently, when the majority of a population is uneducated or completely illiterate, the path toward democracy becomes very complicated.

However, it is Islamism, as a movement, which to some extent separates conscious religiosity from the clergy and spreads this conscious religiosity to a great number of ordinary believers, as well as creating peculiar self-expression values. These values imply that a person is capable of drawing conclusions via her or his own intellectual work and adopts these conclusions not as something external, but as something internalized that passed through the depths of his or her consciousness.

Moreover, as we have already mentioned in Chap. 3, in many modernizing countries, especially in the Islamic ones, only a relatively small minority of population truly adheres to democratic values (and, they rather mean an ideal but not a true democracy, since they have not passed through democratic procedures and have no personal experience). Hence, one can observe complexities and difficulties in establishing democracy during the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. Therefore, Islamism hinders the growth of effective democracy (although, as we have already said, Islam is by no means fatally opposed to it). The Islamist values are quite clear and traditional for most people and do not interfere with anything vital for the existence of people. At the same time, to many people democratic values seem quite vague.

On the other hand, along with increasing education levels, the roles of secular and civic values, associated with the endeavor for freedom, justice, self-realization and an active life position also increases. These values are especially common among students; students form rather active and revolutionary-inclined groups in developing countries (sometimes even in the developed countries, as proved by the events of 1968). Our research shows a fairly significant correlation between the share of students in the total population and the number of anti-government demonstrations (Grinin et al. 2017). It is worth mentioning that, firstly, during Mubarak's rule the number of students increased by several factors, and secondly, these were the students who became the strike force of the Egyptian revolution (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2012).

5.6 How Long Are Revolutionaries Able to Support Democracy?

The Minority and the Majority in the Revolution In what way is the above-discussed related to democracy? First of all, democracy can become the opposition's key idea, a magic wand that is thought to help to solve social problems (naturally implying that democracy is a system that will inevitably bring in "right leaders," that is the oppositionists, to power). And since a rigid regime is in power (principally non-democratic or usurping of that power) and naturally resists the quick establishment of democracy, then to overthrow this regime becomes a goal in itself. This regime embodies society's every evil (which is expected to disappear with the fall of the regime). The regime is claimed to have no positive, valuable, and advanced characteristics (everything positive made by regime is supposed to happen all by itself or it is even spoiled by the regime without which this good would have been even better).

However, in spite of the widespread frustration in society, the ideas of democracy actually penetrate the minds of only a part of the population which often represents neither the society's majority nor even a significant minority. For most people who have a limited cultural intelligence and relatively narrow vital problems, democracy is a mere word (or something established by someone but not necessary for the population to take part in).¹⁵ Under certain circumstances, the ideology-driven minority attracts the majority which is indifferent to democracy (to democracy but not to personal problems) and in this case a revolutionary situation can arise under these circumstances. But from this specific position, it is a long way to a strong democracy. Here, it is appropriate to reflect on the correlation between the revolutionary minority and the majority within different contexts. The revolutionary minority is strong in its activity, persistence, ability to self-organize for joint actions, etc. That is what brings it to the fore of the political scene of revolution; it is ahead and at first seems to represent the whole society. Besides, the radicals/liberals genuinely believe that they are the society, their aspirations are necessary for the society (here the logic that anyone who is against "us" is the enemy of revolution works; who is not with us is against us). If the revolutions are "superficial" and do not establish universal democracy (as was the case in Latin America occasionally or Spain in the nineteenth century), then the greater part of population stays out of politics. The revolutions are

¹⁵The voting abstention in Russia even when the mass voter turnout could be decisive is quite a typical example. Moreover, a large number of voters (especially among the young) almost simultaneously with the right of voting get a steady ideological skepticism. Why voting? What is the use of it? Nothing will ever change. My vote means nothing. However, it seems easy to go and vote. But probably it is difficult as one should make a choice. On the other hand, there is some truth in this skepticism. The other part of the Russian population is accustomed to voting 'they say we should, then we will vote' but also not for the sake of a reasonable voting. In any case, it is out of question that the skepticism of one part of population and the promptness of the other part have been to the advantage of the party in power and of different kind of political chancers. This example explains how a political apathy may in a democratic way support certain forces in power. Karl Kautski called such masses involved in voting 'the political flock of sheep'.

made by a rather numerous segment of population, which is still a minority. Here, by the way, originates one of the most important causes of instability of revolutionary governments, since the masses would quite indifferently witness their overthrow. But if a fair (without falsifications) suffrage is immediately introduced, then the relationship between the revolutionary minority and the majority can significantly change. In such a new situation, the latter actually becomes democratic, but paradoxically it may still continue to be unconvinced in the value of democracy. The example of Egypt proved this rather well. Against the background of meetings and exultation, one can really think that all the people expected radical changes in the spirit of Western democratic and liberal ideology, but it turned out that the major part of the population had rather different values. However, in certain specific situations the democratic system can actually turn profitable to the conservative (“reactionary”) majority, and thus, it becomes more popular with them; meanwhile, this movement toward democracy loses supporters among the revolutionary (“progressive”) minority who strived for power under democratic slogans.

There can be no doubt that the revolutionaries’ activity, their good organization, propaganda, and persistence also play a great part at elections, but still it is less than it used to be when organizing meetings and revolutionary actions. Outcries will not lead to an easy victory. The defeat of the revolutionaries to a great extent is caused by their internal disagreements (which could seem quite unimportant for an external observer but crucial for the parties themselves).

As a result of such a turn, the democratic elections, for whose sake the revolution is actually undertaken, seem to bring victory to conservative forces and with this conservative victory comes the moment of truth. What is more important for the revolutionaries: the democratic ideals or the revolution proper, that is, a constant overthrow and escalation of changes in society? The challenge is solved in different ways by different parties in different countries and situations. Some political forces are unable to reconsider the situation and diverge from their absolutes. Thus, the Mensheviks during the civil war in Russia hesitated to join either the Whites or the Bolsheviks and disappeared as a political force by 1922. But quite frequently it is just the revolutionism (for the sake of rather vague revolutionary principles but with an ultimate urge for power) that becomes of utmost importance. In recent decades, one considers as faked votes any defeat at elections where radicals who previously overthrew the government (or forced it to conduct free elections) failed to win elections (when the hated government actually gives them such an opportunity). The examples of the “color revolutions” in post-Soviet states, in Serbia and other countries prove this rather well. Thereafter, the revolutionaries insisted on a solution by force. The logic is that it is not democracy proper that is of utmost importance

but rather that the opponent defeated at any cost.¹⁶ This logic is quite clear and explicable. But this is the point where revolution and democracy diverge.

In short, in a society with uncertain democratic values the following principle works: “We will support democracy if our candidate wins elections. If he does not, we do not need such a democracy.”¹⁷ The ability to lose elections, to acknowledge the value of rules of democratic game irrespective of who comes to power, to wait for next elections, and to work hard to win—these are actually essential signs of social readiness for democracy.

Since revolutions often occur in societies unprepared for democracy, it often happens that at early and intermediate stages of modernization *the pathways of democracy and revolution eventually diverge*. Their conjunction at relatively early stages is an exception rather than a rule. Of course, as we said above, we remember “velvet revolutions” in Czechoslovakia and some other Eastern European countries. Clearly, it is highly desirable that all revolutions follow the same scenario. However, as has been said previously, at initial stages of modernization this can be hardly realized, as “velvet” revolutions are already the end of a long-lasting social and political development.

Political opponents can make more or less active attempts to turn the revolution to their advantage through reduction, renunciation or abolition of democratic procedures and institutions established during the revolution. Sometimes they succeed; in any case, these attempts do produce some significant effect. It often provokes a dramatic aggravation of the conflict.

Why Should the Pathways of Revolution and Democracy in Countries with Unstable Democracy Inevitably Diverge? Let us dwell on this question. In addition to the above-mentioned reasons (the unpreparedness of society, idealization of democracy etc.) there are a variety of causes.

Firstly, it appears that democracy by itself is insufficient to accomplish the purposes of revolution; you cannot go with democracy alone. Theoretically, democracy is a means to replace a bad government by a good one which is supposed to automatically assure the country’s prosperity. In reality, this is almost certainly impossible. The arrangement of particular matters requires a specific and effective management. But revolutionaries as a rule do not possess such skills. They should either retain old functionaries and managers (who are anyway professional), but then the situation to a large extent remains the same with same abuses; or substitute them, and thus worsen

¹⁶Revolution (as any kind of politics) is hardly a fair contest, in this or that way one uses provocations, disinformation, deceit, and backstage dealings. The provocations often imply stirring up enmity towards government and opponents through direct or indirect murders [shooting from within crowd or something of this kind; with respect to the Revolutions of 1848 and some other revolutionary events see Nefedov (2008); recent examples can be found in Brazil or Ukraine] which evoke the escalation of violence, formation of military guards etc. Thus, violence and other rather precarious means become normal. Consequently, the violation of democracy is not considered as something terrible.

¹⁷The elections in such Caucasian territories as Karachay Cherkessia and South Ossetia, when the opponents renounce the win of the other party and thus trigger the political crisis, is a very illustrative example.

the situation as revolutionary reforms usually aggravate the economic situation (see, e.g., Eckstein 1982, 1986; Zimmermann 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Weede and Muller 1997; Goldstone 2001: 168).

Secondly, since a rapid miracle and general improvement do not happen, and revolutionary actions and ample promises aggravate the situation, it is absolutely essential to find someone to blame and thus, to draw attention away from the real problem.¹⁸ But then what does the respect for democracy really count for? Will the revolutionaries (or radicals, if the moderate revolutionaries come to power) wait for several years to win the next election? Certainly, they will not. The revolutionary epoch is not the time for a quiet life. Everyone wants to obtain the targeted results immediately and without any compromises. If the radicals wait, they will lose their influence, their common followers will start asking hard questions, and so on. In this case, the democratically elected or a transitional (provisional) government finds itself between the hammer and the anvil (i.e., between the radicals, discontent with the worsening situation, and the conservatives displeased with changes and disorders).

Thirdly, the masses, whose main concerns are their own concrete and immediate problems (e.g., food for their children), become disenchanted with democracy. In general, people gradually cease to connect the solution of acute social problems with an abstract idea of democracy, and instead they associate these solutions with the struggle against the enemies of the revolution, the enemies of the president, those of the Party, of Islam, Socialism, etc. This association is clearer and more concrete in these comparisons than with democratic ideals. As a result, conditions for radicalization and the broadening of the revolution emerge. However, as we remember, the more radical is a revolution, the greater the probability that it will transform into reaction.¹⁹ Among other important conditions of stability of liberal

¹⁸The trial of the former rulers is one of the common revolutionary rituals. In Egypt before Morsi's disposition the trial of the President Hosni Mubarak and his sons Ala'a and Gamal and a number of former top police officials was held. Even after the turnover the trial would continue and only in March 2017 the former President returned home. After the take-over the former President Morsi became the accused and after numerous sentences, appellations and retrials he was given a long prison term. It is interesting he was even accused of the escape from prison during the mass turmoil in 2011, that is during revolutionary events. It is worth noting that the military regime surpassed all the previous regimes in Egypt in the number of death sentences. See for example, Letter 7 in the Appendix where Samiha describes the restrictions of freedom, especially in universities, as unprecedented, and a year later she writes that under Mubarak there used to be much more freedom and that she would even like him to return (see Letter 14 in the Appendix to this chapter).

¹⁹The 'reaction'/'counterrevolution' is usually considered to be a definitely negative phenomenon (while revolution is associated, though not so unambiguously, with something positive—among other things just because it is supposed to lead to democracy). But such an interpretation is not always reasonable. The reaction often plays a rather positive role preventing the aggravation of revolutionary upheavals and thus establishing more balanced and viable political institutions. Sometimes positive aspects of political reaction's processes are more pronounced, than the negative ones. For example, the Thermidorian reaction of 1794 can be considered just as an attempt of the French political leaders to mitigate rampage of the Jacobin Terror which caused the fierce civil war in many provinces and to form a new more viable social and political system. One can also point to a positive component in the Bonapartist reaction to the French revolution in 1848. History gives numerous examples. See above about Thermidorian phase of revolution.

regimes, Raymond Aron points out the necessity to limit people's demands in the initial period of development of a constitutional regime (Aron 1993: 141). He writes: "Let us study the situation in France in 1848. The substitution of monarchy by a republic did not increase the society's resources and economic production. For the masses' income to grow it is insufficient to call the regime republican or democratic. The revolutionary changes naturally evoke hopes and demands. And the regime falls victim to discontent." However, it is obvious that the revolutionary masses support revolution not to level down their demands and to wait for something. On the contrary, they think that they have already been waiting for too long. But since the rapid and excessive demands are difficult to satisfy, the country can slide into economic disaster while the democratic regime risks being overthrown.

Fourthly, in this context it turns out that the number of the genuinely democracy-oriented people is very small in comparison with those who strive for power or welfare. In a modernizing, rather poor, narrow-minded, and developmentally retarded society, it cannot be otherwise. In corrupt undemocratic societies, everybody abuses the laws (although, perhaps, bad laws that often complicate life) and accuses everyone (except oneself) of this. Everyone thinks in an undemocratic way, even those who struggle for democracy. Only a few people can stick to their principles, but they have little influence. However, one should realize that globalization can really strengthen the people's strive to change the political regime, but nothing can make up for the people's peculiar political experience which helps to transform political mistakes into political wisdom. This refers not only to insufficiently politically aware masses but also to intellectuals who need much time to strip away their illusions. Thus, globalization increases the gap between the rate of getting information and ideological attitudes from outside, on the one hand, and the accumulation of experience and creation of a necessary economic basis for a transition to stable democracy, on the other.

Fifthly, democracy as a political system, when people accept their defeat and work peacefully in opposition, in modernized society commonly has a generally limited social base. It can persist in one form or another, but reduced and misrepresented, though for a society such a substitution proceeds unnoticeable for some time.

That is why assemblies, parliaments, councils, *majlises* can issue laws and decrees to launch radical changes, but it is the dictatorial authority (a party, central committee, executive committee, leader, etc.), relying on the revolutionary source of power and, therefore, independent from the parliament, that should run the state. It is those authorities that solve the major problems and then submit their decisions for approval. The democratic and pseudo-democratic decision-making process is quite often used to approve determining and fundamental documents and to consolidate the winning party's power. That is what Morsi did with the Constitution in December 2012. In January 2014 Morsi's opponents did the same.

It is not surprising that dictators so like referenda which consolidate their power. *In fact, the democratic institutions turn out to be subsidiary.*

Thus, a genuine and full-scale democracy, that revolution strives to formalize, soon enough starts to contradict both the real purposes of revolution and other political (party, group, and private) goals and conditions.

Democratically elected authorities (or even a transitional pro-democratic government) is either overthrown or separated in full or in part from democracy (transforming into a pseudo-democratic organization like the Long Parliament of England). As has been mentioned above, we speak about societies that have not completed modernization; meanwhile, more culturally developed and advanced societies can frequently transform a post-revolutionary regime into a firmly liberal one.

One should also keep in mind that the key issue of revolution is always one of power, so democracy is acceptable as long as it supports the domination by the most powerful group, party, social stratum, etc.

Since a large-scale and omnipotent democracy does not fit revolutionary transformations, and due to the lack of necessary institutions and the ability to live according to democratic laws (as well as the fact that revolution is always a struggle—sometimes illegal—between opposing forces, involving huge masses of people), *in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period a pure democracy is reduced and transformed to a degree and in different ways* in accordance with society's peculiarities, results of political struggle and other factors. In societies which are ready for democracy and where modernization has been completed, this can be an insignificant reduction (similar to the prohibition to propose a candidate from among the former members of communist parties, etc.). It is worth noting that universal suffrage, taken as a model today, was not legalized in a day, there often were applied voting qualifications. Even in the USA, whose comprehensive democracy fascinated Alexis de Tocqueville (1830), democracy was not perfect. The Amerindians, Afro-Americans, women and a considerable part of men (who acquired the right during Jackson's presidency) were deprived of electoral right. Moreover, the presidential elections were a staged procedure (quite real at that time). In the cradle of modern democracy, Great Britain, in 1830 only a small percentage of population had the voting right. In 1789, in France the part of the Estates-General, which at first declared themselves the National Assembly and then the National Constituent Assembly, passed many well-known laws. But one should remember that the election rules there had little, if anything, to do with the current notion of democracy.

Just as an embryo passes certain developmental stages, the non-democratic societies, striving for democracy, go through evolutionary stages of democracy associated with its limitation. *But in many cases, democracy is limited, because it fails to function to its fullest simply due to the above-mentioned reasons.*

In the course of revolution, these restrictions can be associated with attempts to secure political advantages, and also with revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence (we can observe both of these in Egypt), with the activity of a powerful ideological or any other center (as for example, in Iran), with a dictatorial body, with an introduction of property or political qualifications, with assassination or arrests of the opposition's leaders (what has happened in Egypt recently), with curtailment of free speech and associations, and with the formation of unconstitutional repressive bodies, etc.

The post-revolutionary regime also restricts democracy or simply imitates it. In the contemporary world the most widespread forms of limitation of universal democracy (without which only a few governments perceive themselves legitimate) are different

kinds of falsification of election results which often combine the repression of political opponents (the recent example is Ukraine where until 2014 one of the opposition political leaders was imprisoned, and after 2014 the political activity of many others has been forbidden), and constitutional and legal tricks. Russia shows remarkable examples, and recently Chinese Constitution has been changed in the same direction. Egypt and Syria provide salient examples too. There are also some peculiar cases when there is an unconstitutional or constitutional, but non-democratic, force which enjoys supreme authority (Iran). Other forms of democratic distortion are possible as well. The most widespread one is still the military coup or attempts to conduct a revolutionary overthrow (Georgia and Kyrgyzstan provide numerous examples). The military forces step in when a democratic government decays or degrades or when a state reaches an impasse. Anyway, the course of democratic development is corrected. On the other hand, the military cannot remain in power endlessly without legitimizing the regime, so they have to hand over authority to the civilian community and hold elections.

Thus, the general political course of modernizing societies follows the democratic trend (increasingly approaching the “ideal”), but the fluctuations along this trend can be severe and painful. The development can remain incomplete, oscillating within the controlled democratic system.

In Egypt, the presidential elections of May 26–28, 2014, were much less democratic (even in comparison with the previous ones), because the Muslim Brotherhood was proclaimed a terrorist organization. The same goes for the parliamentary elections that were held in two phases, from 17 October to 2 December 2015. In the conditions of the prohibition of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is not surprising that the pro-government coalition won.

The Pathways of the Transition from an Authoritarian Regime to Democracy

The path to genuine democracy is very long, so the chance is rather good that a new dictatorship will be established. Another important point explains why democracy cannot be established in a post-revolutionary society or, if established, quickly degrades there. “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others,” said Winston Churchill. For the societies that just entered this path, the first part of the phrase is of the utmost importance. Democracy (just as free market and private property) has numerous drawbacks. Mature democratic societies, among other things, have found some means to mitigate them. But in young democracies these drawbacks have excessive forms. And acquiring immunity against such “infantile diseases” of democracy is a long and painful process. As a result, a society can turn out to be abnormal (as in the case with a lack of immunity against drawbacks of private property and free market—actually, rather egoistic institutes if they are not correctly restricted). It is clear that an introduction of formally democratic institutions is absolutely insufficient, since although including multiparty elections, these institutions often conceal and even legitimate an actual dominance of authoritarian rule (Diamond et al. 1995: 8; see also Diamond 1999; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

In conclusion, we should note that the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy can occur in three major ways: through a revolution (quickly from

below), through a military takeover or coup d'état (e.g., the Carnation “Revolution” in Portugal in 1974), and through Reformation (gradually from above). In previous epochs the reformative way was almost impossible, so the path to democracy was paved by revolutions and counterrevolutions. Still some rather successful examples of reformative transition to democracy (or just steps in this direction) can be observed as early as in the nineteenth century. For example, in Japan the parliament was established from above (1889). In Germany Otto Bismarck introduced full male suffrage (1867), while in Prussia the election system proper was established by the Revolution of 1848. Some Latin American states experienced transitions from military dictatorship to democracy, but the latter could not be firmly established in this region, with a few exceptions. However, in the twentieth century, especially in its last decades, due largely to globalization, we can find numerous examples of voluntary dismantling of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes by the very military or other type of dictatorship (in Spain, Chile and other Latin American countries, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and lastly the USSR). Some significant steps toward democratization were also made by the Arab monarchic states. Paradoxically at first sight, but on the eve of the Arab Spring most Arab monarchies appeared much more democratic than the majority of the Arab republics (see, e.g., Truevsev 2011).

Such a non-revolutionary transition to democracy, *ceteris paribus*, can turn out to be more direct and secure. This is especially important against the background of the absence of any significant positive correlation between the democratic government and the GDP growth rates—what is more, in authoritarian states higher GDP growth rates are more likely than in young democracies—let alone post-revolution systems (Eckstein 1982, 1986; Zimmermann 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Weede and Muller 1997; Goldstone 2001: 168; Polterovich and Popov 2007). And in the modernization context economic growth rates are of crucial importance.

5.7 Some Further Events

The Main Events after the July 2013 Coup in Egypt As we have already mentioned, in Egypt, after the coup, a new constitution was adopted. On September 5, 2013, the Constitution Commission under the chairmanship of Amr Moussa began its work on the preparation of the draft Constitution, and on January 14–15, 2014, in Egypt, a referendum was held that approved the new constitution of the country. In May 2014, presidential elections were held, which legitimized el-Sisi's leadership. Thus, the military turned out to be the ruling group again, as this was before June 2012. It should be noted that the constitution gives unprecedented powers to the president and defense minister. In particular, the president (the head of state) is also the head of the executive power under the constitution. He appoints the Prime Minister and sets before him the task of forming a government and submitting his program to the parliament for approval. The president is the chairman of the National Defense Council, which fulfills obligations related to national security issues, including discussion of the budget of the armed forces. The opinion of this Council should be taken

into account when adopting all draft laws relating to the armed forces. The president has the right, in agreement with the Prime Minister, to appoint key government ministers, namely, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Defense and Justice.

As has already been mentioned, as a result of the ban on the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, the boycott of elections on their part and on the part of some liberal groups, in the parliamentary elections in October–December 2015, the pro-government coalition won. But it should be mentioned that the parliament was reformed by a new constitution, it became unicameral instead of bicameral. In general, under the conditions of an actual military dictatorship, the role of parliament is not particularly prominent.

But if we do not take into account the political events connected with the elections, the changes of cabinets and ministers (which took place during all these years), then the primary history of events is connected in Egypt with the opposition to terrorism, which has grown dramatically, and with attempts to cope with economic problems. The scope of terrorist activities and the resultant death toll have grown dramatically. Some clashes with terrorists resemble battles. This situation was the result of the ban of the Muslim Brotherhood and their withdrawal to the underground and with the transition of some of the Islamists to illegal methods of political struggle. Thus, the prohibition of Islamism, which is carried out at the level of the constitution (Article 74 prohibits the creation of political parties or political activities based on religion), as might be expected, led to its radicalization. The problem of terrorism is further aggravated by the activities of cells and followers of the ISIS/Daesh, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, but also in the capital. In particular, on December 11, 2016, a powerful explosion thundered in the cathedral complex in Abbasia in Cairo, where several churches are located, including the cathedral, where the Coptic patriarch usually serves. As a result of the explosion, 27 people were killed and 49 were injured. Responsibility for the terrorist attack was assumed by the ISIS terrorist group. We have already mentioned in Chap. 3 that on October 21, 2017, 58 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Egypt, including 23 officers and 35 privates, were killed in a battle with terrorists in the Al-Wahat area. The Egyptian regime responded by severely cracking down on terrorists (e.g., on December 26, 2017, they hanged 15 militants who attacked the military in 2013). However, the end of the terrorist acts is not visible, and this situation has a negative effect on the country's tourism industry.

As for the economic situation, the revolution and the post-revolutionary years were not the most successful. The country's finances were upset. Nevertheless, recently the governments managed to achieve certain successes. This could be due to the abolition of a number of benefits for the population (this problem was not solved by previous governments). This, by the way, is very characteristic. Governments, which are not popular with the population, are trying in one way or another to support the economic program of helping the poor, despite the cost. Governments that are established as a result of revolutions, often abolish these social programs, because they are not capable of preserving them, but have more support in the population. This is sometimes a natural result. The overthrow of an allegedly bad government leads to a situation that is substantially worse than the prerevolutionary one. The government also in October–November 2016 radically devalued the Egyptian pound, which

beneficially affected exports and trade balances (Issaev et al. 2016). Nevertheless, Egypt's economic achievements should not be regarded as outstanding. Actually, the fact is that the government fell into financial dependence on Saudi Arabia, which significantly limited the country's sovereignty in the international arena and in the MENA region (see this in Chap. 4).

5.8 A Brief Account of the Events of the Arab Spring and Winter in Some Other Countries of the Region

5.8.1 *Yemen*²⁰

The first anti-government protests in Yemen began in January 2011, soon after the victory of the revolution in Tunisia, but at first these protests were rather weak. However, after the news about the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (February 11, 2011), the intensity of protests significantly increased. No doubt, the so-called Al-Jazeera effect (Tausch 2011) played an important role here: The Egyptian revolution was broadcast to the entire Arab World in a colorful and exciting way, encouraging the masses everywhere. "The Happy End of the Egyptian Fairy Tale" gave a new, extraordinarily strong impetus to the rise of anti-government forces in all Arab countries. And now the rhetoric of the majority of protesters has become more political than social: The Arabs are so used to the permanent authoritarianism of their rulers that the departure of the two permanent "elected dictators" shocked many of them (Issaev 2012).

After the protests broke out in the first half of February 2011, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh made several attempts to reduce tension in the society. However, by that time a long-standing conflict between two groups of Yemenite elites—the clan of Saleh and the Ahmars clan had been very clearly festering (whereas the Ahmars controlled many important highly effective units of the Yemeni armed forces). Just as the Egyptian military elite used popular protests to settle accounts with its main enemy, a group of economic elites headed by Gamal Mubarak (see above), the Ahmars' group decided to use popular demonstrations in Yemen to try to defeat its main opponent—the Salehs clan. To this end, to the applause of the gullible international community, the Ahmars group positioned themselves as defenders of "fighters for democracy" against the repression of the "despotic dictatorship" of Saleh. On February 26, 2011, several leaders of the two largest Yemeni tribal confederations, the Hashid and Bakil (grouped around the al-Ahmar clan) announced their transition to the side of the opposition. In March, one of the leaders of the tribal confederation Hashid Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, commander of the northern military district and

²⁰For the preparation of the Yemeni section of this chapter we have relied on the following main sources: Day (2012), Issaev (2012), Issaev and Shishkina (2012), Bonnefoy (2014), Brehony (2015), Issaev and Korotayev (2015), Fraihat (2016), Juneau (2016), Hill (2017), Ragab (2017), Sharp (2017), Blumi (2018), Palik (2018).

the first armored division (one of the most efficient in the country), announced his withdrawal from the General People's Congress—the ruling party. After General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, three more generals and dozens of officers announced their transition to the side of the opposition. The rebel forces arrived in Sanaa allegedly “to protect the demonstrators” in the central square, as well as near the buildings of the Central Bank, the Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Palace (Issaev 2012; Issaev and Shishkina 2012).

The main party of moderate Islamists in Yemen, at that time, was the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (*al-Tajammu' al-Yamani lil-Islāh*) frequently called “al-Islah” that has rather close links both with the Yemen Muslim Brothers, as well as salafis, and with the Ahmar clan.²¹ Quite predictably this party joined the Ahmar clan in its attempts to overthrow Ali Abdullah Saleh.

After the beginning of the Arab Spring, another political Islamist force, the Houthis, also entered the legal political arena. The Houthis, officially called Ansar Allah (“Supporters of Allah”), are members of an Islamic movement that emerged from Sa'dah in northern Yemen in the 1990s. The Houthi movement, which arose in 1992, began an armed struggle with the authorities of Sanaa in the early 2000s. In 2004, the then leader of the Houthis, Badreddin al-Houthi (whose family name became the name of the entire movement), during Ali Saleh's visit to the Sa'ada province accused the Yemeni authorities of selling Yemen to America. The attempt to arrest al-Houthi resulted in an armed clash between his supporters, of whom there were about 60 people, and the authorities. Thus began the first war in the province of Saada, which ended with the murder of the leader of the movement, and the leadership of “Ansar Allah” passed to his brother Abd al-Malik al-Houthi. After that, armed clashes between the Houthis and the ruling regime flared up five times until 2010, when the warring parties managed to agree to a truce. This movement's Islamism is of very peculiar nature since its leadership belongs to Zaydi branch of the Shia Islam (thus, it is not surprising to see the Houthis supported by Iran).

On November 23, 2011, in Riyadh, a plan was signed to settle the Yemen crisis, generated by the Arab Spring. This ended the 33-year period of Ali Abdullah Saleh's rule. After Ali Saleh's resignation, Vice-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi took the post on the basis of the results of the uncontested elections on February 21, 2012.

Since early 2012, power in Yemen has gradually passed into the hands of the al-Ahmar family, represented by the sons of the leader of the Hashid tribal confederation Abdullah al-Ahmar, who died in 2007. At the same time, they acted in an unofficial coalition with the interim President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who increasingly emerged from the control of Saleh and strove to become the real leader of the country. Their main allies were the Islamist party Al-Islah and the Yemenite Muslim Brotherhood, which rose due to the wave of success of their ideological inspirers in Egypt (Bonney 2014). But success accompanied the coalition only as

²¹ It is remarkable that in the period before the Arab Spring the Yemeni moderate Islamists from the Islah Party demonstrated their high political pragmatism. For example, in 2003 it joined the left-wing Yemeni Socialist Party to form the Joint Meeting alliance (together with three other smaller leftist parties) to establish a joint opposition to that time ruling General People's Congress.

long as the Muslim Brotherhood was in power in Egypt; the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi (and the subsequent inter-Arab isolation of the association and its foreign cells) sharply undermined the positions of the temporary Yemeni leadership.

After the failure of the National Dialogue Conference in early 2014, the main political forces in Yemen focused on two opposing camps—the General People’s Congress, led by Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been displaced during the Arab Spring and the Ahmars’ camp, already led by Sadiq al-Ahmar. Already in 2011, the two forces found themselves at opposite political poles, beginning to seek allies among the other political actors in Yemen: Al-Islah and the Muslim Brotherhood rallied around al-Ahmar, while the General People’s Congress joined an alliance with the Baath Party (Bonneyoy 2014), the “Union of Popular Forces,” and also began to pursue a policy of unofficial rapprochement with the Ansar Allah movement. Of particular interest was the secret alliance of the General People’s Congress with the Houthi Islamists, which a few years ago seemed unthinkable.²² During the reign of the former president, the extreme north of Yemen was considered the most insecure region in the country. The feud between the former regime and the Houthis had deep roots, and President Saleh himself fought against Ansar Allah six times during his reign. However, in early 2014, these two political forces were on the same side of the barricades, acting as a serious counterbalance to the current government in the person of the Ahmars. Thus, the struggle was not between secular and Islamist forces, but between different groups of secular forces supported on both sides by various Islamist forces.

It was not a coincidence that the Ahmars and al-Islah failed to develop good relations with the Houthis. The fact is that with the active assistance of Al-Islah in Yemen, the Salafi grouping al-Nusra was created, which was to enter into a confrontation with Ansar Allah. In this case, such a tactic has already occurred in the past, when in the second half of the 2000s the regime used Salafi radicals in the interests of its own domestic policy. This was due primarily to General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who directly led six military operations in Saada from 2004 to 2010 and repeatedly resorted to the services of the Salafis in their struggle against the Houthis.

The Ahmars, along with the “Muslim Brotherhood” managed to quarrel with all the leading political forces in the country. The problems of the South of the country (where speeches demanding the re-establishment of an independent state within the boundaries of the former PDRY were ceaseless) were not solved. Moreover, the power increasingly associated with the Islamists in Sanaa did not suit the southerners in memory of which memories of 1994 are still alive when the North pursued a hegemonic policy toward the South based on the ideas of the spiritual leaders of al-

²²The Houthis emerged in the 2000s as radical Islamists-Zaydis but became more moderate after 2011 when they came from underground and started legal political activities (but mostly after their actual coming to power in Sanaa in September 2014) (see, e.g., Issaev and Korotayev 2015). Thus, they demonstrate that work within legal political framework and the strife to come to power by legal means can impact the Islamists making them more moderate. However, as we have already pointed in Chap. 3, this is an unstable situation. With exacerbation of political environment for Islamists they may become more radical and return to former methods of struggle.

Islah (first of all, al-Zindani and al-Daylani) who declared jihad against the “atheists” of the South.²³

Therefore, the situation in which the power in Yemen gradually began to be monopolized in the hands of the coalition of Mansour Hadi, the Ahmars, Islah and their allies represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, put their opponents on one side of the barricades and forced them to go to extreme measures. Obviously, such prospects were categorically opposed by the Houthis, the General People’s Congress, and the southerners. This predetermined the “Revolution of 21 September” in 2014, after which the Ahmars were forced to leave the country, while “Ansar Allah,” pursuing their policy of concluding alliances with the Yemeni tribes, as well as members of the General People’s Congress, in fact, established control over Northern Yemen.

The next aggravation of this situation occurred on January 17, 2015, when the Houthis arrested the head of the presidential administration Ahmed bin Mubarak on suspicion of an attempt to falsify the draft constitution of the country. On January 18, after unsuccessful attempts to agree on the release of bin Mubarak, Mansur Hadi convened an emergency meeting of the Yemen Security Council, in which all the law enforcement agencies were instructed to bring troops to the streets of Sana on January 19 at 5:00 am Yemeni time. However, “Ansar Allah” by the evening of January 18, learned about the plans of the president and appealed to their supporters in the army and security services not to obey the order of Mansour Hadi. The Houthis played an advanced role and in the morning on January 19 surrounded the presidential palace in Sanaa as well as the National Security Bureau. Throughout the day, fighting continued, which then ended in the evening when “Ansar Allah” managed to take control of the territory of the presidential palace and the building of the Bureau of National Security.

On January 22, 2015, President Hadi filed a resignation petition and found himself under actual house arrest. Members of the government of Yemen also sent a petition to the President of the country about their resignation, and on February 6, the Houthi Revolutionary Committee was established as an interim authority in the country. By mid-February, the coalition of Houthis and forces faithful to Ali Abdallah Saleh had established control over virtually all of Northern Yemen and also a part of South Yemen. On February 15, 2015, the Houthis began their assault of Aden.

On February 21, 2015, Hadi managed to escape from Sanaa to Aden, after being under house arrest for a month. There, he managed to meet with the governors of the southern provinces and make a statement on the withdrawal of his resignation.

The revolution of September 21, 2014–February 6, 2015, brought about a sharp rejection on the part of Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States, and a number of Arab countries, which then turned the intra-Yemeni conflict into a regional problem. The

²³In 1994, an armed conflict took place between the Yemeni government in Sana’a and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in Aden headed by Ali Salem al-Bid, which ended with the defeat of the Southerners. During the Civil War, the religious leaders of al-Islah Shaykhs al-Zindani and al-Daylani issued fatwas against the residents of the South that justified massive violations of political and economic rights on the part of the northerners as well as the removal of the YSP from government (see Day 2012).

situation was further aggravated by the fact that various radical Islamist groups were already operating in Yemen, which alarmed the international community and the Gulf States.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) arose in 2009, but in the early years of the organization's activities, it was not considered a primary threat to the security of Yemen. However, after the resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh, AQAP harshly intensified its activities, in particular in the oil province of Marib, which in turn was due to both external and internal circumstances. The emergence of the "Islamic State" (ISIS/Daesh) can be referred to the former circumstance. Various radical Islamist groups saw in Daesh a real power to follow. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which swore allegiance to the Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in February 2015, was no exception. A very important role here was played by the intensification of the influence of the Houthis, who are incompatible with al-Qaeda at the existential level.

The pressure of the Saudis in many respects forced President Hadi to abandon his abdication that he signed in January 2015, to transfer de facto his capital to Aden, to create a new government and to begin the fight against Ansar Allah.

Saudi Arabia also tried to consolidate the international community in exerting pressure on the Houthis. In particular, Riyadh demanded that its Arab neighbors support the deposed President Mansour Hadi.

On March 26, 2015, Saudi air strikes marked the start of the invasion of Yemen by the coalition forces of the Arab states led by Saudi Arabia within the framework of Operation Decisive Storm. The battle for Aden began between the Houthis who seized the city and the Saudi coalition. In July 2015, the Houthis were knocked out of the city. By August the Saudi coalition (in which an important military role was played by the UAE from the very beginning) concentrated a powerful mechanized fist in the southern Yemeni provinces and, allied with the Yemeni detachments supporting President Mansour Hadi, started advancing northward. However, the bloc of Houthis and forces supporting Ali Abdullah Saleh managed to organize a fairly effective rebuff of the Saudi coalition, and the civil war in Yemen took on a protracted character. In general, the "front line" between the two coalitions has gone quite close to the old state border between the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Note that the Islamists are active participants in the both coalitions. The Zaidi Islamists, in fact, led the northern coalition, and Islamists from the Islaq party joined the southern coalition. At the same time, the radical Islamists of al-Qaeda and Daesh proved to be at war with the forces of both coalitions.

At the same time, as the civil war dragged on, antagonisms began to develop within both coalitions. The aggravation of these antagonisms between the Houthis and the General People's Congress (GPC) of Ali Abdullah Saleh led to the murder of Saleh by the Houthis on December 4, 2017. However (to the surprise of many observers) the Northern Coalition was able to survive even this shock.

The antagonisms in the southern coalition have worsened to an even greater degree. The fact is that the Yemeni portion of the southern coalition was initially heterogeneous. On the one hand, the moderately Islamist Ahmars—Islah block came to this coalition, fighting primarily for the overthrow the Houthi—GPC regime in

Sanaa. But, on the other hand, it includes the rather secularist Southern Movement (*al-Hirāk al-Janūbiyy*), which advocates the independence of South Yemen. At the same time, the antagonisms worsened even among the external participants of the anti-Houthi coalition. In the summer of 2017, as a result of a sharp deterioration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Qatar withdrew from the coalition. On the other hand, relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen are extremely complicated, due to the Emirates pursuing their own policy in Yemen that differs very significantly from the one of the Saudis. The most important point is that the Emirates support the Southern Movement, whereas Saudis rely on the Ahmars' block. Meanwhile, on the 4th of April 2017 the Southern Movement formed the Southern Transitional Council and started taking practical steps in order to form an independent state in the South, and in late January 2018 Aden saw open fighting between the forces of the Ahmars (that are formally loyal to the President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi) and the forces of the Southern Transitional Council.

Thus, the situation in Yemen becomes more and more complicated.

5.8.2 *Libya*²⁴

The first wave of the civil war in Libya more or less came to its end after the assassination of Muammar al-Qaddafi on the 20th of October, 2011. In 2012, there were certain signs of the normalization of internal circumstances and the construction of new state structures. In July 2012, Libyans held their first parliamentary elections. In August 2012, the National Transitional Council (formed during the Libyan 2011 Revolution) officially handed power over to the newly elected General National Congress (*al-Mu'tamar al-Wataniyy al-'Amm*), which was then tasked with the formation of an interim government. 2012 saw a substantial economic recovery after the economic collapse of 2011 (ADB 2014). "Subsequent steps to strengthen the democratic process in Libya included the passage of a law in July 2013 that established elections for a Constituent Assembly, which would then draft Libya's first post-Qaddafi constitution" (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015: 13). Some analysts continued to forecast the further stabilization in Libya even in early 2014.

However, already in late 2011 and early 2012 a few symptoms emerged indicating that the country was heading toward a catastrophe. Revolutionary militias refused to disarm. Actually, just the opposite was observed: "In fact the number of 'revolutionaries' who joined the militias after Qaddafi had been defeated far exceeded the number that fought against the regime during the first eight months of Libya's uprising. 'The total number of revolutionaries who fought Qaddafi across the entire country was less than 40,000,' said a prominent militia leader. 'We fought from day

²⁴For the preparation of the Libyan section of this chapter we have relied on the following main sources: al-Qadhdhafi (1998), David and Mzioudet (2014), Barfi (2014), Baum and Zhukov (2015), Eriksson (2015), Fraihat (2016), Willcoxon (2015, 2017), Bandeira (2017: 203–207, 220–224), Anderson (2017). Additionally, one of the sources for this section is represented by personal experiences of one of the authors who spent two years in Libya during the Qaddafi era.

one of the revolution in Misrata, and we know our estimate is very accurate. We don't understand how the number has reached 200,000. We don't know where that 160,000 came from" (Fraihat 2016: 27). Fraihat further notes: "Many ex-combatants were reluctant to disarm and join the formal structure of the state simply because they would likely lose the privileges they enjoyed after the revolution" (ibidem). However, it appears that, in addition, many Libyans decided to arm themselves (using the opportunity of weak government and abundance of uncontrolled arms around) in order to get the same privileges the armed revolutionaries enjoyed (but, of course, also in order to defend themselves and their families against the background of the absence of effective law enforcement structures).

In many respects the second wave of the Libyan Civil War (the start of an active phase of this wave can be dated as the 16th of May, 2014) turned out to be a direct continuation of its first wave (February–October, 2011). Indeed, one of the salient features of the first wave of this civil war was that the anti-Qaddafi revolutionaries failed to develop anything like a unified command structure. The Libyan *Jamahiriyah* was an extremely atomized society with extremely badly developed links beyond the level of city and village communities. In some respects this was connected with Qaddafi's attempts to apply his "Third Universal Theory" described in his "Green Book" (*al-Kitab al-Akhdar*) (see, e.g., al-Qadhdhafi 1998). According to this theory the state is a sort of "absolute evil." Hence, officially there was no state in Libya under Qaddafi, whereas *Jamahiriyah* was regarded as a form of political organization that was supposed to be different from the state (and, of course, much superior to it). Qaddafi's theory was strongly against the representative democracy; this theory regarded the direct democracy as the only really legitimate form of government. As a result, in al-*Jamahiriyah* the most legitimate political structures were the so-called People's Congresses (*mu'tamarat sha'biyyah*) that united all the adult Libyan citizens of a certain locality who were supposed to meet together from time to time and to make relevant political decisions. No civil society institutions were endorsed at the national level. "Party" was considered as bad a word as "state." Hence, under Qaddafi, officially, all the parties were banned in Libya. Officially, there were no parties in Libya at all. Including the ruling party. Officially, Qaddafi's ruling party did not exist either. In reality, a sort of such a party still existed. It was called "Revolutionary Committees" (*al-Lijan al-Thauriyah*), but the Revolutionary Committees being very powerful organs had no official status and acted in a secrete way (e.g., ordinary Libyans were not supposed to know who was the head of their local "Revolutionary Committee"). They represented a rather effective national political structure, but they were one of the first victims of the 2011 Libyan revolution that totally destroyed the "Revolutionary Committees."

Against this background, it was hardly surprising to see in 2011 that in the territories liberated from Qaddafi the only effective authorities turned out to be city and town councils—and that after 2011, as was noted by some observers, "municipal elections in cities and towns often carried more weight than national elections" (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015: 14).

It is precisely against this background that one could hardly find it surprising to see that in 2011 the anti-Qaddafi revolutionaries failed to develop anything like a

unified command structure. Already in 2011 militias of different cities acted as separate military units, and the first hostilities between different revolutionary detachments developed well before the Qaddafi assassination (the most famous episode seems to be the murder of Major General Abdul Fatah Younis Al-Obeidi, the formal commander-in-chief of the revolutionary “National Liberation Army,” by one of the anti-Qaddafi militias on the 28th of July, 2011).

Two city militias played the most important role in the overthrowing of the Qaddafi regime. These were militias of Misurata and Zintan. These were militias of those two cities (and not the militias of the Benghazi National Transitional Council) that “liberated” Tripoli in August, 2011. And their prominent role continued well after the fall of Qaddafi.

The fall of the Qaddafi regime contributed to the appearance on the surface of some new political actors. And among them the Libyan Islamists were among the most important. Note that one of the Libyan radical Islamist groups (formed out of the veterans of the war against the USSR in Afghanistan), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (*al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya*), tried to overthrow the Qaddafi regime as early as 1990, but received an absolutely strong rebuff which was rather characteristic of Qaddafi. However, after the fall of Qaddafi, the Libyan Islamists again came to the surface. Among them, the Justice and Construction Party/*Hizb al-'Adalah wa-'l-Bina'* and the salafist party *al-Watan* are closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In April–May 2013, a powerful forerunner of the imminent catastrophe was the seizure of the buildings of the Libyan Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice in Tripoli by armed formations that demanded that the General National Congress approve the “Political Isolation Law.”²⁵

In September 2013, the strongest blow to the Libyan economy was caused by the seizure by the Cyrenaic “federalists” of oil loading terminals in Eastern Libya. Another notorious precursor was the kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan by armed gunmen on October 10, 2013.

In the General National Congress, Islamists began to dominate, pushing laws declaring Shari'ah law and establishing a special committee to review all existing laws to ensure they comply with Islamic law; among other things, they adopted new rules on gender segregation and compulsory hijab at Libyan universities. Such laws aroused discontent among a large part of Libyan society.

In January 2014, the term of the GNC expired, but instead of announcing new elections, Congress extended its term of office for one year. An especially destabilizing role was played by the above-mentioned political isolation law that “prevented anyone who had held even a mid-level role in the Qaddafi regime between 1969 and 2011 from serving in a wide array of positions in politics, the media, and academia” (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015: 17; see also David and Mzioudet 2014: 5). At the same time, the GNC also created a special Integrity and Reform Commission for the armed forces, which was supposed to identify and dismiss from the armed forces all those connected with the Qaddafi regime. Moreover, representatives of power struc-

²⁵Earlier the U.S. Ambassador John Christopher Stevens was killed when the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked by militants on September 11–12, 2012.

tures risked being physically destroyed. Indeed, their murders by Islamist militia in the spring of 2014 occurred literally every day (see, e.g., Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015: 15). All this could not but produce among the Libyan professional military the desire to give Islamists a rebuff. They only needed a charismatic leader who could lead such a rebuff. And such a leader appeared. His name was Khalifa Haftar.

Khalifa Belqasim Haftar is a professional military who (aged 26) in 1969 took part in Qaddafi's coup and became a part of the military-political elite of the Jamahiriyyah. In many respects he is a rather typical representative of the generation of the Arab secular nationalists ("Nasserists") of the 1960s. As Barak Barfi notes, "he is an unreformed Nasserist, admiring Arab leaders who promote a secular agenda and form a bulwark against Islamist extremism" (Barfi 2014: 12). In 1987, being one of the leaders of the Libyan Expeditionary Force in Chad, he was taken prisoner during hostilities. In Chad (apparently not without some pressure from some special services), he joined the anti-Qaddafi Libyan National Salvation Front (LNSF) and soon headed its armed wing there called "the Libyan National Army," LNA (incidentally, it does not appear coincidental that Haftar gave the same name to the military formation that he organized in Libya after the anti-Qaddafi revolution). In 1990, there was a coup in Chad, the new authorities tried to normalize relations with Qaddafi and insisted on the withdrawal of "the Libyan National Army" from Chad. Americans first evacuated the LNA to Nigeria, then to Zaire, then to Kenya—but finally to the USA. It was in this country where Haftar spent most of his time till the Libyan Revolution, living mostly in Virginia. Soon after the start of the revolution, on March 12, 2011 he returned to Libya and tried to become the chief commander of the rebel forces, but the National Transitional Council preferred to appoint Major General Abdul Fatah Younis Al-Obeidi (who occupied one of the highest positions in the Qaddafi establishment) as the commander-in-chief of the "Free Libyan Army." Still he acted as a military leader in few operations in the revolutionary war (e.g., in the Zintan area), but failed to be recognized as the formal commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces.

The time between the end of the first phase of the Libyan civil war in October 2011 and the start of its second phase was spent by Haftar with "barnstorming campaign to garner support for his movement... In the year leading up to his May 2014 offensive, Hifter cultivated relationships with such influential eastern Libyan tribes as the Ubaydat, Awaqir and Baraghitha. Hifter was also able to tap into networks he had established in the nascent Libyan army, and received financial support from Libyan businessmen concerned about the influence of Islamist militias. As a result, by the onset of the May offensive, sources in the Libyan military believed that Hifter had already established forces "worthy of a professional army". One reason many Libyan military and security personnel were eager to back Hifter is that they had become a primary target of jihadist violence" (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015: 14–15).

The start of the active stage of the second phase of the Libyan civil war can be dated quite accurately. The 16th of May, 2014. It was this date when Khalifa Haftar announced the start of the Operation Dignity (*'Amaliyyat al-Karamah*) against the Islamists «"in order to eliminate the extremist terrorist" groups that have been destabilizing the country» (Barfi 2014: 1). Haftar prepared the operation quite well,

as a result of which a significant number of combat-ready military units announced support for the operation on the same day. He began his operation in Benghazi. But already on the 18th of May the Operation Dignity extended to Tripoli when pro-Haftar militias from Zintan raided and stormed the General National Congress (GNC) building in the Libyan capital (it seems hardly coincidental that for some time during the 2011 revolution Haftar commanded some of Zintan militias). The GNC was saved by Misurata militias, but the Zintani raid still had rather important consequences, as it forced the GNC to announce new parliamentary elections. The elections to the House of Representatives (*Majlis al-Nuwwab*) were held on the 25th of June against the background of the continuing fighting between Haftar's Libyan National Army and the GNC allied militias. At these elections (that had a very low turnout of about 18%) the Islamists were defeated.

In July 2014 anti-Haftar coalition (it is often denoted as "Islamist-Misurata Bloc," or "Dawn Coalition") started its counteroffensive.

The anti-Haftar counteroffensive began on July 13, 2014, and was named "Operation Libya Dawn" (*'Amaliyyat Fajr Libiya*). Its main aim was to gain full control over the Libyan capital and the main fighting took place around the Tripoli Airport controlled by pro-Haftar Zintani militias. The full control of the Islamist-Misurata alliance over Tripoli was achieved by August 23, 2014. And the House of Representatives (dominated by secularist pro-Haftar forces) had to move to Tobruq in the far east of Libya near the Egyptian border. On the other hand, the Dawn coalition reconvened the General National Council (which had been legally dissolved following the June 25 elections). On August 8, 2014, those members of the former GNC who refused to recognize the results of June 25 elections (and who were mostly members of the Islamist-Misurata alliance) proclaimed themselves as a new General National Congress to serve as a replacement of the newly elected House of Representatives (whose legitimacy the new GNC denied). They formed the "National Salvation Government," appointed Nouri Abusahmain as president and Omar al-Hasi as prime minister.

In the meantime, the House of Representatives in Tobruq appointed its own cabinet and prime minister, eventually making Khalifa Haftar the head of their army (thus, Haftar's "Libyan National Army" was legitimized²⁶).

Thus, a sort of diarchy was established; after August 2014 Libya saw a real (though mostly low intensity) war between the internationally recognized government in provincial Tobruq (dominated to some degree by secularists) and the internationally unrecognized government in the Libyan capital, Tripoli (dominated to some degree by Islamists).

On the other hand, as Barak Barfi notes, "viewing the conflict as Islamists against non-Islamists oversimplifies the situation" (Barfi 2014: 9). According to Lisa Anderson's observations, "Haftar's Dignity coalition was made up of Qadhafi-era soldiers, Cyrenaican separatists, and federalists seeking greater autonomy for the eastern

²⁶Note, however, that relationships between Haftar and Tobruq government have always been far from ideal. A very high degree of internal rivalry have been observed within both Tripoli and Tobruq alliances from the very beginning.

region, fighters from Zintan who were opposed to the Berbers of Jabal Nafusa, and some tribes from Fezzan” (Anderson 2017: 242–243). Note also that “long-standing tensions between associates of Sheikh Sadeq al-Gheriani, who was appointed Mufti in 2011, and adherents of a particular strand of Salafism inspired by a Saudi sheikh called Rabee al-Madkhali, have increased in recent years. Colloquially known as Madkhalis, they detest the Muslim Brotherhood and all forms of political Islam. As a result, many Madkhalis joined Haftar’s Operation Dignity in eastern Libya. Their critics suspect they may be a Trojan horse for Saudi influence in Libya” (Fitzgerald 2018: 7). In fact, this hardly appears surprising if we recollect that in July 2013 the Saudi-sponsored Egyptian salafi al-Noor party supported the coup that toppled the Muslim Brothers’ government in this country (see above).

On the other hand, “the group aligned against Haftar, which called itself Libya Dawn, was a ... disparate collection of former members of the LIFG,²⁷ newly assertive Berber nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the business elite of Misrata” (Anderson 2017: 243). Thus, this coalition included a number of Islamist groups (both moderate and radical), whereas the most important party among the moderate Libyan Islamists is the party of the Libyan Muslim Brothers [“the Justice and Construction Party”²⁸ (JCP)]. On the other hand, this coalition includes Berber nationalists (who allied with the Islamists largely because of the conflicts between the Berber towns of the Nafusa Mountains and Zintani militias allied with Haftar) and the Misurata militias (who constitute the most effective fighting force of the alliance²⁹ and who are not necessarily Islamist, but rather ally with Libyan Islamists for tactical purposes). In view of the subject of the present monograph, it is especially important to note that the relationships between moderate and radical Islamists within the Dawn Alliance were very uneasy from the very beginning.

For example, “as Operation Dignity forces’ political standing was improving, splits emerged in Benghazi between hardline and moderate Islamists after a group of Benghazi-based Islamist notables with links to Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood-linked party JCP announced the establishment on 16 August of a shura council. The council was designed to serve as a reconciliation initiative to ‘find solutions to the problems of the city’. The BRSC³⁰ issued a rejoinder condemning the shura’s creation, accusing the JCP of trying to ‘control the political landscape of the country while ignoring the revolutionaries’, and asserting that the BRSC would “not fight for the sake of democracy or the National Congress”, but only “for the sake

²⁷LIFG = “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group” (*Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libiya*) was an armed Islamist group that was formed in 1995 from those Libyan jihadists who fought in Afghanistan. It had links with al-Qaeda and shortly after the September, 11 attacks it was banned by the UN Security Council.

²⁸The point that this name is rather similar to the names of the party of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in Egypt (“Freedom and Justice Party”), but especially to the name of the main moderate Islamist parties of Morocco and Turkey (“Justice and Development Party”, ideologically rather closely related to the Muslim Brothers) is not coincidental at all. And it is not coincidental either that Turkey (led by its Justice and Development Party) supports the Islamist-Misurata coalition in Libya.

²⁹For example, in 2016 these militias played the most important role during the storm of the actual Libyan capital of the Islamic State, Sirte.

³⁰BRSC = radical Islamist “Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council”.

of God” (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015: 28–29)—thus Libyan radical Islamists virtually accused Muslim Brotherhood linked moderate Islamists in fighting for the sake of democracy rather than for the sake of God. And later on the relationships between radical and moderate Islamists in the Libyan Dawn camp frequently escalated into violent clashes.

This was further complicated by infighting within both camps, by city and tribal militias that pursued their own agendas. The overall extremely complex situation was further complicated by the ethnic dimension of the Libyan conflict. Tuareg and Tubu tribal militias took a rather active part in the conflict in Southern Libya. In fact, they sided with different parties of the conflict not so much for ideological reasons, but rather in order to pursue their own ethnic agendas.

External forces are also rather important. Haftar has a very strong backing on the part of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi; actually, al-Sisi who violently suppressed the Muslim Brothers in Egypt serves as a role figure for Haftar who tries to suppress violently the Muslim Brothers (as well as other Islamists) in Libya; it appears that el-Sisi’s success in Egypt was a vigorous stimulus for Haftar to undertake the same in Libya. But of course the support of Haftar by el-Sisi’s Egypt (and the UAE that also acts as one of the main enemies of the Muslim Brothers in the Arab World) is not simply moral. At various stages of the Libyan Civil War, they have supported Haftar with training, ammunition, and intelligence, as well as with air strikes. For el-Sisi also a possible victory by Haftar is important not only morally. Haftar is important for him as a bulwark against the penetration of radical Islamists from Libya to Egypt—note that Libya and Egypt share a vast zone of Sa’ada tribes, and the success of radical Islamists in Eastern Libya (now controlled by Haftar) will almost inevitably lead to a spillover to neighboring parts of Egypt [where the anti-Sisi sentiments appear to be rather strong (Issaev and Korotayev 2014b; Korotayev and Issaev 2015)].

On the other hand, quite predictably the Tripoli coalition is supported by Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan (but not as actively as the Tobruq coalition is supported by Egypt and the UAE) (see, e.g., European Council on Foreign Relations 2018).

On October 5, 2014, radical Islamists in the eastern Libyan port city of Derna pledged their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and proclaimed themselves part of the ISIS. On the Libyan scene, thus, an even more radical Islamist player appeared. It is noteworthy that in 2016, the moderate Islamists of Tripolitania (acting with the direct support of the USA) played a key role in the smashing of the Libyan branch of Daesh and the taking of their actual capital in Libya, Sirte; their role here was much more salient than the one of the Cyrenaic secularists of Khalifa Haftar.

Shortly after the start of the second wave of the civil war in Libya, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) began to attempt to reconcile the conflicting sides. As a result of these efforts, a Political Agreement was signed on December 17, 2015, at a conference in Shkirat, Morocco. This agreement implied the creation of the Presidential Council and the Government of National Unity. Fayez al-Sarraj became the head of the Council and Government; he was, on the one hand, a former member of the Tobruq parliament, and on the other hand, in 2014, he served as the Minister of Housing and Utilities in the Cabinet of the General National Congress, and, thus, could be regarded as a compromise figure. The Presidential Council was to receive the command of the Libyan National Army. The agreement was unanimously

approved by the UN Security Council, which welcomed the formation of the Council and recognized the legitimacy of the government of Fayeze al-Sarraj. Deputies of House of Representatives in Tobruq adopted a decision on January 26, 2016, on the approval of the Shkirat Agreement and the presidential council, headed by al-Sarraj. The Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayeze al-Sarraj, and six other members of the Presidential Council and proposed cabinet arrived in Tripoli on the 30th of March 2016. The next day, GNA took control of the Prime Minister's office, whereas the General National Congress appointed prime minister Khalifa al-Ghawil fled to Misurata.

However, already in summer 2016 the Libyan House of Representatives withdrew its recognition of the GNA by voting against it. A part of the remnants of the General National Congress did not recognize the Government of National Accord either. However, the GNA is still considered to be the internationally recognized Libyan government.

Thus, the Shkirat Agreement has not led to the end of the partition of the country. There are still two main competing governments—more Islamist in Tripoli, and more secularist in Tobruq, but unlike in the period prior to the Shkirat Agreement, this is the current Tripoli government rather than the current Tobruq one that has international recognition.

5.8.3 *Syria*

The Syrian impasse today is not just an insoluble knot of contradictions within a single country or even a region. This is, in fact, a global impasse that demonstrates the futility of the US-West course to intensify confrontation with Russia and regional powers, to undermine stability for the sake of illusory benefits, a policy that ignores the interests of many countries and their legitimate desire to live differently than the West. This is a dead end, which demonstrates that neither flirting with radical Islamists, nor attempting to use force against them, are productive. On the contrary, all this Western activity gives the radicals extra strength. The brief but vivid history of the Arab Spring, which has degenerated into “winter” (as well as the Iraqi tragedy that has lasted for fifteen years), shows that the most effective deterrent and barrier from the spread of radical Islamism were just authoritarian secular regimes, against which was sent a wave of radical revolutions. Thus, the way out of the Syrian impasse, as well as from the Middle Eastern impasse, is to find a compromise of interests, to establish the most stable regimes in all states where they have been shaken, as well as to support those regimes that have managed to establish order in their countries.

At the turn of 2013/2014 the situation in the region seemed to foreshadow the general development of further events in the form of an intensification of confrontation precisely along the lines of the Sunni-Shiite confrontation, with a preponderance in favor of the Shiites. The events that developed in the first months of 2014 also seemed to support this. The ongoing clashes between Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh weakened the overall potential of the Sunni radicals who fought in Syria and allowed the Syr-

ian regime's armed forces to develop a successful offensive against their positions. The relative success of Daesh in the confrontation with its radical rivals was also in favor of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes, especially since the leadership of al-Qaeda in the person of Ayman al-Zawahiri expressed in this confrontation the unequivocal support of Jabhat al-Nusra, recognizing them as its only legitimate branch in Syria, while simultaneously rejecting such a status for Daesh.

With sufficient coordination of efforts between the leadership of Syria and Iraq, conditions were created for those countries to deliver a joint, decisive blow, primarily against Daesh, which could help achieve a strategic advantage in the confrontation with radical Islamists in both countries. However, this did not happen soon, and the victory of Daesh over Jabhat al-Nusra and the subsequent establishment of a "Caliphate" in the territories of Syria and Iraq seized by the Islamists created for a time a fundamentally new situation in the region.

After the creation of the Islamic State/Daesh, the conflict finally overstepped the country framework. Thus, the regional conflict acquired a truly multidimensional character, which significantly increased the further risks of its proliferation toward any of the countries located here. At the same time, the risks of transformation of any of serious internal conflicts into region-wide ones increased.

Let us repeat once again that the Syrian conflict has turned into a political impasse, and the impasse is not just regional, but global. As early as 2015, it seemed that the opposing forces in Syria themselves had no apparent advantage and that the war was reaching the point of exhaustion. Since then, a certain advantage has emerged, the two most powerful militarily forces have arisen. These are the Assad regime supported by Russia and Iran, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) backed by the USA. Note that the core of the SDF is constituted by People's Protection Units (known as YPG, an abbreviation of their Kurdish name—*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*). In its turn YPG is an armed wing of the Kurdish secular leftist Democratic Union Party.³¹

These were these two forces that destroyed (in cooperation with their foreign allies) the Islamic State in Syria. At present, the regime dominates most of the Syrian territory, whereas the SDF/YPG controls about a quarter of it—the Syrian northeast. At present (early 2018), significant pockets of lands controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra (that re-named itself in Jabhat Fateh al-Sham after 2016) remain in the Syrian northwest. The rest of the territory (mostly in the south and northwest, but also some pockets in Central and South-Eastern Syria) is controlled by dozens of (mostly Islamist) militias united under the umbrella of the "Free Syrian Army" but lacking any real central command and coordination. They still constitute a serious force due to enormous external support from abroad (the USA, the EU, Arab Sunni monarchies, and even Turkey which cooperates with them—and even directs them—very closely in a substantial part of the Syrian territory controlled by this force—and Turkey—in the Syrian northwest). What is more the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary

³¹Note that among other things a close cooperation between the USA and the left-wing Kurdish fighters resulted in bizarre images of American commandos in Syria wearing patches with Communist red stars (Bertrand 2016).

and Opposition Forces positions itself as a representative of these rebel groups at the UN-sponsored Geneva talks, whereas this coalition is recognized as a “legitimate representative of the Syrian people,” or even “a sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people” by about 100 states of the world (e.g., Kahl et al. 2017; Keen 2017). This is accompanied by the growing hostilities between Turkey and the SDF/YPG.

Thus, the Syrian deadlock has not been broken. It has rather been re-formatted.

5.9 Remarks and Conclusions

Concluding Remarks It is sad, but in seven years, not one revolution of the Arab Spring has solved any serious problems (and, apparently, could not solve them). We have to state that everything that needed to be done for modernization was either done, or could be done within the framework of authoritarian regimes.

Revolutions, of course, can stir up society, activate new forces, raise urgent issues on the agenda, and create a great political experience. They can change something in a positive way. But there are quite a few chances that revolution will really solve the most important problems. Not to mention the fact that in a number of countries the revolutions led to chaos and civil war of all with all that we see today in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and even with regard to the emergence of terrorist entities like the Daesh. In this regard, for the region as a whole, the Arab revolutions brought many more problems than solved. But, of course, in the sense of historical experience, with regard to the possibilities of searching for new forms of organizing society, these revolutions were of great importance for the region. However, we will repeat, the price of such experience is too high.

So, despite the active export of democracy, including by revolution, in many countries, democracy simply does not take root. And this is not accidental. The events of the Arab Spring once again confidently confirmed that not only democratic constitutions and the desire of some of the revolutionaries are needed to consolidate democracy. This requires a lot of other conditions to be in place as well, including historical and cultural preconditions, the existence of civil society, a relatively high standard of living, etc. This raises the question whether liberal democratic governance principles can be considered to be universal.

Despite the fact that the mainstream of Western science continues to adhere to the primitive assertion that democracy is the best arrangement for all societies at any stage of their development and level of culture, as well as irrespective of the prevalent archetypes; in Western sociology there are very serious studies that refute this thesis, demonstrating that the emergence of effective liberal democracy requires a number of necessary preconditions (see, e.g., Huntington 1968; Aron 1993; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). We also repeatedly wrote that revolutions simply for the sake of establishing democracy in societies unprepared for its establishment often only delay its emergence (e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2013, 2014, 2016a). All this, unfortunately, was confirmed by the events of the Arab Spring. Now the most important thing is for the region to calm down and move to a state of economic and cultural growth that will

ultimately ensure the progress of these societies and, possibly, but not necessarily, in the future, a transition to more democratic systems than today.

Appendix

Letters from Tahrir

From revolutionary euphoria to disappointment and frustration

In this appendix we publish a few letters received between June 5, 2013, and December 31, 2014, from our Cairo correspondent, the bright representative of the Egyptian revolutionary youth Samiha Razeq. A total of 15 letters were published (see Grinin et al. 2016: Appendix). In this appendix, we publish only four of them, keeping their numbers.

№ 2

4 July, 2013

The letter was written the day after the coup on July 3, 2013 in response to a question from one of the authors of this monograph about whether the correspondent is happy about the latest developments.

Dear Prof. Andrey,

I'm happy of course, but sadness and anger at Western media coverage and analyses nearly kills my happiness.

They call it a military coup! They're arguing stopping assistance to Egypt as a consequence, as if Egyptian resources can't help it be self-sufficient with itself. They talk as if they're blind to all the truly millions in number who demanded to oust this elected out of "rigged elections"³² unlike Western media calling it free and fair, extremist figure, who's just a puppet of the Great Khomeiny of the MB Mohamed Badei!

There was no other solution, Professor, but for the army to intervene, and unlike in 2011 (when it was really a coup d'état since the military ruled the country, and frankly the West supported that!), it immediately turned authority to the rightful civilian; head of the constitutional court, which was the demand of all revolutionaries and the people from the beginning, in fact since Mubarak was ousted. I can truly claim that the revolution in Egypt didn't succeed but until yesterday, when the rightful path of the head of the constitutional court holding authority for an interim period until a new constitution is drafted, and new parliamentary and presidential, "truly free and fair" without military and MB overseeing the rigging of such pleased by Western interests elections!

MB militia, with Hamas fighters coming by the help of MB leaders started on a surge killing demonstrators in the streets with their sophisticated weapons and machine guns, I attended myself one of such fights, and around 8 was killed in just

³²=Mohamed Morsi.

the fight I attended, since we didn't have anything to defend ourselves but some rocks and Molotov. Many more others got killed by their militia in other places and governorates, including my hometown Alex. Just the day before yesterday, I returned home, to find around 9 young youth in my area got killed by their machine guns (of course such incidents are never told in Western media!), 'cause they were demanding them to go away from their area and not call for Morsi and the MB to stay in power in their own local neighborhood, so they simply worked their machine guns against them! Just yesterday I walked in the funeral of three young youth, one of them only 21 years, my heart burst and I cried till my eyes burst out of their sockets, just to see their mourning poor families who I live in their area, this of course didn't make me feel real happiness yesterday after Sisi's statement!

In fact, even yesterday, 16 people got killed by MB militia in different governorates across Egypt, especially the poverty-stricken little-secured Upper Egypt where Islamist extremists are concentrated!

And then Western media after all this are sad 'cause the military intervened and gave power to true civilians! Who has the power to protect civilian Egyptians against MB militia and Hamas but the military?! Even the military and police themselves are not fully armed ahead of MB weapons, several (of course less in number than civilians) police and military officers got killed by MB and Hamas machine guns!

I'm just infuriated! I really wanna blow up all Western media that makes the success of Egyptian revolution after 3 years of struggle seem as if it's a crisis and failure to the so-called democracy, that's in fact only a theocratic religious regime by a group that hijacked the beginning of the revolution with the help of SCAF, and serves the interests of US, Israel, and the West in the region, to deserve being labeled a democracy by their catastrophic media, I can't believe this is happening to spoil our happiness for the final success of our genuine revolution in Egypt! But we will teach the West what true freedom and democracy is against their flawed neo-colonizing democracies, after the success of our world-historic-revolution in Egypt...

Take care Professor,

Samih Razeq

№ 5

24 August, 2013

The situation is really depressing! We have a curfew now everyday from 7 pm till 6 am, 'cause MB are spreading chaos and violence everywhere now, and a few people (whether MB, police, or ordinary civilians) are killed now everyday in some part of Egypt. But the most violent part, as always, is Sinai, where extremists and Hamas members are waging revenge and killing police and military soldiers there everyday through their violent guerrilla war techniques...

But as you might already know, that's not only what is depressing. What's also depressing is that it seems like the old regime is coming back (or I hope I'm wrong in that!)... Mubarak was out of jail a few days ago, and everywhere in the streets people are talking about how the MB were actually the party responsible for all the violence since 25th January 2011, and that Mubarak and SCAF and the police and military are innocent of all the violent crimes! They're talking as if the true revolution was only on June 30th, while 25th January was only a conspiracy made by the MB to

reach power! It's as if the old regime and the military has used and made advantage of MB failure and killings during their one year rule, to make people believe that MB are actually responsible for all violent events since 25th January, and that Mubarak and SCAF are innocent of any violence and killings during their rule!

MB figures are being put into jail (and I'm happy about that, 'cause they're responsible for violence since over a year ago), but what worries me is that until now, no figures from the old regime of Mubarak, nor military figures from SCAF rule are being also put to jail for their causing of violence, corruption, and killings during their rule, so that they face justice as well like MB figures!

Ans as if that's not enough, now the international community has started to stop sending any aid or having trade deals with the Egyptian government, claiming that they refuse what took place in Egypt, 'cause it's a coup d'etat!

I really hope we're not truly heading back to square zero with the old regime again into place!

Yours,
Samiha Razeq
№ 7

30 December, 2013

The situation in Egypt right now cannot get any much worse, in fact, I can't remember a time when the country was in so much oppression!

Some weeks after I last met you³³ the police and military started cracking down on all opposition, not just MB. I was arrested by the police, among other girls, while demonstrating against putting an article in the constitution that allows for holding military trials for civilians. Several liberal and socialist revolutionary youth leaders were arrested (although they played a part in the revolutionary wave against Morsi!) and were sentenced for more that 3 years in jail, and a very huge fine.

Many voices are calling now for Sisi to run for presidency, including Moussa (the head of the constitutional committee), and the media is gradually increasing its propaganda saying that his presidency is a national security obligation now!

After Al-Mansoura bombing last week, which I think is orchestrated by the military regime itself to give it an unrestrained violent hand in completely gaining control over all political forces in the country and silencing any opposition, under the guise of "the national war against terrorism," several civilians are killed by the police during MB demonstrations!

Worst of all is the situation in universities, which has reached a level of unprecedented oppression in the history of Egypt. Several students have been killed "inside" their university campuses by the police, while demonstrating! And the police now storm lecture-halls while professors are giving their lectures and arrest university students (including girls) while they're having their lectures, claiming that these students are "terrorists"!

The problem is that most Egyptians seem to agree with what's going on given the great effect of media propaganda on the minds of the people now. All Egyptian

³³This meeting took place in mid-November 2013.

channels, governmental and private, are launching a war-mongering style propaganda against terrorism (which not only includes MB, but also civilians and students supporting MB, and all other opposition and revolutionary movements that oppose both military and MB rule), and is mobilizing the people behind the military, portraying it as the only savior of the Egyptian people in this dark age of terrorism Egypt is going through!

Yours Sincerely,

Samiha Razeq

Nº 14

30 December 2014

Dear Professor Andrey!

I think I don't need to tell you that the situation in Egypt is at the pit of Hell, if there's a pit for It! As you probably follow all the news. Everything in Egypt has just become like the years 2011: 2013 have never passed through this country! In fact, I wish that Mubarak would come back! The days of his rule had much more freedom space, and all activists were out of jail. But now, it's like we're living in a military prison! It just suffices that I tell you, that one young man was captured and jailed a few days ago because he pressed "Like" for an opposition facebook page!

Yours,

Samiha Razeq

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Part II
Islamism and Its Dimensions
in the World Values Perspective

Chapter 6

Background



6.1 Introductory Notes

It is intriguing to see the totalitarian Islamist movements active in the European diaspora. Fleeing the persecution in the world of Islam, Islamists find a refuge in the West and make full use of the very values that they dismiss. Jean-François Revel sees in this form of multiculturalism a ‘Democracy against Itself.’ In defending the open society against its enemies, the reader is reminded of the two levels of order in the strategy of Islamism: first, the replacement of secular regimes in the world of Islam itself by the Nizam [system] of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God’s rule]; second, and building on this premise, the establishment of a global Pax Islamica via an Islamic ‘thawra al-alamiyya’ (world revolution), as envisioned by Qutb. In Europe itself, while combating the new ideology of totalitarianism imported via migration and transnational movements, the choice is between the Europeanisation of Islam and the Islamisation of Europe (...). In the foreign policy relations of Europe, both with the world of Islam and with the wider world, Europeans need not only to support pro-democracy movements, but also to understand the ambiguity of the Islamists. Despite their deep contempt for western democracy, Islamists make full use of western democratic rights for establishing the tactics to be adopted by their movements within the continent itself. Is it justified to provide the new totalitarianism with protection in the name of democracy in Europe? (Tibi 2007: 43).

If we open a newspaper, turn on an international news channel, or search for international news via platforms such as “Google News,” we will be quickly confronted with the often value-laden and bitter debate which goes on today about “Islamism,” the “Arab Spring” and also the future of democracy under the threat of Global Terrorism. The present chapter introduces the concept of Din-wa-dawla

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(unity of state and religion) and Anti-Semitism as the principal characteristics of the Islamist ideology and analyses important earlier empirical studies on the subject. We highlight the erroneous judgements of past US administrations about ties to the Muslim Brotherhood highlighted in President Obama's Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) in 2010. Earlier empirical studies, reviewed in this chapter, inter alia come to the conclusion that 75% of religious Muslims appear to support politically moderate Islam, while 25% show support for politically radical Islam and that there is no Anti-Zionism without Anti-Semitism. In the present background chapter, we also debate changes in the global economy and indicators of Global Terrorism.

Given the sheer magnitude and the never-ending character of the global Islamist terrorist challenge the world is now facing, we share with the Israeli analyst Mark Heller (Ibid.) the idea that it is time to seriously analyze what sectors of Muslim society, who do support extremism, think and do, and why they think in such a way as they do, while important other segments of Muslim society oppose radicalism and terrorism and even combat it. We attempt to achieve this by the multivariate analysis of global representative opinion surveys. *Below, we introduce the contents of Part II of the present study.*

Confronting what has become the real cancer of Global Terrorism, this Part applies a structure, which is nowadays anyway the standard in medicine and which is now spreading to the social sciences: starting from background¹ (often also called objectives)²—moving on to methods—the results—and then the conclusions. Not only the multivariate analysis about our theme enters almost completely new space, but also the country values of the important indicators used in the multivariate analysis such as the support rates for the terrorists of the “*Islamic State*” (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) or the international rates of people rejecting the fight against them are not known. To paraphrase the former US Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld:

Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know. (U.S. Department of Defence 2002)

Our background section clarifies the concept of Islamism and evaluates already published major empirical studies on Islamism and the “*Arab Spring*.” We will show how the global terror crisis coincides with a global world economic weakening of the West and the real already existing extent and threat from Global Terrorism.

Our readers then have a right to know how good and reliable our social scientific GPRS, which we are using on this journey, really is (methodology section). We then go on to present, step by step, our multivariate empirical results on Islamism, the Arab Spring and what we call the solitude of the West in the fight against terror,

¹ See De Vogli et al. (2009).

² See Wilkinson and Pickett (2008).

based on analytical international opinion surveys in the results section.³ We finalize our analysis in our conclusion section.⁴

As we mentioned in the introduction to the present book, if we search for international news via platforms such as “*Google News*,” we will be quickly confronted with the often value-laden and bitter debate which goes on today about “*Islamism*,” the “*Arab Spring*” and also the *future of democracy* under the threat of Global Terrorism. Now we would like to continue a bit this theme. Turning to the term “*Arab Spring*,” we will find equally amazing divergent opinions. Not only Israel’s Prime Minister Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu continues to be skeptical about the “*Arab Spring*” (Sherwood 2011), but also many observers and political forces in the Arab world themselves nowadays speak about the “*Arab Spring*” as constituting yet another “*مؤامرة*” (“*Muamara*”)⁵ that is “*conspiracy*,” once again planned and projected to hurt the Arab World by the evil West:

Conspiracy or no conspiracy, it is an approved fact that there are influential external forces and study centres linked to Israel that work hard to keep the Arab World divided and weak, lagging behind, easy to manipulate, compliant and managed in manners suitable to Israeli designs and consolidation of its aggressive illegal gains and conquests. (Abu Nimah 2017)

While the above article, published in Jordan, one of the most Western-oriented countries in the region, still leaves the question open whether or not there is such an actual “*conspiracy*,” Mr. Tawfik Tirawi, a top Fatah official and a member of the Palestinian Authority government explicitly maintains directly that the *Arab Spring* was indeed a *conspiracy by Israel* to lessen the power and influence of the Muslim world and divert attention away from the Palestinian issue. “*It is all an Israeli plot to take away the world’s attention from the Palestinians [...] They want to remove the Palestinians from the world’s agenda*” (Benovadia 2017).

On the other hand, we read in the international news as well that a team from the University of Gothenburg in Sweden recently found out that since 1900 there never was a successful path to democracy around the globe without a prior implementation of women’s rights (University of Gothenburg 2017; see also Wang et al. 2017) and that the failure to do so is the ultimate reason for the failure of the Arab Spring. As much as one might sympathize with such a perspective, based on analytical quantitative and data-driven comparative social science, one must also realize that not the entire social science profession and not the entire global Western political leadership class would be prepared to accept the mentioned Gothenburg study.

³See our article series published for the IDC in Herzliya, Israel (<http://www.rubincenter.org/author/arno-tausch/>), the article for the Spring 2017 issue of the journal “*Strategic Assessment*” of the Institute for National Security Studies, INSS, in Tel Aviv (Berman and Tausch 2017) and the articles for journal “*Telos*” and “*Telescope*” in New York (<http://www.telospress.com/author/atausch/>).

⁴The title of this chapter is a direct reference to the famous French Novel “*Submission*”, published by Michel Houellebecq on January 7, 2015, the day of the terrible Paris Charlie Hebdo attacks (Houellebecq 2015). In the novel Michel Houellebecq describes a Presidential Election in France, where the Left teams up with the Muslim Brotherhood to prevent a far-right election victory of Ms. Marine Le Pen. The result is a very generalized Islamization of the French Republic after the election of the successful Muslim Brotherhood candidate.

⁵This term and the ideology about it was analyzed, among others, by Tibi (1993).

6.2 On Some Aspects of Islamism, Islamist Ideology, Terrorism, “Islamophobia,” and Occidentalism

***Din-wa-Dawla* (Unity of State and Religion) and Anti-Semitism as the Principal Characteristics of the Islamist Ideology** The Israeli scholar and high-ranking retired analytical intelligence officer, Paz (2015), correctly maintained some time ago that the issues of the interpretation of religion, culture, and also gender relations play an all-important part in the Jihadist ideology ever since Sayyid Qutb’s integral and negative perception of Western culture (see also Bergesen 2008; furthermore: Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; Juergensmeyer et al. 2013; Lebl 2010, 2013, 2014a, b; Tibi 2007, 2012). Without confronting these issues and neatly looking the other way in an attitude of “political correctness,” unwilling to confront core assumptions of the Islamist ideology, research will produce only very biased and limited results.

What is the ideology which is supporting all the global Islamist terror? With Tibi (2007, 2012, 2013a, b), one can say that it is Islamism, which is religionized politics, based on the Arabic term *Din-wa-dawla* (unity of state and religion) under a system of mandated *Shari’ah* law. Tibi also argues that the Anti-Semitism of Islamism is a vital component of the contemporary Islamist ideology which is very different from both the old Islamic Judeophobia and modern pan-Arab nationalist Anti-Semitism. Islamist contemporary Anti-Semitism now assumes the so-called *Jewish conspiracy against Islam since 622*.

In Tibi (2007), we find four key quotations which explain to us the concept:

Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies in the fact that it is based on a transnational religion [...]. The ‘religionisation’ of politics in this case—as a politicisation of the Islamic religion—represents the return of the importance of the sacred on an international scale. Political Islam presents a civilisational–cultural ‘awakening’ that is framed as a ‘revolt against the West’ [...], a conceptualisation of its mission which makes it necessary to distinguish between Islam as a faith and Islamism as a political ideology. (Tibi 2007: 36–37)

Among the basic features common to all forms of totalitarianism is the goal of imposing norms of belief and behaviour on all aspects of life, thus also denying any separation between the private and the public sphere. As a form of totalitarianism, Islamism plans to subordinate civil society to the comprehensive state apparatus directed by a totalising *Shari’ah*. It also contains Anti-Semitism, one of the components that Arendt identified as a fundamental feature of totalitarian ideologies. (Tibi 2007: 37)

For jihadists, the resort to terror is not an end of itself, rather it is a means employed in the service of what Sayyid Qutb called a ‘world revolution of jihad’, an idea that aims at establishing an order of *Hakimiyat Allah* [God’s rule] as the precondition to remaking the world. The new order will first be established within the world of Islam (i.e. ‘the Islamic state’) and then expanded to become a new World System of governance. Given these ambitions, any approach that focuses solely on Islamism as a form of terrorism will fail to grasp its nature both as a totalitarian ideology and as movement that bases itself on a form of political religion. Jihadism is not only a threat to international security, but equally to open society in general, be it in the world of Islam or in the West. (Tibi 2007: 37)

The new totalitarianism is expressed in the concept of *Din-wa-dawla* [unity of religion and state], an idea that challenges the validity of the secular democratic nation-state in the world of Islam, and in its place offers the alternative of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God's rule]. It also goes beyond this concern with the Islamic world by claiming that it will found an Islamic form of global politics that embraces the whole of humanity. [...] Islamism is interpreted by this paper as an expression of an Islamic revival taking place on a political, cultural and religious level. At stake is not just a political but a civilisational challenge to the secular world order, one which legitimates itself as a way of combating an alleged 'Judeo-Christian conspiracy' believed to be directed against Islam itself. In other words, the Islamist 'revolt against the West' is also one against 'the rule of the world by Jews'. (Tibi 2007: 44)

Thus, our research strategy attempts to capture the totality of Anti-Westernism in the region. At the beginning of the 1960s, under the influence of Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) (Bergesen 2008; Qutb 1990, 2000; Qutb and David 2006; Qutb et al. 1979), the idea was proposed in the Muslim world that Jews are the enemies of Islam from its inception and that an independent Jewish political existence would relinquish territory within the "house of Islam" (*Dār al-Islam*). Both the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood as well as the Iranian Khomeinite *Shi'ca* movement took up this virulent Anti-Semitism, so characteristic of the works of Sayyid Qutb (Ganji 2013). With Heinemann et al. (2007), Kaplan and Small (2006), Lebl (2013), Mansur (2015), Paz (2015), Tibi (2007, 2012, 2015), Werbner (2013), Wippermann (1983), and Wistrich (1991, 2004, 2007, 2010), we would also contend that Arab Anti-Semitism was influenced by European Anti-Semitic literature (mainly French) published in Arabic in the second half of the nineteenth century. Anti-Semitic themes and arguments were systematically developed by Arab propaganda as a weapon against the Jewish population in Palestine during the Mandate period (1917–48) and even more so against the newly created State of Israel (Heinemann et al. 2007).

Again, with Tibi (2007), we maintain that:

The historical roots of contemporary Islamism, as well as of the violence that connects 'religion and terror' in political Islam, can be traced to the totalitarian 'Society of Muslim Brothers' established in 1928 in Cairo. Also called the 'Movement of the Muslim Brothers', this was the very first movement of Islamic fundamentalism. In the past decades this 'Brotherhood' has developed into an international movement claiming to represent the Islamic diaspora in Europe. The founder of this movement, Hasan al-Banna, published in c. 1930 his *Risalat al-Djihad* [Essay on Jihad]. This text and other essays document the first formulation of the new totalitarian jihadist ideology. (Tibi 2007: 39)

Orientalism and Occidentalism One of the most frequent terms in the current literature on the Middle East is the term "Orientalism," which goes back to the work of the late prominent Palestinian intellectual of Palestinian Christian origin and professor of comparative literature at Columbia University in New York, Edward Said (1935–2003; Said 1979, 1985).

Said focused on what he perceived as the culturally inaccurate representations of the East in the Western study of the Eastern world. But the omnipresent hatred of America and the West on the part of the Islamists could be termed as a set of inaccurate representations of its own, which we prefer to call here "*Occidentalism*" (Buruma and Margalit 2005; Rubin and Rubin 2004). In addition, the intense competition between Islamist and secular, Marxist terror groups, which still exists in the Middle East and

the entire Muslim world (Fine 2008), the Sunni/Shia competition as well as regional quests for hegemony (Rubin 1998; Rubin and Rubin 2004) could be additional factors explaining the long-run tendencies toward terrorism and high terror support in the MENA region.

Iran is a factor of its own in the whole. Especially, after the West's nuclear deal with Iran, it has become fashionable even in Western defense and intelligence analysis circles to talk about the Iranian regime's "moderation" (Bolan 2013; Lieber and Press 2013; Waltz 2012), while our analysis is rather cautious about such assessments, and finds much support for Tibi's hypothesis that both Qutb's Sunni vision of Islamism and the Iranian Khomeinite *Shi'a* movement are the two ideological pillars of contemporary Islamism. So, there is a need to focus on Iran's competing, but nevertheless apocalyptic and extremist vision for the Middle East, especially targeted against the State of Israel (Beres 2015; Eiran and Malin 2013; Flannery et al. 2013; Kroenig 2012; Landau 2013; Simon 2013; Terrill 2014; Wigginton et al. 2015).

Not Islamist Terrorism, but "Islamophobia" is the Problem? Important sections of current leading global scholarship attempted to counterbalance this rising global concern about Islamist terrorism by maintaining that not Islamist terrorism, but "Islamophobia" is the real problem we are facing.

In the prestigious "*Columbia Law Review*," published at New York's Columbia University, Beydoun even says:

This Piece defines Islamophobia as the presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and inassimilable. Combined with this is the belief that expressions of Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism. It argues that Islamophobia is rooted in understandings of Islam as civilization's antithesis and perpetuated by government structures and private citizens. Finally, this Piece asserts that Islamophobia is also a process—namely, the dialectic by which state policies targeting Muslims endorse prevailing stereotypes and, in turn, embolden private animus toward Muslim subjects. Islamophobia therefore has three dimensions: structural policy, private animus, and the dialectical process by which the former legitimizes and mobilizes the latent and patent bigotry of individuals and private actors. The result is far more expansive and complex than mere "fear and dislike" of Islam and Muslims. (Beydoun 2016: 2)

The Presidential Directive 11 of President Obama as a Key Toward Understanding How the West Underestimated the Islamist Threat Articles like the above quoted analysis could be quoted almost endlessly. Many journal articles in leading scholarly journals are devoted to the subject. Not only global scholarship, but also Western democratic world leadership simply underestimated the global threat of Islamism, the seemingly endless sequence of Islamist terrorist attacks in Manhattan, London, Madrid, Boston, Paris, and Berlin notwithstanding. In confronting the Islamist terrorist threat, it is wrong to define radical Islamism only in terms of the identification with the outright support for the immediate "bomb-throwing terror," while neglecting the underlying ideological radicalism and also the ongoing radicalization of such organizations as the Muslim Brotherhood (Lebl 2014a, b) or the Turkish Milli Görüs (Vielhaber 2012), which both start, like the most radicalized factions of Islamist terrorism, from the intense hatred of "Jews and Free Masons" and Western civilization as such, and which for many on both sides of the Atlantic

lamentably still appear as “moderate Islamists” and worthy partners of dialogue, while in reality they provide the fertile ground from which the armed terrorist groups only can develop (Lebl 2013; Tibi 2013a, b). The United Arab Emirates paper “Gulf News” even revealed on June 18, 2014, the close ties between two successive US administrations and the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization which was founded with the aid of the Hitlerite Nazi German intelligence services in Egypt in the 1930s (Rubin and Schwanitz 2014):

For the past decade, two successive US administrations have maintained close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya, to name just the most prominent cases. The Obama administration conducted an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2010 and 2011, beginning even before the events known as the “Arab Spring” erupted in Tunisia and in Egypt. The President personally issued Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) in 2010, ordering an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood and other “political Islamist” movements, including the ruling AKP in Turkey, ultimately concluding that the United States should shift from its longstanding policy of supporting “stability” in the Middle East and North Africa (that is, support for “stable regimes” even if they were authoritarian), to a policy of backing “moderate” Islamic political movements. To this day, PSD-11 remains classified, in part because it reveals an embarrassingly naïve and uninformed view of trends in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region. (Gulf News 2014)

Salient Earlier Studies on the Subject In the following, we will present the results of a few path-breaking studies which focused on the real issues as we perceive them here and which are an important guiding post in our own empirical attempt to approach Islamism, the Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy. Such recent literature making use of the statistical data, which underlie our analysis, provides important insights for our research project, and the available, often contradictory results make further research very urgent. The studies under scrutiny here help us to provide some maps on the scholarly knowledge about Islamism, the Arab Spring, and the future of democracy.

In one of the leading studies on the subject nowadays, Brownlee et al. (2015) maintain that democracy remains elusive in the Middle East. Tunisia, the study argues, made progress toward some type of constitutionally entrenched participatory rule, while the other countries that overthrew their rulers Egypt, Yemen, and Libya remain unstable and instability. Elsewhere in the Arab World, the uprisings were suppressed, subsided, or never materialized. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds find that the success of domestic uprisings depended on the absence of a hereditary executive and a dearth of oil rents. Prior levels of socioeconomic development and state strength shaped whether nascent democracy, resurgent authoritarianism, or unbridled civil war followed.

In another widely received empirical studies on the subject, Hoffman and Jamal (2014) reached the conclusion that in Tunisia and Egypt the reading of the Quran, not mosque attendance, is robustly associated with a considerable increase in the likelihood of participating in protest. Furthermore, this relationship is not simply a function of support for political Islam. Evidence suggests that motivation mechanisms rather than political resources are the reason behind this result. Qur’an readers, the study attempts to show, are more sensitive to inequities and more supportive of

democracy than are nonreaders. These findings suggest, the authors maintain, a powerful new set of mechanisms by which religion may, in fact, help to structure political protest more generally.

On the basis of the current literature, we have come to the conclusion that a thorough and more comparative-empirical approach, based on the systematic use of opinion survey data would be necessary on the subject (Abdel-Samad 2014; Acevedo and Chaudhary 2015; Achilov 2013; Al Ganideh and Yaseen 2016; Alianak 2014; Amin 2016; Bakker and Rotondi 2016; Brownlee et al. 2015; Brynen 2012; Dabashi 2012; Davis 2013; Esposito et al. 2016; Falco and Rotondi 2016; Farha 2016; Fox et al. 2016; Ghanem 2016; Govrin 2014; Guzansky and Berti 2013; Haas and Lesch 2013; Hassan 2011; Hoffman and Jamal 2014; Javorssek and Schwitz 2014; McCauley and Scheckter 2008; Mohamad and Ishac 2016; Noueihed and Warren 2012; Pottenger 2004; Rynhold 2015; Sadiki 2015; Sidamor et al. 2016; Underwood 2013; Yavuz 2011; Zartman 2015).

25% of Global Religious Muslims are Radical First, forget about the hypothesis that only a handful or the near totality of global Muslims supports Islamist positions. But 25% of global religious Muslims could be rather a good guess. Achilov and Sen (2016) in their study utilized a large volume of survey data ($n = 53,800$) from 13 Muslim-majority countries and conducted confirmatory factor analyses to test the validity of proposed conceptual framework—a distinction between moderate and radical Islam. Achilov and Sen (2016) also controlled for key sociopolitical conditions. Achilov and Sen (2016) relied on the following indicators, also contained in the Word Values Survey, to discern between moderate and radical Islam:

Indicators of politically moderate views according to Achilov and Sen (2016):

- There should be a Parliamentary System in which all political parties (left, right, Islamic) can compete [item 1]
- Men of religion should not have influence on how people vote [item 2]
- Men of religion should not have influence over government decisions [item 3]
- Government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people [item 4]
- Government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of people in some areas and implement *Shari'ah* law in others [item 5].

Indicators of politically radical views according to Achilov and Sen (2016):

- There should be a system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections [item 6]
- Government should implement only the laws of the *Shari'ah* [item 7]
- Better if more people with strong religiosity held public office [item 8].

Consequently, the study shows that 75% of religious Muslims appear to support politically moderate Islam, while 25% show support for politically radical Islam. In terms of age, politically radical Muslims appear to be slightly younger than moderates. Generally, Muslim women appear more likely than men to support politically

moderate Islam, even after controlling for other social variables (e.g., class, education, political activism). Achilov and Sen (2016) also analyzed a *World Values Survey* item on religious tolerance in the Muslim world. Religious tolerance was measured by the degree of importance religious Muslims attach to the following statement: *Islam requires that in a Muslim country the political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims*. Politically moderate Muslims, the study maintains, show a considerably higher degree of religious tolerance toward non-Muslims than political radicals. Achilov and Sen (2016) also find that politically radical views are shaped by support for the exclusive rule of *Shari'ah*, intolerance for democratic pluralism and a belief in the superiority of clerics in governance decisions. The study also finds that support for politically moderate Islam, compared with radical views, is associated with higher levels of education, social class, associational social capital, and engagement in political activism.

Low Levels of Tolerance in the Region Spierings (2014) by contrast did not focus on support for “democracy,” like most Middle East studies do, but on tolerance as a crucial democratic civic value. This focus substantiated prior claims that Middle Eastern democratic support might be superficial. Spierings found, for example, that on a scale of 0 to 1, the average level of tolerance in the region is much lower in each country than in 21 major Western democracies, whereas “support for democracy” levels in Arab countries are similar to Western ones. So, it seems that “support for democracy” is not strongly associated with tolerance toward other worldviews and liberal democracy in the Middle East. But political tolerance is crucial for a sustainable democratic system. If tolerance is not widespread, Spierings argues, democratization attempts are undermined, explaining the failure of the Arab uprisings. Spierings says, in support of his argument, that higher levels of tolerance in Tunisia, where the revolution has led to a more stable electorally democratic system than in the other Arab Spring countries. Democracy might thus be seen as a way to gain power, suggesting that elections are more at the core of the Middle Eastern interpretation of democracy, explaining both the relatively low levels of liberal democracy in the region and the gap between that and the reported desire for democracy. Spierings concludes that individual-level political Islamism was the most important religious factor explaining support for or the rejection of democracy and tolerance.

Low Support for a Secular Interpretation of Women’s Status In the study by Fox et al. (2016), it is shown that individuals in the region, particularly women, are largely rejecting what the study calls “the false dichotomy between religion and women’s rights,” and feels that “Islam is not necessarily antagonistic to women’s rights.” All else equal, support for uniquely Islamic interpretations of policies pertaining to women’s rights increased over the Arab Spring period in Arab Spring countries. Relatively high degrees of support for gender equality seem to coexist with a preference for Islamic interpretations of personal status codes pertaining to women. The region was characterized by relatively low support for a secular interpretation of women’s status.

Radical Global South, Radical Immigrants? In one of the most comprehensive quantitative research papers, written on the subject under scrutiny here, Fischer

(2010) investigated whether global immigrants are more likely than what the study calls natives to be supporters of terrorist groups and, through lowering terrorists' costs, increase the number of terror incidences in their host country.

Using the *World Values Survey* on 55,000 persons in more than 45 countries (1994–1999), Fischer now found that individual's social, economic, and political disintegration increases the propensity to support terror. The operationalization of terror support rests on the propensity to use violence for political goals, obtained from the third wave of the *World Values Survey* 1994–1999 (WVS) that provides information on attitudes and values of about 55,000 persons in more than 45 countries. The following WVS question served as the dependent variable in the Fischer study: “*Here is one statement. How strongly do you agree or disagree with it?, ‘Using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.’*” The possible answers range from ‘strongly agree’ (1), ‘agree’ (2), to ‘disagree’ (3), and ‘strongly disagree’ (4). Thus, higher values indicate a higher propensity to support terror. According to the original WVS data, the nations with highest rates of consent to political violence were—in descending order—the Dominican Republic; the Philippines; Moldova; Bosnia; Nigeria; Colombia; Slovenia; Serbia; Slovakia; and Venezuela.

In particular, OECD host countries immigrants do show a higher propensity to accept using violence for political goals than OECD natives. Differentiating by region of origin, the study finds strong evidence that persons who emigrated from Africa, Asia, and Oceania into culturally distant OECD countries are more prone to accept political violence. Interestingly, these effects are even independent from individual religion. Fischer also found that on the basis of country panels of transnational terror attacks in 30 OECD countries (1991–2004) population's support for terror is positively associated with terror and also that the share of immigrant population increases the occurrence of terror attacks. Originating from a Muslim culture per se does not appear to matter here, the study says.

Economic Versus Political Concerns in the “Arab Spring” The Princeton Ph.D. thesis by Beissinger (2012) used original survey data to examine who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions in the light of theoretical expectations. Beissinger (2012) found that the middle class participated disproportionately in Egypt and Tunisia, but participants in the Tunisian Revolution were younger and much more diverse in class composition than participants in the Egyptian Revolution. Beissinger also attempted to show that, despite the fact that both revolutions produced free-and-fair elections in their wake, most participants in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions prioritized economic concerns over desires for civil and political freedoms. In Egypt, according to Beissinger, civil society association most strongly differentiated revolution participants prioritizing civil and political freedoms from other participants, whereas in Tunisia it was income.

Gender, Nepotism, and the Arab Spring Ciftci and Bernick (2015) think that education and employment will increase civic interest, associational membership, and participation in demonstrations and political campaigns in the Arab World. It is this finding that Ciftci and Bernick (2015) claim as their reason for more optimism for the consolidation of democracy in the region. According to Ciftci and Bernick (2015),

the Arab Spring demonstrated that a new generation of highly educated activists chanting universalistic slogans of freedom, dignity, and justice were the new driving force in Arab polities. Ciftci and Bernick (2015) also analyze the civic gender gap and the status of women in Arab polities. There is a significant gender gap in various forms of civic involvement in Arab societies. Women's activism lags behind men in Arab civil society, but at the same time modernization helps narrowing this gap to enhance women's status. The study also analyzes the role of "wasta" (nepotism) in Arab societies.

The Edinburgh Study on Gender and the Arab Spring In the study, prepared by Abbott (2017), it is shown that there is little support among either men or women in the region for gender equality and the empowerment of women. Women are much more supportive than men, although the study remarks even among women support are low. The gap in support for gender equality between men and women, Abbott argues, is noticeably larger in Morocco, Jordan and Iraq and lowest in Libya, with Tunisia and Egypt lying between. The more educated, the better off and those living in urban areas are more supportive, and those who support all status law being based on Shari'ah are less supportive. According to the study, age makes no difference, indicating that young people are no more supportive than older ones and confirming that there has been no generational shift to more liberal values. The differences between countries are statistically significant, with Iraq being the most supportive, closely followed by Morocco and Tunisia, and Libya the least supportive closely followed by Egypt. Jordan lies between the two groups. Abbott argues that Egypt has long been recognized as one of the countries which are most restrictive of women's rights in the MENA region. The analysis suggests that since the beginning of the twenty-first century attitudes toward gender equality and the empowerment of women have become more conservative in Egypt and less conservative in Morocco and Iraq. In Tunisia, support for personal status law being enacted in accordance with the Islamic law Shari'ah has increased noticeably, possibly due to the influence of Political Islam in the country since 2011. Abbott also suggests that support for procedural democracy across the six countries varies from a high of just over 50% in Iraq to a low of 17% in Libya. Men were more supportive than women of unrestricted parliamentary democracy in Egypt and Iraq, but the differences were not significant in the other four countries. The correlation between support for democracy and for gender equality and the empowerment of women was very low, with only 6% of respondents supporting both.

Only 17% of Arab Publics Understand, Value, and Support Democracy as They Do in the Western World Kostenko et al. (2014) argue that there could be at least two historical reasons that led to the conservation of Arab values and gender attitudes at rather low levels. One of them, Kostenko argues, is the collapse of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence that led to a certain retrogression of social values in some countries of the Middle East, in particular Yemen. The proliferation of conservative ideologies sponsored by the Arab Gulf monarchies built up via schools, TV channels, and other media. However, Kostenko et al. (2014) found out that female respondents in all the societies included in the survey articulated a higher demand for

more egalitarian roles both in public and private life. But women and men in every country of the Arab World show similar levels of democracy support. The respondents who only received high school-level education or less tended to exhibit the most conservative gender attitudes. University graduates tended to have egalitarian perceptions of female roles both at home and in the public domain. But the study shows that the situation is quite different with respect to support of democracy. Most—and least—well-educated people tended to support the idea of democracy, whereas those who completed a high school or a two-year college did not tend to value democracy; this effect was true for all age cohorts of the Arab World populations. Religiosity in the Kostenko et al. (2014) study was measured as the frequency of reading the Quran. More religious people (those who read the Quran more often) were found to be less gender egalitarian. Higher levels of Muslim religiosity are associated with conservative attitudes in all domains. Democracy support in the Arab societies included into the sample was associated with gender egalitarianism at a rather low level. The study also shows that in some countries the correlation was positive, and it was negative in others. Cluster analysis and negative binomial modeling, applied by the study, showed that there were over 30% of the sample, who support democracy and who oppose gender equality or vice versa. Kostenko et al. (2014) argue that the 80% of democracy supporters claimed by some researchers of public opinion in the Middle East equals only about 17% of those who understand, value, and support democracy as they do in the Western world. Such people are particularly numerous in Lebanon and Morocco; and middle-aged (45+) women with higher levels of education are especially well-represented there. All this, the study argues, contributed to the fact that the Arab Spring revolutions did not lead to a real democratic transition in any country involved. As emancipative values are, the study argues, shared by only a small minority, one cannot expect a shift toward liberal democracy in the Arab World in the near future. The more educated people in the Arab World are more conservative in their gender attitudes. This, the study argues, is a striking counter-intuitive result that has to do with age effects: Younger people tend to be both better educated and more conservative. Controlling for age, education still has a positive effect on gender equality attitudes. Nevertheless, this striking phenomenon probably means, the study argues, that there are two simultaneous processes going on in the Middle East. On the one hand, people are becoming more educated, urbanized, etc., which means the continuation of modernization. On the other hand, one observes, as Kostenko et al. (2014) show, a certain retrogression of social values, which is unexpected from the perspective of the theory of modernization. Younger people, especially belonging to the 25–34 age group, tend to be the most patriarchal in their gender attitudes.

Why the Revolutions Came About Robbins and Tessler (2012) claimed to have found strong support for the thesis that the impact of the Arab Spring on public opinion includes a decrease in support for democracy but an increase in commitment to democracy, at least in two very dissimilar Arab countries. Democracy is no longer the unambiguous solution to social, economic, and political problems.

It is rather the hoped-for end point of a regime transition that, at least in its early stages, appears to bring political chaos, economic downturn, and [a] rise in crime and violence in [the] transitioning countries. Confronted with these realities, some citizens are apparently less inclined to believe that democracy is the best political system. (Robbins and Tessler 2012)

But although the political transition may be tumultuous, many citizens appear, the authors argue, to blame incumbent regimes for this outcome rather than democracy-seekers or other protestors. The uprisings appear, Robbins and Tessler (2012) argue, to have demonstrated that although regimes made many claims about the disadvantages of democracy, they failed to fulfill their part of the authoritarian bargain by showing decisiveness and providing security and economic well-being in exchange for the restriction of political rights.


People Protest for Different Reasons Seybolt and Shafiq (2012) in their study suggest that commonly accepted explanations for protests in four Arab countries are not consistent with the reasons people who live there give for participating in protests. In Algeria, poor overall economic performance does not appear to be a cause of protest. Jordanians' comparatively low rate of protest participation is consistent with the lack of support for a grievance and opportunity hypothesis. In Morocco, where protests were frequent and were according to the study over a quarter of the population participated, economic concerns highlighted by observers do not appear to be significant motivating factors. The desire for democracy does appear to matter, perhaps because people are not satisfied with the reforms of the current political system. Yemen is according to Seybolt and Shafiq (2012) the only country where the study found empirical support for the hypothesis that low family income is correlated with protest participation. So, the study, using data from the Arab Barometer (see below, methodology section), assessed protest participation between 2005–08 in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen. The study also found that protests were common during the years preceding the Arab Spring and the riskier form of protesting (marching in a demonstration) was approximately 1.5 to 2 times as common as the less risky form of protest (signing a petition), despite the dangers of voicing dissent in authoritarian regimes.

Islam—A Diverse Religion Finally, Sarkissian (2011) claims that while Muslims who believe that religion should play a role in politics are found to be more intolerant, more religious Muslims are not. These results, Sarkissian (2011) suggests, indicate that one needs to differentiate between different types of Muslim religiosity. Islam is according to the study “a diverse religion with various interpretations found throughout the world.” Greater religiosity may be associated with intolerance when the interpretation followed is of a particular type. The relationship between Islam and intolerance is stronger when targeted toward groups considered to be religious opponents.

There is No Anti-Zionism Without Anti-Semitism In our round-up of the most important empirical earlier studies on our subject, we also should mention the path-breaking empirical article by Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* a decade ago (Kaplan and Small 2006), that indeed extreme criticisms of Israel (e.g., Israel is an apartheid state, the Israel Defense Forces deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians), coupled with extreme policy proposals (e.g., boycott of Israeli academics and institutions, divest from companies doing business with Israel), are motivated by nothing else than blatant Anti-Semitic sentiments. This finding acquires special importance at a time when the BDS (boycott–divest–sanction) movement against the Jewish State becomes stronger in many Western countries. Based on a survey of 500 citizens in each of ten European countries, the authors asked whether those individuals with extreme anti-Israel views are more likely to be anti-Semitic in their general attitudes. Even after statistically controlling for numerous factors, they found that anti-Israel sentiments consistently predicted the probability that an individual is indeed anti-Semitic, with the likelihood of measured Anti-Semitism increasing with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment observed. A similarly important quantitative analysis (Jacobs et al. 2011) under the title “The impact of the conflict in Gaza on Anti-Semitism in Belgium” came to the mathematical-statistical conclusion that complaints about Anti-Semitism in Belgium indeed showed a statistically significant increase during the Israeli military operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) against Hamas in Gaza. The article made use of a database of complaints to the Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding (Center of Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism), which is a Belgium federal anti-racism agency, and of an analysis of political claims-making in the written press.

The Arab Spring and the Changing World System

Now let us briefly look at the world economic conditions surrounding the “*Arab Spring*.” As was already explained in the chapters of the present book above, the process of the “*Arab Spring*” took place at a time of the acute economic crisis of the hitherto dominating centers of the world economy and a dramatic shift away from the countries of the North Atlantic Western center countries toward the current locomotives of economic growth in the world, China and India. Our maps about the changes in the ranks of the UNDP Human Development Index, 2008–2013 (UNDP 2014), about the rates of overall life satisfaction according to Gallup (UNDP 2014), and the simple country time series correlations of GDP per capita growth rates, calculated from the World Bank, 2007–2014 figures (World Bank 2017) dramatically show how the processes of the Arab Spring are “embedded” in these global changes, reminiscent of the stark prognoses by Andre Gunder Frank in his last major book, “*ReOrient*” (Frank 1998) (Maps 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3).




The shift in the global distribution of economic power is clearly visible

Map. 6.1 Changes in the ranks of the UNDP Human Development Index, 2008–2013

Econometric and politometric time series data like these could be produced almost endlessly, all driving home the important point that the Arab reassertion of its role in the world happens at a time of dramatic shifts toward a World System structure where East and Southeast Asia, as for much of world history over the last 5000 years before the industrial revolution, plays a central role, and where the Arab World was and could become again the intermediary between Asia and Europe/the North Atlantic Arena.

6.3 Islamist Global Terrorism

These changes in the present World System are accompanied by very sharp conflicts and convulsions. Generally speaking, there is increasing solid evidence about the devastating nature of global Islamist terrorism and its thousands of victims each month, from Nigeria to Southeast Asia and also, increasingly, in Europe (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014; Neumann 2014). A recent survey by the French Daily “*Le Monde*” revealed that in Europe alone, there were 2239 victims of terrorist attacks to be mourned from the 9/11 attacks in New York City in 2001 onwards (Vaudano et al.




Overall life satisfaction has experienced big positive strides in several Arab countries over the last decade

Map. 6.2 Overall satisfaction with life, UNDP HDR 2014, based on Gallup

2017). Robust empirical studies, like the one prepared by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence and BBC World Service, document that now there are at least 5042 *monthly* deaths from Islamist political violence on a global level (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014; Neumann 2014).

In the vast international literature on the subject (Achilov 2013; Arwine and Mayer 2014; Aslam 2012; Ciftci 2012; Demant and Engineer 2006; Desai 2007; Ezcurra and Palacios 2016; Falco and Rotondi 2016; Malik 2010; McCauley and Scheckter 2008; Roy et al. 2007; Saggat 2009; Salhi 2013; Salman 2015; Soguk 2011; Tibi 2012), especially two approaches seem to offer promising directions of research for the future. One would be characterized by cross-national data analysis on which sets of characteristics of national states are especially associated with the terror phenomenon and its growth, that is to say, to study the phenomenon by the econometrics and politometrics of terrorism based on national aggregate data. The other, still more promising approach would be to rely on standardized opinion surveys in different countries around the globe and to elicit responses from the publics in the countries affected by terrorism themselves which factors possibly contribute to




While in the developed West, economic growth did not accelerate over time after the crisis of 2008, East and South Asia were among the world’s top ranks of how growth gathers pace over time again

Map. 6.3 Ranking countries on how their economic growth correlates positively with time (To make the country values of each time series correlation coefficient around the globe more visible in the map presentation, we ranked all the global time series correlations of economic growth with the time axis, 2007–2014. Rank 1 (highest rank) is assigned to the country, whose time series correlation of growth with time (2007–2014) is highest, while the lowest rank (139) is held by the country whose time series correlation coefficient is most negative. Japan, Southern Europe, but also Sweden and Finland are in a sharp economic descending flight, and the entire Atlantic Arena has to find a new model of economic growth. Based on the rank order of correlations, the map achieves more visibility than a map, based on the mere simple time series correlation coefficients)

the approval or the rejection of terrorist acts, so as to be able to project what makes populations resilient or susceptible to terrorism.

Global Terrorism Index Map 6.4 now highlights the incidence of Global Terrorism, as highlighted by the “*Global Terrorism Index*”, 2014. The Index weights the following components:

- Total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
- Total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in a given year
- Total number of injuries caused by terrorism in a given year
- The approximate level of total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year.



Map. 6.4 Global terrorism index, 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014)

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Chapter 7

Methods and Data for the Analysis



Introductory Notes This chapter firmly shares the established methodology of global values and comparative opinion research (Davidov et al. 2008; Inglehart 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2015; Tausch et al. 2014), augmented at the end of this part by the analysis of economic cycles, fully presented in the recent study (Grinin et al. 2016). Illuminating earlier opinion studies on the Arab countries, making good use of the systematic study of comparative opinion surveys, were published, among others, in Achilov (2013), Al-Ississ and Diwan (2016), Ciftci and Bernick (2015), Fox et al. (2016), Gorman (2015), Grim (2014), Hoffman and Jamal (2012), Nisbet et al. (2004), Ogan and Varol (2016), Pahwa and Winegar (2012), Paragi (2015), Sjoberg and Whooley (2015), Tessler (2004), Weber et al. (2013); and consequently these articles serve as a methodological guiding post for the present part. The mentioning of these articles could inspire interested readers to take up the challenge of working with the presented open data and a statistical software package of their own choice to produce new and even more complete insights on the questions under debate here.

7.1 The Data Bases and Error Margins

The present essay relies on the statistical analysis of open-survey data and is based on the commonly used statistical software IBM SPSS XXIV, utilized at many universities and research centers around the world.¹ The program contains nearly the entire array of modern multivariate statistics, and any researcher should be able to arrive at the same results as we do here when she or he uses the same open data and the SPSS. Clearly our analysis provides only a first attempt to measure “support” for

¹ IBM SPSS (2007).

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terrorism and is understood as an invitation to further research, especially also along generational, regional, and gender lines.

The sources used are:

- a. The **Arab Opinion Index** of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar (Arab Opinion Index 2017). Since 2012, this think tank has published regular professional surveys of public opinion in the Arab World, and the 2015 *Arab Opinion Index* is the fourth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab World (Arab Opinion Index 2015). The 2014 *Index* was based on 21,152 respondents in 14 Arab countries, and included 5466 Syrian refugee respondents living in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and northern Syria along the Turkish–Syrian border. The 2015 *Index* is based on the findings from face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,311 respondents in twelve Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multistage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between ± 2 and $\pm 3\%$ for the individual country samples. With an aggregate sample size of 18,311 respondents, the *Arab Opinion Index* is currently the largest public opinion survey in the Arab World.
- b. The **Arab Barometer, Wave III**. This openly available original survey data allows researchers free direct access to the original data for multivariate analysis (Arab Barometer III 2017²). The third wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer was fielded from 2012 to 2014 in twelve countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. Like the first and second waves, the third wave seeks to measure and track civilian attitudes, values, and behavior patterns relating to pluralism, freedom, tolerance and equal opportunity; social and inter-personal trust; social, religious, and political identities; conceptions of governance and the understanding of democracy; and civic engagement and political participation. Data from the third wave became publicly available in the fall of 2014.³
- c. The **Pew Spring 2015 Survey** (Pew Research Center 2015⁴). The survey, conducted from March 25 to May 27, 2015, is based on 45,435 face-to-face and telephone interviews in 40 countries with adults 18 and older (Pew Research Center 2015). The Survey covers around 56% of the global citizens on earth. In our results section, we also refer to results achieved by using earlier Pew Surveys, freely available in IBM-SPSS format (Pew Research Center 2016).
- d. The **BBC Global Scan**.⁵ In the version used for our secondary country-level results, a total 24,542 citizens in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel Japan, Kenya, Mexico,

²The available codebook describes the survey and sampling techniques for each country covered by the survey.

³As stated on the website, “the operational base for the third wave is the Center for Strategic Studies in Jordan (CSS). This third phase was funded by the Canadian International Research and Development Centre (IDRC) and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP)”.

⁴This site describes the sampling and survey methods for each country, included in the survey.

⁵http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbc06-3/.

Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the UK, and the USA were interviewed face to face or by telephone between December 17, 2013 and April 28, 2014 (BBC World Service 2014). Polling was conducted for the BBC World Service in London, UK by *GlobeScan* and its research partners in each country.

- e. For purposes of comparison and predictions, we also worked with data from the “*World Values Survey*.” The chosen SPSS data files from the WVS data base is “WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014.” The global Muslim sample (71,773 representative Muslims) was drawn from this WVS file by selecting persons with the denominations given as “Druse” (18), “Muslim” (62,115), “Shia” (4058), and “Sunni” (5583).

For the calculation of error margins, readers are referred to the easily readable introduction to opinion survey error margins, prepared by Cornell University Roper Center (2017). Readers more interested in the details are also being referred to Langer Research Associates n.d. On the basis of the methodological literature on opinion surveys this Web site makes available a direct opinion survey error margin calculator. It is important to recall that for example at a 5% ISIS/ISIL/Daesh favorability rate, error margins for our chosen samples of around 1,000 representative interview partners for each country are $\pm 1.4\%$; at a 10% favorability rate, the error margin is $\pm 1.9\%$; and at a favorability rate of 15% the error margin is $\pm 2.2\%$; see Langer Research Associates n.d. That error margins differ according to reported rates of support of terrorist groups is an important fact of opinion survey research theory, often forgotten to be mentioned in the public debate.

7.2 The Study of Global Values

Answering the issues raised by the general heading of this part, one would be tempted at first to say that the *World Values Survey* (hitherto abridged as WVS; <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>) is really the ideal and single best choice to be the data base for the scientific analysis of this theme. The WVS is the world’s largest collection of representative opinion surveys, which are covering some 90% of the global population. In practice, however, it is evident that the managers of the WVS data base hitherto were much more interested in issues of general sociology, the sociology of religion, and the sociology of the norms of family life and sexuality than in the hard-core issues of identifying support for terrorism or terrorist groups.

To support this contention, we mention some figures on the uses of the WVS data base in international research.⁶ We used the full text data base of the world’s scientific literature, published in the world’s peer-reviewed journals, available via the “*Barton Plus*” Catalogue at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) in Cambridge,

⁶[https://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/resultsadvanced?sid=4ad7e718-d8d6-4960-b6c2-e2635474d63c%40sessionmgr120&vid=7&hid=127&bquery=\(TX+%22world+values+survey%22\)+AND+\(TX+terrorism\)&bdata=JmNsaTA9UIYmY2x2MD1ZJnR5cGU9MSZzaXRIPWVkcylsaXZlJnNjb3BIPXNpdGU%3d](https://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/resultsadvanced?sid=4ad7e718-d8d6-4960-b6c2-e2635474d63c%40sessionmgr120&vid=7&hid=127&bquery=(TX+%22world+values+survey%22)+AND+(TX+terrorism)&bdata=JmNsaTA9UIYmY2x2MD1ZJnR5cGU9MSZzaXRIPWVkcylsaXZlJnNjb3BIPXNpdGU%3d).

Massachusetts, USA. As of April 13, 2017, 1840 articles quoting the *World Values Survey* were also mentioning the word “terrorism”, 1758 such WVS relevant articles the word “Islam”, and 1450 such articles the term “Arab”, but there were by contrast 5703 articles quoting the *World Values Survey* in conjunction with the term “gender”, 3745 articles mentioning the name of the great American sociologist and founder of the WVS project, Ronald “Inglehart” among the none the less than 10,648 scholarly articles (including book reviews *et cetera*), quoting the “*World Values Survey*”. But the number of WVS relevant articles dwindles down to below 10 each, when the additional search term used is “*Salafism*” or “*Salafist*.”

As we said, any researcher around the globe with a proper access to the SPSS XXIV statistical program and the available data should be able to reproduce our findings on a 1:1 basis. For this reason, our presentation of the results will be rather brief, and we concentrate on the most salient results.

The Mathematical—Statistical Methods and Factor Analysis

Our research attempt is of course guided by the vast traditions of mathematical–statistical analysis in opinion survey research (Abdi 2003; Basilevsky 2009; Braithwaite and Law 1985; Brenner 2016; Browne 2001; Davidov et al. 2008; Dunlap and York 2008; Fabrigar et al. 1999; Hanson 2014; Hedges and Olkin 2014; Inglehart and Norris 2003, 2012, 2016; Inglehart and Welzel 2003, 2009; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart 1988, 2006; Kim 2010; Kimelman 2004; Kline 2014; Knippenberg 2015; Manuel et al. 2006; McDonald 2014; Minkov and Hofstede 2011, 2013; Minkov 2014; Mulaik 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2002, 2012, 2015; Suhr 2012; Yeşilada and Noordijk 2010).

We should briefly state that our methodological approach is within a more general framework to study global values with the methodology of comparative and opinion-survey-based political science (Brenner 2016; Hanson 2014; Knippenberg 2015; Manuel et al. 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2015). Our methodology of evaluating the opinions of global publics from global surveys is in addition based on recent advances in mathematical statistical factor analysis (Basilevsky 2009; Cattell 2012; Hedges and Olkin 2014; Kline 2014; McDonald 2014; Mulaik 2009; Tausch et al. 2014). Such studies allow to project the underlying structures of the relationships between the variables.

Our main statistical calculations also relied on cross tables, comparisons of means, and correlation analysis. Concerning factor analysis and the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, which are underlying the correlation matrix, rerefer our readers to important literature on the subject (Abdi 2003; Browne 2001; Dunlap and York 2008; Kim 2010). The SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called *promax* rotation of factors (Braithwaite and Law 1985; Browne 2001; Fabrigar et al. 1999; Minkov 2014; Suhr 2012; Yeşilada and Noordijk 2010), which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research today.⁷ Formulated in plain everyday language, the mathematical procedures of the

⁷Older approaches often assumed that there is no correlation between the factors, best representing the underlying dimensions of the variables. But for example, in attempting to understand the pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom it would be ridiculous to assume that, say, there is no correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and the feeling to be among the losers of globalization.

rotation of factors which best represent the dimensions underlying a correlation matrix are necessary to make the structure simpler and more reliable.

Time Series Analysis

Rounding up our statistical results, we also apply spectral analysis and autocorrelation analysis to long-term time series of Egyptian economic growth. Egypt was chosen because it is the only Arab country with economic growth data back into the nineteenth century. Spectral analysis and autocorrelation analysis are econometric time series analyses, presented in full in Grinin et al. (2016). They need no further explanations here.

Factor Analysis and Sub-Groups

For all analyzed groups and sub-groups, a minimum sample of at least 30 respondents per country had to be available in the original data sets to attempt reasonable predictions for the general or sectoral publics to be analyzed, thus keeping in line with standard traditions of empirical opinion survey research (Tausch et al. 2014).

7.3 World Values Research and Islamism

Let us look first in a more detailed fashion at the simple fact whether or not there are enough data available from the WVS data base to be able to talk meaningfully about *Islamism*, *Islamists*, *Salafism*, and *Salafists* in a comparative fashion in the first place. Yes, the best documented item in the machine-readable roll-out of Wave 6 of the WVS data base, “*important child qualities: feeling of responsibility*” is available from a stunning number of 338,350 respondents around the globe, and also the item “*justifiable: homosexuality*” is documented for 301,077 respondents. While attitudes on “*important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people*” are known from 338,348 respondents, and the highly gender-policy relevant item “*men make better political leaders than women do*” is still available from 282,206 global respondents, and indeed arguably also captures the gender repressive perspectives of the Islamist ideology, the available number of respondents quickly decreases, the further we move down the list of items which indeed might empirically well capture parts of the Islamist ideology and which pitifully enough are only available for handful of countries and not for the entire globe. The answer to the question, whether *in a democracy religious authorities should interpret the laws* is still available from 150,191 global respondents, but the following *Islamism* items are only available from a more and more limited number of countries for further analysis, as we move down the list (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Islamism items in the world values survey

	N with complete data in the WVS
Wife must obey	21,611
More than one wife permitted	21,430
[Reject] neighbours: Christians	19,071
Traits in a woman: Woman wearing veil	18,194
[Reject] the opinion that laws must only reflect people's wishes	15,249
Only laws of the Shari'ah should be in place	13,538
There is a cultural invasion by the west	9732
[Reject] Islam requires women to dress modestly but it does not require them to cover their face with veil	5501
It is a violation of Islam for male and female university students to attend classes together	5396
Islam requires that political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims	5037
A truly Islamic country should not have a parliament with the right to pass laws	4823
If a country pursues policies harmful to Muslims, Islam permits the killing of civilians in that country	3159
The exposure to the culture of the US and other Western countries has a harmful effect on the country	3110
Islam requires that a country with a majority of Muslims must be governed by men of Islamic learning	3103
[Reject] some US Policies toward other countries are good and some are bad	3080
[Reject] the culture of US and other Western countries has many positive attributes	3061
[Reject] if a Palestinian state is established and a peace treaty with Israel is concluded, Islam would not oppose the existence of Israel	3033
Nationalism is incompatible with Islam because Islam requires the ' <i>ummah</i> '	3016
Democracy is a Western form of government that is not compatible with Islam	2996
[Reject] while US policies toward other countries are often bad, most ordinary Americans are good people	2932
[Choice of the] political system: Having an Islamic government, where religious authorities have absolute power	2270
I see myself as citizen of the [Islamic nation]	2103
[Reject] by requiring man treating all wives equally, Islam's true intent is to prohibit taking more than one wife	1188

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

7.4 A Final Methodological Point: The Treatment of Highest Numerical Values, Missing Values and Don't Knows

It is important to mention that in our empirical work, we took great care to properly take into account for the fact that in the Pew and Arab Barometer projects, very often the *highest numerical values of a variable express something else than the original Pew and Arab Barometer variable labels do*. To facilitate the understanding of this important point, we just quote two randomly picked variables from the Pew and the Arab Barometer Surveys. Let us start our explanation of the problem with the Pew Survey, Question 12H:

- ***Q12H. Please Tell Me if You Have a Very Favorable, Somewhat Favorable, Somewhat Unfavorable or Very Unfavorable Opinion of Pakistan? (Pew Spring Survey, 2015)***

Here, the scale ranges from (1) very favorable to (4)—very unfavorable. The number (8) is reserved for the “*don't knows*”, and the number (9) for the refused answers. In addition, the numbers used by Pew to designate “*don't knows*” and “*answer refused*” change sometimes from item to item. Without eliminating these “*don't knows*” and refused answers, one will get biased results, averages near or above (4), and maximum values (9) *et cetera*. Correlating, regressing and factor analyzing the (negative) opinion on Pakistan—in our example—with other variables has to take into account that in the Pew question “Q12H,” an *unfavorable opinion of Pakistan is being measured*. Without proper amendments, we have to report a significant Kendall tau correlation coefficient of +.243 between the opinions on Pakistan and on the USA, based on 2452 individuals. But taking properly the direction of the variable into account and eliminating the “*don't knows*” and the refused answers, we have to report a significant, but substantially reduced Kendall tau correlation between a negative opinion on Pakistan and a negative opinion on the USA to the tune of +.144, based on 1848 respondents with complete data. Since for both indicators a higher number expresses a negative opinion, the concrete practical interpretation problem is not so great here, but what are you doing, if you measure, say, the correlation between a negative opinion on Pakistan and age?

The same problem applies to the *Arab Barometer Survey*. Consider questions like these:

- ***q201.6 I Will Name a Number of Institutions, and I Would Like You to tell Me to What Extent You Trust Each of them: The Armed Forces (The Army)***

The number (0) is assigned to missing values, (1) is trust to a great extent, (2) is trust to a medium extent, (3) is trust to a limited extent, and (4) absolutely no trust. (8) are the “*don't knows*”, and (9) are the refused answers. Without proper controls and corrections, all reported statistics—including cross tables, factor analyses *et cetera*,—would again treat the values (0), (8), and (9) as valid numerical values. To test the importance of our practical advice to potential users of the *Arab Barometer*

data base, we show first a Kendall tau correlation coefficient between (low) trust in the army and (not) reading the Quran or the Bible (variable q610.6: *Do you listen to or read the Quran (or the Bible)?*). Variable 610.6 is scaled from 1 (always) to 5 (never), and the number (0) is again assigned to missing values, (8) are again the “*don’t knows*”, and (9) again are the refused answers. Without proper corrections, there is a significant positive correlation of +.080 between (low) trust in the army and (not) reading or listening to the Quran, based on 14,809 individuals. Running the necessary IBM SPSS XXIV “*select if*” command and eliminating all missing and invalid data, which do not correspond to the specification that

(1) $q2016 > 0.5 \ \& \ q2016 < 4.5 \ \& \ q6106 > 0.5 \ \& \ q6106 < 5.5$

We arrive then at the valid conclusion that there is a significant positive correlation of +.083 between (low) trust in the army and (not) reading or listening to the Quran, based on 14,081 individuals.

Our work takes all these important points into proper consideration, perhaps even at the risk of using a more complicated language when presenting our results. In the WVS data base, which handles the problems of missing values, *don’t knows* and refused answers more elegantly and user-friendly, still the same problem of the direction of the highest numerical values has to be taken into account very carefully as well. For example, the item “*University is more important for a boy than for a girl*” assigns the value (1) for the sexist opinion “agree strongly,” and the value (4) to the strong disagreement with it. The variable “*Justifiable: cheating on taxes*” however expresses a scale, ranging from (1) *never justifiable* to (10) *always justifiable*. The significant reported Kendall tau correlation coefficient between the two variables is –0054, and is based on the data from 266,688 global citizens. But what does it really tell us about the relationship between the two variables? It tells us that the rejection of sexism is negatively related to the endorsement of tax evasion, or, in other words, that the endorsement of sexism goes significantly, but weakly, hand in hand with the endorsement of tax evasion. In a bivariate relationship, the correct interpretation of the direction of the used indicators might still be an easily manageable job, but with dozens of variables around and using such techniques as factor analysis, really great care must be given to this problem to avoid errors of interpretation. This is all the more relevant since the IBM SPSS output based on *World Values Survey* data uses the variable labels, proposed by the WVS team which compiled the data base.

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Chapter 8

Radical Islamism and Islamist Terrorism



8.1 Introductory Notes

Our following presentations will now summarize results discussed at length in Tausch (2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, d, 2016a, b, c, 2017) as well as Tausch and Heshmati (2016). These results are important for the understanding of our completely new results, presented here.

17.38% of the Entire Muslim Population in the World on Average Support Terrorist Organisations and Acts of Terrorism According to the research program developed and presented at length in Tausch (2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, d, 2016a, b, c, 2017), the “terror scene” in the Muslim world can be described in the following steps:



The Pew data analyzed in this research were from the following countries, which in between them share none the less than 42% of the total global Muslim population of our globe: Egypt; Indonesia; Jordan; Lebanon; Malaysia; Nigeria; Pakistan; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Senegal; Tunisia; and Turkey. So at least, there are standard and pretty reliable Pew public opinion survey data available on a number of Muslim communities around the globe which cover none the less than 42% of the global Muslim population and their rates of solidarity with such terrorist groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the justification of suicide bombing even if it means the deaths of innocent civilians.

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At least, the average rates of terror support from these data could be regarded as a good and valid starting point for an informed guess about the probable size of ISIS/ISIL terror support. Given that all five items highlight very radical Islamist positions, the hypothesis that the average rate of support for the four terror organizations, competing/collaborating with ISIS, and the active consent to suicide bombing “to defend Islam” quite well measures the maximum possible support given to the ISIS/ISIL terrorists.

In this research, it was also proposed that in view of the gross “intelligence failure” to foresee the current ISIS/ISIL crisis, it is necessary to re-interpret the policy conclusions, drawn by the Pew Institute in Washington D.C., which are an important element in the overall foreign country assessment of successive US administrations (Pew Research Center 2014). While Pew maintains that

Few Muslims in most of the countries surveyed say that suicide bombing can often or sometimes be justified against civilian targets in order to defend Islam from its enemies. And support for the tactic has fallen in many countries over the last decade. Still, in some countries a substantial minority say that suicide bombing can be justified. (Ibid.)

The article series, first presented in Israel in Tausch (2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, d, 2016a, b, c, 2017) as well as in Tausch and Heshmati (2016) came to the conclusion that these “few Muslims” are currently 62% of the Muslim population in the Palestinian territories, 33% of the Muslim population in the Lebanon, 27% of the Muslim population in Malaysia, and 25% of the Muslim population in Egypt, *etc.* On a population-weighted basis, these very Pew data imply that 9.96% of the entire surveyed Muslim population on earth is of the opinion that suicide bombings are “often” or “sometimes” justified. The Pew’s “few Muslims” correspond—without corrections for the age structure—to 169 million people, roughly the total current population of a sizeable country like Nigeria or Bangladesh.¹ The “few Muslims” said to support the Taliban and al-Qaeda correspond, without the necessary corrections of age structures, to 289 million people (Taliban supporters) or 279 million people (al-Qaeda supporters), which is far more than the current entire population of Indonesia or Brazil. Applying simple time series regression analysis, it was also ventured to say that while indeed there were encouraging trends in several countries, al-Qaeda favorability had risen over time among Muslims in the Palestinian territories, Turkey, and Indonesia. Hamas favorability had increased among Israeli Muslims, and among Muslims in Tanzania, and the Lebanon. Hezbollah favorability had increased over time among Israeli Muslims, and among Muslims in Tanzania and the Lebanon. And while there were hopeful trends of a long-term linear decline in the absolute rejection of suicide bombings which could be observed in Indonesia; Jordan; Lebanon; Malaysia; Nigeria; Pakistan; Senegal, Tunisia, and the Palestinian territories, one also had to observe that favorability of suicide bombing had increased among Muslims in Egypt; Israel; Tanzania; and Turkey. The supporters of suicide bombing amount to almost 10% of the global Muslim population, that is to say, these 9.96% correspond to a milieu of open suicide bombing support of 169 million people. Table 8.1 summarizes these results:

¹We should keep in mind that the mentioned Pew data cover around 42% of the global Muslim population of currently some 1.6 billion people. The World Bank population figures are freely available from World Bank (2017).

Table 8.1 Sociological landscape of Islamism and its supporters in the Muslim world according to representative surveys by the Pew, latest available year (2014)—percentages of total Muslim population per country and globally population-weighted averages

	Egypt	Indonesia	Jordan	Lebanon	Malaysia	Nigeria	Pakistan	Palestinian Territories	Senegal	Tunisia	Turkey	Population-weighted average, Muslims of all countries
(1) % unconcerned about Islamist Extremism	28.0	48.0	45.0	26.0	18.0	21.0	18.0	33.0	19.0	27.0	51.0	33.85
(2) % at least not categorically rejecting suicide bombing	61.0	19.0	47.0	59.0	42.0	22.0	11.0	84.0	50.0	23.0	46.0	26.86
(3) % favoring Hamas	48.0	24.0	43.0	46.0	32.0	25.0	12.0	48.0	11.0	46.0	5.0	22.48
(4) % favoring Hezbollah	18.0	29.0	26.0	46.0	35.0	21.0	15.0	43.0	10.0	35.0	7.0	21.06
(5) % favoring Taliban	28.0	21.0	9.0	4.0	23.0	11.0	12.0	29.0	15.0	13.0	10.0	16.99
(6) % favoring al-Qaeda	20.0	23.0	13.0	1.0	20.0	9.0	13.0	35.0	9.0	15.0	7.0	16.41
(7) % saying suicide bombing often or sometimes justified	25.0	6.0	12.0	33.0	27.0	8.0	3.0	62.0	18.0	12.0	16.0	9.96
(8) implied percentage of terror favorability (average from Indicators 3–7)	27.8	20.6	20.6	26.0	27.4	14.8	11.0	43.4	12.6	24.2	9.0	17.38
percentage of the total population of the entire Muslim world	4.71	14.42	0.38	0.15	1.01	4.46	10.49	0.25	0.73	0.61	4.40	41.59%

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs Population and denominational statistics from: Auswärtiges Amt (2017)
Differences due to rounding

Even a first glance at the data from the *Pew Research Global Attitudes Project Spring 2013* (Dataset for web.sav), further reveals deep alternative insights into the current drama of Arab politics unfolding:

- In Egypt, Malaysia, and Tunisia, more than 10% of the adult population support suicide bombing and the following four terrorist organizations: Hamas; Hezbollah; al-Qaeda; and the Taliban.
- In Indonesia and Jordan, there are 10% or more supporters of Hamas; Hezbollah; and al-Qaeda, and 10% or more of the resident population in addition support either suicide bombing in general or the Taliban in particular.
- In Senegal and the Lebanon, 10% or more of the resident population support Hamas and suicide bombing, and in addition are in favor of either the Taliban or Hezbollah.
- More than 10% of the resident population in Pakistan and Nigeria support Hamas and Hezbollah. Of particular concern is also the radicalization of segments of the Israeli Arab population, which supports to a rate of more than 10% Hamas and Hezbollah. In the NATO member country Turkey, there are more than 10% of the resident population which supports suicide bombing and the Taliban. This happened at a time, when the combined “wisdom” of European decision makers in earnest offered visa-free travel for the almost 80 million Turks (Stearns 2016).

8.2 Capitulating in Front of the Shari’ah State?

The available data, discussed at length in Tausch (2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, d, 2016a, b, c, 2017) as well as Tausch and Heshmati (2016), also suggest that mobilizing Western publics for the necessary war on terrorism will be an uphill struggle:

- A third or more of the resident population in key Western allies thinks that Islamic extremist groups are a minor threat or not a threat to the country: such low rates were observed in Canada; Turkey; Czech Republic; Australia; Poland; Greece; Germany; Japan; Britain; South Korea; Spain; and the USA.
- Not only in many Muslim countries, but also in NATO member states such as Turkey, Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland, 50% or more of the resident population holds an unfavorable opinion of the State of Israel.
- Iran’s nuclear program is seen as constituting only a minor threat or not a threat at all to the country by more than 1/3 of the resident population in key Western allies: Canada; Turkey; Britain; Czech Republic; Spain; Australia; Germany; Japan; France; USA; and Poland. The mainly leftwing electoral support for the politics of appeasement toward the Iranian regime, which was implemented by the European political elites for years now, is the main factor in this (Fallows 2015).

To highlight the relevance of our theoretical focus, discussed in the background section, we present some data from the *2012-Pew-Religion-Worlds-Muslims_dataset.sav* and the *World Values Survey* (Muslim respondents only in each case).

The Pew data concentrated on *Shar'ia* and its harshest aspects:

- Favor making the *Shar'ia* (Islamic law) the official law of the land
- Favor the death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion
- Favor punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery
- Favor stoning people who commit adultery
- If a woman engages in premarital sex or adultery, it is often/sometimes justified for family members to end her life in order to protect the family's honor.

The *World Values Survey* (71,773 representative Muslims) data presented here focused on “*the Orientalism of the Orient*” in the “real-existing Muslim countries” and the three most important WVS variables measuring xenophobia among global Muslim publics:

- % Muslims rejecting neighbors of a different race
- % Muslims rejecting neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers
- % Muslims rejecting neighbors: People of a different religion

The results, based on Pew and WVS data, offer a depressing picture of social realities in many Muslim countries. *50% or more* of the total resident population are in favor or strong favor of the following measures:

**Absolute majorities of
“50% + 1” for Shari'ah
measures in the following
countries**

- *Shar'ia as such*: Afghanistan; Iraq; Palestinian Territories; Malaysia; Niger; Iran; Pakistan; Morocco; Bangladesh; Egypt; Indonesia; Jordan; Algeria; Tunisia
- *Death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion*: Egypt; Jordan; Afghanistan; Pakistan; Palestinian Territories; Algeria; Malaysia
- *Punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery*: Pakistan; Afghanistan; Algeria; Niger; Palestinian Territories; Egypt; Malaysia; Iraq; Jordan
- *Stoning people who commit adultery*: Afghanistan; Pakistan; Palestinian Territories; Egypt; Algeria; Niger; Jordan; Iraq; Bangladesh; Malaysia.

**More than 1/3 of the
Muslim population are for
the following measures in
the following countries**

33 percentage or more of the total resident population are also in favor or strong favor of the following measure:

- *Honor killings (female offender)*: Lebanon; Egypt; Jordan; Palestinian Territories; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Niger.

More than 1/5 of the Muslim population hold the following opinions in the following countries

More than 20% of the respective Muslim population hold racist and xenophobic attitudes:

Rejecting Neighbor of a Different Race Libya; Thailand; Bangladesh; Palestine; India; Lebanon; Saudi Arabia; Philippines; Turkey; Egypt; Yemen; Jordan; Indonesia; Malaysia; Azerbaijan; Iran; Iraq; France; Kyrgyzstan; Cyprus; Bosnia; Nigeria; Algeria; Uganda; Mali; Ghana.

Rejecting Neighbors' Immigrants/Foreign Workers Thailand; Libya; Egypt; Malaysia; Bangladesh; Jordan; India; Palestine; Iraq; Lebanon; Indonesia; Turkey; Montenegro; Iran; Cyprus; Saudi Arabia; France; Bosnia; Kazakhstan; Azerbaijan; Kyrgyzstan; Singapore; South Africa; Pakistan; Algeria; Nigeria; Mali; Bosnia; Yemen; Russia; Philippines; Serbia; Ghana.

Rejecting Neighbor of a Different Religion Libya; Yemen; Palestine; India; Saudi Arabia; Bangladesh; Thailand; Jordan; Algeria; Kyrgyzstan; Turkey; Azerbaijan; Indonesia; Lebanon; Iraq; Philippines; Malaysia; Tunisia; Iran; Morocco; France; Nigeria; Cyprus; Ghana; Bosnia; Mali; Albania.

8.3 Arab Anti-Semitism and Islamism

In the research program presented in Tausch (2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, d, 2016a, b, c, 2017) as well as Tausch and Heshmati (2016), it was highlighted that not only a repressive gender ideology, but also Anti-Semitism is an integral part of the Islamist ideology. Since the publication of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL 2014) study on attitudes and opinions toward Jews in more than 100 countries around the world, there is really no excuse anymore for cross-national opinion research to ignore this subject. The ADL survey based on 53,100 total interviews among citizens aged 18 and over in 101 countries and the Palestinian Territories in the West Bank and Gaza analyzed eleven negative stereotypes against Jews. If respondents consented to six out of eleven statements, they were considered to hold anti-Semitic attitudes. The overall ADL GLOBAL 100 Index Score is 26% of global respondents (population-weighted figures). This makes over 1 billion (1000 million) anti-Semites around the globe. In the world regions, the results are as follows (weighted percentages of the resident total population):

- Middle East and North Africa (MENA): 74%
- Eastern Europe: 34%
- Western Europe: 24%
- Sub-Saharan Africa: 23%
- Asia: 22%
- Americas: 19%
- Oceania: 14%

The interplay between religion, place of residence and Anti-Semitism reveals interesting patterns as well: while only below 1/5 of Christians in the Americas and Oceania are anti-Semitic, the share of Christians with anti-Semitic attitudes in Western Europe is already 25%; in Eastern Europe, it is already 35%, and in the MENA region, it is a staggering 64%. The data for Muslims in these regions correspond to a similar pattern: while only below 1/3 of Muslims in the Americas and Oceania are anti-Semitic, the share of Muslims with anti-Semitic attitudes in Eastern Europe is 20%, while in the MENA region, it is 75%.

The ADL survey, for the first time in global social science literature, also measured Muslim anti-Semitic attitudes in Western Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK). Based on the available population statistics for the European overall population and reliable estimates of the European Muslim population (Nation Master (2014) and <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>), Tausch (2014, 2016a) came to the conclusion that on a population-weighted basis, 54.3% of the total Muslim population of 14.9 million people in these six key West European countries harbor anti-Semitic attitudes (consenting to at least six of the eleven criteria, used by the ADL survey). Anti-Semitic stereotypes by Muslims in these countries are substantially higher than among the total national population in these six key countries of Western Europe, though lower than the corresponding figures of 75% for Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The margin of error for Muslims in each country was $\pm 9.8\%$, and for the combined Western European Muslim oversample for all six countries was $\pm 4.0\%$.

Most prevalent was the belief that “*Jews have too much power in international financial markets*”—an anti-Jewish opinion affirmed by some 70% of Western European Muslims.

The ADL also highlights that on most conspiracy-related statements, scores of European and MENA Muslims showed little difference. However, on negative statements about the “*Jewish character*”, (e.g., “*people hate Jews because of the way they behave*” and “*Jews think they are better than other people*”) European Muslims scored substantially lower than MENA Muslims.

The Anti-Semitism index scores were extremely high for Muslims across all six of the European countries sampled, with still the lowest level recorded in France:

- *Belgium*: 68% of Muslims harbor anti-Semitic attitudes, compared to 21% overall; 3.5% Muslim population share
- *Spain*: 62%, compared to 29% overall; 2.5% Muslim population share
- *Germany*: 56%, compared to 16% overall; 3.7% Muslim population share
- *Italy*: 56%, compared to 29% overall; 1.7% Muslim population share
- *UK*: 54%, compared to 12% overall; 2.7% Muslim population share
- *France*: 49%, compared to 17% overall. 7.5% Muslim population share.

Based on population size figures and the ADL data, Tausch (2014, 2016a) concluded that the share of the 8.1 Muslim anti-Semites Europe in the total number of almost 80 million European anti-Semites is a staggering 10.1%.

All indicators point into the direction that the Anti-Semitism of the so-called “*moderate Islamists*” makes the spread of the ideology of brutal terrorism possible and even fashionable in the first place (Caldwell 2015).

8.4 Islamism and Gender Issues

Most Western scientific publics identifying with the goals of an “*Open Society*” (Popper 2012) still would reject the notion of cultural differences on gender issues between the Muslim world and the West (Moghadam 2002). But Feminists from the Muslim world themselves increasingly criticize Western Feminism for overlooking “*oppressive gender relations*” in the non-Western world, and there seems to be some consensus in this literature (Mojab 2001; Mir-Hosseini 2011) that the Islamist rallying cry of “*Return to Shari’ah*” led to regressive gender policies, with devastating consequences for women: compulsory dress codes, gender segregation, and the revival of cruel punishments and outdated patriarchal and tribal models of social relations (Mir-Hosseini 2011). In the context of Islamism and gender relations, Tausch and Heshmati (2016) presented a shocking survey of the existing data and their respective country level values (Poushter 2014). Pew respondents were shown images of women, ranging from a Lady with no hair cover to the full scale “*Afghan*” type of “*Burka*”. Except for the Lebanon with its large Christian minority population, acceptance of a Western dress style by Muslim publics has now become a minority affair, even in the once staunchly secularist and head-scarf-free Kemalist Turkey. In Lebanon, the percentage accepting a Western female hairstyle is 49%, in Turkey it is 32%, and in Tunisia it is 15%, while it is below 5% in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The Pew data also reveal the astonishing rate of Muslim acceptance of the opinion that a wife should always obey her husband. In 20 of the 23 countries where the question was asked, at least half of Muslims believe a wife must always obey her spouse (Pew Research Center 2013). By contrast, the nowadays seemingly helpless consolidated legislation of the European Union contains, as of April 10, 2017, 908 text pieces which mention the term “*gender mainstreaming*”

and 910 text pieces which mention the term “*gender discrimination*”.² The data first presented in Tausch and Heshmati (2016) present a truly staggering amount of sexist discrimination prevailing in the Muslim world:

- In Malaysia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, Tajikistan, Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Palestinian Territories, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, female obedience in marriage is supported $\frac{3}{4}$ or more of the total Muslim population, and in Lebanon, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, it is supported by more than half of the total Muslim population. Only in the former Communist Balkan countries of Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia, these percentages are below 50%.
- More than 70% of Muslim publics think that the veil is important or very important, such as in Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Only Turkey with its tradition of Kemalism still stands out as a statistical outlier and a veil support rate of only 14%.³ However, in recent years there are tendencies for Islamists comeback to weaken the secular policies of Turkey.
- Sizeable proportions of global Muslim publics not only support the veil, but also another concept, completely incompatible with civil law in the West—the idea of institutionalized polygamy. In Nigeria, a sizeable majority of almost $\frac{3}{4}$ of the entire Nigerian Muslim population supports it, and in Algeria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, this support rate is $\frac{2}{5}$; while in other mainly Muslim countries, the support rates are less but still a considerable minority. It also has to be observed that also a sizeable minority of Turkish Muslims— $\frac{1}{6}$ —in fact supports polygamy.
- And although some Muslim publics in some countries around the globe are less inclined than their non-Muslim counterparts to accept male domestic violence against women, our evaluation of the “*World Values Survey*” data shows that more than a third and, in some countries, more than half of the entire Muslim population accepts male domestic violence against women (India; Thailand; Iraq; Rwanda; Mali; Egypt; Bahrain; Algeria; Lebanon; Ghana; Burkina Faso; Philippines; Malaysia; Nigeria; Russia; Singapore; Uzbekistan; Kuwait; Palestinian Territories; Germany; Yemen; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Morocco; and China).⁴

In view of these tendencies, Tausch and Heshmati (2016) made a case for a kind of neo-Kemalism in the West and also in those Muslim countries which strive for

²http://eur-lex.europa.eu/search.html?textScope=te&qid=1452181322988&DTS_DOM=EU_LAW&type=advanced&lang=en&andText0=gender%20mainstreaming&SUBDOM_INIT=CONSLEG&DTS_SUBDOM=CONSLEG”.

³The data from the Pew on the proper way to cover/not to cover the hair and from the *World Values Survey* on the importance of women wearing the veil seem to suggest divergent percentages for the case of Turkey. But looking at the wording of the questions the differences are explained: while more than $\frac{2}{3}$ of Turkish Muslims think that it is *proper* for a woman to cover her head, only $\frac{1}{6}$ think it is *important*.

⁴A very practical introduction to the logic of error margins in sample-based survey results is to be found in European Commission (2015), Clauß and Ebner (1970), and a host of other literature recommend discarding survey results from samples which are smaller than 30.

Western political orientations and reforms (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011; Ozcetin 2013; Dedeoglu 2013; Kandiyoti 2012; Arik 2015; Cronin 2014). The acceptance of the veil and of polygamy cannot be separated from attitudes which largely must be deemed as incompatible with an overall functioning “*Open Society*.”

8.5 Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité or a Muslim Brotherhood Republic?

In the following, we will now present some very new materials on the mass support for Islamism in the Arab World and in the Muslim World in general, which further qualify and support the perspective already presented and discussed at length in Tausch (2013, 2014, 2015a, b, c, d, 2016a, b, c, 2017). The new data presented here, further support our theoretical perspectives, already presented in the background section and the empirical data evaluated here. Today, we can reach the conclusion that the size of support for exclusive *Shari’ah*-based lawmaking in the Muslim world seems to be even greater than suggested by the Achilov and Sen study (2016). The following WVS-based table is based on some of the most important concentrations of the global Muslim population in East and South Asia (Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) and also contains the very large Muslim communities of Nigeria and Egypt. In only one of the surveyed nine countries—Bangladesh—the call for lawmaking which is exclusively based on the *Shari’ah* is supported by less than an absolute “electoral majority,” while in all the other surveyed countries the call for lawmaking which is exclusively based on the *Shari’ah* is supported by an absolute “electoral” majority (Table 8.2).

Our newly evaluated *Arab Barometer* data, extracted from the original sources, also suggest to us that the Muslim Brotherhood as the most important Islamist Sunni

Table 8.2 Identification with the Shari’ah state: only laws of the Shari’ah

	Only laws of the Shari’ah—WVS data (%)
Bangladesh	44
Indonesia	50
Nigeria	53
Iraq	55
Pakistan	62
Algeria	72
Jordan	78
Egypt	80
Saudi Arabia	88

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

Table 8.3 Arab Barometer data on support of the Muslim Brotherhood

	I trust it to a great extent (%)	I trust it to a medium extent (%)	I trust it to a limited extent (%)	I absolutely do not trust it (%)	N
Libya	5	11	9	75	1082
Egypt	7	14	9	71	1165
Lebanon	4	15	16	65	1169
Tunisia	16	21	12	51	1108
Jordan	7	29	25	39	1695
Yemen	16	25	22	38	1160
Morocco	17	28	18	37	1066
Kuwait	17	24	23	36	944
Palestinian Territories	21	29	16	34	1123
Algeria	14	38	21	28	1134
Sudan	25	26	22	27	1157
Iraq	11	34	32	23	1129

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

Arabic mass organization seems to have lost ground in Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia, while it still shows considerable resilience and strength in Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, the Palestinian Territories, Kuwait, Morocco, Yemen, and Jordan, where in each case only a hypothetical electoral minority has no trust at all in the Brotherhood, and where, to a varying degree, considerable sectors of the total population openly and explicitly have a great extent of trust in the Muslim Brotherhood (Table 8.3).

Our next question, to be answered from our new empirical materials, is the amount of mass support for the most radical and most active Sunni Arab Islamist terrorist organization, ISIS/ISIL/Daesh.

8.3% of Global Muslims Even Support ISIS/ISIL/Daesh No question that in terms of its unspeakable brutality, ISIS/ISIL/Daesh even exceeds all the other terrorist organizations which today exist on our planet. Table 8.4 now summarizes our new estimates of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh favorability rates (strong support+ some support), compiled from the Pew and ACRPS data, giving testimony to the fact that on a population-weighted basis, 8.3% of global Muslims support ISIS/ISIL/Daesh:

18% of Syrian Refugees Sympathize with ISIS/ISIL/Daesh, 30% Want a Theocratic State The prevailing culture of welcoming refugees in Europe notwithstanding, the ACRPS data also suggest that among Syrian refugees in the Middle East, there is a considerable ISIS/ISIL/Daesh support rate of 18% (Pew Research Center 2015; 2016)⁵ The ACRPS Syrian refugee poll was based on respondents from

⁵Pew Research Center (2015) as well as Arab Opinion Index (2015), <http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/cb12264b-1eca-402b-926a-5d068ac60011> and ACRPS A Majority of Syrian Refugees

Table 8.4 ISIS/ISIL/Daesh support rates

Country	% support for ISIL among the adult population in the country
Lebanon	1.0
Israel	1.7
Iraq	2.0
Jordan	2.0
Saudi Arabia	2.0
Tunisia	2.0
Indonesia	4.0
Kuwait	5.0
Turkey	7.5
Burkina Faso	7.8
Morocco	8.0
Algeria	9.0
Egypt	9.0
Senegal	10.7
Pakistan	11.0
Sudan	11.0
Malaysia	11.2
Nigeria	14.0
Mauritania	20.0
ISIS support total Muslim world in% of the total population in the surveyed countries	8.3

Courtesy Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Strategic Assessment

Total country population figures to calculate the overall population-weighted averages for the entire region were taken from successive issues of “Der Fischer Weltalmanach” (2013) and subsequent issues. For some countries, both the ACPRS and the Pew report results which are very similar

377 population centers inside and outside official refugee camps registered by the UNHCR. The sampling procedure was a multi-staged clustered approach with an error margin of $\pm 2\%$. This analysis of Syrian refugee opinion is the largest of its kind in the region and also reveals the important result that none the less than 30% of the interviewed representative Syrian refugees want a religious state as a solution to the conflict, 50% a civilian state, and 18% are impartial on this question (2% did not know or declined an answer).⁶

Oppose ISIL, <http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/6a355a64-5237-4d7a-b957-87f6b1ceba9b5d068ac60011>.

⁶<http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/44ce127c-5cac-4fe3-9959-579062a19748>.

Hitherto, there has been no survey of the political opinions of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who entered Europe since the onset of the “*European refugee crisis*” in summer 2015, so the ACPRS survey result, which clearly suggests that practically every fifth Syrian refugee sympathizes with ISIS/ISIL/Daesh, and every third wants a religious state (Shari’ah state) potentially can have a considerable impact on political debates in Europe to come.

A Long Asymmetric Warfare against the West is Ahead Even not considering these Syrian data, we can estimate that 8.3% of the surveyed inhabitants of the Muslim world hold sympathies or even strong sympathies for the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh terrorists after properly weighting the data for population sizes of the different countries concerned. Without further considering the age structure of the populations concerned, this would imply a potential of more than 80 million ISIS/ISIL/Daesh supporters in the countries documented above. If we make the not unfounded assumption that Table 8.4 also properly reflects the opinion structure of the Muslim world in general, we arrive at a milieu of some 130 million people who constitute the global hard core of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh support, or the children who grow up into such a milieu of hatred and violence. Compare this to the small number of the 50,000–100,000 hard-core Roman Catholic Northern Irishmen and women who voted for Irish nationalist groups over the 1970s, 1980s and beyond among a total Roman Catholic Northern Irish population of just half a million people. The IRA could mobilize some 1500–2000 fighters on the terrorist front, and the British Army, arguably one of the best trained and equipped armies in the world, had to deploy none the less than 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers to fight this asymmetric warfare and insurgency only to arrive at a standstill after decades of fighting and bloody conflict (Tausch 2015a). Military training of children in Gaza to strike soon enough at the “Zionist” “enemy” is an appropriate example of what we are talking about here (Greenwood 2013).

52% of all Arabs Favor Terrorism Against the USA, 48% are Against it A glass of water may be half empty or half full, depending on your viewpoint. From the existing data, we must deduce that nine in ten Muslims around the globe do not support the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh terrorists, but that there is indeed a considerable milieu of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh terror supporters and terror sympathizers.

Table 8.5 suggests that a hypothetical electoral majority of 52% of the entire Arab World, based on the surveys in twelve countries, and weighted by population size, agrees or even strongly agrees to the opinion that “*US interference in the region justifies armed operations against the USA everywhere*”. Again, we must emphasize that 48% of the Arab population are brave enough to reject or strongly reject this proposition, and that they even say so to an unknown interview partner.

Table 8.5 Mass support for anti-American terrorism in the Arab World

	I strongly agree (%)	I agree (%)	I disagree (%)	I strongly disagree (%)	Agree + strongly agree (%)
Algeria	40	37	15	10	77
Palestinian Territories	19	42	34	5	61
Kuwait	13	47	29	12	60
Morocco	12	42	28	18	54
Sudan	19	35	28	19	54
Iraq	14	38	31	16	52
Population-weighted total (total Arab World)	17	35	27	21	52
Jordan	17	33	32	17	50
Lebanon	23	26	18	34	49
Egypt	11	37	26	26	48
Tunisia	13	30	29	30	43
Libya	17	25	40	18	42
Yemen	16	21	30	32	37

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

Arab Barometer Survey data: “US interference in the region justifies armed operations against the USA everywhere”

To round up our picture, Table 8.6 analyzes the support rates for terrorist groups competing with ISIS/ISIL/Daesh in countries of the Middle East. On the one hand, even in the State of Israel, and due to some outright and openly confessed terror support rates among segments of the Israeli Arabs, lamentably enough susceptible to demagoguery and chauvinism, overall terror support rates for *the entire State of Israel* now reach two digit levels (in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah), and still 4% even in the case of al-Qaeda and 2% in the case of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh.⁷ On the other hand, only in one Middle East country (Jordan), one single terrorist group (Hamas) still commands an absolute majority of support, while in *all* the other surveyed countries and territories, neither Hamas, nor Hezbollah, let alone al-Qaeda, command a majority support, and Arab citizens today are brave enough to resist this way the temptations of demagoguery, chauvinism, and violence:

⁷See also Karsh (2013).

Table 8.6 Support for specific terrorist groups in the Middle East according to the Pew Spring 2015 survey

Country/Territory	Palestinian occupied territories	Israeli Muslims	Jordan	Lebanon	Turkey	[Israel]
Very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of Hamas (%)	44	38	52	30	15	11
Very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of Hezbollah (%)	39	40	13	42	11	11
Very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of al- Qaeda (%)	20	14	8	1	9	4
Very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh (%)	7	6	3	0	9	2
Average terror group favorability rate (%)	27	25	19	18	11	7
N=	823	243	905	971	656	921
Margin of error \pm % at 95% confidence level	from 1.7 to 3.4%	from 3.0 to 6.2%	from 1.1 to 3.3%	from 0.6 to 3.1%	from 2.2 to 2.7%	from 0.9 to 2.0%

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

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Chapter 9

Between the Arab Spring and the Support for Terrorism



9.1 Participation in the Arab Spring

What do we really know from opinion surveys about the Arab Spring? The survey data which we analyzed give us a clear answer to this question. First of all, participation rates in events of the Arab Spring differ strongly from country to country, with Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, and the Sudan above the average rates in the Arab World, and Lebanon, Jordan, and Algeria at the bottom of the list. In Yemen and Libya, participation rates were above 20%, and in Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Kuwait, and Morocco, participation rates were between 10 and 20%, while in Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria and Iraq, participation rates were below 10% (Table 9.1).

The next question, which we attempt to answer with the help of our data, is which political and social segments of the Arab population were especially active in the Arab Spring demonstrations? As it is well-known, political skepticism regarding the Arab Spring events was voiced, among others, by the current Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu who presented a

[...] scathing attack on the uprisings in the Middle East, saying that Arab countries are “moving not forward, but backward” and support from the US and European countries was naive. The Israeli prime minister said the Arab Spring was becoming an “Islamic, anti-western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, undemocratic wave”. (Sherwood 2011)

Is it really true that the pronouncedly Islamic, anti-western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, and undemocratic segments of the Arab population were especially active in the Arab Spring events? The available and emerging empirical data present a nuanced picture of the realities, which, among others, can be demonstrated with the following cross-table, calculated from the Arab Barometer Survey. The question to be answered empirically is very simple: was the Arab Spring a “*Muslim Brotherhood Spring*”?

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Table 9.1 Participation in the Arab Spring

	Participation in the Arab Spring (%)	N
Yemen	42	1120
Libya	33	1218
Tunisia	19	1195
Sudan	15	1167
Total Arab World	14	14,427
Egypt	14	1186
Palestine	12	1193
Kuwait	10	1011
Morocco	10	1079
Iraq	6	1182
Algeria	5	1128
Jordan	3	1777
Lebanon	3	1171

Table 9.2 Arab Spring and Muslim Brotherhood

Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood	The Arab Spring led some demonstrations and rallies in your country. Did you participate in any of these events?		xx
	Yes, I did	No, I did not	N
I trust it to a great extent	17%	12%	1761
I trust it to a medium extent	19%	26%	3353
I trust it to a limited extent	15%	20%	2573
I absolutely do not trust it	49%	43%	5892
N	1940	11,639	13,579

Both supporters and opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the Arab Spring, but only 17% of those who participated in the Arab Spring demonstrations were supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, while 49% of those who participated in the Arab Spring demonstrations had no confidence at all in the Muslim Brotherhood. So, a segment of the Arab Spring movement indeed showed high approval of the Muslim Brotherhood, while almost half of the protest movement had no confidence at all in the Muslim Brotherhood (Table 9.2).

In the following, we will try to recall earlier results about Arab public opinion, achieved with the “*Arab Opinion Index*” by the Arab Center for Research and Policy

Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar, hitherto practically neglected by Western scholarship until now (Tausch 2013).¹ They underline our major point—the still existing weakness of Arab Civil Society.

9.2 The Weakness of Arab Civil Society

The Arab Opinion Index shows the overwhelming support for democracy and change in the region. At the same time, the data show basic weaknesses of the civil society support for the structures of democracy. Support for the separation of religious practices from political and social life is only expressed by 46.6% of the population in the Arab countries, and the separation of religion from politics is only supported by 42.8% of the population. That political freedom and civil liberties are a requirement of democracy which is only supported by 36.3%, and that equality and justice among citizens are a requirement of democracy is supported by only 19.5% of the Arab World.

Equally astonishing is the true and real extent of Arab rejection of what is denominated as the “peace process.” A resounding 83.7% of Arabs are against the recognition of the State of Israel, and 59.6% support nuclear proliferation in the region to counter the perceived Israeli possession of nuclear weapons. 41.5% fully support the takeover of political power by religious people, and 32.2% prefer to deal only with religious people in their personal relationships.

A very high percentage (85.6%) of the population is declaring itself to be religious or deeply religious, while the opinion that there is only one Arab nation is only supported by 35.6%. So, we refer our readers to Table 9.3 (our overall regional results, calculated with proper population weights).

Judging by the percentage of people, who say that political freedom and civil liberties are an absolute requirement of democracy, we arrive at the following *hard-core data of the development of a civil society, necessary to support the workings of a democratic system*, derived from the Arab Opinion Index (Table 9.4).

Also, evaluations of the *World Values Survey* data on the civic culture of the Arab World show the population-weighted “*civil society*” support rates for democracy in the region as well as phenomena associated with it in the literature. Our results are based on 12 countries and territories, comprising some 68% of the entire population of the Arab League plus Syria, i.e., Algeria; Egypt; Iraq; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Qatar; Tunisia; Yemen. Resounding majorities of more than ¾ of the Arab population nowadays endorse democracy, think that competition is good, and would accept a neighbor of a different race or speaking a different language. Majority opinions or even handsome “electoral major-

¹<http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-fc91660608b0>. To our knowledge, the first and only article to mention this unique source is Schwalje (2012). The author of this study would like to thank Dr. Hichem Karoui from the ACRPS in Doha for drawing his attention to this unique study. See also the earlier study by Tausch and Karoui (2011). This study analyses *World Values Survey* and *European Social Survey* data on global and European Muslim opinions.

Table 9.3 The drivers and bottlenecks of democratization in the Arab World—population-weighted results from the “Arab Opinion Index” (12 countries, 85% of Arab population covered by the analysis)

Possible drivers of future democratic pro-western development	Weighted percentage results for all the Arab countries
% supporting overthrow of Mubarak	83.1
satisfied/very satisfied with life	76.0
% supporting Tunisian revolution	67.2
% agree: in spite of problems democratic system better	63.7
% satisfied/very satisfied with economic conditions	55.1
great deal of trust in the army	47.4
% agree/strongly agree religious practices must be separated from political and social life	46.6
% agree/strongly agree: best to separate religion from politics	42.8
% saying political freedom and civil liberties requirement of democracy	36.3
% agree strongly: clergy must not influence the way people vote	35.7
% satisfied/very satisfied with political conditions	27.1
% saying equality and justice among citizens requirement of democracy	19.5
% saying Iran most threatening to country’s security	6.5
% saying Iran most threatening to personal security	3.3
Possible bottlenecks for future democratic pro-Western development	Weighted percentage results for all the Arab countries
% against recognition of Israel	83.7
% Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons justifies nuclear proliferation	59.6
% saying corruption widespread	49.2
% agree/strongly agree: best if religious people take over public office	41.5
household income does not cover regular expenses	38.6
% saying Israel most threatening to country’s security	34.6
% prefer to deal with religious people	32.2
% saying Israel most threatening to personal security	30.3
% agree/strongly agree: in a democratic system the economic performance runs badly	25.3
% desire to emigrate	22.2
% saying USA most threatening to country’s security	17.3
% saying USA most threatening to personal security	12.6
% say partner from a well-known family decisive for parental approval of a marriage	8.7
Data on religion and Arab nationalism	Weighted percentage results for all the Arab countries
% religious/very religious	85.6
% saying: one Arab nation	35.6
% saying neighboring Arab countries most threatening to country’s security	11.3

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

Source Calculated from the Arab opinion index data, Arab center for research and policy studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar, available at: <http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-fc91660608b0>

Table 9.4 Real civil society support for democracy in the Arab World (12 countries, 85% of Arab population covered by the analysis)

Countries	% saying political freedom and civil liberties are a requirement of democracy (%)
Sudan	49
Iraq	46
Algeria	41
Lebanon	41
Jordan	39
Saudi Arabia	38
Egypt	34
Palestinian territories	32
Yemen	30
Tunisia	29
Mauritania	22
Morocco	17

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

Source Calculated from the Arab opinion index data, Arab center for research and policy studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar, available at: <http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-fc91660608b0>


ity opinions” of 50 + 1% nowadays comprise support for civil rights being protected by democracy, hard work and rejection of corruption and theft, University education for females, acceptancy of people of a different religion, tolerance and respect as a value in child education, altruism, and the rejection of violence against other people (Table 9.5).

So, there are darker and not so bright structures of existing Arab public opinion as well: our first conclusion is that while current data show the overwhelming support of the population of the Arab countries for democracy, variables of trust, nonviolence, some indicators of gender justice (especially equal access to political office) and tolerance toward homosexuals indicate some of the existing deficits in the development of civil societies in the region. Only an electoral minority of Arabs would express enough confidence in major companies, the press, the civil service, labor unions, and private ownership, and equally only an electoral minority would refrain from thinking that the beating of children by parents is justified, etc.

In a Hayekian perspective, it must be added that “*democracy and the market economy*” are not being shared as a goal on an equal footing by the Arab publics, since support for private ownership of the means of production, generally regarded as the backbone of a capitalist order, is supported in a stronger fashion (1–4 on the WVS scale) by only 27% of the Arab population. Thus, we have more than 80% support for political democracy, but less than 50% support for trust, nonviolence, gender justice and tolerance toward homosexuals.

Table 9.5 Civil society and democracy support in the Arab World, based on *World Values Survey* data, covering 68% of the global Arab population

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Arab Countries – civil society support rates (population weighted totals) in percent of the total Arab population</i>
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections (7–10)	84.18
importance of democracy (7–10)	83.81
competition good (1–4)	77.27
accepting neighbors: people of a different race	75.22
Democracy: civil rights protect people's liberties (7–10)	74.36
hard work brings success (1–4)	71.93
never justifiable: stealing property	71.47
never justifiable: accepting a bribe	71.28
University not more important for a boy	66.07
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect	65.29
accepting neighbors: people of a different religion	64.90
democracy: women have the same rights as men (7–10)	64.88
never justifiable: violence against other people	61.94
Confidence in the armed forces (1–2)	61.67
Feeling of happiness (1–2)	60.45
never justifiable: avoiding fare on public transport	57.14
accepting world citizenship (1–2)	55.77
Confidence in the police (1–2)	54.58
never justifiable: claiming government benefits without entitlement	54.29
democracy: not strong support for religious authorities interpreting the laws (7–10)	52.62
Important child qualities: independence	51.41
interest in politics (1–2)	51.25
Confidence in the Banks (1–2)	51.19
Confidence in the major companies (1–2)	42.24
Confidence in the government (1–2)	39.34
Confidence in the press (1–2)	34.23
Confidence The Civil Service (1–2)	34.07
never justifiable: parents beating children	32.05
accepting neighbors: homosexuals	28.24
Confidence Labor Unions (1–2)	27.40
private ownership (1–4)	26.61
men do not make better political leaders	20.03
Confidence in the United Nations (1–2)	15.20



Below 50% support

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

9.3 The Most Salient Multivariate Results on ISIS Middle East Terror Support from the Arab Barometer Survey, 2016

One of our four main multivariate analyses for this Part is the analysis of the terror support rates from the Arab Barometer Survey, 2016 data. In the Arab Barometer Survey, 2016, we used the following proxies for Islamism and terrorism. These variables are printed in bold indented letter.

- ***q201.12 I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what extent you trust each of them: The Muslim Brotherhood (distrust)***
- ***q700.3 Do you prefer that future economic relations between your country and Iran ... ? (no preference)***
- ***q700a.3 Do you prefer that future security relations between your country and Iran ... ? (no preference)***
- ***q706 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The US interference in the region justifies armed operations against the USA everywhere (disagree)***

According to our investigation, the possible drivers of our independent variables were:

- Age (effect+ or -)
- Attitudes on indicators of gender equality (effect+ or -)
- Frequency of reading of Holy Scriptures (effect+ or -)
- Gender (effect+ or -)
- Lawmaking should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law (effect+ or -)
- Lawmaking should reflect people's wishes (effect+ or -)
- Level of education (effect+ or -)
- Living conditions compared with the rest of fellow citizens (effect+ or -)
- Participation in the Arab Spring demonstrations (effect+ or -)
- Prayer frequency (effect+ or -)
- Prayer service attendance (effect+ or -)
- Preferred intensity of economic and security relations with USA, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel (effect+ or -).

Performing promax factor analysis, we can report the results mentioned below. The factor analytical results are listed in our online appendix tables.² In order not to overburden our readers with statistical materials, we mention here only the most salient results. Appendix Tables 1–3 give a complete account of the results achieved. Our specialist readership will find a large amount of information in that appendix. It suffices to say here for the general readership of this Part that in our analysis, 61.12% of the variance of the Arab Barometer Survey data are explained by our model. There are nine factors, whose eigenvalue, a statistical standard measure generally, used in factor analysis to discern important factors is above the standard threshold of 1.0:

²https://www.academia.edu/36302399/Online_Statistical_Appendix_to_ISLAMISM_ARAB_SPRING_AND_DEMOCRACY_Springer_2018_.

Table 9.6 Support for terrorism—factor loadings of the terror support variable with the factors of the model

Factor loadings of the variable with the factors of the model	Variable: armed operations against the USA justified
Orientation: Iran and Turkey	0.198
Upper strata	0.194
Distance from the Arab Spring among the less educated strata	0.183
For Shari'ah state	0.173
Secularism	0.073
Orientation: Israel and the USA	-0.064
Feminism	-0.153
Orientation: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the USA	-0.209
For secular democracy	-0.421

- Distance to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the USA
- Distance to Iran and Turkey
- Secularism
- Distance to Israel and the USA
- Rejection of the Shari'ah state
- Feminism
- Rejection of secular democracy
- Distance from the Arab Spring among the less educated strata
- Upper strata.

Among the publics in the countries and territories with complete data, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian O. T., and Sudan, which are fairly representative for Arab publics as a whole, given the general scarcity of data about these phenomena from the region.

In our presentations of our multivariate results of this Part, we generally present first of all the factor loadings of the main *variables* under investigation, and then look at the characteristic factor loadings, the relevant *factors* have with the different variables of the model.

The matrix of correlations between the promax factor components is documented in appendix Table 2.³ Armed terrorist operations against the USA are clearly supported respondents oriented toward Iran and Turkey, by the upper strata, by respondents distant from the Arab Spring, and by people supporting the *Shari'ah* state. People opposing terror against America clearly are supporters of secular democracy, and their world political orientation combines Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the USA, and they support feminism (Table 9.6).

³https://www.academia.edu/36302399/Online_Statistical_Appendix_to_ISLAMISM_ARAB_SPRING_AND_DEMOCRACY_Springer_2018_.

Table 9.7 Terror against America support factor

Salient factor loadings with the variables of the model	The terror against America support factor
Rejecting laws in accordance with the people’s wishes	0.814
The US interference in the region justifies armed operations against the USA everywhere	0.421
Against economic relations with the USA	0.341
Against security relations with the USA	0.317
Trust the Muslim Brotherhood	0.290
Men are better at political leadership than women	0.269
The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law	0.243
Against laws in accordance with citizens’ wishes in certain areas and with Islamic law on others	0.179
Pray daily	0.134
University education for males is more important than university education for females	0.114
Age	-0.151

Table 9.7 clearly establishes that the propensity to endorse terrorism against the USA is an outflow of an Islamist ideological conviction and that the highest statistical factor loading of the terror against America factor is achieved by rejecting the idea so central to a secular democracy that laws must be in accordance with people’s wishes. The Presidential Directive Number 11 by President Obama (see above) is squarely contradicted by our empirical results. The terror factor has a positive loading with trust the Muslim Brotherhood, and other indicators of common Islamism and sexism (men are better at political leadership than women, the government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law, against laws in accordance with citizens’ wishes in certain areas and with Islamic law on others, University education for males is more important than university education for females). In addition, the propensity to endorse terrorism against the USA is clearly a function of already existing Anti-Americanism (against economic relations with the USA, against security relations with the USA).

It emerges that the propensity to endorse terrorism is more frequent among the younger generation. Unfortunately, as well, the frequency of daily prayer increases the propensity for terrorism, mainly because under current conditions, a part of Muslim theology has been hijacked by a radical vision of a violent “Muslim liberation theology” against the West.

9.4 Who Participated in the Arab Spring, and Why? Multivariate Results from the Arab Barometer Survey, 2016

We now turn to the second multivariate analysis of this Part, dealing with the participation rates in the Arab Spring. Who participated and who did not participate, and why? Which opinions and social background are characteristic of the Arab Spring generation? Again, the data from the Arab Barometer Survey, 2016, provide a very useful and hitherto largely untapped resource for the analysis of the epoch-making events of the wave of protest movements in the Arab World of 2010/2011. The way our analysis is designed also allows linking this analysis with our terror support data. We used the following proxy for commitment to the Arab Spring:

- *q800a The Arab Spring led some demonstrations and rallies in your country. Did you participate in any of these events? (no participation)*

The possible drivers of our independent variable (commitment to the Arab Spring) were according to our model

- Age (effect + or -)
- Attitudes on indicators of gender equality (effect + or -)
- Endorsing terrorism against the USA (effect + or -)
- Frequency of reading of Holy Scriptures (effect + or -)
- Gender (effect + or -)
- Lawmaking should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law (effect + or -)
- Lawmaking should reflect people's wishes (effect + or -)
- Level of education (effect + or -)
- Living conditions compared with the rest of fellow citizens (effect + or -)
- Participation in the Arab Spring demonstrations (effect + or -)
- Prayer frequency (effect + or -)
- Prayer service attendance (effect + or -)
- Preferred intensity of economic and security relations with USA, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel (effect + or -)
- Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood (effect + or -).

Again performing promax factor analysis, we can again report the results mentioned below. It is certain that the Arab Spring generation was the younger and educated elites of Arab society. Their world political orientation was more inclined toward Iran and Turkey, and certainly not toward the USA and Israel. The Arab Spring generation had a certain distance toward feminism, and at the same time that it represented the educated younger generations, it was distant from the old elites dominating the Arab countries (Table 9.8).

The analysis of the "Arab Spring Factor" and its factor loadings reveals still more interesting and strategically important insights. The Arab Spring generation certainly represented the educated elites of the countries concerned and it looked

Table 9.8 Support for the Arab Spring—factor loadings of the variable: participation in the Arab Spring with the factors of the model

Factor loadings of the variable Arab Spring with the factors of the model	Variable: participated in the Arab Spring
Orientation: Iran and Turkey	0.123
Orientation: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the USA	0.023
For Shari’ah state	0.008
Orientation: Israel and the USA	-0.017
Secularism	-0.037
For secular democracy	-0.038
Feminism	-0.112
Upper strata	-0.126
Distance from the Arab Spring among the less educated strata	-0.672

Table 9.9 Arab Spring factor

Salient factor loadings with the variables of the model	The Arab Spring factor
Participated in Arab Spring events	0.672
Level of education	0.589
Prefer future security relations with Turkey	0.199
Prefer future economic relations with Turkey	0.132
University education for males is more important than university education for females	-0.137
Gender (female)	-0.142
The US interference in the region justifies armed operations against the USA everywhere	-0.183
Trust the Muslim Brotherhood	-0.257
Age	-0.417

toward Turkey, the largest Muslim economy of the world, for inspiration (prefer future security relations with Turkey, prefer future economic relations with Turkey). At the same time, it again clearly emerges from the analysis of the factor loadings of the Arab Spring factor that the “Arab Spring generation” was especially young, that it had less trust in the Muslim Brotherhood, that it rejected terrorism against the USA, that it was predominantly male, and that it rejected the sexist idea that University education for males is more important than university education for females (Table 9.9).

Our Table 9.10 now presents a short summary of the country factor scores of our investigation. Weighting the factors, established by the analysis of the opinion structures in the Arab World by their eigenvalues, and if necessary, reverting the indicator of the development of a pro-Western, democratic civil society when the factor originally highlights a negative phenomenon, we can tentatively construct an Overall Indicator of Mass Support for Arab Democratization. High top on the list is

Table 9.10 Factor scores, weighted by the eigenvalues of the factor analytical model from the Arab Barometer 2016 Survey

	Lebanon	Egypt	Morocco	Jordan	Kuwait	Sudan	Algeria	Palestinian O. T.
Identification with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the USA	-1.2495	1.1981	0.6018	0.6301	0.1590	1.0548	-1.5235	-0.8612
Distance to Iran	0.4726	0.4990	-0.0511	1.3873	-0.3099	-1.1641	-0.6753	-0.8655
Secularism	0.6153	-0.3576	0.3791	-0.4930	0.0574	-0.4103	0.5013	-0.0108
Identification with Israel and the USA	-0.4649	-0.1322	0.2497	-0.1558	0.6433	0.1519	0.5775	-0.4527
Rejection of the Shari'ah state	1.9654	0.0937	-0.0861	-0.3413	-0.3420	-0.7852	-0.2743	-0.4481
Feminism	0.4916	-0.1700	0.0975	-0.1750	0.0420	-0.2217	0.0964	-0.1337
Secular democracy	0.7289	0.3219	0.2549	-0.0747	0.0490	-0.3476	-0.6470	-0.3930
Arab Spring	-0.1259	0.5672	-0.2265	-0.0659	0.1147	0.0030	-0.5263	0.1824
Overall indicator of mass support for Arab democratization	2.4335	2.0201	1.2192	0.7118	0.4135	-1.7193	-2.4712	-2.9824

Lebanon and Egypt, followed by Morocco and Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Algeria and the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

The results are to be interpreted as a cautious and optimistic signal for the attempts to stabilize the situation in Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan, while the data suggest that we especially have to be skeptic about the possibilities of democratic nation-building in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Again, and again, our data demonstrate that there is an alarming amount of radicalism in the territories, rendering attempts to achieve a peaceful two-state solution an uphill if not impossible struggle.

Terror Support in the Arab World: Multivariate Results from the Pew Spring 2015 Survey (Pew Research Center 2015)

Based on the Pew Global Attitudes Project Spring 2015 Data (Pew Research Center 2015), we now perform the third main multivariate analysis of this Part and analyze the support of terrorist states and terrorist groups with the help of the following variables:

- *Q12J. unfavorable opinion of Hamas?*
- *Q12K. unfavorable opinion of Hezbollah?*
- *Q12L. unfavorable opinion of al-Qaeda?*
- *Q12N. unfavorable opinion of The Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as [ISIS]?*

In this analysis, the possible drivers of or blockades against terrorism and terror support were understood to be found among the following variables:

- Age (effect + or -)

- Confidence in world leaders (Obama, Putin) (effect + or -)
- Economic prospects (effect + or -)
- Economic situation (effect + or -)
- Gender (effect + or -)
- Important: freedom from censorship (effect + or -)
- Important: freedom from internet censorship (effect + or -)
- Important: freedom of religion (effect + or -)
- Important: freedom of the press (effect + or -)
- Important: gender equality (effect + or -)
- Important: honest and fair elections (effect + or -)
- Important: religion (effect + or -)
- Opinion of regional and world powers (USA, China, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) (effect + or -).

In the following, we report our results achieved by the multivariate analysis of the Pew data. The standard promax factor analysis yields 61.37% of variance explained. The seven factors are to be called:

- Distance to Iran, Russia, China, Hezbollah
- Distance to democracy
- Anti-Americanism, pro-Hezbollah
- Secularism
- Distance to ISIS, al-Qaeda
- Economic pessimism
- Young women.

A pro-ISIS/ISIL/Daesh attitude is associated with a distance to democracy and is to be found more frequently among sectors of the global Muslim population, having an optimistic economic outlook. This certainly surprising result is repeated in other findings of this analysis (see below). A secularistic attitude certainly determines a distance to ISIS/ISIL/Daesh, and also, a distance to Iran, Russia, China, Hezbollah determines a negative attitude toward ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. The other factors of our model have less than 1% of variance in common with the support rate for ISIS/ISIL/Daesh. So first of all, we report how the ISIS support *variable* is explained by the *factors* of our model (Table 9.11).

The factor loadings reported in our background Tables suggest that the support for ISIS/ISIL/Daesh coincides very significantly with support for al-Qaeda, the other most important globally operating Sunni anti-Western terrorist organization. The ISIS/al-Qaeda factor is positively associated (in descending order) with the following attitudes: pro-Hamas, pro-Hezbollah, pro-Turkey, pro-Iran, confidence in Putin, religion important, pro-Saudi Arabia. The most important blocks against the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh/al-Qaeda support factor are the convictions that people have a right to practice religion freely, and that women have the same rights as men. Also, older people are more skeptical about ISIS/ISIL/Daesh/al-Qaeda, and also people convinced of the importance of honest elections will tend to be distant from that manifestation of extreme Sunni-oriented Islamist terrorism. Interestingly enough,

Table 9.11 Factor analytical results at a glance—factor loadings

Factor loadings with the factors	Variable: pro-ISIS
Distance to democracy	0.124
Anti-Americanism, pro-Hezbollah	-0.009
Young women	-0.085
Secularism	-0.144
Distance to Iran, Russia, China, Hezbollah	-0.172
Economic pessimism	-0.185

Table 9.12 ISIS/al-Qaeda factor—factor loadings with the different variables of the model

Most salient factor loadings with the variables of the model	The ISIS, al-Qaeda factor
Pro-Hamas	0.315
Pro-Hezbollah	0.265
Pro-Turkey	0.245
Pro-Iran	0.219
Confidence in Putin	0.150
Religion important	0.123
Pro-Saudi Arabia	0.117
Gender female	-0.108
Pro-China	-0.158
No media censorship	-0.160
People can say what they want	-0.186
Economic situation very bad	-0.234
Honest elections	-0.299
Age	-0.345
Women same rights	-0.411
Practice religion freely	-0.546

also people at the margin progress who feel that their economic situation is very bad, will be relatively more immune from the terrorist ISIS/ISIL/Daesh/al-Qaeda temptation, and convictions about the necessity that people can say what they want and that there is no media censorship coincide with a rejection of ISIS and al-Qaeda. Also, Muslim publics holding more positive attitudes of China as well as women are less prone to succumb to the ISIS and al-Qaeda temptation (Table 9.12).

In Table 9.13, we can report the manifest support for different political parties coincides with distance to or support of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh/al-Qaeda. Our results show the alarming trend of terror support among the manifest electorates of political parties in Turkey. In total, electorates in Lebanon are most immune against ISIS/ISIL/Daesh/al-Qaeda support, while the electorates of all Turkish political parties in our study show the strongest support rates of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh/al-Qaeda. Our Table 9.13 also reveals

Table 9.13 Distance to al-Qaeda and ISIS among supporters of different political parties in the Middle East

Party	Country	Factor scores: distance to ISIS, al-Qaeda
Al Quwat Al Lubnaniyyah	Lebanon	0.7232
Al Hizb Al Taqadomi Al Ishtiraki	Lebanon	0.7208
Tayar Al Watani Al Hur	Lebanon	0.5856
Hizb Al Katayeb	Lebanon	0.5035
Hezbollah	Lebanon	0.4469
Tayar Al Mustaqbal	Lebanon	0.4332
Haraket Amal	Lebanon	0.3617
Joint Arab list—Ra’am, Ta’al, Mada, Chadash, and Balad	Israel	−0.0944
Islamic Brotherhood (Muslim Brothers)	Jordan	−0.1548
Independents	Palestinian Territories	−0.1593
The Islamic Jihad	Palestinian Territories	−0.2712
Al Wasat Al Islami party	Jordan	−0.2992
Fatah	Palestinian Territories	−0.3279
National union party	Jordan	−0.4281
The popular front for the liberation of Palestinian O. T. (PFLP)	Palestinian Territories	−0.6036
Jordanian united front party	Jordan	−0.6333
National current party	Jordan	−0.7879
Hamas	Palestinian Territories	−0.7897
National unity party	Jordan	−0.8695
Islamic labor front	Jordan	−0.8901
Nation party	Jordan	−0.9107
Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP) (Selahattin Demirtas—Figen Yuksekdag)	Turkey	−0.9645
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) (Devlet Bahçeli)	Turkey	−0.9984
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) (Ahmet Davutoğlu)	Turkey	−1.0425
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) (Kemal Kilicdaroglu)	Turkey	−1.6067

the disappointing amount of radicalism among the electorate of the major Arab political party in Israel, the so-called Joint Arab list—Ra’am, Ta’al, Mada, Chadash, and Balad (Table 9.14).

Table 9.14 Factor scores, weighted by the eigenvalues of the factor analytical model from the Pew 2015 Spring survey (Pew Research Center 2015)

	Israel	Lebanon	Turkey	Jordan	Palestinian O. T.
Distance to Iran, Russia, China, Hezbollah	0.4202	-1.0604	1.2092	1.2132	-1.3114
Democracy movement	0.2718	1.7666	-0.9708	-1.3770	-0.7912
No Anti-Americanism, anti-Hezbollah	1.3983	-0.2041	0.5653	-1.1386	-0.9528
Secularism	1.2182	-0.0151	0.6673	-1.2439	-0.9356
Distance to ISIS, al-Qaeda	0.5666	0.4733	-1.1480	-0.1701	-0.4658
Economic optimism	0.5705	-0.5340	0.1645	-0.1916	0.0439
Young women	-0.0196	0.0128	-0.3208	0.1919	0.0501
Indicator of mass support for western democracy	4.4260	0.4389	0.1666	-2.7161	-4.3627

Analogue to Table 9.10, we also present a short synopsis of the country factor scores of our analysis. As no surprise, the Indicator of Mass Support for Western Democracy shows respondents in Israel far in the lead, with publics in Lebanon second, followed by the inhabitants of Turkey, Jordan, and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The amount of mass support for Islamist terrorist organizations in Turkey, hitherto considered to be an important Western ally in the region, is disturbing, even alarming.

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Chapter 10

The Solitude of the West in the Fight against Terror



10.1 Introductory Notes

In the present contribution, we would now like to enrich international literature on the subject of attitudes toward Islamist terrorism by providing results from multivariate analysis based on the available evidence from global opinion surveys (Adamczyk and LaFree 2015; Avril and Neem 2014; Feldman 2013; Grodsky 2016; Harrison and Mitchell 2014; Huizinga 2016; Kurlantzick 2013; Pakulski and Körösényi 2012; Runciman 2015; Todorov 2014; Wejnert 2014). In the following, we attempt such a perspective, based on the Spring 2015 Survey of the Pew Institute in Washington, D.C. (Pew Research Center 2015).

Breaking down the Pew data about concern about ISIS/ISIL/Daesh along denominational lines, we find in the empirical materials presented in Table 10.1 that atheists and agnostics in key Western countries are far less concerned than Protestants/Anglicans and Roman Catholics about the ISIS threat, and that, Muslims in the UK, Germany, Canada, and France generally are far less concerned about ISIS/ISIL/Daesh than their fellow countrymen and countrywomen from other denominations. However, Muslim Pew Spring Survey sample sizes in the UK, Germany, Canada with complete data are rather deficient and below the 30-person threshold; so for Muslims in the UK, Germany, and Canada, Table 10.1 can be interpreted really only as a first guiding post for further empirical research on the subject. In France, however, the data, based on a Muslim sample of 36, seem to confirm that after all the ISIS/ISIL/Daesh terrorist attacks against the country in recent years, French Muslims still are at the bottom of our list and still they are less concerned about ISIS terrorism than their other countrymen and countrywomen.

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Table 10.1 What way ahead for the Western democracies? *La soumission?* Concern over ISIS along denominational lines (Pew Research Center 2015)

Country	Religious denomination	Q13B. Please tell me how concerned you are, if at all, about each of them—are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned about the Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as ISIS?	N
UK	Protestant (including Anglican)	1.28	216
Canada	Catholic (inc. Roman Catholic and Orthodox)	1.30	255
Canada	Protestant (inc. all denominations—United, Presbyterian, Anglican, Lutheran, Baptist, etc.)	1.33	161
France	Agnostic	1.34	38
Germany	Protestant	1.34	283
France	Roman Catholic	1.36	527
Germany	Roman Catholic	1.36	278
UK	Roman Catholic	1.39	107
France	Protestant	1.40	20
France	Atheist	1.40	229
Germany	Atheist	1.43	137
UK	Atheist	1.50	125
UK	Agnostic	1.60	42
Germany	Agnostic	1.67	21
UK	Muslim	1.75	20
Germany	Muslim	1.76	21
Canada	Agnostic	1.77	43
Canada	Muslim	1.80	20
Canada	Atheist	1.80	81
France	Muslim	1.86	36

10.2 Rates of Support for the Fight Against ISIS Terrorism

Our Table 10.2 now evaluates available Pew data about the general country-wide support for the US-led global fight against ISIS, and the rates of concern about ISIS terrorism in the different countries of the world. Our data show that global support and global concern are far below expectations, and that, governments, confronting ISIS terrorism, must make a far greater effort to convince global publics about the dangers emanating from ISIS terrorism.

Table 10.2 Global support for anti-terror policies

	Do you support US military actions against the Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as ISIS? (%)	Very concerned about the Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as ISIS (%)
Russia	14	18
Pakistan	18	15
Argentina	22	34
Venezuela	26	28
Peru	26	37
Malaysia	28	22
Chile	31	31
Ukraine	31	8
Mexico	36	24
South Africa	39	25
Ethiopia	42	38
Senegal	45	36
Brazil	46	46
Burkina Faso	47	41
Turkey	50	36
Palestinian territories	54	55
Tanzania	54	51
Vietnam	56	31
Japan	59	72
Poland	65	30
Indonesia	66	67
Ghana	66	45
India	66	45
Germany	67	71
Spain	68	79
UK	68	69
Canada	68	59
Uganda	69	39
Nigeria	71	37
Italy	71	69
Philippines	72	49
Kenya	77	35
Jordan	77	61
South Korea	78	74
Lebanon	78	84
Australia	79	71
Israel	79	46
USA	81	74
France	84	73
China	xx	10

Less than 50% of the populations surveyed by Pew in Russia, Pakistan, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Malaysia, Chile, Ukraine, Mexico, South Africa, Ethiopia, Senegal, Brazil, and Burkina Faso support US military actions against ISIS. In addition, less than 50% of the population in Ukraine, China, Pakistan, Russia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Venezuela, Poland, Chile, Vietnam, Argentina, Kenya, Senegal, Turkey, Peru, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Ghana, India, Brazil, Israel, and the Philippines are very much concerned about ISIS.

Highest support (in descending order), shared by more than half of the population for the US-led fight against ISIS is recorded in France, the USA, Israel, Australia, South Korea, Lebanon, Kenya, Jordan, the Philippines, Nigeria, Italy, Uganda, Canada, UK, Spain, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Poland, Japan, Vietnam, Tanzania, the Palestinian territories, and Turkey; while the greatest concern about ISIS, shared by more than half of the respective populations, is being felt in Lebanon, Spain, the USA, South Korea, France, Japan, Australia, Germany, Italy, the UK, Indonesia, Jordan, Canada, the Palestinian territories, and Tanzania. Table 10.2 provides our readers with the details.

We also roughly can estimate from the Pew Spring 2015 data and our own cross-national data that 59% of the global surveyed population supports the US-led fights against ISIS and that 47% of the global surveyed population is concerned with ISIS.

10.3 Anti-Semitism and the Hatred of Israel

A number of studies, including Beres (2015), Bolan (2013), Eiran and Malin (2013), Flannery et al. (2013), Ganji (2013), Kroenig (2012), Landau (2013), Simon (2013), Terrill (2014), Waltz (2012), and Wigginton et al. (2015) debated the conclusions to be drawn from the Iranian nuclear program and the prospects this implies for the security of Israel. Most of the literature is in agreement on the fact that from the days of the Iranian revolution, the Iranian regime attempts to destroy the Jewish State. “Progressive” and “conservative” “factions” of the regime are united in this goal, and it suffices to read the respective messages from the political and religious leadership of the country on “Al Quds” day. Seen from that perspective, and seen also from the perspective that Sunni radicalism, often competing with Shiite Iran in many other areas, shares the same goal, it is simply frightening to witness the erosion of mass support for Israel especially in Europe, which was the scene of the Shoah only decades ago. Our Table 10.3 lists the latest available Israel support data from Pew, while Table 10.4 (global population-weighted estimates) and Table 10.5 (country support rates) provide the data based on the BBC World Poll. According to the Pew data (2013), only in the USA and in Nigeria a majority of the population still supports Israel. In Germany, the country of the perpetrators of the Shoah, only 30% of the population now support Israel. In key NATO Western alliance countries, these support rates are even lower.

The BBC World poll (BBC World Service 2014), which is based on representative surveys in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany,

Table 10.3 Support for Israel—Pew data 2013

	Very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of Israel (2013) (%)
USA	60
Nigeria	52
Russia	46
France	34
Britain	34
Czech Republic	34
Poland	30
Germany	30
Italy	25
Spain	24
Greece	20
Senegal	20
China	14
Indonesia	13
Egypt	7
Malaysia	7
Pakistan	4
Turkey	4
Palestinian territories	3
Tunisia	3
Jordan	2
Lebanon	1

Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the UK, and the USA, came to similar conclusions. On a population-weighted basis, only 23% of the citizens of our globe now support Israel, while some 41% oppose the Jewish State.

The country-wide support rates for Israel, documented in Table 10.5, in a way repeat the Pew-based evidence discussed above. Only in the USA and in some Sub-Saharan African countries, Israel still enjoys some degrees of support which are higher than the percentages of people with negative opinions on the State of Israel. Again, the results for key Western allies are devastating, with only 8% of Germans who bear the collective responsibility of the most terrible crime in human history are supporting Israel. It should be noted that the Pew data were collected in 2013, while the BBC World data were collected one year later in 2014.

Map 10.1 shows the BBC World data projected onto a world map, based on the balance of opinion sheets documented in Table 10.5. In Germany, bearing the collective responsibility of the Shoah, the pro-opinions (8%) are exceeded to the tune of 59% by the negative opinions (67%).

Table 10.4 Population-weighted global results about opinions on Israel by international comparison (calculated from BBC World Poll)

Global players under judgment from the global public	% of global citizens saying that the following country mainly has a positive influence	% of global citizens saying that the following country mainly has a negative influence	Positive minus negative
Canada	47.31	14.12	33.19
UK	51.36	20.54	30.82
Germany	47.36	17.42	29.94
France	43.86	21.96	21.89
China	50.74	29.33	21.41
EU	41.04	25.34	15.69
Brazil	36.45	22.91	13.53
India	40.04	31.27	8.77
South Africa	34.61	27.28	7.33
Korea South	34.60	27.36	7.24
Japan	39.76	34.47	5.29
Russia	34.61	32.46	2.15
US	36.79	38.43	-1.64
Israel	22.86	40.79	-17.93
Korea North	21.76	40.18	-18.43
Pakistan	18.56	46.58	-28.01
Iran	18.77	47.55	-28.78

Table 10.6 documents the erosion of support for the Jewish State among the adherents of different political parties in Europe (EU/European NATO members). Generally, one can say that center-right and center-left parties, especially in Eastern Europe, still provide the most solid basis of support for the Jewish State in Europe, while both among extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing European parties, we witness the most rapid erosion of support for Israel.¹ Interestingly enough, rejection of the Jewish State is by far most pronounced among the adherents of the different political parties in the EU-member candidate state and NATO-member country, Turkey.

To round up our analysis of the support rates for Israel, we also present Pew-based data on the intensity of religious practice, and religious denomination in conjunction with international different Israel support rates. Our data analysis documents that

¹For an analysis of the especially dark chapter of lacking German solidarity with Israel during the finest hour of the Jewish State during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, see Hagai and Wolffsohn (2013) and Wolffsohn (2013). As the analysis of formerly secret documents now released shows, the government of the German “Peace Chancellor” Willy Brandt denied the use of German airports for US planes sending badly needed military hardware to the beleaguered Jewish State, attacked by the advancing Egyptian and Syrian armies just 28 years after the end of the Shoah.

Table 10.5 Country results about opinions on Israel by international comparison (calculated from BBC World Poll)

	Israel—positive attitude	Israel—negative attitude	Balance
Kenya	42.00	15.00	27.00
USA	51.00	32.00	19.00
Ghana	44.00	32.00	12.00
China	32.00	33.00	-1.00
Nigeria	35.00	38.00	-3.00
Russia	23.00	32.00	-9.00
India	16.00	26.00	-10.00
Chile	29.00	41.00	-12.00
Peru	16.00	40.00	-24.00
Poland	15.00	44.00	-29.00
Greece	15.00	46.00	-31.00
Canada	25.00	57.00	-32.00
Korea South	23.00	56.00	-33.00
Mexico	13.00	53.00	-40.00
France	21.00	63.00	-42.00
Brazil	15.00	58.00	-43.00
Japan	3.00	54.00	-51.00
Australia	16.00	69.00	-53.00
Pakistan	12.00	65.00	-53.00
Indonesia	12.00	70.00	-58.00
UK	14.00	72.00	-58.00
Germany	8.00	67.00	-59.00
Spain	4.00	70.00	-66.00
Turkey	8.00	81.00	-73.00
Egypt	1.00	96.00	-95.00

not only (with a few exceptions) Muslims but also Oriental Christians show very low rates of support for Israel or rather even an outright rejection of the Jewish State (Table 10.7).

10.4 Anti-Zionism = 66% Explained by Anti-Semitism?

A great number of Western politicians nowadays, especially in Europe, contend that their “critique” of Israel is not anti-Semitic, and that one has to differentiate between the two phenomena, critique of Israel and Anti-Semitism. It suffices to mention here such political leaders as Jeremy Corbyn from the British Labor Party (Rich

Table 10.6 Support for Israel according to political parties (calculated from Pew data)

Country	Party Supporters of ...	Sample size	(very) favorable opinion of Israel (%)
Czech R	Top 09	70	57
France	L'Union des Démocrates Indépendants (UDI) de Jean-Louis Borloo	62	45
France	UMP	261	43
UK	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	101	43
UK	Conservative Party	193	42
Poland	Platforma Obywatelska RP—PO	119	39
Spain	PP	190	38
France	Parti Socialiste	249	38
Spain	UPyD	57	37
Czech R	ODS	66	36
Germany	FDP	36	36
Poland	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej—SLD	39	36
Germany	SPD	231	33
France	Mouvement démocrate-Modem	37	32
Germany	CDU/CSU	303	32
Germany	Bündnis 90, Die Grünen	168	32
UK	Labor Party	291	31
Czech R	CSSD	148	30
Italy	Partito Democratico (PD)	168	29
UK	Liberal Democrats	69	29
France	Front National	90	28
Poland	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość—PiS	98	26
Greece	New Democracy (N. D.)	107	24
Germany	Piratenpartei	33	24
France	Lutte Ouvrière, NPA	36	22
Germany	Die Linke	41	22
Czech R	KSCM	56	21
Greece	Coalition of Radical Left—Unitary Social Front (SY.RIZ.A)	96	21
Italy	Movimento 5 stelle	202	21
Italy	Popolo della Libertà (PDL)	108	19
Spain	PSOE	203	19
Greece	Communist Party of Greece (K.K.E)	42	19
France	Europe Ecologie/Les verts	79	19
France	Parti de Gauche de Jean Luc Mélenchon	87	16
Spain	IU/EU	101	13
UK	Green Party	34	12


(continued)

Table 10.6 (continued)

Country	Party Supporters of ...	Sample size	(very) favorable opinion of Israel (%)
Greece	Golden Dawn	63	11
Turkey	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)	140	6
Turkey	Barýp ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) (Selahattin Demirtaþ/Gltan Kýþanak)	36	6
Turkey	Adalet ve Kalkýnma Partisi (AKP)	420	4
Turkey	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) (Devlet Bahçeli)	85	4

2017). Similar attitudes can be found nowadays all across the Western developed countries. But cross-correlating the above-mentioned Anti-Semitism data collected by ADL with the Pew Survey data about Israel support we find however that Anti-Semitism (see also Map 10.2) statistically explains to a considerable percentage the lack of support for Israel. Publics in countries with a low prevalence of Anti-Semitism generally have a higher rate of support for Israel, and with rising Anti-Semitism, support for Israel diminishes (Graph 10.1).

It suffices to mention here as well that among the contemporary drivers of the country results for the ADL’s 100 Index of Anti-Semitism, we find low mean years



source:our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Map 10.1 BBC World Poll—results for Israel show the erosion of support for Israel in Europe, but encouraging results for the standing of Israel in China, India and Russia as well as in Eastern Europe, Latin America and in some African countries

Table 10.7 Our evaluation of the Pew data on the support for Israel according to religious denomination and religious practice


Country	Religious/cultural background	Average opinion on Israel—1—very good to 4—very bad	N	Standard deviation
Nigeria—religious	Christian	1.800	305	0.906
Russia—religious	Orthodox	2.470	336	0.795
Czech R—religious	Roman Catholic	2.480	65	0.850
Russia secular	Orthodox	2.500	159	0.856
Poland secular	Catholic	2.590	96	0.674
Poland—religious	Catholic	2.680	338	0.670
Russia—religious	Muslim	2.680	22	0.894
Nigeria—religious	Muslim	2.780	178	1.015
China secular	Buddhist	2.840	154	0.715
Czech R secular	Roman Catholic	2.930	29	0.753
Senegal—religious	Muslim	2.930	339	0.896
Italy secular	Catholic	2.940	161	0.793
Italy—religious	Catholic	3.000	539	0.825
China—religious	Buddhist	3.020	91	0.666
China—religious	Christian	3.040	28	0.881
Greece—religious	Orthodox	3.050	589	0.754
China—religious	Muslim	3.090	23	0.668
Greece secular	Orthodox	3.110	151	0.767
Malaysia—religious	Hindu	3.200	25	1.000
Senegal—religious	Christian	3.230	31	0.956
Greece secular	Atheist/not believer	3.250	20	0.786
Indonesia—religious	Muslim	3.380	579	0.783
Malaysia—religious	Buddhist	3.410	49	0.610
Pakistan—religious	Muslim	3.610	327	0.692
Egypt—religious	Christian	3.650	78	0.753
Turkey secular	Muslim	3.660	29	0.670
Malaysia—religious	Muslim	3.670	328	0.632
Turkey—religious	Muslim	3.760	563	0.521
Lebanon secular	Muslim	3.770	30	0.504
Egypt—religious	Muslim	3.820	660	0.578
Egypt secular	Muslim	3.820	28	0.548
Lebanon—religious	Druze	3.830	64	0.380
Palestine—religious	Muslim	3.830	503	0.535

(continued)

Table 10.7 (continued)


Country	Religious/cultural background	Average opinion on Israel—1—very good to 4—very bad	N	Standard deviation
Tunisia—religious	Muslim	3.870	474	0.487
Lebanon—religious	Christian	3.920	319	0.296
Lebanon—religious	Muslim	3.920	483	0.337
Jordan—religious	Muslim	3.940	689	0.360
Jordan secular	Muslim	3.960	28	0.189
Lebanon secular	Christian	4.000	28	0.000

Here, we made use of the question Q178. How important is religion in your life—very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important? Our categories were defined as: religious (Q178: Very important or Somewhat important) and secular (Q178: Not too important or Not at all important)



Map 10.2 ADL 100—percentage of people holding anti-semitic prejudices

of schooling, high population shares of Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims, and low rates of trust in other people (Alesina and Guiliano 2013; Alesina et al. 2015). Apart from that, there is a clear curve-linear trade-off between development level and Anti-Semitism, which corresponds to the well-known tendency of social crisis phenomena first to grow with rising development levels, only to level-off at later stages of development (Tausch and Heshmati 2013 with a survey of the literature, starting with Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets; see Kuznets 1976). In a closing paragraph of this part (see below), we call this phenomenon the Kuznets trap of modernization.



Graph 10.1 Anti-Semitism explains more than 66% of the global negative attitudes on the State of Israel

The above empirical model of global Anti-Semitism explains more than 2/3 of the cross-national rates of Anti-Semitism in 87 countries with complete data. It is also interesting to note which countries are still way beyond the predicted values, and which ones are below. Even considering the seven predictors of our model, the majority Muslim countries Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Malaysia are characterized by Anti-Semitism rates of 10% or worse than the predictions. But certainly, also South Korea, Panama, Poland, South Africa, and Haiti as well as Kenya, Armenia, and Hungary must be mentioned as well. The case of South Korea is particularly disturbing.


Anti-Semitism > 10% Worse than Predicted South Korea, Panama, Yemen, Lebanon, Poland, South Africa, Haiti, Kenya, Morocco, Armenia, Hungary, Algeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia.

Anti-Semitism > 5% Worse than Predicted Greece, Lithuania, Switzerland, Jordan, Ukraine, Tunisia, Cameroon, Botswana, Nicaragua, Bahrain, China, Dominican Republic, Belarus, Egypt, Uganda, Japan, Germany, Peru.

Anti-Semitism < 10% Better than Predicted Nigeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Brazil, Turkey, Singapore, Portugal, Romania, Italy, Tanzania, Cote d'Ivoire, Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Russia.

Anti-Semitism < 5% Better than Predicted Georgia, Ghana, Czech Republic, UK, Vietnam, Argentina, the USA, Sweden, Ireland, Venezuela, Mexico, Bulgaria, Spain.

Map 10.3 projects the unstandardized residuals from Table 10.8.



Map 10.3 Residuals from the multiple regression (Table 10.8) and the data from Map 10.2 (ADL 100—percentage of people holding anti-Semitic prejudices)—where Anti-Semitism is stronger or weaker than expected from our multiple regression model

10.5 The Choice of Variables in the Multivariate Analysis on Global Solidarity in the Fight Against Terror

In the following, we briefly deal with the choice of our variables for the fourth multivariate analysis in this part. In our following lists, the variables used as a proxy to measure Islamism and terror support are again printed in bold indented letters.

Pew Global Attitudes Project Spring 2015 Analysis (2)—global solidarity in the fight against terror

- *Q12C. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Iran? (unfavorable)*
- *Q13B. Please tell me how concerned you are, if at all, about each of them—are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not at all concerned about The Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as ISIS? (unconcerned)*
- *Q35. Do you support or oppose the U.S. military actions against the Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as ISIS? (oppose)*

The following variables are used to predict the above-mentioned solidarity in the fight against terror variables:

Possible Drivers of or Blockades Against Terrorism, Terror Support, and the Commitment in the Fight Against Terror

Table 10.8 Drivers of the ADL 100 Anti-Semitism rates by international comparison

	Regression coefficient <i>B</i>	Standard error	Beta	<i>T</i> =	Error <i>p</i>
Constant	9.131	9.674		0.944	0.348
Mean years of schooling 2013 (UNDP 2014)	-1.958	1.033	-0.219	-1.896	0.062
Income 2013 (EU = 100) (World Bank 2017)	18.054	6.099	1.023	2.960	0.004
Income 2013 ² (EU = 100) (World Bank 2017)	-1.985	0.915	-0.708	-2.170	0.033
% population share of Roman Catholics (Barro and McCleary 2003)	10.772	5.314	0.173	2.027	0.046
% population share of Orthodox Christians (Barro and McCleary 2003)	35.687	8.588	0.318	4.155	0.000
% population share of Muslims (Barro and McCleary 2003)	54.565	5.635	0.825	9.684	0.000
Gallup poll about trust in other people (UNDP 2014)	-0.322	0.137	-0.176	-2.344	0.022

adj **R**² = 69%; *n* = 87 countries; *F* = 28.363; error *p* < .001

- Age (effect + or -);
- Economic situation, economic prospects (effect + or -);
- Gender (effect + or -);
- Importance of democracy (effect + or -);
- Importance of religion (effect + or -);
- Opinions on gender equality (effect + or -);
- Opinions on media freedom, incl. electronic media (effect + or -);
- Opinions on religious freedom (effect + or -);
- Opinions on USA, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey (effect + or -);
- Opinions on world leaders (Obama, Putin) (effect + or -).

The Results of the Multivariate Analysis on Global Solidarity in the Fight Against Terror

We now can briefly report our empirical results:

The factor loadings of our promax factor analysis with the variable—opposition to the US-led military actions against ISIS—are the following (Table 10.9):

The “female factor” is connected with opposition against the US military actions against ISIS; and distance to Russia, Iran, and China is negatively related to opposition against the US military actions against ISIS. However, the factor loadings in

Table 10.9 Explanations of the variable: oppose the US military actions against ISIS

Factors	Factor loadings of the variable: oppose the US military actions against ISIS
Distance to America	0.510
Fight against ISIS no priority or opposing military US-led action against ISIS	0.476
Female factor	0.213
Distance to a free religion	0.047
Distance to democracy	0.034
Poverty and pessimism	-0.034
Distance to Russia, Iran, China	-0.102

Table 10.10 Explanations of the variable: not at all concerned about ISIS

Factors	Factor loadings of the variable: not at all concerned about ISIS?
Fight against ISIS no priority or opposing military US-led action against ISIS	0.768
Distance to democracy	0.184
Distance to America	0.110
Distance to a free religion	0.098
Distance to Russia, Iran, China	-0.024
Poverty and pessimism	-0.045
Female factor	-0.074

question are relatively small and well below the standard threshold of ± 0.500 , often encountered in empirical studies on such subjects.

The variable: not at all concerned about ISIS has a smaller 0.184 loading with the factor “distance to democracy” (Table 10.10).

It is also important not only to study the factor loadings of salient variables with the different factors of the model, but also to look into the relationships of salient factors with different variables of the model. The factor “distance to America” and its factor loadings with the variables of the model tell us that distance to America today often goes hand in hand not only with opposition against the US military action against ISIS, but also with an unfavorable opinion of China, with economic pessimism, with an unfavorable opinion of Mr. Putin (mainly due to the Islamist hatred of both America and Russia as the competing “Western devils”), and the age factor. The ten countries with the greatest distance to America are (Table 10.11):

1. Russia;
2. Jordan;
3. Palestinian territories;

Table 10.11 Factor loadings of the factor: distance to America with the variables of the model

Salient factor loadings with the variables:	Factor: distance to America
Unfavorable to the USA	0.837
Unfavorable opinion of Mr. Obama	0.828
Oppose US military action against ISIS	0.510
Unfavorable opinion of China	0.292
Economic situation of country deteriorates	0.226
Economic situation of country bad	0.180
Unfavorable opinion of Mr. Putin	0.134
Unconcerned about ISIS	0.110
Age	0.108

4. Pakistan;
5. Venezuela;
6. Argentina;
7. Lebanon;
8. Turkey;
9. Malaysia; and
10. Japan.

Table 10.12 analyzes the factor loadings of the factor: lack of support for America in the fight against ISIS with the variables of the model. The rejection of gender equality contributes to that type of thinking, as well as the rejection of the importance of honest elections, and the importance of the freedom of speech. Apart from the age factor, a foreign policy orientation toward China, Iran, trust in the current Russian President and economic pessimism contributes toward the lack of support for America in the fight against ISIS. Which are now the ten countries most lacking support for America in the fight against ISIS? These countries are:


1. Ukraine;
2. Malaysia;
3. Pakistan;
4. South Africa;
5. Senegal;
6. Russia;
7. Mexico;
8. Burkina Faso;
9. Nigeria; and
10. Kenya.

Table 10.12 shows the most salient factor loadings of the factor: lack of support for America in the fight against ISIS with the variables of our model.

Maps 10.4 and 10.5 show the country values for “distance to America” and “Fight against ISIS no priority or opposing military US-led action against ISIS.”

Table 10.12 Factor loadings of the factor: lack of support for America in the fight against ISIS with the variables of the model


Salient factor loadings with the variables	Factor: fight against ISIS no priority or opposing military US-led action against ISIS
Unconcerned about ISIS	0.768
Opposing US-led military action against ISIS	0.476
Not important that women have same rights	0.280
Honest elections not important	0.191
Not important that people can say what they want	0.141
Economy of the country will worsen	-0.113
No confidence in Mr. Putin	-0.119
Unfavorable opinion of Iran	-0.129
Unfavorable opinion of China	-0.197
Age	-0.596



source:our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Map 10.4 Distance to America

Graph 10.2 and Table 10.13 highlight the potentials of our analytical model for the realities of the current political system in France together with Britain, currently the European country most affected by terrorism. On the one hand, differences between




Map 10.5 Fight against ISIS no priority or opposing military US-led action against ISIS

the French overall population and the Muslim population are often dramatic, especially along the factor analytical dimensions “religion” and “fight against terror.” The mainly secular France tends to give low priority to religion and a high priority to the fight against terror, while French Muslims give high priority to religion and low priority to the fight against terror. Both the voters of the far right as well as the voters of the far left give no priority to the fight against terrorism. While the radical left now assembled around the person of Jean Luc Melenchon professes a high allegiance to democratic values, it is distant to Euro-Atlantic values, the priority of the fight against terror, and religious liberty. The far right of the Front National is the typical political party of the losers of globalization, combining poverty and pessimism, and distance to democracy.

Table 10.13 French political spectrum

France	Distance to democracy	Distance to Russia, Iran, China	Distance to America	Poverty and pessimism	Distance to a free religion	Fight against ISIS no priority or opposing military US-led action against ISIS	Female factor	N
Lutte Ouvrière, NPA	-0.0197	0.0655	-0.2159	0.4973	0.8545	-0.0830	0.2639	21
Front national	0.3150	0.2344	-0.0286	1.0660	1.5238	-0.2530	0.0500	90
Parti Communiste	-0.3772	0.5366	0.3033	0.4593	1.2482	-0.2614	-0.1457	22
Parti de Gauche de Jean Luc Mélenchon	-0.3824	0.3864	0.2724	0.3988	1.0865	-0.3915	-0.1088	66
Europe Ecologie/Les verts	-0.3079	0.5955	0.1129	0.5141	0.8930	-0.3981	0.5107	68
France—nationwide	-0.1630	0.4553	-0.1033	0.5713	0.8952	-0.6072	0.1210	957
UMP	-0.0508	0.3671	-0.3308	0.6900	0.7465	-0.7003	0.1598	261
Parti Socialiste	-0.3678	0.5426	-0.1923	0.2381	0.7765	-0.7432	0.1359	213
Mouvement démocrate-modem	-0.2303	0.5652	-0.0475	0.4228	0.3724	-0.8809	0.0196	51
L'Union des Démocrates Indépendants (UDI) de Jean-Louis Borloo	-0.3114	0.4575	-0.1649	0.4058	0.6648	-0.9979	0.0095	49



Graph 10.2 Factors of support for the fight against terror along denominational lines in France

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Chapter 11

Islamism, Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy



11.1 A Synopsis of the Results and Some Perspectives

This Chapter highlights the strategic conclusions to be drawn from our analysis. We debate the urgent needs of Arab societies for reform: the system of education, and the system of higher education in particular.


We are almost 95% walking in the fog, and although some literature, bringing light into this darkness has been already published, nowhere solutions, especially straightforward ones, are in sight (Arwine and Mayer 2014; Byman 2015; Ferris and Kirişci 2016; Filiu 2015; Griffin 2015; Kingsley 2016; Lister 2015; McCants 2015; Postelnicescu 2016; Solomon 2016; Wright 2016).

This Part attempted so far to provide a differentiated picture of terror support rates among populations in the Arab world. The ACRPS data suggest that among Syrian refugees in the Middle East, there is a considerable ISIS/ISIL/Daesh support rate of 18%. The analysis of Syrian refugee opinion also reveals the important result that none the less than 30% of the interviewed representative Syrian refugees want a religious state as a solution to the conflict.


Our final synopsis of our empirical results about the amount of terror support in the Middle East is presented in Graph 11.1.

With a 27% average terror support rate for all four terror groups under scrutiny here in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, this is not only a security but also an electoral factor too big for comfort. The partial radicalization of Israeli Muslims—with an average terror support rate of 25% even bigger than in Jordan and the Lebanon—is also evident from our analysis. On average, around a fifth of the population in Jordan and the Lebanon also supports the four terror groups whose support rates were analyzed here. In the European Union membership candidate country Turkey, the average terror support rate is still 11%. This fact alone should support all those

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
Graph 11.1 Terror support in the Middle East according to the Pew Spring 2015 Survey (Pew Research Center 2015) and our own SPSS XIV evaluations of the original data (valid cases only)



Graph 11.2 Supporting the Muslim Brotherhood is connected with the following background data, attitudes and expressed world political sympathies (derived from the Arab Barometer, 3rd wave)

who critically ask themselves what should be the future of the relationship between Ankara and Brussels.

Graph 11.2 summarizes our factor analytical results about the Muslim Brotherhood. Throughout this work we emphasized that President Obama’s favorable Presidential Directive Number 11, establishing a positive role for the Brotherhood, founded with the help of the Nazi German intelligence services in the 1930s, is utterly wrong. Supporting the Brotherhood is a factor of support for the Shari’ah state and



Graph 11.3 Terror support—Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, ISIS is connected with the following background data, attitudes and expressed world political sympathies (derived from Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center 2015)


for the Mullah regime in Iran, and supporting the Brotherhood is a setback for secular democracy in the region. It is as simple as that.

It is not poverty which is the main driver of terror support for Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and ISIS—it is—as to be seen from Graph 11.3, based on our promax factor analyses—pro Iranian and anti-American opinion currents, combining with anti-secularism.


Supporting terror against America is not a domain of the lower strata. Supporters of secular democracy and the Arab Spring and of feminism are against anti-American terrorism. Graph 11.4 also clearly shows that rather, supporters of terror against America are either in the camp of the world political supporters of Saudi Arabia OR Iran and Turkey, and that they do support in their majority the Shari’ah state, although we are also confronted with a secular, left-wing terror support which unfortunately also made some inroads among Christians in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

Finally, Graph 11.5 summarizes the weakness of the solidarity in the fight against international terrorism. The coalition against ISIS is confronted by two basic constraints—Anti-American attitudes, and the pacifist skepticism of women against the war on terror.

How Best to Tackle Islamism: Arab Higher Education Holds the Key Many different sources commented already on one of the most urgent needs of Arab societies for reform: the system of education, and the system of higher education in particular. In summarizing our analyses on the subject, we have come to the conclusion that without a profound education reform, democracy in the Arab World will never mature. Map 11.1 portrays the mean years of schooling in the World System on the basis of UNDP HDR data.




Graph 11.4 Endorsing terrorist attacks against America—is connected with the following background data, attitudes and expressed world political sympathies (derived from the Arab Barometer, 3rd wave)




Graph 11.5 The weakness of the solidarity in the fight against international terrorism (pro-Iran attitudes, unconcerned about ISIS, opposing the US-led coalition against ISIS) is connected with the following background data, attitudes and expressed world political sympathies (derived from Pew Spring Survey 2015)


Our analytical perspective is especially true for the huge gender gap in education, which clearly is established in our Maps 11.2 and 11.3.



Map 11.1 Mean years of schooling, male (UNDP 2014)



Map 11.2 Mean years of schooling, female




Map 11.3 Gender balance in school years

11.2 The Cyclical Aspects

According to Samir Amin (Amin 2016), the recent Arab Spring uprisings comprise an integral part of a massive “second awakening” of the Global South. The Arab world is shaping what may become the end of “Western imperialism”. Amin sees the United States, in an increasingly multi-polar world, as a victim of overreach, caught, as Amin says, in its own attempts to contain China, while confronting Syria and Iran. In his radical Marxist vision, real self-government by independent nations would necessarily mean the end of U.S. empire, and the economic liberalism that has kept it in place. The way forward for the Arab world, would be to take on capitalism itself.

In compliance with latest results of economic-cycle-oriented research on the Arab Spring (see above as well as Akaev et al. 2017; Grinin and Korotayev 2012, 2014, 2016; Grinin et al. 2015a, b, 2016a, b; Korotayev et al. 2015, 2016a, b; Sincar 2012; Slinko et al. 2017) we analyze here some long-term cyclical trends.

Our annual economic growth data were calculated and taken from Barro and Ursúa (2008). In comparison to some other countries, especially from the semi-periphery of the World System, Egypt, the only Arab country with long-term data in our data base, clearly shows only shorter Kuznets cyclical upward and downward movements, while we cannot discern any Kondratieff waves for the Egyptian economy (Graph 11.6).



Graph 11.6 The economic cycle of the Arab countries—Egypt from 1895 onwards by international comparison. SPSS autocorrelation and SPSS spectral analysis (periodogram)





Graph 11.7 Barro/Ursúa time series economic growth in Egypt = $(AV5-AV4)/AV4 \times 100$

Graph 11.7 portrays the time series of economic growth in Egypt, based on 5 year moving averages. The peaks of catching-up growth in the immediate post-World-War-II period, the early 1960s under Nasser and the late 1970s and early 1980s under Sadat ended in the 1980s, and the Egyptian economy ever since is in search of a new growth model.

Graph 11.8 shows two aspects of the real convergence of living conditions of the Arab World, based on life expectancy data from the World Bank. While average living conditions, measured by average life expectancies, improved, there is a considerable slowing down in the velocity of convergence as compared to the European Union since the late 1980s. Not rising poverty or misery, but a failed relative convergence process seems to create so many frustrations on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean.


This failure in the process of relative convergence is further compounded by the zig-zag economic convergence process measured by Gross National Income per capita in comparison to the EU, and the rate of unemployment. Not that the Arab World has been utterly unsuccessful on both fronts, but rather, the fact that Arab GNI per capita hovers around 37–45% of the GNI per capita in the EU and that unemployment fluctuates between 10 and 14% seems to create a large-scale frustration potential, compounded, as the preceding Chapters show, by the demographic process (Graphs 11.9 and 11.10).




Graph 11.8 Life expectancy in the Arab World by international comparison

11.3 Islamism, Islamicity, the Open Society and the Future of Democracy in the Arab World

In this part of the Chapter, we wind up our debates about Islamism, Islamicity, the Open Society and the Future of Democracy in the Arab World. To this end, we present international value comparisons, combined with macro-quantitative reflections which will allow us to make cautious predictions about the future trajectories of democracy in the region, based on the relationships between development levels and value developments.



Graph 11.9 Convergence process of the Arab World (GNI pc EU = 100)



Graph 11.10 Unemployment in the Arab World

Our Open Society Index combines data for the mass support for tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence. All Muslim countries in our 77 countries and territories with full data which were under investigation here are below the global average; and the best placed Muslim country is post-Soviet Kazakhstan; and the best placed Arab country is Qatar. While some Arab countries might perform, here and there, in a rather surprising and positive fashion, it is especially the combination of the dimensions, where the Arab world really fails.

We debate the possible reconciliation of Popper's Open Society and the theology of Islam, namely the writings of the U.S. scholar Hossein Askari. His Index of Islamicity is the instrument how a society fulfils what Askari calls Islam as a rules-based religion. We find that his Indicator is a valid instrument to measure socio-economic progress. Following Askari's argument, the real precondition to develop a truly Islamic society, guided by truly Quranic principles and directed towards an Open Society, would be to develop precisely the patterns of societal tolerance, captured by our democratic civil society index. The development of tolerance, measured by our democratic civil society index, explains almost 69% of the variance of Askari's Islamicity Index.

We also amply debate the famous (Hoffman and Jamal 2014) study about Quran reading and the Arab Spring. According to our multivariate results from surveys, individual piety did not play a significant role in influencing Arab Spring protest behavior.

In the following, we also used World Values Survey data first to classify the identification of global publics with pivotal aspects of democracy and the market economy, and we then analyzed how the country values for the general publics, the practicing Roman Catholics attending Church services every week, and the Muslims in these countries depend on per capita incomes. Our research gives evidence to the fact that not only macro-economic phenomena, but also value developments and even patterns of prejudice are U-shaped or inverted U-shaped functions of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. We call this process the Kuznets trap: rising crises phenomena in the transition phase from the rural to the urban life style, accompanied by an implosion of basic values, necessary for the functioning of a democratic society and a market economy.

At lower levels of socio-economic development, active Roman Catholicism indeed is a countervailing force of humanizing societies, but it fails to influence developments at higher "stages of development". Muslim communities at all stages of development show currently a deficit of accepting the fundamental values of democracy and the market economy in comparison to the development paths of overall society (x-axis is the \ln of GDP per capita). The promise of democracy and the market economy is that of a thorny—but at the end of the day fruitful—path towards an Open Society. Askari was right in emphasizing that the Muslim principle of Ma'ad establishes accountability and justice, for humankind will be judged and rewarded in accordance to their rule compliance or non-compliance. Not the number of suicide bombers, but education or poverty eradication, the equitable distribution of income and wealth, safety and security, socio-economic justice, social capital, environmental sustainability, healthcare, institutional quality, economic development, financial development, and business environment should be the aims of Muslim communities as those of human kind. Following this path, the region could become an economic and political powerhouse of the world, and even Gaza could become another Singapore or Mauritius.

In the following, we will deal with Islamism, Islamicity, the Open Society and the Future of Democracy in the Arab World. To this end, we will again present international value comparisons, combined with macro-quantitative reflections which will

allow us to make cautious predictions about the future trajectories of democracy in the region, based on the relationships between development levels and value developments.

During the dark days of the Second World War, Sir Karl Popper wrote in faraway New Zealand the text of his monumental “*Open Society and Its Enemies*”. With a stark turn to the worse in many regions of the world in 2014/2015 (sharp Russia/West tensions over the Ukraine, destabilization of many countries of the Middle East due to Islamist terrorism, et cetera), it is time to test the global support for the two principle aims of the West, democracy and a market economy. To this end, we analysed the global support for Open Society in the tradition of Popper (2012) and Bergson (1935), based on the freely available data of the *World Values Survey*, latest release, 2010–2014.¹

11.4 Comparative Aspects of the Development of Arab Civil Society—Evidence from Open Society Index and Its Relationship to Effective Democracy

Our Open Society Index combines data for the mass support for tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence.


Arguably, Graph 11.11 shows the connections to be concluded from the Open Society literature in the tradition of Popper and Bergson.

We constructed a kind of “UNDP Index” of the civic culture of Arab countries by international comparison with the existing data,² selecting the WVS items on the civic culture of tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence. Our index, which can be interpreted as a parameter for the maturity of civil society for democratic governance, weights the variables equally. According to the UNDP Index methodology, for each country the worst value of a given variable is subtracted from the observed country value of a given variable. This resulting number is then divided by the difference between the best and the worst value among the entire group of countries of the variable in question, yielding component indices ranging from 0 (worst performance) to 1 (best performance). The resulting overall index—in our case the Index of a Democratic Civil Society—is nothing but the average of the six chosen components (UNDP n.d.):

- Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
- accepting neighbors: People of a different religion
- men do not make better political leaders than women do
- University is equally important for a boy and for a girl
- democracy: religious authorities should not interpret the laws
- unjustifiable: For a man to beat his wife.

¹See <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>.

²See WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014_MULTIVAR_spss_v2015_04_20.sav.




Graph 11.11 The open society

Table 11.1 Towards a UNDP type of index of the global democratic civil society

Country/region	Maximum	Minimum	Worst value	Best value
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0.900	0.360	0.360	0.900
neighbors: people of a different religion	0.570	0.010	0.570	0.010
men make better political leaders than women do	3.430	1.500	1.500	3.430
University is more important for a boy than for a girl	3.700	2.300	2.300	3.700
Democracy: religious authorities should interpret the laws	7.830	1.800	7.830	1.800
justifiable: for a man to beat his wife	4.820	1.160	4.820	1.160

In constructing the index, we took particular care to select variables with a maximum country coverage in the vast *World Values Survey* data base in order to achieve not only a substantial depth of the index, but also a very wide geographical coverage across nations and cultures. The original WVS items were used in the following fashion in the construction of the UNDP type of indicator (Table 11.1).

The country results for this procedure are the following: Sweden, Norway and Andorra are the countries best combining the civic culture of tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence, while the three worst placed nations on earth are Mali, Bahrein and Yemen. All Muslim countries in our 77 countries and territories with full data which were under investigation here are below the global average; and the best placed Muslim country is post-Soviet Kazakhstan; and the best




Map 11.4 Index of a democratic civil society (UNDP-type of Index)


placed Arab country is Qatar. While some Arab countries might perform, here and there, in a rather surprising and positive fashion, it is especially the combination of the six dimensions, where the Arab world really fails.

Map 11.4 portrays the values of these calculations onto a choropleth global map. Map 11.5 shows the global distribution of the country values of the “Effective Democracy Index”, developed by Alexander et al. (2012), combining human rights and the freedom from corruption. Arguably, the Effective Democracy Index is the most reliable single democracy indicator today.

Graph 11.12 shows the basic wisdom of classical modernization theories in political science. As correctly predicted by Almond and Verba (1963), Almond (1996, 2002) and Lipset (1959), and re-iterated by Barro (2012), there is a very close causal and statistical relationship between “modern”, open-society oriented values, democracy and development. In his 2012 analysis on the subject, Barro found that in an 80-country panel since the 1960s, the convergence rate for per capita GDP is around 1.7% per year. In the post-1960s panel, Barro’s analyses found support for modernization theories, highlighting the positive effects of per capita GDP and schooling on democracy and the maintenance of law and order. Barro (2012) also found positive effects of per capita GDP and schooling on the Polity indicator for democracy. Our own modest contribution to this debate in the context of the future of democracy in the Arab World is to be seen in Graph 11.12 with the proof of the combination of the low degree of the development of a democratic civil society and low effective democracy in the Arab World, evident from Table 11.2 and Maps 11.4 and 11.5. The development of a democratic civil society explains none the less than 67% of



Map 11.5 Index of effective democracy



Graph 11.12 An index of a democratic civil society and effective democracy

the variance of the effective democracy indicator. If the Arab World wants democracy, it must devise ways to become a more democratic civil society, combining a commitment to educate children in a spirit of tolerance and respect for other people, accepting neighbors, including people of a different religion, a commitment to gender equality in politics and education, a separation of law making and religious authorities, and a commitment against male domestic violence. It is as easy as that.

For sure, our predictions for the development of democracy in the Arab World are thus rather pessimistic.

Table 11.2 An index of a democratic civil society

Country/region	UNDP-type index of a democratic civil society
Sweden	0.961
Norway	0.945
Andorra	0.921
Netherlands	0.904
Switzerland	0.893
Canada	0.865
New Zealand	0.864
Finland	0.862
France	0.856
Australia	0.846
Great Britain	0.830
Germany	0.821
Trinidad and Tobago	0.819
Spain	0.805
United States	0.799
Uruguay	0.785
Slovenia	0.757
Colombia	0.726
Poland	0.721
Brazil	0.721
Chile	0.719
Taiwan	0.717
Cyprus	0.715
Argentina	0.715
Hungary	0.702
Peru	0.671
Estonia	0.668
Bulgaria	0.617
Mexico	0.616
Zimbabwe	0.614
Ecuador	0.614
Japan	0.610
Romania	0.605
Russia	0.602
China	0.602
Singapore	0.594
Global sample	0.591
Ethiopia	0.588
Moldova	0.586

(continued)

Table 11.2 (continued)

Country/region	UNDP-type index of a democratic civil society
Kazakhstan	0.566
Ukraine	0.560
Belarus	0.558
South Korea	0.550
Georgia	0.544
Hong Kong	0.543
Serbia and Montenegro	0.525
Ghana	0.521
South Africa	0.521
Turkey	0.516
Qatar	0.514
Thailand	0.512
Burkina Faso	0.507
Indonesia	0.497
Azerbaijan	0.491
Kyrgyzstan	0.487
Uzbekistan	0.479
Rwanda	0.477
Tunisia	0.466
Iran	0.449
Lebanon	0.445
Pakistan	0.444
Malaysia	0.443
Jordan	0.435
Viet Nam	0.429
Morocco	0.428
Zambia	0.428
Philippines	0.416
Armenia	0.405
Nigeria	0.404
Occupied Palestinian Territories	0.397
Libya	0.396
Iraq	0.380
Algeria	0.368
India	0.355
Yemen	0.337
Bahrain	0.328
Mali	0.262

Courtesy Rubin Center, Herzliya, Israel, where Arno Tausch first published this Table in Middle East Review of International Affairs

11.4.1 Comparative Aspects of the Development of Arab Civil Society—Evidence from the Islamicity Index

The relatively low stage of development of a democratic civil society in the Arab World can be also confronted by highlighting the fact that the religion of Islam can be reconciled with an Open Society. At this stage, we attempt to introduce a unique, novel and forward looking new approach to reconcile Popper’s Open Society and the theology of Islam, namely the writings of the U.S. scholar Hossein Askari (Rehman and Askari 2010a; Askari 2015)³. His Index of Islamicity is the instrument how a society fulfils what Askari (n.d.) calls Islam as a rules-based religion. Askari says:

Islam is a rules-based religion. The Holy Quran provides the foundational rules. These rules were interpreted and put into practice by the Prophet Mohammad (sawa) in the first Muslim community in Medina. The Prophet Mohammad (sawa) shepherded and served the first Muslim community in Medina subject to the support and concurrence of the community. Under his guidance the Muslim community flourished with justice as its hallmark. Muslims are asked to study the Quran and the life of the Prophet Mohammad (sawa), to internalize the rules prescribed by The Almighty, and to follow them to develop just and flourishing communities. [...] When we simply used our eyes to look at the Muslim countries, we failed to see a high degree of rule compliance. We could not see the socio-economic outcomes that we would expect from rule-compliant Muslim countries. We realized that a benchmark or index was needed to assess the degree of rule compliance or “Islamicity,” to serve as an indicator of needed political, social, and economic reforms.

This was a difficult task that was best taken up in steps. The difficulties were many:

- What should be the characteristics of a truly rule-compliant Muslim community?
- Where could the data be found on these characteristics?
- How could diverse data be summed up (or what importance or weight should be assigned to each characteristic) in a single number or index?

[...] The first index was an overall index that included four broad facets of a Muslim community—economic and human development, laws and governance, human and political rights, and international relations. The second index was a standalone economic and human development index. [...] We endeavored to incorporate what we gathered to be the least controversial characteristics or outcomes of a rule-compliant Muslim community [...] Given our focus of assessing socio-economic development outcomes we did not include core personal Islamic beliefs, as these would bias the results against non-Muslim countries. These core beliefs are the acceptance of Islam’s fundamental axioms of Tawheed (unity), Nubuwwah (Prophethood), and Ma’ad (accountability). Tawheed is recognizing Allah (swt) as the One and Only Creator and Sustainer of the entire Creation. It implies the unity of creation and the rejection of any kind of discrimination or disunity. Nubuwwah refers to the Prophets and Messengers entrusted with divine revelations for the guidance of mankind. [...] Ma’ad establishes accountability and justice, for humankind will be judged and rewarded in accordance to their rule compliance or non-compliance. [...] We looked at the performance of groups of countries (OIC and others) along individual dimensions (no overall index), such as education or poverty eradication. [...] In addition to compliance with Islam’s core beliefs, this index incorporates: equitable distribution of income and wealth, safety and security,

³See Islamicity Indices (2017).

Table 11.3 Correlates of the Islamicity-Index


Variable	Pearson correlation with Islamicity-Index	R ²
Overall 35 development index	0.884	78.193
Corruption avoidance measure	0.880	77.445
Human development index (HDI) value 2004	0.835	69.792
Rule of law	0.831	69.011
UNDP-type Index of a democratic civil society	0.830	68.881
Gender empowerment index value	0.827	68.443
Happy life years	0.791	62.614
Environmental performance index (EPI)	0.755	57.035
Global tolerance index	0.752	56.614
Tertiary enrollment	0.744	55.355
Life satisfaction (0–10)	0.738	54.442
No redistributive religious fundamentalism	0.730	53.360
Life expectancy (years)	0.729	53.143
UNDP education index	0.719	51.645
2000 economic freedom score	0.718	51.591
Comparative price levels (US = 1.00)	0.708	50.092
Civil and political liberties violations	−0.742	55.100
Combined failed states index	−0.921	84.886

socio-economic justice, social capital, environmental sustainability, healthcare, education, institutional quality, economic development, financial development, and business environment. (Askari n.d.)


The Index was further developed in Rehman and Askari (2010b), and in Askari and Mohammadkhan (2015). Cross-correlating the Index of Islamicity with standard indicators of socio-economic development, reported in Tausch and Heshmati (2013), we get (Table 11.3).

Thus, we can say that the Indicator is a valid instrument to measure socio-economic progress. Graph 11.13 now shows the additional vital link between our democratic civil society indicator, developed above, and the Islamicity Index. Following Askari's argument, the real precondition to develop a truly Islamic society, guided by truly Quranic principles and directed towards an Open Society, would be to develop precisely the patterns of societal tolerance, captured by our democratic civil society index. The development of tolerance, measured by the democratic civil society index, explains almost 69% of the variance of Askari's Islamicity Index, highlighted also in choropleth Map 11.6. We agree with Askari's conclusions based on the classical Muslim Nineteenth Century philosopher Muḥammad' Abduh (1849–1905) who said:

I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but no Islam. (Askari n.d.)



Graph 11.13 Democratic civil society and Islamicity-Index



Map 11.6 Islamicity index, 2015

11.4.2 *Qur'an Reading Is the Decisive Factor for Participation in the Arab Spring?*

Having raised the issue of Islamicity and the Open Society, we finally can comment here in the light of earlier studies and our own empirical results, how different patterns of Muslim religious practice affect the main variables under scrutiny in the present study, Islamism, the Arab Spring, and attitudes on democracy.

We already mentioned briefly above that an important and often quoted empirical study on the Arab Spring, based on the analysis of Arab Barometer data, Hoffman and Jamal (2014) reach the conclusion that the Arab Spring protests were not motivated by anti-religious sentiment. On the contrary, individuals who read the Qur'an more often were three to four times as likely as others to participate in the protests. On the other hand, what Hoffman and Jamal call the "days of rage" narrative does not have much empirical support. Hoffman and Jamal (2014) argue instead that people who engaged in communal religious practice were, in fact, slightly less likely than others to engage in protest. The evidence from the second wave of the Arab Barometer, used by Hoffman and Jamal (2014), suggests that in the Arab Spring itself, belief rather than communal practice was the more important source of religious motivation for protest. The role played by religion in the Arab Spring was according to Hoffman and Jamal primarily psychological rather than organizational. Since organized Islamist movements had represented the strongest opposition to the existing regimes in each of these countries, there is a strong possibility that once attitudes about political Islam are controlled for, the effect of Qur'an reading may disappear. In order to account for this possibility, Hoffman and Jamal (2014) presented the results of logistic regressions controlling for two separate measures of support for political Islam. In the first set of models, respondents were asked about their belief that Islamic law is appropriate for their countries. In the second, respondents were asked if they believed that a political system in which only Islamist parties were allowed to compete was appropriate for their country. While support for political Islam does seem to have some independent impact on Arab Spring participation, the effect of Qur'an reading, Hoffman and Jamal (2014) maintain, remains largely unchanged when including these control variables. There are, according to Hoffman and Jamal, many possible explanations for the positive link between Qur'an reading and protest behavior. Qur'an readers might be more supportive of democracy than non-readers, and therefore more motivated to engage in protest against authoritarian regimes. To address this possibility, Hoffman and Jamal (2014) built a composite measure of support for democracy consisting of three items that capture attitudinal commitment to democracy. All items are scored from 1 to 4, with 4 indicating the most pro-democracy response. Each question asks respondents how much they agree with the indicated statement. The first statement is: "*Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems.*" The second is: "*A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems,*" and the third is "*Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values in your country.*" This composite index, constructed by Hoffman and Jamal (2014), ranges from 0 to 12, but no respondents were scored as 0 or 1, so an 11-point scale resulted. According to Hoffman and Jamal (2014), the results of various statistical investigations with this indicator seem to suggest that Qur'an readers were significantly more likely than non-Qur'an-readers to perceive unequal treatment of individuals in their countries. Qur'an readers were, on average, more supportive of democracy than non-readers. Qur'an readers are significantly more likely to perceive inequalities in their treatment from the regime, and are more supportive of democracy than are non-readers. Qur'an reading motivated protest rather than facilitating it. Qur'an readers appear to be more sensitive to injustice, a result

that is plausible given the social justice message found in various parts of the Qur'an. Thus, Qur'an readers were more likely to engage in protest than were non-Qur'an readers despite having much lower levels of overall trust and a much weaker sense of political efficacy. In the Arab Spring, it appears, Qur'an reading increased motivation for protest, but did not provide the resources that tend to make protest easier. But Hoffman and Jamal (2014) also maintained that even with access to survey data about the Arab Spring protesters, it remains difficult to identify who the protesters were and why they were mobilized into anti-regime activity. It is also, the study argues, impossible to predict what the future holds with regard to regime outcomes or the relationship between religion and politics. Religion should not be discarded as a motivator for protest behavior in the Arab world. The next phase of Arab politics may involve, Hoffman and Jamal (Hoffman and Jamal 2014) maintained, moves towards democracy, but is unlikely to involve a move away from religion. Thus, the traditional temptation to associate democracy with secularization—particularly common in the West—is likely to be misleading in the Arab world. Regardless of the type of relationship between religion and politics that will emerge from the Arab Spring, it is clear that studies of these revolutions must rethink the classical assumptions about religion and democracy. According to the study, individual piety played a significant role in influencing protest behavior, but communal religious practice did not. While the mechanisms behind these relationships are indeterminate, there is evidence to suggest that many of the revolutionaries who were active in the Arab Spring were motivated, at least in part, by a psychological attachment to religion.

In another very salient article on this subject, Ciftci (2012) attempted to show that non-secularist attitudes and positive perceptions of legal Islamic practices in the Arab World lead to less support for democracy among ardent supporters of the Islamic law, *Shari'ah*. Supporters of democracy, Ciftci (2012) found out, also favor *Shari'ah* and are able to find the middle ground between Islamic values and democracy. Thus, a fusion of Islam and democracy taking the form of a '*democratized Shari'ah*' or a '*Muslim democracy*' may be the norm. Perceptions of gender equality have a huge statistical influence on the views about democracy and *Shari'ah*. Gender is also relevant to the extent that women are found to be less supportive of democracy and more supportive of *Shari'ah*. Ciftci also maintains that as "*evidenced by the successful Muslim democracies of Turkey and Indonesia, Islamic parties may survive in democratic systems*".

We maintain by contrast that the results obtained by our data analysis rather support what Hoffman and Jamal themselves call "*the traditional temptation to associate democracy with secularization*". We think that there is no reason to rethink the classical assumptions about religion and democracy, made by social scientific modernization theories. According to our study, individual piety did not play a significant role in influencing protest behavior. And the tale of the revolutionaries who were active in the Arab Spring and their motivations are different from what Hoffman and Jamal and also Ciftci suggest. Graph 11.14 summarizes our results from the Arab Barometer Survey. We place our non-statistical summaries of the promax factor analytical research results as easily discernible comments directly above the Graphs. We tend to interpret especially factor loadings above ± 100 . We should emphasize

that both the direction of the detected influences as well as the relatively low size of the statistical effects make us rather cautious to follow Hoffman and Jamal and also Ciftci's interpretations.

11.4.3 Comparative Aspects of the Development of Arab Civil Society

In the following, we use *World Values Survey* data first to classify the identification of global publics with pivotal aspects of democracy and the market economy, and we then analyze how the country values for the general publics, the practicing Roman Catholics attending Church services every week, and the Muslims in these countries depend on per capita incomes. These calculations are necessary in order to risk some predictions about the future trajectories of democracy in different cultural systems, as per capita incomes rise.

Our analysis of the *World Values Survey* data derived the following factor analytical scales, well compatible with a large social scientific literature:


1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley 1999)
2. Democracy movement (Huntington 1993)
3. Climate of personal non-violence
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara 2000; Fukuyama 1995)
5. Happiness, good health (Post 2005)
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington 2000)
7. Accepting the market economy (Glahe and Vorhies 1989; Hayek 2012; Novak 1991b)
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson 2009)
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset 1959)
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al. 1999)
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and Marsh 1990).

We mention here briefly the salient factor loadings, explaining 10% or more of a variable:


The Violent and Lawless Society

- 0.796 Justifiable: Avoiding a fare on public transport
- 0.765 Justifiable: Stealing property
- 0.760 Justifiable: Claiming government benefits
- 0.732 Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe
- 0.560 Justifiable: Violence against other people
- 0.451 Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife.


Graph 11.14 The sociology of religion in the region




(Arab Barometer): daily prayer frequency is positively related to identification with the Shari'ah state, and negatively related with the identification with secular democracy and participation in the Arab Spring



(Arab Barometer): Friday prayer participation is positively associated with a world political orientation towards Saudi Arabia, and is negatively associated with an identification with feminism



(Arab Barometer): the relatively weak statistical relationships seem to suggest that there is a very slight positive effect of regular Quran reading with an identification with the Shari'ah state and Saudi-Arabia, and negative effects with acceptancy of the State of Israel and secular democracy. But we highlight that these effects are all below +/- .100



(Arab Barometer): secularism relatively weakly does not go hand an identification with the Shari'ah state and Saudi-Arabia, but secularism has a stronger positive effect on feminism and a positive attitude towards Israel

Democracy Movement

- Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression 0.753
- Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections 0.738
- Democracy: Women have the same rights as men 0.704
- Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 0.493
- Importance of democracy 0.493
- Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0.448.

Climate of Personal Violence

- Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0.846
- Justifiable: Parents beating children 0.795
- Justifiable: Violence against other people 0.786
- Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe 0.604
- Justifiable: Stealing property 0.587.

Lack of Trust in Institutions

- No confidence: The Government 0.776
- No confidence: The Police 0.717
- No confidence: The Press 0.715
- No confidence: The United Nations 0.637.

Unhappiness, Poor Health

- State of health (bad) (subjective) 0.771
- Feeling of unhappiness 0.716
- Age 0.440
- I don't see myself as a world citizen 0.405
- Insecurity in neighborhood 0.364.

Redistributive Religious Fundamentalism

- Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws 0.687
- Not important in life: Religion -0.596
- Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0.460
- Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 0.389.

Rejecting the Market Economy

- Competition [good or] harmful 0.760
- Hard work does not bring success 0.733
- [Private vs.] state ownership of business 0.353.

Feminism

- Reject: Men make better political leaders than women do 0.717
- University is not more important for a boy than for a girl 0.682
- Gender (female) 0.555.

Distance to Politics


- No interest in politics 0.849
- Not important in life: Politics 0.837.

Nihilism

- Not important in life: Friends 0.690
- Not important in life: Leisure time 0.669
- Not important in life: Work 0.495
- Not important in life: Family 0.478.

Welfare Mentality, Rejection of the Calvinist Work Ethics

- Supporting larger income differences -0.677
 - Not important in life: Work 0.467
 - Not important in life: Religion 0.400
 - Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0.395.
- Our Index construction was based on the following weighting of our factor scores:
1. **The non-violent and law-abiding society** [The violent and lawless society -4.263]
 2. **Democracy movement** 2.574
 3. **Climate of personal nonviolence** [Climate of personal violence -2.260]
 4. **Trust in institutions** [Lack of trust in institutions -1.929]
 5. **Happiness, good health** [Unhappiness, poor health -1.864]
 6. **No redistributive religious fundamentalism** [Redistributive religious fundamentalism -1.554]
 7. **Accepting the market economy** [Rejecting the market economy -1.434]
 8. **Feminism** 1.245
 9. **Involvement in politics** [Distance to politics -1.197]
 10. **Optimism and engagement** [Nihilism -1.141]
 11. **No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics** [Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics -1.075]



Map 11.7 Overall civil society index, based on the size of the factor analytical Eigenvalues

This yielded Map 11.7, based on the factor scores, documented in our statistical appendix,⁴ and in Table 11.4.

11.4.4 The Future of Democracy and the Kuznets Trap

In the following analysis, we plot *World Values Survey* data about the acceptancy of

1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley 1999)
2. Democracy movement (Huntington 1993)
3. Climate of personal non-violence
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara 2000; Fukuyama 1995)
5. Happiness, good health (Post 2005)
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington 2000)
7. Accepting the market economy (Glahe and Vorhies 1989; Hayek 2012; Novak 1991b)
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson 2009)
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset 1959)
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al. 1999)
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and Marsh 1990).

⁴https://www.academia.edu/36302399/Online_Statistical_Appendix_to_ISLAMISM_ARAB_SPRING_AND_DEMOCRACY_Springer_2018_.

Table 11.4 Percentile performance (Arab civil societies are among the top ... percent of global society)


	Overall civil society index	Global rank	Global percentile performance (country among top ... %)
Sweden	7.047	1	1.695
Trinidad and Tobago	5.751	2	3.390
Australia	5.487	3	5.085
Japan	5.466	4	6.780
Netherlands	5.216	5	8.475
Ghana	4.760	6	10.169
Germany	4.274	7	11.864
Uzbekistan	4.250	8	13.559
Qatar	3.749	9	15.254
Cyprus	3.500	10	16.949
Uruguay	3.496	11	18.644
Spain	3.197	12	20.339
United States	3.197	13	22.034
Romania	2.920	14	23.729
Poland	2.802	15	25.424
Taiwan	2.745	16	27.119
Georgia	2.562	17	28.814
Thailand	2.523	18	30.508
Turkey	2.121	19	32.203
South Korea	1.906	20	33.898
Armenia	1.852	21	35.593
Zimbabwe	1.789	22	37.288
Brazil	1.752	23	38.983
Tunisia	1.656	24	40.678
China	1.514	25	42.373
Chile	1.312	26	44.068
Estonia	1.157	27	45.763
Malaysia	1.029	28	47.458
Ecuador	0.945	29	49.153
Slovenia	0.730	30	50.847
Colombia	0.631	31	52.542
Rwanda	0.402	32	54.237
Argentina	0.342	33	55.932
Morocco	0.249	34	57.627
Jordan	0.199	35	59.322

(continued)

Table 11.4 (continued)

	Overall civil society index	Global rank	Global percentile performance (country among top ... %)
Libya	0.079	36	61.017
Nigeria	0.042	37	62.712
Yemen	-0.205	38	64.407
Azerbaijan	-0.301	39	66.102
Kazakhstan	-0.367	40	67.797
Kuwait	-0.840	41	69.492
Peru	-0.931	42	71.186
Mexico	-0.947	43	72.881
Kyrgyzstan	-0.958	44	74.576
Pakistan	-1.223	45	76.271
Singapore	-1.482	46	77.966
Hong Kong	-1.876	47	79.661
Belarus	-2.711	48	81.356
Palestinian Occupied Territories	-2.997	49	83.051
Ukraine	-3.060	50	84.746
Iraq	-3.306	51	86.441
Egypt	-3.878	52	88.136
Algeria	-4.422	53	89.831
Bahrain	-4.426	54	91.525
Russia	-4.609	55	93.220
Lebanon	-5.183	56	94.915
Philippines	-5.774	57	96.610
South Africa	-9.691	58	98.305
India	-10.498	59	100.000

Among active Roman Catholics, overall society and Muslim communities against the respective natural logarithm of GDP per capita. What are the results of this endeavor? Just as in the case of Anti-Semitism, discussed above, we find strong empirical support for the idea first proposed by Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets (1976) that social crisis phenomena, such as inequality, rise with higher per capita incomes, only to level off at higher stages of development. Our research gives evidence to the fact that not only macro-economic phenomena, but also value developments and even patterns of prejudice are U-shaped or inverted U-shaped functions of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. We call this process the Kuznets trap: rising crises phenomena in the transition phase from the rural to the urban life style, accompanied by an implosion of basic values, necessary for the functioning of a democratic society and a market economy.



Graph 11.15 Value development in global society, as predicted by our data and GDP per capita (For the GDP per capita data, see Tausch and Heshmati (2013))

At lower levels of socio-economic development, active Roman Catholicism indeed is a countervailing force of humanizing societies, but it fails to influence developments at higher “stages of development”. Muslim communities at all stages of development show currently a deficit of accepting the fundamental values of democracy and the market economy in comparison to the development paths of overall society (x-axis is the n log of GDP per capita) (Graph 11.15).

A more detailed view of our appendix graphs⁵ reveals the following confirmation of Kuznets’ approach of U-shaped and inverted U-shaped functions of development.

Non-violent and Law-Abiding Society Muslim communities—just as practicing Roman Catholic communities, experience a sharper inverted U-turn in the course of development, with a strong implosion of non-violence and law-abiding at middle income levels. This pattern would confirm the idea that with rising crises phenomena at middle income levels, which are characteristic of the transition of a society from a rural to an urban lifestyle, support for non-violence and law-abiding falls, and then rises again when the crises phenomena recede at highest stages of development. The predicament of Muslim societies could precisely be described by those patterns: transition phases and crises at middle income levels, accompanied by the implosion of the values of non-violence and law-abiding.

Democracy Movement while there is a fairly linear increase of the democracy movement in overall society, the Roman Catholic democracy movement starts at relatively low levels at low levels of development, and reaches a saturation point at high stages of development, and the Muslim democracy movement even exhibits a

⁵https://www.academia.edu/36302399/Online_Statistical_Appendix_to_ISLAMISM_ARAB_SPRING_AND_DEMOCRACY_Springer_2018_.

slightly U-shaped pattern, with the democracy movement weakest at middle income levels. Only at very low levels of development, Muslim support for democracy is stronger than in overall society, while at all other development levels, the Muslim democracy movement is weaker than that of overall society. Again, our findings would suggest that Muslim societies and the Arab World are in the “Kuznets trap”.

Climate of Personal Non-violence an unfortunate shape of a saturation of the climate of personal non-violence is to be observed for overall society, practicing Roman Catholics, and Muslims. As is the case for the pattern of the democracy movement, Muslim communities are best-practice performers at low levels of development, while practicing Roman Catholic communities are bad performers at low stages of development, and experience a sharper implosion of their climate of personal non-violence at high stages of development, but certainly are best-performers at higher middle-income stages. Muslim communities at middle and higher income levels are performing badly on this scale, again showing the importance of the Kuznets trap for the understanding of the Muslim Middle Eastern societies.

Trust in Institutions while overall societies, practicing Roman Catholics, and Muslims all exhibit an inverted U-shaped function of trust with rising per capita incomes, the U-shaped pattern is especially strong for Roman Catholics and it is fairly weak Muslim communities. At middle and upper-middle income levels, their levels of trust are higher than those of overall society. Considering the importance which Alesina et al. (Alesina and Guiliano 2013, 2015; Alesina and Ferrara 2000; Alesina et al. 2015) assign to the factor “trust” for modern economic growth, this pattern could be a relative asset for the functioning of democracy and the market economy in the Muslim Middle East.

Happiness, Good Health again, there is a marked U-shaped relationship confirming the existence of the “Kuznets trap” of modernization and the difficult transition from a rural to an urban society. Practicing Roman Catholics, champions of happiness and good health in poor countries, most seriously are affected by the “Kuznets trap” of modernization, while the U-shaped pattern also exists for Muslim societies, but the downward swing during the modernization crisis at higher middle-income levels is worst for the practicing Roman Catholic communities.

No Religious Fundamentalism there are U-shaped “Kuznets traps” of modernization for all three communities (global communities irrespective of denomination, practicing Roman Catholics, and Muslims), while it is certain that irrespective of development levels, Muslim communities find it most difficult to distance themselves from the patterns of religious fundamentalism.

Acceptancy of the Market Economy as development propels incomes and living standards and the urban lifestyle, the acceptancy of the market economy falls and recovers only slightly at high stages of development. From higher middle-income levels upwards, there is an optimistic tendency to be observed for both Muslims and practicing Roman Catholics: in a modern, mature, urbanized environment, these two

groups of believers realize better than overall society that a market economy needs acceptance of its basic values in order to function.

Feminism while after some initial differences in the rate of speeding up-support for feminism all three types of communities are characterized by growing support for feminism, the only retrogressive tendency is to be observed for practicing Roman Catholic at very high stages of development.

Involvement in Politics while there are typically inverted U-shaped “Kuznets traps” for both overall societies and the practicing Roman Catholics, Muslim societies are characterized by a very clear negative function of falling involvement in politics with rising income levels, becoming yet another predicament for the “normal” development of democracy and a market economy.

Optimism and Engagement while Roman Catholics might be the superstars of optimism and engagement in poor and rural societies, they are most seriously affected by the “Kuznets trap” of the crises of modernization. Only at higher stages of development, their optimism and engagement recovers, while Muslim communities experience a smoother but still existing “Kuznets implosion” or “Kuznets trap” of their value development concerning optimism and engagement, in order to become the superstars of this value development at high stages of development.

Calvinist Work Ethics just as in the case of the acceptancy of the market economy, there is a paradoxical phenomenon to be observed. The acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics is highest at lower middle-income levels, and will be falling from this stage onwards. While both Muslims and practicing Roman Catholics show a less inclined downward trend, the negative phenomenon is still the same and is one more example of how treacherous the road to a modern urban democracy and market economy really is.

The violent Islamist ideology of terrorism, most clearly evident from the works of Naji (Naji 2006) and Mus’ab al-Suri (2008) offers nothing more and nothing less than two promises:

- (1) prolonged wars of attrition; and
- (2) work towards the establishment of a caliphate.

But the promise of democracy and the market economy is that of a thorny—but at the end of the day fruitful—path towards an Open Society.

Askari was right in emphasizing that the Muslim principle of *Ma’ad* establishes accountability and justice, for humankind will be judged and rewarded in accordance to their rule compliance or non-compliance. Not the number of suicide bombers, but education or poverty eradication, the equitable distribution of income and wealth, safety and security, socio-economic justice, social capital, environmental sustainability, healthcare, institutional quality, economic development, financial development, and business environment should be the aims of Muslim communities as those of human kind. Following this path, the region could become an economic and political powerhouse of the world, and even Gaza could become another Singapore or Mauritius.

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Chapter 12

General Conclusion to the Monograph. Mena Region and Global Transformations. Arab Spring and the Beginning of the World System Reconfiguration



Preliminary Remarks In our monograph, we more or less fully touched upon a number of important problems and issues: the nature and characteristics of Islamism, and why Islamism has such a strong roots in most Islamic countries; the relation of Islamism to secular power and its future; why it is important to strive to divide the Islamists and support, if possible, moderate Islamists, in order to weaken radical Islamism; how Islamism relates to democracy and what are the prospects for combining Islamic and Western values. We have paid much attention to the issues of Islamic radicalism and terrorism, the extent and reasons for the support of terrorism among the Muslims as well as the relations with the West, Islamophobia, and the correlation between Islamism and Anti-Semitism. The key issues have been also the analysis of values in the Arab World especially of the democratic ones, including the problems of future democracy in the Arab World. We also emphasized that though it will take much time and hard work, it is necessary to promote liberal values not instead of the Islamist ones but in combination with them. We have also examined what we see as mistakes in USA and Western policy toward the countries of the Middle East. We more than once pointed out that one should keep in mind that wars, interventions, and especially the overthrows of strong political secular regimes contribute to the growth of terrorism. We have paid a special attention to the causes and events of the Arab Spring, considering these revolutions against the background of general approaches to revolutions in general and at the present stage, showing the limitations and the danger of a revolutionary road to democracy. We paid a lot of attention to the analysis of the influence of global processes on the Islamic countries and in particular on the events of the Arab Spring. In the Conclusion, we would like

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to talk about the reverse effect of events in the Arab countries, especially the Arab Spring on global events.

In Chap. 4, we talked about the great significance of the events of the Arab Spring for the World System. However, a special perception of the Arab Spring is connected not only with the point that “the History is made there”. As we already mentioned elsewhere (Grinin and Korotayev 2011, 2012a, b, 2014c, 2016a, b; Grinin et al. 2016), those events appear to indicate the advance of a few new global phenomena. But which phenomena? In 2009 and 2010, we suggested that in the forthcoming decades, the international system will start to transform “faster and in a more substantial way. Consequently, we are entering a period of searching for new structural and systemic solutions within the World System, which means a considerably complicated period awaiting us in the nearest future. Working out and stabilizing the model of a new political order within the World System will be a complicated, lengthy, and rather contentious process” (Grinin and Korotayev 2010b: 173; see also Grinin 2010). Basing ourselves on this forecast, in our paper “The Coming Epoch of New Coalitions: Possible scenarios of the near future” (Grinin and Korotayev 2011), we came to a conclusion that the turbulent events of late 2010 and 2011 in the Arab World may well be regarded as a start of the global reconfiguration. However, this important theme was touched upon in the above-mentioned article quite superficially. The further development of events in the Arab World has confirmed this opinion. On the other hand, it has prompted us to engage ourselves into a large-scale analysis of factors that led to such a radical shift in the course of political processes in the Arab World, as well as into an analysis of those World Systems transformations that were similar to the Arab Spring in their synchrony and scale. This concluding chapter offers results of this analysis together with a few forecasts that stem from it. We also suggest an explanation why the new catch-up of the World System political component started in the Arab countries.

We also would like to offer our analysis of similar historical World System reconfigurations starting with the sixteenth-century Reformation. The analysis is based on the theory (developed by the authors) of the periodical catch-ups experienced by the political component of the World System that tends to lag behind the World System economic component. Thus, we show that the asynchrony of development of various functional subsystems of the World System is a cause of the synchrony of major political changes. In other words, within the globalization process, political transformations tend to lag far behind economic transformations. And such lags cannot constantly increase, the gaps are eventually bridged, but in not quite a smooth way.

12.1 Synchronicity of Revolutionary Changes

The World System is a system by definition, that is why it is not surprising to observe certain synchronous phenomena within it from the moment of its emergence (see, e.g., Korotayev 2005, 2006, 2012; Korotayev et al. 2006; Korotayev and Grinin 2012a, b, 2013; Grinin 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 2009; Barfield 1989; Chase-Dunn and Manning 2002; Hall et al. 2009). However, it is evident that in the pre-Modern World

System, it could take decades (or even centuries) for the synchronization impulses to get from one World System zone to another [if they were not connected with global climatic events (Korotayev et al. 1999; Parker 2013)]. Within one empire, one could frequently observe synchronous social upheavals, but well-synchronized social processes in different polities were rather exceptional. With the formation of the Modern World System and intensification of globalization processes, the situation started to change. Already in the early Modern period, one could observe such a series of well-synchronized socio-ideological processes as the Reformation movement in a rather large number of polities (it started in Wittenberg in Saxony in 1517 with the Ninety-Five Theses by Martin Luther). At this point, one should take into account the powerful information technology that had emerged not long before that time—printing. On the other hand, one should also take into account the point that in Germany (and Europe and the World System in general—up to China and Japan) the early sixteenth century was the time of a rather rapid growth of wealth in connection with the development of sea trade, the growing demand for German silver, etc. (see, e.g., Arrighi 1994; Grinin and Korotayev 2015a). Thus, one could observe here the action of global factors and inflated expectations among certain population groups. The Latin American Wars of Independence (1809–1826) may be regarded as another set of events of such a type; they started with the dethronement of the Spanish Bourbon dynasty by Napoleon in 1809 (Tomas 1960; Lavrov 1991; Costeloe 1986). To a lesser extent, such a pattern could be observed in 1830–1831; however, the July Revolution in France produced substantial repercussions in Belgium and Poland, as well as in some German polities. On the other hand, the synchronicity in question was observed in a perfectly salient way in revolutions of 1848 and 1849 that engulfed a large number of European countries (see, e.g., Weyland 2012).

It is quite remarkable that the revolutions of 1848 and 1849 were tightly connected with the world economic crisis of 1847 as well as crop failures of 1845–1847. Those crop failures caused processes that were analogous to the modern agflation (see Chap. 4 above). The 1905 Russian Revolution also produced certain repercussions in the world (note that it also took place after the world economic crisis of 1900–1903, as well as in combination with crop failures that were observed in Russia in 1901, 1905, and 1906). Note also that the emergence of new modes of printing, information transmission, communication, and information facilitated the proliferation of revolution waves (about connection of revolutions and information technologies, see Grinin 2017; Akaev et al. 2017). Note also a certain revolution wave at the end of the First World War and immediately after it, as well as the proliferation of the national liberation movements in the colonies after the Second World War, in the late 1940s and the 1950s, that peaked in 1960 (see Grinin 2012b; Grinin et al. 2016). Another revolution wave was observed in Eastern Europe in 1989–1991. The analysis of such synchronous social and revolutionary movements makes it possible to single out the following preconditions for their emergence:

1. The presence within a certain region of similar political and ideological conditions accompanied by emergence of new social groups. Usually, these are new groups of intelligentsia, or other new elite (or counter-elite) groups (frequently with some clearly international orientations). They tend to position themselves

as a social avant-garde and to employ some popular new ideologies. Thus, in revolutionary Europe of 1848, this role was played by modernized intelligentsia, radical middle class, and advanced workers (whereas in some countries, like Hungary, a certain role was played by nationalist intelligentsia and nobility). Local intelligentsia acted as a vanguard in Africa in the late 1950s. However, of course, within the process of revolution one can observe the emergence of a mass of new forces and contradictions, as well as ideological constructs that may become leading in certain cases. As we have already mentioned above, in the Arab countries (especially in Egypt and Tunisia) the vanguard role was played by radically minded educated youth, by spontaneously emergent loosely organized youth movements, whereas the Islamists followed them (see, e.g., Khalaf 2011; Ghoneim 2012). Note also that, at the early phases of the Arab revolutions, religious, fundamentalist slogans were hardly visible at all; the dominant slogans were secular democratic demands of freedom, honest elections, human rights, in addition to certain social justice slogans, and so on (e.g., Khalaf 2011; Muhammed 2011; Walzer 2016).

2. A revolutionizing influence on other countries (especially those that are similar with respect to their civilization, political, and social parameters) is observed in somehow similar situations. One may single out two types of emergence of a situation that could produce a synchronizing effect. The first is the emergence of power vacuum in connection with the weakening of a certain power that blocked certain changes. One could mention as examples the French and British colonies that after the Second World War got their independence in a direct connection with the weakening of the both powers, or revolutions in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s in connection with the weakening of the USSR. The second type is the aggravation of emergent contradictions under the influence of global factors. This was typical for the 1848 Spring of Nations and for the Arab Spring. However, for the Arab World, one could also trace certain elements of the first type, which we will discuss below.
3. There should be also a sharp decline of trust in old political forms and, hence, aspiration for radical changes. For the subject of this conclusion, it is important to note that such a decline of trust and aspiration to radical changes engulf a whole region and emerge under the influence of not only internal societal transformations but also under the influence of certain aspects of global development. We have considered them in detail above in Chaps. 4, 5, and 11.
4. Finally, it seems important to note that for the realization of such modular social movements, an important role is played by the approbation of new social and communicative technologies of protest organization (see, e.g., Akaev et al. 2017). In this case, new revolutionary technologies are added to the armory of the protest vanguard.

Theoretically, power vacuum may happen in virtually any moment; however, major global crises are more typical for downswing phases of the long Kondratieff waves (K-waves). Let us recollect that the characteristic period of those waves is 50–60 years, accordingly each of those phases lasts for 20–30 years. Upswing phases

are characterized by faster economic growth rates and less pronounced crises, and downswings are characterized by a slower economic growth and more prolonged crises (Kondratieff 1926, 1928, 1935, 1979, 1984, 1998, 2004 [1922]; Tausch 2006; Grinin et al. 2016b; Grinin and Korotayev 2010a: Chap. 3, 2012a: Chap. 1; Korotayev and Tsirel 2010a, b, c; Grinin et al. 2011: Chap. 3; Akaev et al. 2017). In 1830 and 1848, revolutions in Europe began accordingly in the middle of the first K-wave downswing and at its end. At present (after 2008), it appears possible to speak about the downswing phase of the fifth K-wave. We believe that it is not coincidental that this was accompanied by such a large-scale political event as the Arab Spring and its global echo (see Grinin 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012b; Akaev et al. 2017). This phase is likely to continue up to the 2020s. It cannot be excluded that around that time, as a result of the acceleration of economic growth in a number of Tropical African countries (taking into account their “youth bulges”), a wave of protests similar to the Arab Spring will roll over some of them (see, e.g., Grinin 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012b; Korotayev et al. 2010, 2011a, b, 2014; Korotayev 2014; Zinkina and Korotayev 2014a, b; Korotayev and Zinkina 2014a, b, 2015).

Finally, it appears necessary to stress that each of the above-mentioned revolutionary waves marked large-scale changes in the World System. Those waves gave stimuli to large-scale changes (e.g., after the 1848 revolutions one could observe a strong acceleration of the capitalist development and emergence of modern political systems in Europe, which strongly affected the World System periphery as well). That is why there are grounds to suggest that the Arab Spring marks the start of a new global reconfiguration.

12.2 Political and Economic Components of Globalization and the Arab Spring

Let us now consider why there are global reasons for the initiation of synchronous mass social movements. First, we recall what we wrote earlier: “economic and financial globalization greatly advances the development of international law and political globalization. Will the political component of the World System lag behind the economic one even more in the decades to come? The answer to a great extent depends on what the economic development will be in the nearest future. Numerous economists and social scientists, presenting various arguments (sometimes basing on the dynamics of the famous Kondratieff cycles), suppose that in the next 15–20 years world economic development will most probably proceed at a slower rate than in the preceding period. We support this point of view.¹ However, if this forecast works well, will not the political component of the World System be able to catch up slightly?” (Grinin and Korotayev 2010b: 172–174; see also Grinin 2009b, 2010, 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012b; 2015b).

¹We also substantiated this approach in detail in Grinin et al. (2016b).

We do believe that in the forthcoming two decades, the World System political component is likely to somehow catch up. But how will this catch-up proceed? Of course, the way this catch-up will take place is very important. The catch-up implies development at a rather high speed, which may be accompanied by tensions, hairpin bends, and cataclysms; and it has become perfectly clear that this is accompanied by the involvement of large groups of countries into turbulent events. That is why we suppose that the World System political component catch-up is likely to turn out to be a rather turbulent period. And global factors do and will cause such synchronous mass social movements, protests, and explosions (Grinin 2009a, b, 2010; Grinin and Korotayev 2010b, 2012b, 2015b).

The logic is quite evident here: Within social systems, the lagging behind cannot be endless; when the gap becomes too large, a period of political catch-up begins. It happens just when the economic development slows down because of some crisis, whereas the lagging of social and political development behind the economic growth is just one of the crisis causes Grinin et al. (2011).

Thus, the idea might be formulated as follows: It is just the asynchronic development of the World System's different aspects that is the major cause of synchronicity of major social movements. In other words, within current globalization some processes lag behind the other, in particular, political processes lag behind economic processes. And this cannot last for a long time, since sooner or later the catch-up starts which rarely proceeds smoothly—rather it takes place in a jerky way. Such a lagging of one vector behind the other leads to various disproportions, which oppositions may define as “defects of the regime” contributing to the emergence of opposition, protest, and revolutionary ideologies. It even appears irrelevant whether one of the respective ideals can be hardly applied effectively in a particular country at a certain moment of time. They would rather play the role of a battering ram that crashes rigid regimes, while the countries' further destiny depends on historical luck. In the global world terms, the cost of changes for a particular society, in fact, is not so important. Therefore, it is dangerous to follow blindly the fashionable theories and their proselytes: The natural historical development under globalization will be carried out precisely according to the principle “you've got to crack a few eggs to make an omelette,” when countries and political movements would occasionally find themselves in the position of those “eggs.”

The events of the Arab Spring have fully confirmed this forecast, also introducing new nuances into the very idea of instability. We concluded that the stormy events of 2011 in the Arab World, including revolutions and unrest in seemingly relatively prosperous and dynamically developing Egypt and Tunisia, or rich Bahrain and Oman, are the beginning of structural changes, even more so, the beginning of the reconfiguration of the world (see Grinin 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012b; Grinin et al. 2016a). The events unfolding in the Near and Middle East and in other regions, especially in Ukraine, but also in the Far East (Grinin 2014) in 2012–2015, increasingly convince us that the reconfiguration of the world has started and is proceeding quite actively (see also Korotayev et al. 2016, 2017a, b; Akaev et al. 2017; Ortman et al. 2017).

Meanwhile, the reconfiguration processes can manifest in the most unexpected places. And it does happen. We see such turbulent and unexpected twists and turns in the UK that exits the EU, in Spain (in connection with the referendum in Catalonia), in the USA, where the country is seething as a result of President D. Trump's coming to power, and his policy leads to increasing tension in different places of the world. We are not talking about the Middle East, where unexpectedly sharp tectonic processes began even in the Gulf countries (a quarrel with Qatar) and inside Saudi Arabia as a result of the monarch's change and the emergence of a young ambitious crown prince on the foreshore.

So, there is every sign of the started global reconfiguration. And such changes may take place in various forms (that sometimes can be quite unexpected). At the same time, the changes that quickly capture entire clusters of societies also remain possible.

Why does the recent political component catch-up take place in the Arab countries? From the point of view of globalization processes, one can hardly ignore the fact that the gap between the level of economic, technological, and educational development, on the one hand, and mentality, religious influence on everyday life, law, family relationships, etc., on the other, appears to be the greatest there among all the civilizations and cultural regions (see Part II of the present monograph for more detail). It is here that women have the least rights in comparison with men, but at the same time, the level of education, culture, and perception of the world among women is clearly not consistent with their situation. The influence of religion on all aspects of life, including law and finance, is much higher here than elsewhere while religious tolerance is virtually nonexistent in many countries. The Arab countries will be unable to ignore these problems endlessly, especially since the high level of migration (including migration to European states) together with increasing openness to television and Internet broadcasts undermine or directly break open a previously closed ideology.

12.3 From the History of Globalization: Political Component Catch-up

The political development lagging behind the economic development began to be felt since the late nineteenth century—perhaps, even since the 1870s—when the second Kondratieff wave downswing started. Revolutions of the 1900s may be regarded as a certain “attempt” of political component catch-up in the World System framework. However, those attempts were not really successful, which finally resulted in the First World War. After this war, one could observe a wave of institutional political globalization, first (not very successful) attempts to create world coordination organs (the League of Nations) and some international economic organizations. A relatively slow economic development in the interwar period additionally indicated the necessity of a deep restructuring of the World System. This restructuring was

finished with the Second World War that led to the emergence of a new world order, effective economic world organizations, and possibilities of fast economic growth.

As a result of the Second World War (defeat of Japan and Italy, and, especially, the weakening of Britain and France), one could observe the transition to independent government in a number of colonies. The first major breakthrough took place as a result of the end of the British colonial rule in South Asia (that led to the formation of independent states in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma). Later France, exhausted by wars in Algeria and Indochina, failed to resist independence movements in Africa, and in 1960 colonies started getting independence one after another.

In 1950–1980, the development of the world economy was accompanied by the emergence of a large number of economic and social alliances and blocks. A certain lag still remained. Socialist countries turned out to be the weakest link. The crisis in the Soviet Union created a power vacuum that resulted in the collapse of the political system of all the European socialist countries.

This facilitated the development of the phenomenon that was denoted as “globalization.” But as is well known, the globalization was mainly economic (at the world scale, the largest political change of the last decades was the deepening and expansion of the European integration). While the economic situation was improving the economic change still proceeded at a faster speed, whereas now we seem to be entering a period of the political component catch-up, and the Arab Spring appears to be one of its major episodes.

Thus, the globalization and the accelerating development of the developing countries have led to the sense of the necessity of deep changes in the world. We have denoted this period of major changes as Epoch of New Coalitions, and we suggest that in process of those changes we will observe the emergence of contours of a new world order (see Grinin and Korotayev 2011, 2012b, 2014a, b, 2015b). In certain respect, the forthcoming epoch might remind changes that took place after the Second World War. However, there will be a very important difference. In the first case, a dominant World System leader emerged—the USA—whereas in the forthcoming future, the emergence of such a leader is highly unlikely. That is why the role of new coalitions will be especially high. A somehow similar phenomenon was observed after the Second World War with the emergence of various blocks in accordance with the proximity to Communism or anti-Communism, to the USA or the USSR and some other blocks connected with regional or other policies. However, in the forthcoming future, the vector of global development is likely to be directed toward the formation of effective global (inter-block, interstate) coordination centers.

12.4 Middle East and Global Reconfiguration

As we elsewhere mentioned, at present one can observe the weakening of the economic role of the USA as the World System hegemon (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2014a, b, 2015a; Grinin et al. 2015, 2017). However, the loss by the USA of the leader role will mean a profound and rather complicated critical transformation of the World

System itself, whereas even its nearest consequences are quite unclear. The situation in the Middle East could serve here as a rather good illustration. Many people are likely to experience (together with well-known American diplomat Richard Haas) nostalgia with respect to those days, when the USA (together with the Saudi kings) supported the Arab status quo (Kaminski 2011). That is why it is so necessary to analyze the whole range of consequences (that stem from this process) for the world in general and specific countries in particular.

In course of its development, the globalization contributes to the perception of suprasocietal entities (rather than particular states) as the most important units. That is why analysts (and, especially, economists) more and more prefer to deal with regional units (Southeast Asia, the Asian-Pacific Region, Europe, and so on). The constituent countries of respective regions and blocks may be very different; yet, such a perception may be rather useful and effective. The Arab Spring, while demonstrating different situations in different countries (e.g., Tausch 2011; Gardner 2011; Anderson 2011; Goldstone 2011; Malkov et al. 2013; Beissinger et al. 2015; Korotayev et al. 2013, 2016; Grinin et al. 2016a), still showed that the contemporary world started to change rather radically under the influence of global processes. That is why there are certain grounds to suppose that especially strong changes will take place in peripheral countries.

This is connected with two directly opposite developmental vectors that, nevertheless, can be regarded as components of a basically single process: (1) the weakening of the former World System core (the USA and the West) and (2) the simultaneous strengthening of positions of a number of peripheral countries (and the general growth of the role of developing countries in the world economy and politics)—taken together these processes constitute a single process that we have denoted as “the Great Convergence” (Grinin and Korotayev 2014b, 2015a; Korotayev et al. 2011a, b, c, d, 2012, 2015, 2016a; Korotayev and Zinkina 2014c; Grinin et al. 2015). As a result, the process of “reconfiguration” of World System is strengthened. In different countries, regions, and situations, the reconfiguration process may manifest itself in rather different (and often unpredictable) ways. If we project this on the Middle East, we cannot exclude that (as a result of the weakening of the USA and the West in general) one may expect the emergence of a spectrum of influences [including ones of China, India, and so on (e.g., Jha 2011)]. Hence, this region may generate various changes (including certain global norms and principles). Yet, at present we see a certain polarization of forces that will be discussed below.

The Arab Spring has demonstrated the ambiguous position of the USA (and the West in general) in the Middle East. This is largely connected with the point that under the influence of the crisis, the Western powers are more concerned with their internal problems. On the one hand, the West is not ready to abandon its leading role. This is especially salient as regards Libya and Syria. It is quite clear that from the point of view of the USA, it would have been rather stupid to miss this chance to get rid of old enemies under a nice pretext. On the other hand, the USA and Europe have virtually betrayed their allies in whom they heavily invested.

The true reasons of such a position will only become fully clear much later; however, it appears that the Western countries became hostages of their own belief in

democracy in conditions when revolutionaries started their revolts just under the banner of democracy; thus, the West failed to support its non-democratic but quite loyal allies. That is why the comparison made in April 2011 by a Financial Times observer looks rather convincing, notwithstanding some exaggerations that it contains:

For the western world, the ‘Arab spring’ threatens to be a classic case of good news and bad news. The good news is that this is the Arab 1989. The bad news is that we are the Soviet Union. Earlier this year, the Obama administration made it clear to Mr Mubarak that the US would not accept the violent suppression of the Egyptian uprising; just as in 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, told the East German leadership that he would not support the murder of peaceful demonstrators in Leipzig. In both cases—Egypt and East Germany—the withdrawal of superpower support helped to tip the regimes over the edge, and to spread turmoil across a whole region. Like the USSR in 1989, the US chose the honorable option in refusing to let its regional ally stay in power through force. But, like the Russians, the US now has to worry that it will sacrifice power in a traditional sphere of influence. (Rachman 2011)

Comparison with 1989 is not coincidental at all. It clearly indicates that the weakening of the West (that began soon after its might had reached its apogee when Communism had disappeared, as a result the West had lost such an enemy whose presence could justify any political actions) has reached a critical point. The world has started developing in a much less governable way than before. This implies that reconfiguration has begun.

In addition to evident parallels with 1989, the current situation appears to be comparable with the situation after the Second World War. At that time, a role of the alternative to the Western way of development was played by the Communist Block led by the USSR, whereas now we observe a fast growth of wealth and might of China and India (as well as a number of regional powers).

As regards the Middle East one has an impression that, firstly, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict loses its primary importance, and, secondly, that we observe the deepening of the split in the Islamic Middle East. Since quite a long time, one could see here a certain antagonism between Shiite Iran (that supports Shiite movements in Lebanon, Iraq, and some other countries of the region) and the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf led by Saudi Arabia. However, in connection with the Arab Spring events—protests in Bahrain (where Iran once again tried to play “a Shiite card”), the intervention of the Saudi and UAE forces, civil war between rebels (backed to a considerable extent by the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf) and the regime (incidentally, the principle ally of Iran in the region) in Syria, Saudi led intervention in Yemen against the Houthis who are supported by Iran (Terrill 2014; Juneau 2016; Barzegar and Dinan 2016) and so on—this antagonism appears to have significantly aggravated. In the meantime, the Iranian leaders do not hide their ambitions to make Iran a regional leader, whereas the Saudi King already in 2011 called to attack Iran in order to “cut the snake’s head” (Yaron 2011; for more detail see Chap. 5 above; see also Grinin et al. 2016a). Parties in such a confrontation need allies whom they try to find in all the possible directions. This confrontation—“the USA and its allies, on the one hand, Iran and its allies, on the other—finds its reflection in every local conflict. In Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, or Palestine, any forces are classified according to

the scale whose poles are formed by Washington and Teheran” (Yaron 2011; Grinin et al. 2016a; see also Jha 2011). Note, however, that in 2013, Saudi Arabia confronted the USA (that supported the Morsi government) in Egypt and managed to defeat the USA on the Egyptian soil (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2016a; Arafat 2018). This confirms our above-described thesis on the start of the Epoch of New Coalitions (Grinin 2010, 2012a; Grinin and Korotayev 2010a, b, 2011). For example, in 2011, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf started the discussion of the possibility to include Jordan and Morocco into this originally regional organization, which would transform it into a sort of “protective” club of Arab monarchies (see, e.g., Khalaf 2011). On the other hand, after 2012, one could observe an increasing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In its turn, one could see the formation of a rather effective alliance between Qatar and Turkey—note that both of these states strongly support the Muslim Brothers throughout the Arab World, whereas Saudi Arabia and its allies vigorously fight them (Salloukh 2013; Başkan 2016; Phillips 2017). It is also remarkable that the Saudi assault on Qatar launched in summer 2017 led to the improvement of relations between Qatar and Iran (Aras Akpinar 2017).

In general, nowadays one can speak about the following aspirants to regional hegemony:

- (1) Saudi Arabia that heads a rather large coalition that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE [though the Emirates quite explicitly compete with the Saudis in Yemen (Huliaras and Kalantzakos 2017)], Egypt (financially dependent on Saudi Arabia), and some other states financially dependent on the Saudis.
- (2) Iran that has a considerable influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the northern part of Yemen, and that can insert a considerable pressure on Saudi Arabia and Bahrain through the Shiite populations in these two countries.
- (3) The Turkey–Qatari alliance that can also rely on the Muslim Brotherhood network in the Arab World.

The geopolitical result of this split in the Islamic World is not clear yet; however, the latest events around Iran appear to have confirmed in a rather salient way its significance for the world’s destiny. It is quite possible that this split will for some (probably quite long) time determine the main “intrigues” of the Middle Eastern political evolution.

The growing contradictions within the Islamic world virtually bury the still popular idea of Huntington (1993, 1996)—that the clash of civilizations will determine in the foreseeable future the main vector of the world development. Civilizational affiliations remain important, but this importance is declining, whereas the importance of some other factors is growing.

We would like to finish this part of our concluding chapter with a point that is rather similar to the one with which we started this conclusion. The Middle East and North Africa have always been in focus of the world opinion’s attention. The Arab Spring and its still unpredictable geopolitical result have made this region even more important.

We would like to maintain once more that the Islamic world (with a very few exceptions) remained in many respects the most conservative country cluster (see

Part II of this monograph for more detail). The Arab Spring is most likely to accelerate its modernization as well as the general pace of the global change. It does not appear to be a coincidence that even in 2011, the adherents of Islam started to maintain that the Arab revolutions pushed millions of people not only to topple regimes, but also to revise many centuries-old ideas (Muhammed 2011). And all these suggest that not only the Near East but the world as a whole has started to develop in a new way (see Akaev et al. 2017 for more detail).

We would like to end this concluding chapter with some forecasts.

12.5 Reconfiguration Crises

The move to a new state requires wisdom and compromise from all, especially the USA. However, wisdom has always been a scarce quality among political elites. And during the reign of President Trump, it became especially obvious how much it is scarce in the USA. However, there are also deeper reasons. The radical change in the balance of economic forces in the world, which we spoke about above, creates objective conditions for a revision of the world order. However, it does not automatically lead to an automatic change in the military–political balance. To this end, as already mentioned, the political component of world development (political globalization) must be brought to an economic one, which implies the reconfiguration of the World System. The main vectors of this reconfiguration are the weakening of the former center of the World System (the USA and the West), the simultaneous strengthening of the positions of a number of peripheral countries and, in general, the increasing role of developing countries. As already mentioned, such a pull-up happens by jerks and means more or less acute political and geopolitical crises in these or those regions. Again, we are considering crises and shocks in the Middle East and Ukraine precisely as reconfiguration crises that are also geopolitical, requiring a change in the world order. At the same time, the emergence of powerful and probably sudden crises in certain societies or regions is becoming more and more likely. Their suddenness may be akin to an earthquake. And, to continue geological comparisons, it is worth noting that just as tectonic shifts occur along the line of the most moving earth’s crust and on the boundary of tectonic plates, this kind of reconfiguration crises also arise in regions and societies that are least stable and lie at the junctions of geopolitical “plates.”

Therefore, it can be assumed that particularly significant changes will occur in peripheral countries, which, figuratively speaking, are at the junction of geopolitical “plates.” At the junctions are also the societies of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Western China (Tibet and Xiangjiang), West Africa (at the junction of Islamic and Tropical Africa), some regions of South America. These are rather unstable regions where some symptoms of the crisis are already manifesting or they are likely (but this does not mean that they will necessarily happen). At the same time, deep crises can arise in the center of the World System (both in the USA and Europe) and elsewhere, as the sociopolitical map of possible tectonic shifts today needs to be rethought today.

So, let us repeat, the need for the political component to catch up (which sooner or later inevitably must lead to the formation of a new world order) means that the world will be in a very turbulent epoch with characteristic crises for a significant time (one or two decades) and increased tensions (Grinin 2009a, 2013, 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2012a, 2014a, 2015a). In addition, the said catch-up assumes that the economic growth of the world during this period will be relatively weak. And this additionally can both increase tensions, on the one hand, and persuade countries to cooperate, on the other.

12.6 On the Principles of the New World Order

The new world order will not be formed soon, and it will require a fairly stable balance of power and interests, new models of supranational governance and coordination of world processes, new principles that could help to reduce confrontation and stimulate cooperation. Let us formulate their short list (see Grinin 2016a, b, c; Grinin et al. 2017 for more detail).

(1) The pluralism of political regimes can include the following points: (a) legitimacy of all regimes; (b) the idea that any regime (including democratic) has its pros and cons; (c) values of pluralism of regimes (like pluralism of religions). (2) Refusal from forcible imposition of institutions (including the planting of democracy). (3) Recognition of the value of stability, order, legitimacy, and the refusal to inspire internal revolutions. This means that: (a) the social order, security guarantee, and economic growth, even under authoritarian conditions, are recognized as more important than formal democratic rights; (b) support for anti-government movements that threaten anarchy and the overthrow of the government (especially incitement to overthrow the regime) can only be carried out in exceptional cases, legitimized by generally recognized international institutions. (4) Severe restriction and regulation of the use of sanctions. The imposition of sanctions must be strictly limited and placed in a strict procedural channel (causes, cases, evidence, negotiations, precedents, etc.). (5) The ban on the use of global economic, financial, rating information, and other instruments as tools of the national foreign policy. (6) Guarantees of state borders, restrictions on all sorts of separatist movements, under whatever slogans they may be held. This would significantly reduce international tensions. (7) Refusal to impose new ethical and legal standards (especially in the field of sexual and family relations) and discrimination under this pretext.

Obviously, recognition of principles alone does not guarantee their fulfillment, but it is important to get out of today's practice when the ideals of democracy, fighting corruption, or human rights are used as rams in the geopolitical struggle.

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